new era of strategic rivalry between the United States and China is reshaping the global order. Asia is widely regarded as the central arena of this confrontation. Deeper engagement in Asia has gone hand in hand with questions over the depth of America’s security commitment to Europe. Yet, this refocusing of American strategic priorities risks obscuring critical lessons from history. During the Cold War, the secondary theater proved far more violent than the primary.
Despite being the epicenter of Cold War tensions, Europe remained largely peaceful. The continent was divided by the Iron Curtain, heavily militarized, and bristling with nuclear weapons—but it avoided direct conflict. In contrast, Asia bore the brunt of proxy wars: Korea, Vietnam, Cambodia. On these fault lines, violence flared, fueled by superpower rivalry but ignited by local opportunism.
This pattern should give us pause. If Europe is the secondary theater in a new Cold War—centered on a Sino–American rivalry—we cannot assume it will remain stable. On the contrary, history suggests that secondary theaters are more volatile. They are less tightly managed, more prone to miscalculation, and more susceptible to regional powers seeking to exploit superpower competition.
The Logic of Secondary Theater Escalation
In alliance politics, secondary partners—those not at the center of strategic decision making—often act more anxiously than their patrons. Through “chain–ganging,” allies drag their patrons into conflicts that do not relate to the patron’s primary concerns. Kim Il–Sung in Korea and Ho Chi Minh in Vietnam both escalated tensions while pressuring Moscow and Beijing for support. Local actors had their own agendas, and their actions often exceeded what their senior partners preferred.
From the Baltic to the Balkans, from Ukraine to the Caucasus, today’s Europe is rife with unresolved tensions. Russia’s war in Ukraine demonstrates the cost and escalatory potential of regional conflicts. This war has already reshaped European security by incentivizing European states to dramatically boost their defence expenditure and to treat China with growing apprehension because of its high tolerance of Russian adventurism.
For the U.S., the stakes are high. Treating Europe as a strategic afterthought risks repeating past mistakes. Secondary theaters are not quiet backwaters; they are pressure points where global rivalries meet local ambitions. In the new Cold War, Europe may be the second front, but it is unlikely to be the more peaceful one.
Europe’s Strategic Importance
A stable Europe is not a strategic luxury for the U.S., it is critical to American security in ways that may actually grow in the new Cold War. Home to robust economies, important technologies, and America’s closest allies, the continent anchors the transatlantic alliance. Undermining NATO’s credibility by eroding European security would be a grave error.
Moreover, China is not absent from Europe. Through its Belt and Road Initiative, investments in critical infrastructure, and influence operations, Beijing has steadily expanded its footprint. European ports, telecommunications networks, and energy grids are partially tied to Chinese capital and technology. These entanglements create exploitable vulnerabilities.
Russia remains a potent threat. Its military, though battered, retains significant capabilities. Its hybrid warfare tactics—cyberattacks, disinformation, drone incursions—continue to destabilize European democracies. A weakened or distracted U.S. presence in Europe could embolden Moscow to test NATO’s resolve, particularly in the Baltics or the Black Sea. Such circumstances could push Russia and its proxies into more aggressive actions. This could even produce a full blown nuclear crisis because of Russia’s belief that it holds the upper hand in terms of nuclear forces whilst the U.S. commitment appears to be wavering.
Learning from the Past
The Cold War’s Asian conflicts were not inevitable. They were the result of strategic miscalculations, alliance entanglements, and underestimation of local dynamics. The U.S. focused on containing communism globally, often failing to appreciate the unique political and cultural contexts of its Asian allies. The result was decades of war, immense human suffering, and significant strategic setbacks.
Europe’s stability during the Cold War was not accidental. It was the product of sustained U.S. commitment, robust deterrence, and clear signaling. American troop positioning in Germany, nuclear guarantees, economic integration, and diplomatic engagement all contributed to a balance of power that discouraged aggression by the Soviet Union. In the new Cold War, the U.S. must apply these lessons, reaffirm its security commitments, invest in deterrence, and engage diplomatically with allies and adversaries alike.
If we accept the premise of a new Cold War, we must also accept its implications. Strategic competition is not confined to one region. It is a global phenomenon, shaped by local actors, historical legacies, and shifting alliances. A global strategy requires global attention and matching ambitions with resources.
The U.S. must resist the temptation to view Europe through the lens of post–Cold War stability. The continent is changing; war has returned. As Russia’s ongoing aggression shows, Europe, as a secondary theater, is more vulnerable. Alliances are being tested. New powers are emerging. In this environment, complacency is dangerous.
A robust U.S. presence in Europe—military, economic, and diplomatic—is essential. It deters adversaries, reassures allies, and preserves the balance of power. It ensures that the mistakes of the past are not repeated.
The new Cold War may pivot around Asia, but its outcome will be shaped elsewhere. Europe is not a sideshow, but a crucible where global ambitions collide with local grievances. If history is any guide, this is where peace must be preserved, not presumed.
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The future of security in Europe as a “secondary theater”
Photo by Nitin Verma on Unsplash
November 26, 2025
Strategic rivalry between the U.S. and China is evolving and reshaping the global order. As the U.S. refocuses its strategic priorities, it must not make the mistake of assuming Europe will escape volatility as a “secondary theater,” write Andrew Novo and Alexander Mattelaer.
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new era of strategic rivalry between the United States and China is reshaping the global order. Asia is widely regarded as the central arena of this confrontation. Deeper engagement in Asia has gone hand in hand with questions over the depth of America’s security commitment to Europe. Yet, this refocusing of American strategic priorities risks obscuring critical lessons from history. During the Cold War, the secondary theater proved far more violent than the primary.
Despite being the epicenter of Cold War tensions, Europe remained largely peaceful. The continent was divided by the Iron Curtain, heavily militarized, and bristling with nuclear weapons—but it avoided direct conflict. In contrast, Asia bore the brunt of proxy wars: Korea, Vietnam, Cambodia. On these fault lines, violence flared, fueled by superpower rivalry but ignited by local opportunism.
This pattern should give us pause. If Europe is the secondary theater in a new Cold War—centered on a Sino–American rivalry—we cannot assume it will remain stable. On the contrary, history suggests that secondary theaters are more volatile. They are less tightly managed, more prone to miscalculation, and more susceptible to regional powers seeking to exploit superpower competition.
The Logic of Secondary Theater Escalation
In alliance politics, secondary partners—those not at the center of strategic decision making—often act more anxiously than their patrons. Through “chain–ganging,” allies drag their patrons into conflicts that do not relate to the patron’s primary concerns. Kim Il–Sung in Korea and Ho Chi Minh in Vietnam both escalated tensions while pressuring Moscow and Beijing for support. Local actors had their own agendas, and their actions often exceeded what their senior partners preferred.
From the Baltic to the Balkans, from Ukraine to the Caucasus, today’s Europe is rife with unresolved tensions. Russia’s war in Ukraine demonstrates the cost and escalatory potential of regional conflicts. This war has already reshaped European security by incentivizing European states to dramatically boost their defence expenditure and to treat China with growing apprehension because of its high tolerance of Russian adventurism.
For the U.S., the stakes are high. Treating Europe as a strategic afterthought risks repeating past mistakes. Secondary theaters are not quiet backwaters; they are pressure points where global rivalries meet local ambitions. In the new Cold War, Europe may be the second front, but it is unlikely to be the more peaceful one.
Europe’s Strategic Importance
A stable Europe is not a strategic luxury for the U.S., it is critical to American security in ways that may actually grow in the new Cold War. Home to robust economies, important technologies, and America’s closest allies, the continent anchors the transatlantic alliance. Undermining NATO’s credibility by eroding European security would be a grave error.
Moreover, China is not absent from Europe. Through its Belt and Road Initiative, investments in critical infrastructure, and influence operations, Beijing has steadily expanded its footprint. European ports, telecommunications networks, and energy grids are partially tied to Chinese capital and technology. These entanglements create exploitable vulnerabilities.
Russia remains a potent threat. Its military, though battered, retains significant capabilities. Its hybrid warfare tactics—cyberattacks, disinformation, drone incursions—continue to destabilize European democracies. A weakened or distracted U.S. presence in Europe could embolden Moscow to test NATO’s resolve, particularly in the Baltics or the Black Sea. Such circumstances could push Russia and its proxies into more aggressive actions. This could even produce a full blown nuclear crisis because of Russia’s belief that it holds the upper hand in terms of nuclear forces whilst the U.S. commitment appears to be wavering.
Learning from the Past
The Cold War’s Asian conflicts were not inevitable. They were the result of strategic miscalculations, alliance entanglements, and underestimation of local dynamics. The U.S. focused on containing communism globally, often failing to appreciate the unique political and cultural contexts of its Asian allies. The result was decades of war, immense human suffering, and significant strategic setbacks.
Europe’s stability during the Cold War was not accidental. It was the product of sustained U.S. commitment, robust deterrence, and clear signaling. American troop positioning in Germany, nuclear guarantees, economic integration, and diplomatic engagement all contributed to a balance of power that discouraged aggression by the Soviet Union. In the new Cold War, the U.S. must apply these lessons, reaffirm its security commitments, invest in deterrence, and engage diplomatically with allies and adversaries alike.
If we accept the premise of a new Cold War, we must also accept its implications. Strategic competition is not confined to one region. It is a global phenomenon, shaped by local actors, historical legacies, and shifting alliances. A global strategy requires global attention and matching ambitions with resources.
The U.S. must resist the temptation to view Europe through the lens of post–Cold War stability. The continent is changing; war has returned. As Russia’s ongoing aggression shows, Europe, as a secondary theater, is more vulnerable. Alliances are being tested. New powers are emerging. In this environment, complacency is dangerous.
A robust U.S. presence in Europe—military, economic, and diplomatic—is essential. It deters adversaries, reassures allies, and preserves the balance of power. It ensures that the mistakes of the past are not repeated.
The new Cold War may pivot around Asia, but its outcome will be shaped elsewhere. Europe is not a sideshow, but a crucible where global ambitions collide with local grievances. If history is any guide, this is where peace must be preserved, not presumed.
