e are swimming in a vast ocean of information and content. How much of it is true and how much of it is false is unclear. The waters are so muddy and murky that it is difficult to tell at the best of times. Even trusted sources often find themselves victims of mis– and dis–information, regurgitating and recirculating propaganda and falsehoods. With a never–ending stream of content, information swiftly becomes noise and finding truth is less an exercise of seeking facts and more about finding information that simply conforms to your pre–existing biases and beliefs.
It is this cognitive noise that nation–states like Russia and China seek to exploit through their information warfare, propaganda, and mis– and dis–information campaigns. It is less an exercise in convincing someone of ‘truth’ and more of an effort to further stir the waters with a ‘firehose of falsehoods’ as one RAND report defined it. Yet, we often think that contemporary problems are somehow novel or unique, but as author Peter Pomerantsev shows in his thoroughly enjoyable new book, “How to Win and Information War,” these challenges, and indeed the solutions to them, are not so unique. Pomerantsev looks to World War II and the UK’s Political Warfare Executive to see how one propagandist, Sefton Delmer, turned the tables on the Nazi regime.
This is, first and foremost, a work of historical non–fiction, but the parallels for today are vividly on display. Pomerantsev's frequent asides and injection of commentary apply Delmer’s experiences and expertise to the challenges of today, but in a way that feels natural and conversational. He is, in a way, helping the reader along, educating them, showing them the truth, and the process of propaganda. It is really rather clever.
Delmer’s background growing up in World War I Germany and, later, England, made him a product of two worlds and offered him unique insights into identity and messaging. As a journalist, he saw first–hand the rise of the Nazis, even posing as an aide to Ernst Röhm, the head of the Nazi’s Sturmabteilung (Storm Troopers), to gain access to a party rally. He followed Adolf Hitler on his city–to–city campaign, seeing the Nazi leader up close and looking beyond the performative façade before he became dictator.
After the outbreak of World War II, and unlike many of his compatriots, he sought not to preach to the converted, but asked a key question: “How do you deliver truth to people who are resistant to it?” He found that, as Pomerantsev writes, propaganda is much more than just mobilizing content. “Instead of ‘evidence,’ whether fake or real, what people were looking for was a sense that they were special, that they were surrounded by enemies, that they were part of a common destiny.”
Delmer landed on a key truth, one that, ironically, many struggle to comprehend even today: “What was the point of talking to like–minded people and preaching to the converted? How would that ever help get under the psychic skin of those under the sway of Nazi propaganda?” This is endemic not just internationally, but domestically, as well. Organizations are keen to connect with the already converted, to preach to the choir as it were, and are loath to understand, let alone reach outside of that narrowly defined bubble. Non–adherents aren’t just misinformed, they are wrong. Few took the time to understand why Trump was so popular, his supporters—critics argued—were just wrong or racist, or both, really.
Delmer’s first radio station attempted to conceal its identity from its listeners, purporting to be from an insider who railed against the Nazi Party but praised the German Army. It was the fat–cat Nazis who were the problem, not the noble inheritors of the Prussian military tradition. It sought to create a space for dissent and disobedience, while adhering to a belief in greater Germany. It encouraged acts of defiance even if listeners didn’t think that was what it was about. A later program, der Chef, sought an entirely different aim: “The aim was not to dupe the listener but to give them a safe way, both physically and mentally, to escape Nazi media.” Delmer wanted the Germans (and in particular the Kriegsmarine) to know that der Chef, in contrast with his previous radio propaganda programs, was British in origin, again creating a safe space for dissent and plausible deniability if discovered as it sounded very much like other Nazi propaganda programs.
The success that Delmer achieved is as much a function of its time and place as anything else. World War II was a total war in which the consequences of failure were not merely adjusted national borders, but occupation, subjugation, and atrocity. The United Kingdom was on a war–footing in all aspects of society and the government, and bureaucratic institutions reflected this reality. That the government was willing to entertain the notion, let alone allow and support Delmer to develop these radio stations and embark on his propaganda campaigns, illustrates the seriousness with which London took the threat from Nazi Germany. The military, intelligence, and civil service support that fed him the information and gossip that made his radio programs real for audiences could only have occurred in a wartime environment.
Could such a political warfare campaign occur today? Likely not. The United States is, at present, reactive to events rather than proactively shaping desired outcomes. Russia clearly believes it is at war with the United States and the West, and China is moving aggressively to divide America’s allies in the Indo–Pacific and achieve regional hegemony. By contrast the United States is lurching from crisis to crisis, carrying out actions but with little conception of the desired effect or desired end state beyond vague notions of the ‘liberal international order.’ This is not to suggest that Washington shift to an economy mobilized for war or the reestablishment of conscription, but rather it needs to better leverage all the tools of its arsenal in a concerted fashion to shape the environment, deter conflict, and create more favorable conditions for itself and the Western-led liberal international order.
There are of course risks when wading into the muddy waters of the information space, which Pomerantsev articulates well: “But even if such deceptive operations can achieve precise and short–term goals, they will be found out today much faster than they were in World War II.” He presciently continues, “This is the danger of dabbling in disinformation even in a ‘good cause:’ it nurtures an environment of endless distrust that benefits authoritarian instincts. If you play that game, take care that the negative side effects don’t outweigh the benefits.”
Unfortunately, the information war in America has also been politicized. Efforts to establish a ‘disinformation board’ or merely call out foreign election interference are seen as direct attacks against one party. For many officials, it is less about foreign subversion of American democracy and more about political power plays. Yet the threat remains and indeed grows. Whether in response to geopolitical crises like Hamas’ attack on Israel or over apps like TikTok, mis– and dis–information is ever present.
Washington certainly has the tools to conduct political warfare operations against Russia and China, but they are so siloed, so disconnected, and their use so fraught with political peril that mounting a coherent operation is nigh impossible. Is it any wonder then that the best the United States can muster is poorly executed strategic communications campaigns? Washington is good at actions in isolation, but rarely on follow–through or in connections across agencies and departments. Sanctions are a good example. Washington has implemented robust sanctions on Russian businesses but has done little to pursue secondary and tertiary sanctions or enforce the original sanctions.
Perhaps more than anything else, this inability to think and act in a proactive manner is the result of Washington’s inability to define a desired effect before acting. Motion is not the same as movement, yet many within the Washington policy ecosystem assume them to be the same. Even then, once an action is taken, that is often the end of the discussion. Covert action by the Central Intelligence Agency is emblematic of this—it is highly proficient in executing specific actions, but if those actions are disconnected from broader policy efforts, Langley’s efforts will fall flat or come to nothing.
Pomerantsev's book is an enjoyable blend of history, biography, and contemporary observation. That it is not a pure attempt at any one of the three makes it unique and worth reflecting upon. Will the West ever get out onto the playing field of the information war? It remains to be seen. In the interim, curious networks of information warriors like Bellingcat and others are attempting to subvert the propaganda and falsehoods of Russia. Yet the challenge will remain: How do you get people to believe the truth when they simply are simply content with performative theater, half-truths, and comforting lies?
a global affairs media network
Turning the tools of propagandists against themselves
Photo by Yle Archives on Unsplash
March 30, 2024
Will the West ever get out onto the playing field of the information war? It remains to be seen. But the importance of doing so is borne out in a new book, writes our book reviewer, Joshua Huminski.
W
e are swimming in a vast ocean of information and content. How much of it is true and how much of it is false is unclear. The waters are so muddy and murky that it is difficult to tell at the best of times. Even trusted sources often find themselves victims of mis– and dis–information, regurgitating and recirculating propaganda and falsehoods. With a never–ending stream of content, information swiftly becomes noise and finding truth is less an exercise of seeking facts and more about finding information that simply conforms to your pre–existing biases and beliefs.
It is this cognitive noise that nation–states like Russia and China seek to exploit through their information warfare, propaganda, and mis– and dis–information campaigns. It is less an exercise in convincing someone of ‘truth’ and more of an effort to further stir the waters with a ‘firehose of falsehoods’ as one RAND report defined it. Yet, we often think that contemporary problems are somehow novel or unique, but as author Peter Pomerantsev shows in his thoroughly enjoyable new book, “How to Win and Information War,” these challenges, and indeed the solutions to them, are not so unique. Pomerantsev looks to World War II and the UK’s Political Warfare Executive to see how one propagandist, Sefton Delmer, turned the tables on the Nazi regime.
This is, first and foremost, a work of historical non–fiction, but the parallels for today are vividly on display. Pomerantsev's frequent asides and injection of commentary apply Delmer’s experiences and expertise to the challenges of today, but in a way that feels natural and conversational. He is, in a way, helping the reader along, educating them, showing them the truth, and the process of propaganda. It is really rather clever.
Delmer’s background growing up in World War I Germany and, later, England, made him a product of two worlds and offered him unique insights into identity and messaging. As a journalist, he saw first–hand the rise of the Nazis, even posing as an aide to Ernst Röhm, the head of the Nazi’s Sturmabteilung (Storm Troopers), to gain access to a party rally. He followed Adolf Hitler on his city–to–city campaign, seeing the Nazi leader up close and looking beyond the performative façade before he became dictator.
After the outbreak of World War II, and unlike many of his compatriots, he sought not to preach to the converted, but asked a key question: “How do you deliver truth to people who are resistant to it?” He found that, as Pomerantsev writes, propaganda is much more than just mobilizing content. “Instead of ‘evidence,’ whether fake or real, what people were looking for was a sense that they were special, that they were surrounded by enemies, that they were part of a common destiny.”
Delmer landed on a key truth, one that, ironically, many struggle to comprehend even today: “What was the point of talking to like–minded people and preaching to the converted? How would that ever help get under the psychic skin of those under the sway of Nazi propaganda?” This is endemic not just internationally, but domestically, as well. Organizations are keen to connect with the already converted, to preach to the choir as it were, and are loath to understand, let alone reach outside of that narrowly defined bubble. Non–adherents aren’t just misinformed, they are wrong. Few took the time to understand why Trump was so popular, his supporters—critics argued—were just wrong or racist, or both, really.
Delmer’s first radio station attempted to conceal its identity from its listeners, purporting to be from an insider who railed against the Nazi Party but praised the German Army. It was the fat–cat Nazis who were the problem, not the noble inheritors of the Prussian military tradition. It sought to create a space for dissent and disobedience, while adhering to a belief in greater Germany. It encouraged acts of defiance even if listeners didn’t think that was what it was about. A later program, der Chef, sought an entirely different aim: “The aim was not to dupe the listener but to give them a safe way, both physically and mentally, to escape Nazi media.” Delmer wanted the Germans (and in particular the Kriegsmarine) to know that der Chef, in contrast with his previous radio propaganda programs, was British in origin, again creating a safe space for dissent and plausible deniability if discovered as it sounded very much like other Nazi propaganda programs.
The success that Delmer achieved is as much a function of its time and place as anything else. World War II was a total war in which the consequences of failure were not merely adjusted national borders, but occupation, subjugation, and atrocity. The United Kingdom was on a war–footing in all aspects of society and the government, and bureaucratic institutions reflected this reality. That the government was willing to entertain the notion, let alone allow and support Delmer to develop these radio stations and embark on his propaganda campaigns, illustrates the seriousness with which London took the threat from Nazi Germany. The military, intelligence, and civil service support that fed him the information and gossip that made his radio programs real for audiences could only have occurred in a wartime environment.
Could such a political warfare campaign occur today? Likely not. The United States is, at present, reactive to events rather than proactively shaping desired outcomes. Russia clearly believes it is at war with the United States and the West, and China is moving aggressively to divide America’s allies in the Indo–Pacific and achieve regional hegemony. By contrast the United States is lurching from crisis to crisis, carrying out actions but with little conception of the desired effect or desired end state beyond vague notions of the ‘liberal international order.’ This is not to suggest that Washington shift to an economy mobilized for war or the reestablishment of conscription, but rather it needs to better leverage all the tools of its arsenal in a concerted fashion to shape the environment, deter conflict, and create more favorable conditions for itself and the Western-led liberal international order.
There are of course risks when wading into the muddy waters of the information space, which Pomerantsev articulates well: “But even if such deceptive operations can achieve precise and short–term goals, they will be found out today much faster than they were in World War II.” He presciently continues, “This is the danger of dabbling in disinformation even in a ‘good cause:’ it nurtures an environment of endless distrust that benefits authoritarian instincts. If you play that game, take care that the negative side effects don’t outweigh the benefits.”
Unfortunately, the information war in America has also been politicized. Efforts to establish a ‘disinformation board’ or merely call out foreign election interference are seen as direct attacks against one party. For many officials, it is less about foreign subversion of American democracy and more about political power plays. Yet the threat remains and indeed grows. Whether in response to geopolitical crises like Hamas’ attack on Israel or over apps like TikTok, mis– and dis–information is ever present.
Washington certainly has the tools to conduct political warfare operations against Russia and China, but they are so siloed, so disconnected, and their use so fraught with political peril that mounting a coherent operation is nigh impossible. Is it any wonder then that the best the United States can muster is poorly executed strategic communications campaigns? Washington is good at actions in isolation, but rarely on follow–through or in connections across agencies and departments. Sanctions are a good example. Washington has implemented robust sanctions on Russian businesses but has done little to pursue secondary and tertiary sanctions or enforce the original sanctions.
Perhaps more than anything else, this inability to think and act in a proactive manner is the result of Washington’s inability to define a desired effect before acting. Motion is not the same as movement, yet many within the Washington policy ecosystem assume them to be the same. Even then, once an action is taken, that is often the end of the discussion. Covert action by the Central Intelligence Agency is emblematic of this—it is highly proficient in executing specific actions, but if those actions are disconnected from broader policy efforts, Langley’s efforts will fall flat or come to nothing.
Pomerantsev's book is an enjoyable blend of history, biography, and contemporary observation. That it is not a pure attempt at any one of the three makes it unique and worth reflecting upon. Will the West ever get out onto the playing field of the information war? It remains to be seen. In the interim, curious networks of information warriors like Bellingcat and others are attempting to subvert the propaganda and falsehoods of Russia. Yet the challenge will remain: How do you get people to believe the truth when they simply are simply content with performative theater, half-truths, and comforting lies?
