nce hailed as Washington’s most reliable ally in Latin America, Colombia now finds itself at the center of a diplomatic firestorm with the United States. On October 19th, U.S. President Donald Trump called Colombian President Gustavo Petro “an illegal drug leader” on Truth Social, accusing him of encouraging massive coca production. Hours later, Trump announced the suspension of all U.S. aid and the imposition of tariffs. Petro responded by recalling his ambassador for consultations and convening his cabinet to decide on the government’s response. More recently, he was added to the Clinton List for granting benefits to armed groups, further escalating tensions with Washington.
This latest confrontation is not an isolated crisis; it is the culmination of growing tensions that have escalated since Trump’s return to office in 2025 over how both countries understand drug policy and security. What in the 2000s was a model of hemispheric cooperation has devolved into a shouting match on social media. The collapse of formal U.S.–Colombia diplomatic channels reveals a deeper rupture: the erosion of a decades–long partnership built on counter–narcotics cooperation, regional stability, and a shared strategy that once defined the “war on drugs.”
From Cooperation to Confrontation
In the two decades since Plan Colombia began in 2000, U.S. and Colombian policy were aligned with a heavy investment in counter–narcotics, military cooperation, and state–building. The results were visible—coca production fell from over 163,000 hectares in 2000 to under 50,000 by 2012. However, the alliance was built on an unequal foundation: U.S. funding dictated priorities while Colombia faced the challenges that came with militarization.
By the mid–2010s, that consensus began to fracture. The 2016 Peace Accords and the end of aerial fumigation marked a policy shift toward development and rural reform. The United States, however, continued to measure success through eradication and seizures. As Colombia placed greater emphasis on rural development and voluntary crop substitution over eradication, differing priorities caused misalignments between the U.S. and Colombia. This was particularly visible during the Santos administration. Yet with Petro’s arrival to power in 2022, promising to “end the war on drugs” and promote a new regional paradigm, the bilateral relationship became increasingly strained.
Petro’s relations with the U.S. showed signs of waning under the Biden administration. Several U.S. officials privately described his government as “disillusioned,” pointing to disputes over counter–narcotics policy. With Trump back in office, Washington’s return to more punitive rhetoric has more visibly collided with Petro’s ideology. Accusations of “narco–socialism” and Petro’s defiant responses have turned policy disagreement into political theater.
A Clash of Paradigms
At the heart of the dispute is not coca, but a clash of worldviews. Petro frames coca as a symptom of poverty and state neglect, advocating for trade incentives and agricultural diversification rather than criminalization. He has urged the U.S. to remove tariffs on Colombian agro–industrial exports to provide farmers with alternatives to coca production.
Washington, by contrast, remains fixated on supply–side drug enforcement. Decertifying Colombia—something the U.S. last did in 1996 and 1997 under President Samper—sends a clear signal that military benchmarks still define “success.” Yet this view ignores the scale and entrenchment of the drug economy: that illicit coca production now represents over 4% of Colombia’s GDP—surpassing remittances sent from abroad—underscoring how deeply it has become embedded in rural livelihoods. Eradication without good governance only deepens instability. Without trust and dialogue, enforcement becomes merely symbolic. While eliminating production may work in the short term, it will persist unless the root causes are addressed.
When Institutions Fail, Populism Fills the Void
What makes this moment different from past crises is not the accusation itself but the absence of formal diplomatic channels. Even at the height of the Samper scandal in the 1990s, Washington and Bogotá maintained back-channel communication. Today, half of Petro’s cabinet reportedly lacks U.S. visas, and statements are issued through social media rather than diplomatic notes. Yet their duel leaves ordinary citizens paying the price.
Despite political theatrics, both countries need each other. The U.S. remains Colombia’s largest trade partner and security donor, while Colombia remains critical to hemispheric stability. Colombia is a key partner in counter–narcotics, migration management, and regional security—while U.S. economic and military aid continues to shape Colombia’s development and security agenda. The challenge is not to restore the Plan Colombia of the past, but to build a new framework grounded in mutual respect, public health, and economic opportunity.
Letting populism dictate foreign policy risks undoing twenty years of progress. Social media cannot replace diplomacy, and rhetoric is no substitute for strategy. The U.S.–Colombia partnership once stood as the model of cooperation in the Americas. Both nations would benefit from rebuilding trust and cooperation beyond the current tensions.
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How U.S.–Colombia relations went from cooperation to confrontation
Image by CESAR AUGUSTO RAMIREZ VALLEJO from Pixabay
November 19, 2025
Colombia has gone from the U.S.’s most reliable ally in Latin America to being at the middle of a diplomatic firestorm. These growing tensions are the result in part of growing differences in how both countries understand drug policy and security, writes Lucía González Camelo.
O
nce hailed as Washington’s most reliable ally in Latin America, Colombia now finds itself at the center of a diplomatic firestorm with the United States. On October 19th, U.S. President Donald Trump called Colombian President Gustavo Petro “an illegal drug leader” on Truth Social, accusing him of encouraging massive coca production. Hours later, Trump announced the suspension of all U.S. aid and the imposition of tariffs. Petro responded by recalling his ambassador for consultations and convening his cabinet to decide on the government’s response. More recently, he was added to the Clinton List for granting benefits to armed groups, further escalating tensions with Washington.
This latest confrontation is not an isolated crisis; it is the culmination of growing tensions that have escalated since Trump’s return to office in 2025 over how both countries understand drug policy and security. What in the 2000s was a model of hemispheric cooperation has devolved into a shouting match on social media. The collapse of formal U.S.–Colombia diplomatic channels reveals a deeper rupture: the erosion of a decades–long partnership built on counter–narcotics cooperation, regional stability, and a shared strategy that once defined the “war on drugs.”
From Cooperation to Confrontation
In the two decades since Plan Colombia began in 2000, U.S. and Colombian policy were aligned with a heavy investment in counter–narcotics, military cooperation, and state–building. The results were visible—coca production fell from over 163,000 hectares in 2000 to under 50,000 by 2012. However, the alliance was built on an unequal foundation: U.S. funding dictated priorities while Colombia faced the challenges that came with militarization.
By the mid–2010s, that consensus began to fracture. The 2016 Peace Accords and the end of aerial fumigation marked a policy shift toward development and rural reform. The United States, however, continued to measure success through eradication and seizures. As Colombia placed greater emphasis on rural development and voluntary crop substitution over eradication, differing priorities caused misalignments between the U.S. and Colombia. This was particularly visible during the Santos administration. Yet with Petro’s arrival to power in 2022, promising to “end the war on drugs” and promote a new regional paradigm, the bilateral relationship became increasingly strained.
Petro’s relations with the U.S. showed signs of waning under the Biden administration. Several U.S. officials privately described his government as “disillusioned,” pointing to disputes over counter–narcotics policy. With Trump back in office, Washington’s return to more punitive rhetoric has more visibly collided with Petro’s ideology. Accusations of “narco–socialism” and Petro’s defiant responses have turned policy disagreement into political theater.
A Clash of Paradigms
At the heart of the dispute is not coca, but a clash of worldviews. Petro frames coca as a symptom of poverty and state neglect, advocating for trade incentives and agricultural diversification rather than criminalization. He has urged the U.S. to remove tariffs on Colombian agro–industrial exports to provide farmers with alternatives to coca production.
Washington, by contrast, remains fixated on supply–side drug enforcement. Decertifying Colombia—something the U.S. last did in 1996 and 1997 under President Samper—sends a clear signal that military benchmarks still define “success.” Yet this view ignores the scale and entrenchment of the drug economy: that illicit coca production now represents over 4% of Colombia’s GDP—surpassing remittances sent from abroad—underscoring how deeply it has become embedded in rural livelihoods. Eradication without good governance only deepens instability. Without trust and dialogue, enforcement becomes merely symbolic. While eliminating production may work in the short term, it will persist unless the root causes are addressed.
When Institutions Fail, Populism Fills the Void
What makes this moment different from past crises is not the accusation itself but the absence of formal diplomatic channels. Even at the height of the Samper scandal in the 1990s, Washington and Bogotá maintained back-channel communication. Today, half of Petro’s cabinet reportedly lacks U.S. visas, and statements are issued through social media rather than diplomatic notes. Yet their duel leaves ordinary citizens paying the price.
Despite political theatrics, both countries need each other. The U.S. remains Colombia’s largest trade partner and security donor, while Colombia remains critical to hemispheric stability. Colombia is a key partner in counter–narcotics, migration management, and regional security—while U.S. economic and military aid continues to shape Colombia’s development and security agenda. The challenge is not to restore the Plan Colombia of the past, but to build a new framework grounded in mutual respect, public health, and economic opportunity.
Letting populism dictate foreign policy risks undoing twenty years of progress. Social media cannot replace diplomacy, and rhetoric is no substitute for strategy. The U.S.–Colombia partnership once stood as the model of cooperation in the Americas. Both nations would benefit from rebuilding trust and cooperation beyond the current tensions.
