year has passed since the Russian invasion of Ukraine began. While the valiant Ukrainian resistance has undoubtedly dealt a strategic blow to Putin's imperialist ambitions, the fact remains that this conflict produces only losers. First and foremost, Ukraine and its people are paying the highest price of this war–that of the blood shed under the invader's blows. The civilian casualties are frightening, as is the level of destruction in the cities under Russian fire. Other losers include Europe, developing countries, the global economy, the Russian people, and respect for humanitarian law, among others.
Experts predict that this war will last for a long time. Yet how long can Ukraine, despite its valor, continue to repel wave after wave of invaders from a Russian army that seems to have almost inexhaustible human capital and no regard for humanitarian considerations?
Wishful thinking about regime collapse in the Kremlin isn’t a strategy for ending the war. So all that remains is negotiation to end the conflict. Such negotiations are already being advocated by third-party states that support the belligerents directly or indirectly. However, for negotiation to be a viable strategy, these third-party states must be willing to see it through to completion, beginning with the imposition of a cease-fire. Unfortunately, we are still a long way from there. To make matters worse, when the aggressor is a permanent member of the Security Council, the veto system paralyzes UN peacekeeping mechanisms, as it did during the U.S. invasion of Iraq in 2003.
Looking to History for Inspiration
Can recent history point us in the direction of a possible scenario for de-escalation, a cease-fire, and a return to lasting peace? There are several historical examples which don’t help.
Referring to the 1919 Treaty of Versailles, French President Immanuel Macron said it is important to avoid humiliating Russia overly. This concern seems irrelevant, however, as it assumes a highly unlikely Russian military defeat and economic collapse.
An agreement borrowing from the 1938 Munich Agreement in Czechoslovakia also seems unlikely to be useful. Such an agreement would recognize Russia’s current territorial gains in exchange for a guarantee of non-expansion. However, the Munich Agreement didn’t satisfy Hitler’s appetite for conquest and wider war followed. The failure of the Munich Agreement was really the start of World War II. The agreement had the capacity and backing to end the war before it truly began, but failed due to its weak and poorly managed implementation.
What about other models? The Korean Armistice, signed in 1953 between the United Nations, China, and North Korea, effectively ended hostilities but was not followed by a peace treaty. Negotiations took two years. Tensions on the Korean peninsula remain high even after seventy years.
The Paris Peace Accords, signed in January 1973 after a five-year negotiation process, formally ended hostilities between the United States and North Vietnam. It didn't stop South Vietnamese forces from fleeing, Saigon from falling, or the Americans from leaving quickly in April 1975.
The Dayton Agreement, signed in Paris in December 1995, brought an end to the conflict in Bosnia and Herzegovina, which began in 1992. It authorized the country's division into the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina and the Republika Srpska. The extremely complex management of relations between the various entities in Bosnia and Herzegovina under the authority of the international High Representative makes the country unstable, and the temptation of Serbian secession remains.
What about the Minsk Agreements signed in September 2014 and February 2015 to end the conflict in the Donbas? Is it possible to imagine a Minsk III? Is there any reason to believe that with a little goodwill and a lot of political pressure, it might work this time? It's difficult to imagine.
Would it be preferable to halt NATO expansion, including into Sweden and Finland, in exchange for Russian troop withdrawal and Ukraine's neutral status? Is Russian intervention solely motivated by NATO expansion?
There are many unknowns and few certainties. One of those few certainties is that complex treaty provisions are negotiated over long periods of time with limited political opportunities. The coming months will be crucial. Who will triumph in the conflict between the desire for empire and the desire for Europe? Who will benefit from the time constraint? Who will be able to sustain and impose sanctions in the long run? The answers to these questions will shape Europe’s future for decades.
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What Kind of Peace in Ukraine? Lessons from Recent History
Photo by Jared Phillips via Unsplash.
February 22, 2023
The war in Ukraine is a year old, and experts expect the conflict to continue for a long time. Yet it would be too optimistic to think Ukraine can continue to stand off the Russian invader indefinitely, so it's time to explore what a possible peace settlement could look like, writes Richard Rousseau
A
year has passed since the Russian invasion of Ukraine began. While the valiant Ukrainian resistance has undoubtedly dealt a strategic blow to Putin's imperialist ambitions, the fact remains that this conflict produces only losers. First and foremost, Ukraine and its people are paying the highest price of this war–that of the blood shed under the invader's blows. The civilian casualties are frightening, as is the level of destruction in the cities under Russian fire. Other losers include Europe, developing countries, the global economy, the Russian people, and respect for humanitarian law, among others.
Experts predict that this war will last for a long time. Yet how long can Ukraine, despite its valor, continue to repel wave after wave of invaders from a Russian army that seems to have almost inexhaustible human capital and no regard for humanitarian considerations?
Wishful thinking about regime collapse in the Kremlin isn’t a strategy for ending the war. So all that remains is negotiation to end the conflict. Such negotiations are already being advocated by third-party states that support the belligerents directly or indirectly. However, for negotiation to be a viable strategy, these third-party states must be willing to see it through to completion, beginning with the imposition of a cease-fire. Unfortunately, we are still a long way from there. To make matters worse, when the aggressor is a permanent member of the Security Council, the veto system paralyzes UN peacekeeping mechanisms, as it did during the U.S. invasion of Iraq in 2003.
Looking to History for Inspiration
Can recent history point us in the direction of a possible scenario for de-escalation, a cease-fire, and a return to lasting peace? There are several historical examples which don’t help.
Referring to the 1919 Treaty of Versailles, French President Immanuel Macron said it is important to avoid humiliating Russia overly. This concern seems irrelevant, however, as it assumes a highly unlikely Russian military defeat and economic collapse.
An agreement borrowing from the 1938 Munich Agreement in Czechoslovakia also seems unlikely to be useful. Such an agreement would recognize Russia’s current territorial gains in exchange for a guarantee of non-expansion. However, the Munich Agreement didn’t satisfy Hitler’s appetite for conquest and wider war followed. The failure of the Munich Agreement was really the start of World War II. The agreement had the capacity and backing to end the war before it truly began, but failed due to its weak and poorly managed implementation.
What about other models? The Korean Armistice, signed in 1953 between the United Nations, China, and North Korea, effectively ended hostilities but was not followed by a peace treaty. Negotiations took two years. Tensions on the Korean peninsula remain high even after seventy years.
The Paris Peace Accords, signed in January 1973 after a five-year negotiation process, formally ended hostilities between the United States and North Vietnam. It didn't stop South Vietnamese forces from fleeing, Saigon from falling, or the Americans from leaving quickly in April 1975.
The Dayton Agreement, signed in Paris in December 1995, brought an end to the conflict in Bosnia and Herzegovina, which began in 1992. It authorized the country's division into the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina and the Republika Srpska. The extremely complex management of relations between the various entities in Bosnia and Herzegovina under the authority of the international High Representative makes the country unstable, and the temptation of Serbian secession remains.
What about the Minsk Agreements signed in September 2014 and February 2015 to end the conflict in the Donbas? Is it possible to imagine a Minsk III? Is there any reason to believe that with a little goodwill and a lot of political pressure, it might work this time? It's difficult to imagine.
Would it be preferable to halt NATO expansion, including into Sweden and Finland, in exchange for Russian troop withdrawal and Ukraine's neutral status? Is Russian intervention solely motivated by NATO expansion?
There are many unknowns and few certainties. One of those few certainties is that complex treaty provisions are negotiated over long periods of time with limited political opportunities. The coming months will be crucial. Who will triumph in the conflict between the desire for empire and the desire for Europe? Who will benefit from the time constraint? Who will be able to sustain and impose sanctions in the long run? The answers to these questions will shape Europe’s future for decades.
