ou may have heard by now; Ukraine appears to have secured a bridgehead on the east side of the Dipro River near Kherson. Media reports speculate that this means Ukraine’s much anticipated spring offensive is imminent, and it probably is. Yet there remains a lot of confusion about what that might look like and when it might happen—and what sort of chances Ukraine has at success.
Below is an attempt at gathering together some of the “best guesses” being made in the public domain by experts while explaining some concepts that fall into the realm of military experts.
What Does the Bridgehead Mean?
A bridgehead is a military concept referring to the temporary, successful capture of a bit of real estate in enemy occupied territory on the other side of a body of water or similar obstacle, which is intended to serve as a safe gathering point for allied forces in anticipation of a wider attack.
Importantly, bridgeheads are temporary. Opposition forces know what a bridgehead means and will typically seek to mobilize forces to respond and collapse the bridgehead. This suggests that if this is indeed a bridgehead, Ukraine will likely seek to exploit it in a matter of days. Kherson regional administration Deputy Head Yuriy Sobolevskiy said Ukraine has been carrying out successful raids on the east side of Dnipro and would not comment on any potential offensive, so what appears to be a bridgehead could instead conceivably be more aggressive raiding or a feint. But some analysts expect the counteroffensive to begin imminently. However, it is important to recognize that no Western intelligence agencies have yet verified that a bridgehead even exists at this point.
Can Ukraine Sustain a Successful Counteroffensive?
The answer to this remains unclear, but we do understand some of the challenges facing Ukraine militarily. Two of the main challenges are shared by their Russian adversaries: concerns over munitions shortages and the level of training for newer recruits. Ukraine also has to juggle training of its forces on new weapon systems (such as different models of tanks from the British, German, and U.S.) with immediate operational needs. Finally, Ukraine’s pipeline of willing, able new recruits may be drying up (another problem shared by Russia).
Lastly there is the challenge of Russia’s air dominance, which complicates the provision of Ukrainian tactical air support, and air cover for ground troops and supply lines. Western reluctance to supply modern military aircraft is well-documented (and despite public pleas by Ukraine for these platforms, there are reasons to believe modern fighters won’t change the tactical equation as much as many believe). Poland and Slovakia have supplied some additional MiG-29 aircraft in recent weeks, but the exact numbers are unknown and there are reports that these arrived unfit for combat. Worse for Ukraine here is that its air defense stockpiles are running low, which appears to be the intention or recent upticks in Russian drone strikes.
These are all fundamentally logistics challenges, but those are the most important challenges. There is an old but revered military axiom: “Amateurs talk about strategy; professionals talk about logistics,” and it has held true time and again. Strategic geniuses need to overcome their logistics challenges before their genius can be expressed.
Ukraine’s ability to achieve sustained success in a counteroffensive depends on how well it has accounted for these logistical challenges in comparison to Russia. It also depends a lot on what Ukraine deems success to mean—and what its Western allies deem success to mean.
Much to Gain, Much to Lose
One of the key goals of Ukraine’s counteroffensive is expected by analysts to be cutting off land access to Crimea. Any counter offensive launched from the Dnipro River bridgehead would be well placed for that objective. There is some concern that Ukrainian officials may be targeting Crimea itself, which would be a far more difficult task—especially considering at least one U.S. intelligence assessment is not confident Ukraine can successfully cut off land access to Crimea in the first place.
Any success on the Crimea question—be it cutting off land access or threatening gains on the Crimean Peninsula itself—would be a major (and for Ukraine, positive) shift in the strategic situation. It would also potentially impact Russia’s plans for renewed offensive operations of its own, a concept that is already contested among Russian leadership and military officials, according to the Institute for the Study of War.
Perhaps more important is what the perception of success, or of failure, could mean.
With battle lines relatively stable for some time, enthusiasm for supporting Ukraine has eroded in some corners of the West. There is also some evidence that this erosion of support is linked to specifically targeted Russian disinformation. If Ukraine fails to deliver on its counteroffensive—or even if there is a perception things didn’t go as well as they should—it could make continued Western military support for Ukraine more politically difficult. Perceptions of success or failure will matter for Ukraine at home as well, with perceptions of failure likely making it even more difficult for military recruitment while success should have the opposite effect. Similarly, if the West perceives Ukraine’s counteroffensive as successful, it could shore up support and help expedite deals for new weapon platforms and munitions. Conversely, one could imagine how a flagging counterattack might convince Ukraine’s allies in the West that they need to do more to sustain Ukraine’s military.
Whether recent news of a bridgehead and Ukraine troop movement means the counteroffensive launches in the coming days is more than we can say. The so-called “bridgehead” could be a feint to test how Russia responds. This may not be any bridgehead at all—claims made Tuesday by the Ukrainian government that a bridgehead had in fact been established have not been independently verified—and Ukraine could still be focused on solving its logistics dilemmas before launching. The real counteroffensive could happen elsewhere and soon.
Despite the excitement among military analysts and pundits about this bridgehead and what it means, we simply don’t know. However, a counteroffensive almost has to come, sooner rather than later—and seeking to cut off Crimea’s land access as most analysts expect does make sense. Whenever the counteroffensive comes and whatever it looks like, though, the logistics questions and what’s at stake will likely remain substantively the same.
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Whither Ukraine’s Spring Offensive? Here’s What We Know.
Ukraine's Dnipro River and the city of Kherson, photo taken in summer 2020. Photo by Diana Vyshniakova on Unsplash.
April 26, 2023
Ukraine claims to have secured a bridgehead on the eastern side of the Dnipro River, and media reports are abuzz with the possibility of an imminent Ukrainian counteroffensive. Diplomatic Courier and W2050's Shane Szarkowski breaks down what we do-and don't-know about what to expect next.
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ou may have heard by now; Ukraine appears to have secured a bridgehead on the east side of the Dipro River near Kherson. Media reports speculate that this means Ukraine’s much anticipated spring offensive is imminent, and it probably is. Yet there remains a lot of confusion about what that might look like and when it might happen—and what sort of chances Ukraine has at success.
Below is an attempt at gathering together some of the “best guesses” being made in the public domain by experts while explaining some concepts that fall into the realm of military experts.
What Does the Bridgehead Mean?
A bridgehead is a military concept referring to the temporary, successful capture of a bit of real estate in enemy occupied territory on the other side of a body of water or similar obstacle, which is intended to serve as a safe gathering point for allied forces in anticipation of a wider attack.
Importantly, bridgeheads are temporary. Opposition forces know what a bridgehead means and will typically seek to mobilize forces to respond and collapse the bridgehead. This suggests that if this is indeed a bridgehead, Ukraine will likely seek to exploit it in a matter of days. Kherson regional administration Deputy Head Yuriy Sobolevskiy said Ukraine has been carrying out successful raids on the east side of Dnipro and would not comment on any potential offensive, so what appears to be a bridgehead could instead conceivably be more aggressive raiding or a feint. But some analysts expect the counteroffensive to begin imminently. However, it is important to recognize that no Western intelligence agencies have yet verified that a bridgehead even exists at this point.
Can Ukraine Sustain a Successful Counteroffensive?
The answer to this remains unclear, but we do understand some of the challenges facing Ukraine militarily. Two of the main challenges are shared by their Russian adversaries: concerns over munitions shortages and the level of training for newer recruits. Ukraine also has to juggle training of its forces on new weapon systems (such as different models of tanks from the British, German, and U.S.) with immediate operational needs. Finally, Ukraine’s pipeline of willing, able new recruits may be drying up (another problem shared by Russia).
Lastly there is the challenge of Russia’s air dominance, which complicates the provision of Ukrainian tactical air support, and air cover for ground troops and supply lines. Western reluctance to supply modern military aircraft is well-documented (and despite public pleas by Ukraine for these platforms, there are reasons to believe modern fighters won’t change the tactical equation as much as many believe). Poland and Slovakia have supplied some additional MiG-29 aircraft in recent weeks, but the exact numbers are unknown and there are reports that these arrived unfit for combat. Worse for Ukraine here is that its air defense stockpiles are running low, which appears to be the intention or recent upticks in Russian drone strikes.
These are all fundamentally logistics challenges, but those are the most important challenges. There is an old but revered military axiom: “Amateurs talk about strategy; professionals talk about logistics,” and it has held true time and again. Strategic geniuses need to overcome their logistics challenges before their genius can be expressed.
Ukraine’s ability to achieve sustained success in a counteroffensive depends on how well it has accounted for these logistical challenges in comparison to Russia. It also depends a lot on what Ukraine deems success to mean—and what its Western allies deem success to mean.
Much to Gain, Much to Lose
One of the key goals of Ukraine’s counteroffensive is expected by analysts to be cutting off land access to Crimea. Any counter offensive launched from the Dnipro River bridgehead would be well placed for that objective. There is some concern that Ukrainian officials may be targeting Crimea itself, which would be a far more difficult task—especially considering at least one U.S. intelligence assessment is not confident Ukraine can successfully cut off land access to Crimea in the first place.
Any success on the Crimea question—be it cutting off land access or threatening gains on the Crimean Peninsula itself—would be a major (and for Ukraine, positive) shift in the strategic situation. It would also potentially impact Russia’s plans for renewed offensive operations of its own, a concept that is already contested among Russian leadership and military officials, according to the Institute for the Study of War.
Perhaps more important is what the perception of success, or of failure, could mean.
With battle lines relatively stable for some time, enthusiasm for supporting Ukraine has eroded in some corners of the West. There is also some evidence that this erosion of support is linked to specifically targeted Russian disinformation. If Ukraine fails to deliver on its counteroffensive—or even if there is a perception things didn’t go as well as they should—it could make continued Western military support for Ukraine more politically difficult. Perceptions of success or failure will matter for Ukraine at home as well, with perceptions of failure likely making it even more difficult for military recruitment while success should have the opposite effect. Similarly, if the West perceives Ukraine’s counteroffensive as successful, it could shore up support and help expedite deals for new weapon platforms and munitions. Conversely, one could imagine how a flagging counterattack might convince Ukraine’s allies in the West that they need to do more to sustain Ukraine’s military.
Whether recent news of a bridgehead and Ukraine troop movement means the counteroffensive launches in the coming days is more than we can say. The so-called “bridgehead” could be a feint to test how Russia responds. This may not be any bridgehead at all—claims made Tuesday by the Ukrainian government that a bridgehead had in fact been established have not been independently verified—and Ukraine could still be focused on solving its logistics dilemmas before launching. The real counteroffensive could happen elsewhere and soon.
Despite the excitement among military analysts and pundits about this bridgehead and what it means, we simply don’t know. However, a counteroffensive almost has to come, sooner rather than later—and seeking to cut off Crimea’s land access as most analysts expect does make sense. Whenever the counteroffensive comes and whatever it looks like, though, the logistics questions and what’s at stake will likely remain substantively the same.
