hile Russia remains bogged down in Ukraine, the United States and the European Union seek to strengthen their influence in Central Asian nations that have traditionally been in Moscow’s zone of influence. Although energy-rich Kazakhstan has a special place in both Russian and Western strategies in the region, the war in Ukraine seems to have allowed another regional actor—Kyrgyzstan—to increase its geopolitical importance.
Despite being Russia’s ally in the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO), and a member of the Russian-led Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU), Kyrgyzstan is trying to increase its partnership with the European Union. It is therefore not surprising that the landlocked former Soviet republic of around 6.7 million people hosted the EU-Central Asia summit on 1-2 June 2023. Following the event, the EU officials continued visiting Bishkek.
“Central Asia is a strategically important region for the European Union. Our visit to Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan reconfirmed the need for the EU to intensify its presence in and involvement with the countries of the region”, David McAllister, chairman of the European Parliament’s Committee on Foreign Affairs said following the EU delegation’s visit to the two Central Asian neighboring states on 25 August 2023.
Kyrgyzstan has, however, been criticized for helping Moscow circumvent Western sanctions over the war on Ukraine, which is something that the authorities in Bishkek strongly deny. The United States imposed sanctions on several Kyrgyz companies over their alleged contribution to Russia’s war inUkraine. Some of them were registered in 2022, shortly after Russia launched its full-scale invasion of the Eastern European country. They were reportedly involved in the exports of technology to the Russian Federation. As a result, the Kyrgyzstani State Committee for National Security launched an investigation into the activities of private companies involved in the re-export of sanctioned goods.
The EU, unlike the U.S., does not intend to sanction Kyrgyzstan, or any other Central Asian state, over their alleged assistance to Russia. Moreover, Brussels aims to increase its trade cooperation with Bishkek, hoping to improve its economic presence in the country whose total trade turnover with the EU accounted for only 5% in 2022. Although both Bishkek and Brussels aim to improve bilateral trade, Kyrgyz economic expert Umrat Takirov argues [Russian-language link] that the EU market is not very promising for Kyrgyzstan’s exporters. In his view, the major obstacles for the EU—Kyrgyzstan economic cooperation are high logistics costs, since the Central Asian nation has no seaports, as well as very high EU standards that Kyrgyz products do not comply with. Thus, for the foreseeable future Russia will almost certainly remain Kyrgyzstan’s major trade partner. But will Moscow manage to preserve its political influence in Bishkek?
Although the European Union and the United States have intensified their engagement with partners around the world, including Central Asian states, large parts of Kyrgyzstan’s population remain supportive of Russia’s leadership. More importantly, there is a growing number of Kyrgyzstani migrants in Russia, even though reports suggest they are facing numerous problems in the Russian Federation. Occasional incidents, however, are unlikely to have a major impact on relations between Moscow and Bishkek. The Kremlin seems determined to preserve the former Soviet ally in its zone of influence.
Indeed, Moscow aims to build a new transportation route—within the framework of the International North-South Transportation Corridor (INSTC)—that can ship freight from China through Kyrgyzstan-Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan, then along the Caspian Sea to the Russian port of Astrakhan. The route will bypass Kazakhstan, where the Kremlin is losing influence, and will likely increase Kyrgyzstan’s importance for the Russian strategic planners.
Thus, unlike in energy-rich Kazakhstan, where the West seems to be strengthening its positions, the EU and the U.S. will have a hard time reducing Russian influence in Kyrgyzstan, where Moscow seeks to increase its “soft power.” In an attempt to preserve the Central Asian nation in its sphere of influence, the Kremlin plans to build Russian-language schools in Kyrgyzstan, and it also seeks to preserve Russian as the language of “interethnic communication” in the former Soviet republic, despite Bishkek’s attempts to strengthen the role of Kyrgyz language.
Also, the fact that the court in Bishkek, as a result of the Russian pressure, had to overturn the verdict [Russian-language link] of Askar Kubanychbek-uulu—a Kyrgyz citizen who was sentenced to 10 years in prison for fighting for Russia in Ukraine—clearly indicates that Moscow’s influence in Kyrgyzstan is still relatively strong. But the Russian-Western diplomatic battle for the Central Asian country is far from over, including a U.S.-Central Asia summit this month.
Bishkek’s recent decision to shut down Kloop—a mainly U.S.-funded media organization —might be on the agenda, although such a move by Kyrgyz authorities is unlikely to have a serious impact on relations with the United States. Policy makers in Washington are quite aware that a harsh approach regarding the Central Asian state would almost certainly move Bishkek deeper into the Russian orbit. Therefore, despite sanctions on Kyrgyz companies, and criticism of Bishkek’s media policy, the U.S. will likely seek to improve relations with Kyrgyzstan, aiming to gradually reduce Russian influence in the country.
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The Russian-Western Battle for Influence in Kyrgyzstan
September 25, 2023
The U.S. and EU are looking to strengthen their influence in Central Asia while Russia is focused on its invasion of Ukraine. Kyrgyzstan is emerging as an increasingly important actor in this geopolitical maneuvering, writes DC Correspondent Nikola Mikovic.
W
hile Russia remains bogged down in Ukraine, the United States and the European Union seek to strengthen their influence in Central Asian nations that have traditionally been in Moscow’s zone of influence. Although energy-rich Kazakhstan has a special place in both Russian and Western strategies in the region, the war in Ukraine seems to have allowed another regional actor—Kyrgyzstan—to increase its geopolitical importance.
Despite being Russia’s ally in the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO), and a member of the Russian-led Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU), Kyrgyzstan is trying to increase its partnership with the European Union. It is therefore not surprising that the landlocked former Soviet republic of around 6.7 million people hosted the EU-Central Asia summit on 1-2 June 2023. Following the event, the EU officials continued visiting Bishkek.
“Central Asia is a strategically important region for the European Union. Our visit to Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan reconfirmed the need for the EU to intensify its presence in and involvement with the countries of the region”, David McAllister, chairman of the European Parliament’s Committee on Foreign Affairs said following the EU delegation’s visit to the two Central Asian neighboring states on 25 August 2023.
Kyrgyzstan has, however, been criticized for helping Moscow circumvent Western sanctions over the war on Ukraine, which is something that the authorities in Bishkek strongly deny. The United States imposed sanctions on several Kyrgyz companies over their alleged contribution to Russia’s war inUkraine. Some of them were registered in 2022, shortly after Russia launched its full-scale invasion of the Eastern European country. They were reportedly involved in the exports of technology to the Russian Federation. As a result, the Kyrgyzstani State Committee for National Security launched an investigation into the activities of private companies involved in the re-export of sanctioned goods.
The EU, unlike the U.S., does not intend to sanction Kyrgyzstan, or any other Central Asian state, over their alleged assistance to Russia. Moreover, Brussels aims to increase its trade cooperation with Bishkek, hoping to improve its economic presence in the country whose total trade turnover with the EU accounted for only 5% in 2022. Although both Bishkek and Brussels aim to improve bilateral trade, Kyrgyz economic expert Umrat Takirov argues [Russian-language link] that the EU market is not very promising for Kyrgyzstan’s exporters. In his view, the major obstacles for the EU—Kyrgyzstan economic cooperation are high logistics costs, since the Central Asian nation has no seaports, as well as very high EU standards that Kyrgyz products do not comply with. Thus, for the foreseeable future Russia will almost certainly remain Kyrgyzstan’s major trade partner. But will Moscow manage to preserve its political influence in Bishkek?
Although the European Union and the United States have intensified their engagement with partners around the world, including Central Asian states, large parts of Kyrgyzstan’s population remain supportive of Russia’s leadership. More importantly, there is a growing number of Kyrgyzstani migrants in Russia, even though reports suggest they are facing numerous problems in the Russian Federation. Occasional incidents, however, are unlikely to have a major impact on relations between Moscow and Bishkek. The Kremlin seems determined to preserve the former Soviet ally in its zone of influence.
Indeed, Moscow aims to build a new transportation route—within the framework of the International North-South Transportation Corridor (INSTC)—that can ship freight from China through Kyrgyzstan-Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan, then along the Caspian Sea to the Russian port of Astrakhan. The route will bypass Kazakhstan, where the Kremlin is losing influence, and will likely increase Kyrgyzstan’s importance for the Russian strategic planners.
Thus, unlike in energy-rich Kazakhstan, where the West seems to be strengthening its positions, the EU and the U.S. will have a hard time reducing Russian influence in Kyrgyzstan, where Moscow seeks to increase its “soft power.” In an attempt to preserve the Central Asian nation in its sphere of influence, the Kremlin plans to build Russian-language schools in Kyrgyzstan, and it also seeks to preserve Russian as the language of “interethnic communication” in the former Soviet republic, despite Bishkek’s attempts to strengthen the role of Kyrgyz language.
Also, the fact that the court in Bishkek, as a result of the Russian pressure, had to overturn the verdict [Russian-language link] of Askar Kubanychbek-uulu—a Kyrgyz citizen who was sentenced to 10 years in prison for fighting for Russia in Ukraine—clearly indicates that Moscow’s influence in Kyrgyzstan is still relatively strong. But the Russian-Western diplomatic battle for the Central Asian country is far from over, including a U.S.-Central Asia summit this month.
Bishkek’s recent decision to shut down Kloop—a mainly U.S.-funded media organization —might be on the agenda, although such a move by Kyrgyz authorities is unlikely to have a serious impact on relations with the United States. Policy makers in Washington are quite aware that a harsh approach regarding the Central Asian state would almost certainly move Bishkek deeper into the Russian orbit. Therefore, despite sanctions on Kyrgyz companies, and criticism of Bishkek’s media policy, the U.S. will likely seek to improve relations with Kyrgyzstan, aiming to gradually reduce Russian influence in the country.
