ars without warfare…may be becoming the new normal,” writes author and analyst Mark Galeotti in his excellent new book “The Weaponisation of Everything”, a copy of which was kindly provided by Yale University Press for review. He adds, “We live in a world of permanent low-level conflict, often unnoticed, undeclared and unending.” The present crisis with Russia on Ukraine’s borders notwithstanding, this is an exceedingly apt diagnosis of the world today. War is becoming less about tanks, ships, and planes (thought those absolutely still matter) and more about competition, even if we find ourselves struggling to come to grips with what that means. Galeotti is, then, a welcome guide to unpacking what this “permanent, bloodless war” looks like.
Galeotti’s book is subtitled “a field guide to the new way of war” and it succeeds masterfully by being precisely that; much like a bird fancier’s guide (albeit much more insidious and violent), this is an excellent survey of the panoply of tools that states and non-state actors use to attempt to assert their political will on an opponent. More than that, it is a grounded look at how many of these tactics, techniques, and procedures (the aptly titled TTPs of military doctrine) are at their core merely an updated playbook for the modern era.
We find ourselves in an era when nearly everything can and indeed is weaponized. This isn’t all that new. As he illustrates with historical anecdotes, leaders for centuries have used tools of disinformation and propaganda, economic warfare, subversion and assassination, as well as open war to achieve their aims. While today these techniques are modernized for the internet-era, this is not the radical reinvention of geopolitics as some have suggested.
Galeotti takes the broad range of tools states can and do wield to advance their interests from business and crime to law and culture—and everything in between. He takes each in turn, contextualizes it, and provides examples of this type of warfare in practice both today and in the past. As with his excellent “A Short History of Russia” he also includes a suggested follow-on reading list, referencing other books that discuss the topic in question. It is a nice touch, and one from which I’ve ended up purchasing books.
This focus on non-conventional warfare is not to say that war of the traditional variety is unthinkable or will never happen again. Rather, as Galeotti describes, the cost and consequences of modern warfare is becoming so high, and legal structures and norms of behavior (often waged by as he writes “borelords” (lawyers carrying a pen and conducting lawfare)) are becoming so prevalent that traditional force-on-force conflict is becoming less likely—though not unthinkable.
An interesting thread that I wish he had pulled on earlier is whether the West is prepared for this new era. The West (and especially the U.S.) seem to cling to a binary conception of war—you are either at war or you are not. This seems ill-suited to an era of all-against-all, largely “bloodless, permanent war” described by Galeotti.
The United States (arguably) manages more traditional conflict very well. Move outside that framework of operations and things become very difficult, very quickly. In Afghanistan the U.S. enjoyed absolute military dominance. Yet despite operational and tactical successes, Washington was unable to translate temporary progress into strategic victory. Why? Because victory was not defined by military success but by political progress and a political outcome. Washington was unable to mobilize all the tools of national power toward a specific end.
This, then, suggests that the West needs not a new definition of warfare, but a reframing of its understanding of the concept of war writ large. If the new era of conflict is fought in the “grey zone” of the hybrid and subliminal and kinetic war is of the rarer variety, perhaps we need to redefine what we consider to be war and peace.
There is no small irony in the fact that the West’s fixation on traditional warfare to the exclusion of everything else is an aberration when one looks at recent history. The Second World War had as much deception, economic warfare, subversion, propaganda, and legal warfare as it did island-hopping and tank battles. The subsequent Cold War was almost entirely fought by these same, non-traditional warfare means. Of course, there were direct and indirect conflicts, but the United States and Soviet Union spent more time competing through non-kinetic means than anything else. Much of Great Britain’s imperial history was sustained as much by the subtle arts of subterfuge, influence, bribery, and manipulation as anything else.
One also wonders how successful the West can be when many of the weapons of war are no longer the monopoly of the state (or have not been for some time). How can the U.S. wage strategic competition against China when there are so many deeply intertwined financial and business interests? How can London push back against Moscow’s aggression when so many in the City of London are enriched by inflows of Oligarchic money? What is Washington to do when the most powerful tools in its arsenal, and the things the international citizenry want, are the things the furthest outside of its control e.g. Hollywood, Silicon Valley, and Wall Street financing?
In reading Galeotti’s book, one can’t help but reflect on the simplicity of warfare. Yet as Clausewitz (both Carl and Marie) wrote “Everything is very simple in war, but the simplest thing is difficult.” At the end of the day, war—whether by force of arms, information, law, trade, or some other tool—is about the imposition of one’s will on an adversary to either do or not do something. That truth is as applicable in the Napoleonic era as it is today. Yet, it seems to be continually re-discovered with each crisis.
Galeotti’s prescription for the era of permanent, bloodless war is similarly grounded. Rather than calling for some radical policy or societal overhaul, Galeotti suggests we develop resilience, awareness and political will, and public vigilance. He sees new relevance for international institutions (an interesting point, with which I may disagree as these very institutions are battlegrounds in their own right for primacy). Institutions of like-minded countries can achieve much, but open organizations risk corruption and manipulation. Take for example China’s wielding of its influence in the WHO during COVID-19.
He believes, rightly, that states and governments will need to “become more imaginative and flexible in how they think about power.” He briefly touches upon the private sector and the individual, both of which have roles, albeit considerably smaller when compared to the first two. Collectively, especially for the U.S., it is a function of recognizing that American culture is not as attractive as it once was. Today, citizens of states like Russia and China want a better life for themselves and their family, more than the trappings of American democracy.
That this book is calm and collected is hardly surprising. This approach is part and parcel of all of Galeotti’s work. He is a rare island of analytical stability in a sea of increasingly breathless commentary. Galeotti’s approach is particularly illuminating and enjoyable specifically because it is so considered and grounded. His analysis is never breathless and never reactionary. It is presented in such a way that it disassembles preconceived notions and popular wisdom, an approach that makes the subjects more interesting for having done so.
I marked “The Weaponisation of Everything” as one of the books to which I was most looking forward in 2022 and it didn’t disappoint. It is smart, insightful, witty, and grounded, taking a measured look at a subject that received more breathless commentary than anything else. It is, nonetheless, interesting to reflect on what this dynamic looks like. As he writes in the introduction, “I would certainly rather be targeted by disconcerting memes than nuclear missiles”—yet even memes can have deadly consequences as we’ve seen before and are likely to see again.
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Waging War When Everything is a Weapon
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February 12, 2022
In his latest book review, Joshua Huminski speaks glowingly about Mark Galeotti's latest book, "The Weaponisation of Everything," which seeks to understand not only how warfare and competition have changed, but to provide a measured guide on how states can prepare for this new era of competition.
W
ars without warfare…may be becoming the new normal,” writes author and analyst Mark Galeotti in his excellent new book “The Weaponisation of Everything”, a copy of which was kindly provided by Yale University Press for review. He adds, “We live in a world of permanent low-level conflict, often unnoticed, undeclared and unending.” The present crisis with Russia on Ukraine’s borders notwithstanding, this is an exceedingly apt diagnosis of the world today. War is becoming less about tanks, ships, and planes (thought those absolutely still matter) and more about competition, even if we find ourselves struggling to come to grips with what that means. Galeotti is, then, a welcome guide to unpacking what this “permanent, bloodless war” looks like.
Galeotti’s book is subtitled “a field guide to the new way of war” and it succeeds masterfully by being precisely that; much like a bird fancier’s guide (albeit much more insidious and violent), this is an excellent survey of the panoply of tools that states and non-state actors use to attempt to assert their political will on an opponent. More than that, it is a grounded look at how many of these tactics, techniques, and procedures (the aptly titled TTPs of military doctrine) are at their core merely an updated playbook for the modern era.
We find ourselves in an era when nearly everything can and indeed is weaponized. This isn’t all that new. As he illustrates with historical anecdotes, leaders for centuries have used tools of disinformation and propaganda, economic warfare, subversion and assassination, as well as open war to achieve their aims. While today these techniques are modernized for the internet-era, this is not the radical reinvention of geopolitics as some have suggested.
Galeotti takes the broad range of tools states can and do wield to advance their interests from business and crime to law and culture—and everything in between. He takes each in turn, contextualizes it, and provides examples of this type of warfare in practice both today and in the past. As with his excellent “A Short History of Russia” he also includes a suggested follow-on reading list, referencing other books that discuss the topic in question. It is a nice touch, and one from which I’ve ended up purchasing books.
This focus on non-conventional warfare is not to say that war of the traditional variety is unthinkable or will never happen again. Rather, as Galeotti describes, the cost and consequences of modern warfare is becoming so high, and legal structures and norms of behavior (often waged by as he writes “borelords” (lawyers carrying a pen and conducting lawfare)) are becoming so prevalent that traditional force-on-force conflict is becoming less likely—though not unthinkable.
An interesting thread that I wish he had pulled on earlier is whether the West is prepared for this new era. The West (and especially the U.S.) seem to cling to a binary conception of war—you are either at war or you are not. This seems ill-suited to an era of all-against-all, largely “bloodless, permanent war” described by Galeotti.
The United States (arguably) manages more traditional conflict very well. Move outside that framework of operations and things become very difficult, very quickly. In Afghanistan the U.S. enjoyed absolute military dominance. Yet despite operational and tactical successes, Washington was unable to translate temporary progress into strategic victory. Why? Because victory was not defined by military success but by political progress and a political outcome. Washington was unable to mobilize all the tools of national power toward a specific end.
This, then, suggests that the West needs not a new definition of warfare, but a reframing of its understanding of the concept of war writ large. If the new era of conflict is fought in the “grey zone” of the hybrid and subliminal and kinetic war is of the rarer variety, perhaps we need to redefine what we consider to be war and peace.
There is no small irony in the fact that the West’s fixation on traditional warfare to the exclusion of everything else is an aberration when one looks at recent history. The Second World War had as much deception, economic warfare, subversion, propaganda, and legal warfare as it did island-hopping and tank battles. The subsequent Cold War was almost entirely fought by these same, non-traditional warfare means. Of course, there were direct and indirect conflicts, but the United States and Soviet Union spent more time competing through non-kinetic means than anything else. Much of Great Britain’s imperial history was sustained as much by the subtle arts of subterfuge, influence, bribery, and manipulation as anything else.
One also wonders how successful the West can be when many of the weapons of war are no longer the monopoly of the state (or have not been for some time). How can the U.S. wage strategic competition against China when there are so many deeply intertwined financial and business interests? How can London push back against Moscow’s aggression when so many in the City of London are enriched by inflows of Oligarchic money? What is Washington to do when the most powerful tools in its arsenal, and the things the international citizenry want, are the things the furthest outside of its control e.g. Hollywood, Silicon Valley, and Wall Street financing?
In reading Galeotti’s book, one can’t help but reflect on the simplicity of warfare. Yet as Clausewitz (both Carl and Marie) wrote “Everything is very simple in war, but the simplest thing is difficult.” At the end of the day, war—whether by force of arms, information, law, trade, or some other tool—is about the imposition of one’s will on an adversary to either do or not do something. That truth is as applicable in the Napoleonic era as it is today. Yet, it seems to be continually re-discovered with each crisis.
Galeotti’s prescription for the era of permanent, bloodless war is similarly grounded. Rather than calling for some radical policy or societal overhaul, Galeotti suggests we develop resilience, awareness and political will, and public vigilance. He sees new relevance for international institutions (an interesting point, with which I may disagree as these very institutions are battlegrounds in their own right for primacy). Institutions of like-minded countries can achieve much, but open organizations risk corruption and manipulation. Take for example China’s wielding of its influence in the WHO during COVID-19.
He believes, rightly, that states and governments will need to “become more imaginative and flexible in how they think about power.” He briefly touches upon the private sector and the individual, both of which have roles, albeit considerably smaller when compared to the first two. Collectively, especially for the U.S., it is a function of recognizing that American culture is not as attractive as it once was. Today, citizens of states like Russia and China want a better life for themselves and their family, more than the trappings of American democracy.
That this book is calm and collected is hardly surprising. This approach is part and parcel of all of Galeotti’s work. He is a rare island of analytical stability in a sea of increasingly breathless commentary. Galeotti’s approach is particularly illuminating and enjoyable specifically because it is so considered and grounded. His analysis is never breathless and never reactionary. It is presented in such a way that it disassembles preconceived notions and popular wisdom, an approach that makes the subjects more interesting for having done so.
I marked “The Weaponisation of Everything” as one of the books to which I was most looking forward in 2022 and it didn’t disappoint. It is smart, insightful, witty, and grounded, taking a measured look at a subject that received more breathless commentary than anything else. It is, nonetheless, interesting to reflect on what this dynamic looks like. As he writes in the introduction, “I would certainly rather be targeted by disconcerting memes than nuclear missiles”—yet even memes can have deadly consequences as we’ve seen before and are likely to see again.
