kraine’s counteroffensive will not mark the end of the war or even the beginning of the end. Rather it is just the next step in an extended conflict. Whilst the outcome of the (hopefully successful) offensive will create conditions for the next phase of activity, it is the translation of that success to the central strategic and political objective that matters—sustainable Ukrainian security. Indeed, the key question is not whether Ukraine should be in NATO, but what is the best way of ensuring Ukraine’s long-term security—of which membership in NATO is an option.
Ukraine’s Long-term Security Challenges
When seeking to answer the larger question of Ukrainian long-term security, several framing considerations are necessary.
Russia is unlikely to end its aggression toward Ukraine even if the fighting stops. While Russia’s conventional forces will find themselves in a weakened position, Moscow will seek to rearm. It will also retain indirect means—including missile strikes, cyber-attacks, and support for insurgents—to target and influence Kyiv. Even if Russia loses catastrophically, there is no prospect for an equivalent campaign of de-Nazification or Imperial deconstruction as was necessary in Germany and Japan at the end of the Second World War. Banking on political change within Russia is not viable, either. Even if the Putin regime falls, there is no guarantee a successor regime would be less hostile to Ukraine.
Ultimately, Ukraine’s long-term security is not about battlefield outcomes alone, these can only condition a negotiated settlement. This negotiated settlement, regardless of however much progress Ukraine makes, will likely only suspend immediate hostilities, not end Russia’s long-term animus toward Ukraine.
Modernizing Ukrainian Security Infrastructure
Given these considerations, the United States and its allies have two inter-related, courses of action. First, the U.S. and its allies must establish independent Ukrainian deterrence. This would see Kyiv’s forces transform from its “franken-force” of Warsaw Pact-era and NATO-standard equipment focused on the defeat of Russia’s forces into a modern, combined arms force capable of deterring future conventional aggression, a process that is already underway.
In the author’s conversations with European defense officials in late 2022, this was an objective heavily hinted at, if never outright acknowledged. Commitments by the U.S. to provide M1A1 main battle tanks (and European partner promises of main battle tanks) and the recent decision to begin training Ukrainian pilots on the F-16 aircraft reflect long-term plans for enhancing Kyiv’s ability to defend itself. These platforms and their associated infrastructure represent a commitment by the West to Ukraine’s long-term security.
Beyond Ukraine’s immediate battlefield requirements, long-term deterrence necessitates the modernization of Ukraine’s defense infrastructure to include robust integrated air defense capabilities, counter-battery artillery, intelligence, surveillance, reconnaissance (ISR) capabilities, and national-level command and control. At the same time, Ukraine’s domestic security infrastructure needs to be strengthened, its systemic corruption must be addressed, and democratic governance must be strengthened to counter non-military threats from Russia. These political reforms will in many ways be more challenging and require sustained political commitment from Ukraine’s leadership.
This approach is costly and requires continued political and economic commitment from participating NATO countries. For the United States this will result in increased domestic political and economic pressure at a time when Washington seeks to pivot to the Indo-Pacific. Additionally, allied defense industrial bases are not meeting current demands, let alone the anticipated requirements of refilling spent stockpiles let alone meeting the projected needs of building a NATO-standard force. Moreover, the prospect of a Trump presidency in 2024 and the uncertainty of its policies complicate future planning and necessitate a measure of hedging.
Ukraine’s Relationship With NATO
Some form of this modernization program is necessary but is insufficient alone to achieve Ukraine’s long-term security. This is the basis of the case for Ukraine’s entry into NATO.
According to NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg, all members have agreed that Ukraine will join the alliance in the future, but no date for the start of accession has been agreed. In 2008 NATO pledged that Ukraine would eventually join, but progress on a Membership Action Plan (MAP) was blocked by France and Germany. Today Ukraine’s entry into NATO is even more problematic, with U.S. reticence due to concerns about escalation with Russia.
Kyiv’s hopes to secure a full MAP at the Vilnius Summit are likely overly ambitious, something President Volodymyr Zelensky of Ukraine has acknowledged. Without the United States’ clear support, NATO will almost certainly not move forward on Ukrainian accession. Alternative models of partnerships with NATO do exist, for example Sweden’s “Enhanced Opportunity Partner” status. This brings with it opportunities to contribute to NATO missions and Alliance objectives, while engaging in dialogues with NATO.
If NATO full membership is not viable would other types of security guarantees for Kyiv suffice? Guarantees or commitments are only as strong as the parties to them versus presumed adversaries. The 1991 Budapest Memorandum which saw Ukraine surrender its nuclear weapons in exchange for security guarantees ultimately proved hollow. If NATO does not want to incur Article Five obligations for Ukraine an alternative course of action could well be the long-term armament commitment in line with what is presently underway, backed by a commitment to defend Ukraine with all measures short of open hostilities by NATO partners. Here an Israel-type bilateral security agreement could see Ukraine receive guaranteed military support, intelligence cooperation, and other assistance that stops short of mutual defense agreements.
The goal of any security agreement is the future deterrence of Russian aggression. NATO deterrence has held and will likely continue to hold. Ukrainian membership in NATO was and remains a red line for Putin’s Russia. While it is unclear what Moscow would do if that red line were crossed, it is unlikely Washington will want to find out. Washington and its European partners are, however, building a robust playbook of how to support Ukraine and punish Russia which could well be used in the future. Indeed, this menu of responses could well serve as the basis of a non-NATO security agreement.
The U.S. and its allies must provide an answer to the critical first question—what is the best way to secure Ukraine’s long-term security? Only after answering that question is an effective discussion about the future of Europe’s security architecture possible.
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Pathways for Ukraine’s Long-Term Security
Image by Engin Akyurt from Pixabay
July 11, 2023
Ukraine's counteroffensive is only the next step in an extended conflict, not the beginning of an end. We shouldn't let the counteroffensive, or the question of NATO membership, overshadow the key question of what is the best way of ensuring Ukraine's long-term security, writes Joshua Huminski.
U
kraine’s counteroffensive will not mark the end of the war or even the beginning of the end. Rather it is just the next step in an extended conflict. Whilst the outcome of the (hopefully successful) offensive will create conditions for the next phase of activity, it is the translation of that success to the central strategic and political objective that matters—sustainable Ukrainian security. Indeed, the key question is not whether Ukraine should be in NATO, but what is the best way of ensuring Ukraine’s long-term security—of which membership in NATO is an option.
Ukraine’s Long-term Security Challenges
When seeking to answer the larger question of Ukrainian long-term security, several framing considerations are necessary.
Russia is unlikely to end its aggression toward Ukraine even if the fighting stops. While Russia’s conventional forces will find themselves in a weakened position, Moscow will seek to rearm. It will also retain indirect means—including missile strikes, cyber-attacks, and support for insurgents—to target and influence Kyiv. Even if Russia loses catastrophically, there is no prospect for an equivalent campaign of de-Nazification or Imperial deconstruction as was necessary in Germany and Japan at the end of the Second World War. Banking on political change within Russia is not viable, either. Even if the Putin regime falls, there is no guarantee a successor regime would be less hostile to Ukraine.
Ultimately, Ukraine’s long-term security is not about battlefield outcomes alone, these can only condition a negotiated settlement. This negotiated settlement, regardless of however much progress Ukraine makes, will likely only suspend immediate hostilities, not end Russia’s long-term animus toward Ukraine.
Modernizing Ukrainian Security Infrastructure
Given these considerations, the United States and its allies have two inter-related, courses of action. First, the U.S. and its allies must establish independent Ukrainian deterrence. This would see Kyiv’s forces transform from its “franken-force” of Warsaw Pact-era and NATO-standard equipment focused on the defeat of Russia’s forces into a modern, combined arms force capable of deterring future conventional aggression, a process that is already underway.
In the author’s conversations with European defense officials in late 2022, this was an objective heavily hinted at, if never outright acknowledged. Commitments by the U.S. to provide M1A1 main battle tanks (and European partner promises of main battle tanks) and the recent decision to begin training Ukrainian pilots on the F-16 aircraft reflect long-term plans for enhancing Kyiv’s ability to defend itself. These platforms and their associated infrastructure represent a commitment by the West to Ukraine’s long-term security.
Beyond Ukraine’s immediate battlefield requirements, long-term deterrence necessitates the modernization of Ukraine’s defense infrastructure to include robust integrated air defense capabilities, counter-battery artillery, intelligence, surveillance, reconnaissance (ISR) capabilities, and national-level command and control. At the same time, Ukraine’s domestic security infrastructure needs to be strengthened, its systemic corruption must be addressed, and democratic governance must be strengthened to counter non-military threats from Russia. These political reforms will in many ways be more challenging and require sustained political commitment from Ukraine’s leadership.
This approach is costly and requires continued political and economic commitment from participating NATO countries. For the United States this will result in increased domestic political and economic pressure at a time when Washington seeks to pivot to the Indo-Pacific. Additionally, allied defense industrial bases are not meeting current demands, let alone the anticipated requirements of refilling spent stockpiles let alone meeting the projected needs of building a NATO-standard force. Moreover, the prospect of a Trump presidency in 2024 and the uncertainty of its policies complicate future planning and necessitate a measure of hedging.
Ukraine’s Relationship With NATO
Some form of this modernization program is necessary but is insufficient alone to achieve Ukraine’s long-term security. This is the basis of the case for Ukraine’s entry into NATO.
According to NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg, all members have agreed that Ukraine will join the alliance in the future, but no date for the start of accession has been agreed. In 2008 NATO pledged that Ukraine would eventually join, but progress on a Membership Action Plan (MAP) was blocked by France and Germany. Today Ukraine’s entry into NATO is even more problematic, with U.S. reticence due to concerns about escalation with Russia.
Kyiv’s hopes to secure a full MAP at the Vilnius Summit are likely overly ambitious, something President Volodymyr Zelensky of Ukraine has acknowledged. Without the United States’ clear support, NATO will almost certainly not move forward on Ukrainian accession. Alternative models of partnerships with NATO do exist, for example Sweden’s “Enhanced Opportunity Partner” status. This brings with it opportunities to contribute to NATO missions and Alliance objectives, while engaging in dialogues with NATO.
If NATO full membership is not viable would other types of security guarantees for Kyiv suffice? Guarantees or commitments are only as strong as the parties to them versus presumed adversaries. The 1991 Budapest Memorandum which saw Ukraine surrender its nuclear weapons in exchange for security guarantees ultimately proved hollow. If NATO does not want to incur Article Five obligations for Ukraine an alternative course of action could well be the long-term armament commitment in line with what is presently underway, backed by a commitment to defend Ukraine with all measures short of open hostilities by NATO partners. Here an Israel-type bilateral security agreement could see Ukraine receive guaranteed military support, intelligence cooperation, and other assistance that stops short of mutual defense agreements.
The goal of any security agreement is the future deterrence of Russian aggression. NATO deterrence has held and will likely continue to hold. Ukrainian membership in NATO was and remains a red line for Putin’s Russia. While it is unclear what Moscow would do if that red line were crossed, it is unlikely Washington will want to find out. Washington and its European partners are, however, building a robust playbook of how to support Ukraine and punish Russia which could well be used in the future. Indeed, this menu of responses could well serve as the basis of a non-NATO security agreement.
The U.S. and its allies must provide an answer to the critical first question—what is the best way to secure Ukraine’s long-term security? Only after answering that question is an effective discussion about the future of Europe’s security architecture possible.
