ne can see the war in Ukraine as an attempt to reshape the world order and the global redistribution of power rather than as a mere binational conflict. However, in any shift of power distribution, science and technology have always been key issues— if not the most important ones. Throughout the last two decades, the influence of science and technology in international affairs and their decisive role in resolving international conflicts has been captured by the term ‘science diplomacy’— using science to address global challenges or to bring back on track diplomatic negotiations that are otherwise in a deadlock.
As both the United States and Britain have leaned into the idea that science diplomacy is a soft power, the European Union has invested millions into its Horizon 2020 programs to develop strategies that make hard military power less needed in their international affairs. However, as the war in Ukraine has shown, science diplomacy is anything but a soft power and science is not a universal language that strengthens cooperation and exchange. Instead, science diplomacy can be a formidable political and strategic tool that serves as an element of coercive hard power. In the case of the current war in Ukraine, science diplomacy, exercised through scientific sanctions, has proved to be a punitive strategy.
In her May 4, 2022 speech, the president of the European Commission, Ursula von der Leyen clearly stated that “the future of the European Union is also written in Ukraine.” One of the first ways in which the EU began to exert incremental pressure on Russia was the suspension of cooperation in research and innovation. This cut Russia off from scientific institutions, first and foremost of which was Horizon 2020. EU-Russian scientific ties were gradually severed, including those through academic organizations, research institutions, and the funding agencies of several EU member states— vital to the EU’s science diplomacy strategy. Scientific fields such as research on climate change and space science have been deeply affected as a result.
At the same time, the United Nations (UN) General Assembly approved a resolution demanding the end of the war in Ukraine on March 2. Although non-binding, the resolution justified the decisions of scientific organizations, both national and international, to freeze cooperation with Russia. Several attempts to exclude Russia from other UN organizations and related agencies followed. On May 10, European member states within the World Health Organization passed a resolution that, besides demanding that Russia respect international humanitarian law, could result in the closure of the country’s regional office.
Likewise, following Russia’s seizure of Chernobyl during the initial phase of the invasion, Poland addressed the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Board of Governance on March 2, condemning Russia in a joint statement with Canada. A day later, during an emergency meeting, the IAEA Board adopted a resolution on nuclear safety, security, and safeguards, calling for an immediate end to the war.
Other international organizations, such as the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), made their moves even earlier. Just one day after the beginning of the war, the OECD decided to close its office in Moscow. As a next step, OECD’s Nuclear Energy Agency (NEA) suspended the Russian membership, excluding Moscow from any decision making. In a May 11 email to NEA delegates and steering members, Daniela Lulache, NEA’s Head of Policy and Co-ordination, affirmed that “starting this day, representatives of the Russian Federation will not be entitled to attend the NEA official bodies’ meetings and may not receive any documents related to such meetings.” Yet, cutting Russia from major regulatory agencies reduces insights into their nuclear operations and polarizes the world— leading to a new Cold War where nuclear science and technology are once again a major battleground.
From a historical perspective, attempts to use international organizations to exert pressure on particular nations have been common. In order to replace some of the international scientific associations that existed before World War I, representatives from the leading scientific academies of the major Allied nations founded the International Research Council (IRC) in 1919. The new Council was deeply politicized and far less international than it claimed to be as it excluded the defeated Central Powers, including Germany. The IRC’s major concern was to assure that Germany could not regain its military power and its prominence in industry, science, and technology. German scientists were excluded from conferences and German was forbidden as an IRC language. Despite the IRC’s policy of exclusion, throughout the interwar period German scientists continued to thrive in fields such as radioactivity research, chemistry, and eugenics. After the end of the Second World War, scientific sanctions and the expulsion from international organizations were developed into a Cold War strong policy of isolation.
In the today’s globalized context, scientific sanctions create more problems than they solve. An anonymous survey of Russian academics—of whom only two supported the war in Ukraine—revealed that Russian scientists feel trapped and anticipate that scientific sanctions will be counterproductive in the long run. They will force Russians to shift research topics and reorient themselves towards India and China, to the detriment of both the United States and Europe. There will certainly be a weakening of collective approaches to problems that afflict and threaten our common humanity. Our recent experience with the pandemic was itself an object lesson in the value of global cooperation—and the disastrous effects of its absence.
The swift cut of all scientific ties with Russia through expulsions might seem like an immediate and appropriate response to a catastrophic war. However, the implications are profound. Scientific sanctions could impact not only economic and political relations, but also diplomatic ones— limiting the available options to cope with the variety of situations which are bound to occur, including nuclear issues. Thus, the complexities of the challenges the world faces in the 21st century demand the kind of science diplomacy that builds bridges for a global future instead of destroying them. And while governments and nation states might have their hands tied, individual academics and universities have the privilege of their academic freedom. The time is ripe for them to make a difference.
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Scientific Sanctions Do Not Work
Illustration via Pixabay.
May 31, 2022
Our current regimes for scientific sanctions are sadly outdated, having been designed for the Cold War era rather than contemporary global crises. With science and technology being global in the 21st century, we need a more sophisticated science diplomacy, writes science historian Maria Rentetzi.
O
ne can see the war in Ukraine as an attempt to reshape the world order and the global redistribution of power rather than as a mere binational conflict. However, in any shift of power distribution, science and technology have always been key issues— if not the most important ones. Throughout the last two decades, the influence of science and technology in international affairs and their decisive role in resolving international conflicts has been captured by the term ‘science diplomacy’— using science to address global challenges or to bring back on track diplomatic negotiations that are otherwise in a deadlock.
As both the United States and Britain have leaned into the idea that science diplomacy is a soft power, the European Union has invested millions into its Horizon 2020 programs to develop strategies that make hard military power less needed in their international affairs. However, as the war in Ukraine has shown, science diplomacy is anything but a soft power and science is not a universal language that strengthens cooperation and exchange. Instead, science diplomacy can be a formidable political and strategic tool that serves as an element of coercive hard power. In the case of the current war in Ukraine, science diplomacy, exercised through scientific sanctions, has proved to be a punitive strategy.
In her May 4, 2022 speech, the president of the European Commission, Ursula von der Leyen clearly stated that “the future of the European Union is also written in Ukraine.” One of the first ways in which the EU began to exert incremental pressure on Russia was the suspension of cooperation in research and innovation. This cut Russia off from scientific institutions, first and foremost of which was Horizon 2020. EU-Russian scientific ties were gradually severed, including those through academic organizations, research institutions, and the funding agencies of several EU member states— vital to the EU’s science diplomacy strategy. Scientific fields such as research on climate change and space science have been deeply affected as a result.
At the same time, the United Nations (UN) General Assembly approved a resolution demanding the end of the war in Ukraine on March 2. Although non-binding, the resolution justified the decisions of scientific organizations, both national and international, to freeze cooperation with Russia. Several attempts to exclude Russia from other UN organizations and related agencies followed. On May 10, European member states within the World Health Organization passed a resolution that, besides demanding that Russia respect international humanitarian law, could result in the closure of the country’s regional office.
Likewise, following Russia’s seizure of Chernobyl during the initial phase of the invasion, Poland addressed the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Board of Governance on March 2, condemning Russia in a joint statement with Canada. A day later, during an emergency meeting, the IAEA Board adopted a resolution on nuclear safety, security, and safeguards, calling for an immediate end to the war.
Other international organizations, such as the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), made their moves even earlier. Just one day after the beginning of the war, the OECD decided to close its office in Moscow. As a next step, OECD’s Nuclear Energy Agency (NEA) suspended the Russian membership, excluding Moscow from any decision making. In a May 11 email to NEA delegates and steering members, Daniela Lulache, NEA’s Head of Policy and Co-ordination, affirmed that “starting this day, representatives of the Russian Federation will not be entitled to attend the NEA official bodies’ meetings and may not receive any documents related to such meetings.” Yet, cutting Russia from major regulatory agencies reduces insights into their nuclear operations and polarizes the world— leading to a new Cold War where nuclear science and technology are once again a major battleground.
From a historical perspective, attempts to use international organizations to exert pressure on particular nations have been common. In order to replace some of the international scientific associations that existed before World War I, representatives from the leading scientific academies of the major Allied nations founded the International Research Council (IRC) in 1919. The new Council was deeply politicized and far less international than it claimed to be as it excluded the defeated Central Powers, including Germany. The IRC’s major concern was to assure that Germany could not regain its military power and its prominence in industry, science, and technology. German scientists were excluded from conferences and German was forbidden as an IRC language. Despite the IRC’s policy of exclusion, throughout the interwar period German scientists continued to thrive in fields such as radioactivity research, chemistry, and eugenics. After the end of the Second World War, scientific sanctions and the expulsion from international organizations were developed into a Cold War strong policy of isolation.
In the today’s globalized context, scientific sanctions create more problems than they solve. An anonymous survey of Russian academics—of whom only two supported the war in Ukraine—revealed that Russian scientists feel trapped and anticipate that scientific sanctions will be counterproductive in the long run. They will force Russians to shift research topics and reorient themselves towards India and China, to the detriment of both the United States and Europe. There will certainly be a weakening of collective approaches to problems that afflict and threaten our common humanity. Our recent experience with the pandemic was itself an object lesson in the value of global cooperation—and the disastrous effects of its absence.
The swift cut of all scientific ties with Russia through expulsions might seem like an immediate and appropriate response to a catastrophic war. However, the implications are profound. Scientific sanctions could impact not only economic and political relations, but also diplomatic ones— limiting the available options to cope with the variety of situations which are bound to occur, including nuclear issues. Thus, the complexities of the challenges the world faces in the 21st century demand the kind of science diplomacy that builds bridges for a global future instead of destroying them. And while governments and nation states might have their hands tied, individual academics and universities have the privilege of their academic freedom. The time is ripe for them to make a difference.
