tour of the Indo–Pacific region this week by President Trump during the ASEAN Summit resulted in multiple deals on trade, many of which have been well–covered in the media. Far less attention has been paid to a series of deals that, through an integration of tariffs in the frameworks, could finally address complex and troubling forced labor issues in the region.
The text of new trade deals with the countries of Malaysia and Cambodia, and the new trade framework agreements with Vietnam and Thailand provide innovative, new action. Previous trade deals like the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans–Specific Partnership (CPTPP) addressed labor issues through reliance on unenforceable, aspirational multilateralism while others like the Generalized System of Preferences (GSP) and Uyghur Forced Labor Protection Act (UFLPA) relied on unilateral pressure. These trade deals move instead toward bilateral, enforceable reciprocity, potentially reshaping $200 billion or more in trade flows.
There has been innovation in labor provisions before, most notably the United States–Mexico–Canada Agreement (USMCA) rapid response mechanism, a facility specific labor enforcement tool in the U.S./Mexico trade agreement. But while the core commitments of the new trade agreements echo USMCA standards, including ILO–aligned bans on forced labor and freedom of association protections, the new trade agreements utilize tariff reciprocity as an enforcement hook, which could potentially be much vaster and more potent than USMCA’s facility–specific rapid response mechanism. The verdict will be out until more specific details of joint enforcement mechanisms of these new trade deals are released, but the language put forward in these new deals cuts to the core of addressing goods made with forced labor from China, which may give forced labor advocates cause for optimism.
The new U.S.–Malaysia Reciprocal Trade agreement illustrates this powerful new blueprint in the global fight against forced labor. In particular, it should help curb the insidious transshipment of Xinjiang sourced goods that get relabeled in Malaysia, allowing goods tainted by forced labor to evade the safeguards of the UFPLA. Unlike traditional trade deals that have relied on self–reported compliance, the deal between Malaysia and the U.S. innovates by embedding a robust, bilateral duty evasion cooperation framework, including mandatory joint audits of supply chains and real-time data sharing between U.S. Customs and Border Patrol and Malaysian authorities. The purpose of this framework is to trace and block rerouted high–priority sector goods like textiles, cotton, and electronics tainted by state–sponsored forced labor exploitation from Xinjiang.
Recently, many stakeholders have been critical of the Trump Administration’s commitment to end forced labor, mainly due to the reduction of personnel in key offices in the U.S. government that have traditionally provided the staffing to address the issue. However, this week’s action could be seen as President Trump “cutting the head off of the snake” of forced labor by the enhanced weaponization of a trade agreement to enforce human rights in the region where it occurs, with linked incentives for China’s neighbors for contributing to the fight.
By tying these enforceable mechanisms to tariff exemptions of the vast majority of U.S. exports and including preferential access for critical minerals, the U.S./Malaysia agreement not only attempts to weaponize market incentives to enforce human rights standards, but also sets a replicable model for “friendshoring,” potentially shielding American consumers from $500 million in annually blocked imports, while empowering southeast Asian partners to police their ports as frontline defenders against global labor abuses.
These new trade deals, like U.S./Malaysia, seem to represent a cornerstone of President Trump’s Indo–Pacific strategy: countering China’s economic influence by forging bilateral pacts with China’s neighbors and explicitly tying trade access to commitments on labor standards and supply chain transparency. As a result, the fight against forced labor will get real–time, financially incentivized, technology–enforced trade rules in these U.S. trade agreements. This action represents the first attempt at dynamic forced labor enforcement within the tariff architecture itself, a shift that no other U.S. trade agreement has attempted. Time and analysis will tell if these new trade features get to the root of eradicating forced labor, but this new action builds on USMCA’s Rapid Response Mechanism and UFPLA. But, thanks to this novel approach on tariffs, Malaysia, Cambodia, Thailand and Vietnam have all taken steps forward this week flipping the script on forced labor and joining the U.S. with unchartered enforcement innovation.
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New trade deals offer real hope on combatting forced labor
Photo by Matthew Yong on Unsplash
November 3, 2025
A new approach to trade deals the U.S. has taken with some Southeast Asian countries more toward bilateral, enforceable reciprocity on labor issues. This could finally offer real hope with efforts to combat forced labor in the region, writes Martha Newton.
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tour of the Indo–Pacific region this week by President Trump during the ASEAN Summit resulted in multiple deals on trade, many of which have been well–covered in the media. Far less attention has been paid to a series of deals that, through an integration of tariffs in the frameworks, could finally address complex and troubling forced labor issues in the region.
The text of new trade deals with the countries of Malaysia and Cambodia, and the new trade framework agreements with Vietnam and Thailand provide innovative, new action. Previous trade deals like the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans–Specific Partnership (CPTPP) addressed labor issues through reliance on unenforceable, aspirational multilateralism while others like the Generalized System of Preferences (GSP) and Uyghur Forced Labor Protection Act (UFLPA) relied on unilateral pressure. These trade deals move instead toward bilateral, enforceable reciprocity, potentially reshaping $200 billion or more in trade flows.
There has been innovation in labor provisions before, most notably the United States–Mexico–Canada Agreement (USMCA) rapid response mechanism, a facility specific labor enforcement tool in the U.S./Mexico trade agreement. But while the core commitments of the new trade agreements echo USMCA standards, including ILO–aligned bans on forced labor and freedom of association protections, the new trade agreements utilize tariff reciprocity as an enforcement hook, which could potentially be much vaster and more potent than USMCA’s facility–specific rapid response mechanism. The verdict will be out until more specific details of joint enforcement mechanisms of these new trade deals are released, but the language put forward in these new deals cuts to the core of addressing goods made with forced labor from China, which may give forced labor advocates cause for optimism.
The new U.S.–Malaysia Reciprocal Trade agreement illustrates this powerful new blueprint in the global fight against forced labor. In particular, it should help curb the insidious transshipment of Xinjiang sourced goods that get relabeled in Malaysia, allowing goods tainted by forced labor to evade the safeguards of the UFPLA. Unlike traditional trade deals that have relied on self–reported compliance, the deal between Malaysia and the U.S. innovates by embedding a robust, bilateral duty evasion cooperation framework, including mandatory joint audits of supply chains and real-time data sharing between U.S. Customs and Border Patrol and Malaysian authorities. The purpose of this framework is to trace and block rerouted high–priority sector goods like textiles, cotton, and electronics tainted by state–sponsored forced labor exploitation from Xinjiang.
Recently, many stakeholders have been critical of the Trump Administration’s commitment to end forced labor, mainly due to the reduction of personnel in key offices in the U.S. government that have traditionally provided the staffing to address the issue. However, this week’s action could be seen as President Trump “cutting the head off of the snake” of forced labor by the enhanced weaponization of a trade agreement to enforce human rights in the region where it occurs, with linked incentives for China’s neighbors for contributing to the fight.
By tying these enforceable mechanisms to tariff exemptions of the vast majority of U.S. exports and including preferential access for critical minerals, the U.S./Malaysia agreement not only attempts to weaponize market incentives to enforce human rights standards, but also sets a replicable model for “friendshoring,” potentially shielding American consumers from $500 million in annually blocked imports, while empowering southeast Asian partners to police their ports as frontline defenders against global labor abuses.
These new trade deals, like U.S./Malaysia, seem to represent a cornerstone of President Trump’s Indo–Pacific strategy: countering China’s economic influence by forging bilateral pacts with China’s neighbors and explicitly tying trade access to commitments on labor standards and supply chain transparency. As a result, the fight against forced labor will get real–time, financially incentivized, technology–enforced trade rules in these U.S. trade agreements. This action represents the first attempt at dynamic forced labor enforcement within the tariff architecture itself, a shift that no other U.S. trade agreement has attempted. Time and analysis will tell if these new trade features get to the root of eradicating forced labor, but this new action builds on USMCA’s Rapid Response Mechanism and UFPLA. But, thanks to this novel approach on tariffs, Malaysia, Cambodia, Thailand and Vietnam have all taken steps forward this week flipping the script on forced labor and joining the U.S. with unchartered enforcement innovation.
