n 16 October, U.S. Secretary of War Pete Hegseth announced on X that Admiral Alvin Holsey, the Commander of U.S. Southern Command (SOUTHCOM), would be retiring before the end of the year. Holsey’s sudden departure, barely a year into his term as SOUTHCOM commander, threatens to unmoor U.S. strategy in Latin America just as President Trump embraces a more unilateral and militarized approach to the region. Over successive administrations, SOUTHCOM has played an increasingly central role in determining U.S. hemispheric relations and Holsey’s positioning marked a degree of continuity in regional affairs at a turbulent time. This was especially key as the region is becoming more important to the U.S. administration. With Admiral Holsey no longer steering the ship, the U.S. approach to the region may become even more aggressive.
Why SOUTHCOM Matters
Latin America and the Caribbean is rarely the main focus of U.S. foreign policy, with analysts as far back as the 1970s referring to U.S. neglect of the region. With Washington’s attention split and regularly focused on other global hotspots, Latin America and the Caribbean has received little attention relative to other parts of the globe. While Washington has focused on other regions, SOUTHCOM—located in Miami—has taken an increasing role in determining the direction of regional affairs. This has ranged from identifying key policy areas, offering military training and support, and even providing humanitarian aid to the region.
This has led to the impression that the U.S. relationship with Latin America and the Caribbean has become more force–centric. While true that SOUTHCOM has taken an increasingly dominant role in defining regional affairs, it is important to note that it has also moved beyond simply looking at defense relations, with former SOUTHCOM Commander General Laura Richardson regularly advocating for economic integration under the slogan that “Economic Security is National Security.” Despite the broad approach taken by SOUTHCOM, given the organization’s function, it regularly identified threats in the region rather than opportunities—a perception that influenced policy circles in Washington.
An Anchor in Tumultuous Times
When Trump took office, several analysts pointed to the number of Latin Americanists that he had brought on to his team as evidence that the administration would be focused on the Western Hemisphere. U.S. Secretary of State Marco Rubio’s first international trip was to Latin America and on the eve of his visit he called for an “Americas First” foreign policy. While much of the attention on Trump’s team focused on cabinet–level positions and senior advisors, SOUTHCOM also shifted leadership in the lead–up to Trump’s inauguration with Admiral Holsey stepping into the role previously held by General Richardson.
While the change in administration marked a shift in foreign policy priorities, Admiral Holsey marked a degree of continuity in how SOUTHCOM viewed and approached the region. Not only had he previously served as Military Deputy Commander under General Richardson, but in his posture statement to Congress—an annual presentation by each of the regional commands to highlight their priorities—Holsey marked a strong degree of continuity with his predecessors.
Despite the continuity of SOUTHCOM’s posture to the region, the Trump administration has taken an increasingly militarized approach to regional affairs. Even prior to assuming office, Trump announced his desire that the U.S. “take back” the Panama Canal, rhetoric that drew concerns across the region. After Trump did assume office, the administration’s efforts to combat cartels and pressure the Venezuelan government toward democratic transition has meant more militarized regional affairs. Shortly after taking office, the Trump administration designated several cartels in the region as “Foreign Terrorist Organizations,” opening the door for military options—that Trump reportedly requested from the Pentagon in August. In recent weeks, the administration has moved from rhetoric to action, destroying at least ten alleged drug trafficking boats off the coast of Venezuela. At the same time, the administration has ramped up troop deployments to the region. Most recently, the administration has authorized the CIA to take covert action in Venezuela.
Before his retirement announcement, Holsey reportedly opposed the increased militarization of regional affairs under the Trump administration, even questioning operational legality in some cases. This led to Holsey being cut out of the regional decision–making process, to the extent that the Pentagon announced the creation of a joint task force to counter Venezuelan drug trafficking that would be run in coordination with II Marine Expeditionary Force rather than operations solely being led by SOUTHCOM. Since the announcement of Holsey’s retirement, U.S. military engagement has increased sharply–with the U.S. striking an alleged drug-trafficking vessel in the Pacific and sending an aircraft carrier to the Southern Caribbean.
What’s Next?
Holsey’s exit signals more than a personnel change; it marks a potential tipping point in U.S. hemispheric policy. If his successor embraces the White House’s hard–edged posture, Washington risks alienating key partners and fueling a backlash that could reshape inter–American relations for a generation. Holsey served as an important voice of stability in the U.S. approach to the region. As he leaves the scene, a more hawkish voice with less experience in engaging in hemispheric affairs may take his place. If this happens, the probability of further U.S. military escalation is increasingly likely—not only in Venezuela and the Southern Caribbean, but also in U.S. engagements with other countries in the region.
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U.S. hemispheric affairs unmoored

Image by Frauke Riether from Pixabay
October 28, 2025
Admiral Holsey’s sudden exit from SOUTHCOM removes a stabilizing force in U.S. hemispheric affairs. His departure paves the way for a more aggressive approach —which could in turn risk alienation of regional partners and long–term instability, writes Adam Ratzlaff.
O
n 16 October, U.S. Secretary of War Pete Hegseth announced on X that Admiral Alvin Holsey, the Commander of U.S. Southern Command (SOUTHCOM), would be retiring before the end of the year. Holsey’s sudden departure, barely a year into his term as SOUTHCOM commander, threatens to unmoor U.S. strategy in Latin America just as President Trump embraces a more unilateral and militarized approach to the region. Over successive administrations, SOUTHCOM has played an increasingly central role in determining U.S. hemispheric relations and Holsey’s positioning marked a degree of continuity in regional affairs at a turbulent time. This was especially key as the region is becoming more important to the U.S. administration. With Admiral Holsey no longer steering the ship, the U.S. approach to the region may become even more aggressive.
Why SOUTHCOM Matters
Latin America and the Caribbean is rarely the main focus of U.S. foreign policy, with analysts as far back as the 1970s referring to U.S. neglect of the region. With Washington’s attention split and regularly focused on other global hotspots, Latin America and the Caribbean has received little attention relative to other parts of the globe. While Washington has focused on other regions, SOUTHCOM—located in Miami—has taken an increasing role in determining the direction of regional affairs. This has ranged from identifying key policy areas, offering military training and support, and even providing humanitarian aid to the region.
This has led to the impression that the U.S. relationship with Latin America and the Caribbean has become more force–centric. While true that SOUTHCOM has taken an increasingly dominant role in defining regional affairs, it is important to note that it has also moved beyond simply looking at defense relations, with former SOUTHCOM Commander General Laura Richardson regularly advocating for economic integration under the slogan that “Economic Security is National Security.” Despite the broad approach taken by SOUTHCOM, given the organization’s function, it regularly identified threats in the region rather than opportunities—a perception that influenced policy circles in Washington.
An Anchor in Tumultuous Times
When Trump took office, several analysts pointed to the number of Latin Americanists that he had brought on to his team as evidence that the administration would be focused on the Western Hemisphere. U.S. Secretary of State Marco Rubio’s first international trip was to Latin America and on the eve of his visit he called for an “Americas First” foreign policy. While much of the attention on Trump’s team focused on cabinet–level positions and senior advisors, SOUTHCOM also shifted leadership in the lead–up to Trump’s inauguration with Admiral Holsey stepping into the role previously held by General Richardson.
While the change in administration marked a shift in foreign policy priorities, Admiral Holsey marked a degree of continuity in how SOUTHCOM viewed and approached the region. Not only had he previously served as Military Deputy Commander under General Richardson, but in his posture statement to Congress—an annual presentation by each of the regional commands to highlight their priorities—Holsey marked a strong degree of continuity with his predecessors.
Despite the continuity of SOUTHCOM’s posture to the region, the Trump administration has taken an increasingly militarized approach to regional affairs. Even prior to assuming office, Trump announced his desire that the U.S. “take back” the Panama Canal, rhetoric that drew concerns across the region. After Trump did assume office, the administration’s efforts to combat cartels and pressure the Venezuelan government toward democratic transition has meant more militarized regional affairs. Shortly after taking office, the Trump administration designated several cartels in the region as “Foreign Terrorist Organizations,” opening the door for military options—that Trump reportedly requested from the Pentagon in August. In recent weeks, the administration has moved from rhetoric to action, destroying at least ten alleged drug trafficking boats off the coast of Venezuela. At the same time, the administration has ramped up troop deployments to the region. Most recently, the administration has authorized the CIA to take covert action in Venezuela.
Before his retirement announcement, Holsey reportedly opposed the increased militarization of regional affairs under the Trump administration, even questioning operational legality in some cases. This led to Holsey being cut out of the regional decision–making process, to the extent that the Pentagon announced the creation of a joint task force to counter Venezuelan drug trafficking that would be run in coordination with II Marine Expeditionary Force rather than operations solely being led by SOUTHCOM. Since the announcement of Holsey’s retirement, U.S. military engagement has increased sharply–with the U.S. striking an alleged drug-trafficking vessel in the Pacific and sending an aircraft carrier to the Southern Caribbean.
What’s Next?
Holsey’s exit signals more than a personnel change; it marks a potential tipping point in U.S. hemispheric policy. If his successor embraces the White House’s hard–edged posture, Washington risks alienating key partners and fueling a backlash that could reshape inter–American relations for a generation. Holsey served as an important voice of stability in the U.S. approach to the region. As he leaves the scene, a more hawkish voice with less experience in engaging in hemispheric affairs may take his place. If this happens, the probability of further U.S. military escalation is increasingly likely—not only in Venezuela and the Southern Caribbean, but also in U.S. engagements with other countries in the region.