ower competition has become the flavor du jour of recent international polities and academic thought, but what must be considered within the current transition window of the world are rapidly shifting architectures and pressure nodes of international influence. Two key factors to consider: the Biden administration and Defense Secretary Lloyd Austin III’s February NATO Summit attendance clearly signaled a revitalizing of U.S.-NATO partnerships; in addition, Secretary-General Jens Stoltenberg acknowledging the need for more equitable burden sharing on defense costs and operations. The second factor is the pending May 1st withdrawal of all foreign forces from Afghanistan, following the U.S.-Taliban agreement struck in Doha from February 2020. This withdrawal portends the end of the single-greatest draw on the U.S. Special Operation Commands resources, manning, and focus for its present capabilities in the counter-VEO (Violent Extremist Organizations) paradigm.
Both factors greatly influence recommending dramatic shifts in the policies guiding the employment of the Special Operations Enterprise. As this era of warfighting potentially approaches a very real phase gate, with the potential for its final conclusion, the role of SOF will become pivotal in countering state-level aggression abroad. Overt signaling of collaborative security, backed by actual reorientation of forces away from forever-war deployments towards integrative cooperation, and a unified policy that concentrates on the present and future threats to a stable world order are the tools by which the SOF enterprise can continue to spearhead the U.S. defense architecture.
Of note, this analysis recognizes that the discussion on what exactly constitutes great power competition requires acknowledgment that competition does not immediately equate to overt conflict or engaged combat between states. Rather, ‘conflict’ amounts to prestaging against new domains of competition, particular to the [dis]information arena, fomenting dissonance in democratic partnerships, and manipulating narratives (especially in the case of the Chinese Communist Party). The latter is one that promotes authoritarian regimes as legitimate alternatives to a liberal democratic world order. Tantamount to promoting the authoritarian model is achieved by creating discord between the United States and partners abroad, who reside squarely in the theaters where adversaries enjoy increased influence.
While the United States is emerging from a vitriolic election process, our international partnerships have deteriorated due to the rhetoric-driven policies and an outdated concept of power brokering, better suited to a far less nuanced era of geopolitics. Policies that have been predominantly transactional, corporatized, and absent a constructive defense strategy have placed the United States at a pivotal crossroads; continuing the path of 2016-2020 policies is all but certain to isolate us in an increasingly complicated security environment. Turning away from the challenge of rapidly evolving power structures could see us lose our footing as the world’s guarantor of stability. The best alternative then - rebuilding damaged partnerships and fostering new security cooperation, offers the potential for keeping the international order balanced against conflict. Special Operations forces are well equipped to spearhead this change in policy, while achieving tactical advantages over those adversaries through the key avenue of collaborative security integration.
Power brokerage built on cooperation
Modern conflict arenas are not as easily dominated by the U.S. as recent wars have inculcated, a narrative this space has covered at length in previous entries. Further, the mechanisms of warfighting are not as straightforward as traditional means of conflict, demonstrated by the use of the information domain for shaping public opinion, leveraging propaganda to undermine military lines of effort, with the space and information domains residing among avenues where power rivals aim to reduce U.S. and allied freedom of maneuver. Where a revised SOF strategy would yield tremendous benefits is in leveraging the joint nature of special operations elements into improving existing relationships and fostering new security partnerships abroad.
While the waning strategic value of the two-decades conflict in Afghanistan faces its potential final terminus, multiple benefits for the special operations enterprise may be ascribed from the Global War on Terror into the great power’s paradigm. Afghanistan demonstrated a new capability between the United States and partners abroad by engaging in a collaborative, direct intervention against hostile actors abroad. While the campaign in Afghanistan ebbed and flowed over the years, new locales continued the theme of rapid, proficient integration between coalition partners in meeting sudden threats to world stability. The anti-ISIS coalition began as a SOF-led counter-punch to the rapid spread of the Islamic State across Syria and Iraq, eventually supported by 83 states with U.S. and coalition special forces elements leading the fight to reclaim lost territory and prevent a greater conflagration of violence across the Middle East.
This model of rapid integration and deployment demonstrates a unique capability for SOF elements to coordinate efforts between partner states against a common foe, to say nothing of the unique roles of many SOF units who specialize in building and supporting indigenous forces against violent regimes. As this research has covered previously, this is a critical core competency that must return as the focus for SOF elements, in a stark departure from one-and-all tactical SOF components performing direct action counter-terror missions.
In 2021, the old familiars and still emerging arenas of competition and potential conflict are known, but unfamiliar by recent doctrinal SOF methodologies. Chinese aggression, Russian grey-zone operations, African continental vulnerabilities, and the Arctic region have entered the fray as pivotal zones of power influence, vulnerable to rapid escalation into conflict. Special Operations Forces are among the most lethal components in the defense enterprise, yet unilateral force application in these arenas is far too widespread a burden for the U.S. SOF enterprise to tackle alone. Utilizing the template established in Afghanistan, the Anti-ISIS coalition, and similar collaborative efforts, the SOF enterprise should engage partner state defense forces in security operations and response capabilities for deterring adversarial threats.
Operational Constructs
Building on the collaborative counter-terror referential model of Afghanistan and Islamic State responses, rapid deployment and streamlined force projection are the hallmarks of the SOF enterprise. Afghanistan, Iraq, and similar locales served as a demonstration for special operations elements to rapidly enter into areas of conflict. But the idea of relying on crisis to induce crisis-response is a recipe for disadvantage, particularly when considering that the next conflict will likely consist of adversaries whose capabilities easily rival the United States and Allies.
Forward staging SOF elements in the Afghan campaign model does not mean deploying combat troops to allied shores, expecting a combat theater warm-base and ready-made target deck. Rather, this analysis suggests identifying opportunities for training and security operations with partner nations vulnerable to adversary influence. There are many states who’s diplomatic and political entities would benefit tremendously from the overt signaling that coincides with the presence of U.S. Special Operations elements working hand-in-hand with military forces abroad, in particular those NATO partners and states surrounding the South China Sea. Additionally, redefining the role of SOF components arrayed and deployed to the Middle East falls in line with this proposed new construct of security cooperation, albeit where CVEO is certain to remain a foundational cog in the operational wheel.
In short, rather than a constant rotational cycle of special operations teams, aircraft, and multi-domain capabilities returning to catalyzed conflict zones, and targeting the same sites over and over, the enterprise should identify locales to forward stage in collaborative exercises and presence operations, improving the capabilities of host-nations military and security forces against the threat of aggressor forces. Presence alone can serve as a deterrent to adversary interference, whereas the absence of commitment to collaborative security partnerships invites the kind of destabilizing events that have become the trademark of liminal warfare/gray zone operations. In the event of necessary CVEO operations, this construct places SOF elements at forward areas to address such a ‘traditional’ threat requiring specialized and sensitive operational capabilities, but with supported partners incorporated.
Such security partnerships exist across the military spectrum; indeed, the idea of countering state aggression is not a new idea in the SOF community. In Europe, the U.S. SOCEUR-led “Trojan Footprint” exercise pits coalition SOF elements against a simulated Eastern European threat, unifying the special operations capabilities of ten different states forces, building on interoperability, command and control, and improving functional partnerships for multi-lateral operations. In Australia, Exercise Talisman Sabre has fused operational capabilities between U.S. and Australian SOF commands in order to improve force projection, austere operational capabilities, and cross-command force application.
A fusion of these existing exercise templates, further supported by the lessons learned from the GWOT-era for rapid mobilization, offers an opportunity for special operations to insert itself directly into the Great Powers paradigm as a heavyweight power broker. When aligned under a revised, concentrated effort by the U.S. SOF enterprise to identify and develop new opportunities for these events, this construct may act as an extension of political and diplomatic channels. Not only would this approach result in rebuilding international political goodwill, but this model also enables those same forces to be forward staged in the event of potential confrontation.
The aim of this new paradigm of SOF employment is to deter aggression and ensure stability. It serves to push the ‘battle lines’ back, but not to the point of forcing and outbreak of hostilities unless provoked. The goal of forward staging SOF elements with partners old and new would not seek to recreate the conditions of volatility such as those found at the Indo-Chinese border, but would act as a hardline against expansion, incursion, and destabilizing efforts by adversaries in areas of vulnerability.
The New SOF model
Typified by ‘quiet professionalism’, special operations elements have addressed the most sensitive threats to U.S. national security since inception, operating well-below the median of public awareness for many global events. These proposed shifts in SOF application denote a more public, overt application of the force, by deliberate design. Adversaries like Russia have made great efforts to bolster domestic public opinion and promote their special forces capabilities, no doubt saber-rattling to the world order as part of liminal aggression. The Chinese Peoples Liberation Army’s Special Operations Units continue to modernize as well, pursuing opportunities for collaborative development, albeit closer to home field.
Where the U.S. possesses an advantage over these rivals remains in the lessons learned from Afghanistan—we have already adapted to long-distance force projection. While the two-decade war on terror may first appear to have been a disadvantage due to the sheer resources and venture costs, the U.S. and allies are well ahead of competitors in the groundwork of security operations. Despite the spirited attempts at undoing alliances in the previous four years, the foundation for sustaining and growing global partnerships remains ripe for increased cooperation.
This is an opportunity that the SOF enterprise cannot afford to ignore. The U.S. and key NATO/Indo-Pacific partners enjoy the potential for growing the network of allies wherein security cooperation may expand, and fuse like-minded liberal democratic ideals through such ventures. Re-aligning SOF to take on a more profound role of partnership building is a critical paradigm shift that will reset the security environment for 2021, and beyond.
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The New Special Operations Model: Partnerships & Deterrence
March 12, 2021
P
ower competition has become the flavor du jour of recent international polities and academic thought, but what must be considered within the current transition window of the world are rapidly shifting architectures and pressure nodes of international influence. Two key factors to consider: the Biden administration and Defense Secretary Lloyd Austin III’s February NATO Summit attendance clearly signaled a revitalizing of U.S.-NATO partnerships; in addition, Secretary-General Jens Stoltenberg acknowledging the need for more equitable burden sharing on defense costs and operations. The second factor is the pending May 1st withdrawal of all foreign forces from Afghanistan, following the U.S.-Taliban agreement struck in Doha from February 2020. This withdrawal portends the end of the single-greatest draw on the U.S. Special Operation Commands resources, manning, and focus for its present capabilities in the counter-VEO (Violent Extremist Organizations) paradigm.
Both factors greatly influence recommending dramatic shifts in the policies guiding the employment of the Special Operations Enterprise. As this era of warfighting potentially approaches a very real phase gate, with the potential for its final conclusion, the role of SOF will become pivotal in countering state-level aggression abroad. Overt signaling of collaborative security, backed by actual reorientation of forces away from forever-war deployments towards integrative cooperation, and a unified policy that concentrates on the present and future threats to a stable world order are the tools by which the SOF enterprise can continue to spearhead the U.S. defense architecture.
Of note, this analysis recognizes that the discussion on what exactly constitutes great power competition requires acknowledgment that competition does not immediately equate to overt conflict or engaged combat between states. Rather, ‘conflict’ amounts to prestaging against new domains of competition, particular to the [dis]information arena, fomenting dissonance in democratic partnerships, and manipulating narratives (especially in the case of the Chinese Communist Party). The latter is one that promotes authoritarian regimes as legitimate alternatives to a liberal democratic world order. Tantamount to promoting the authoritarian model is achieved by creating discord between the United States and partners abroad, who reside squarely in the theaters where adversaries enjoy increased influence.
While the United States is emerging from a vitriolic election process, our international partnerships have deteriorated due to the rhetoric-driven policies and an outdated concept of power brokering, better suited to a far less nuanced era of geopolitics. Policies that have been predominantly transactional, corporatized, and absent a constructive defense strategy have placed the United States at a pivotal crossroads; continuing the path of 2016-2020 policies is all but certain to isolate us in an increasingly complicated security environment. Turning away from the challenge of rapidly evolving power structures could see us lose our footing as the world’s guarantor of stability. The best alternative then - rebuilding damaged partnerships and fostering new security cooperation, offers the potential for keeping the international order balanced against conflict. Special Operations forces are well equipped to spearhead this change in policy, while achieving tactical advantages over those adversaries through the key avenue of collaborative security integration.
Power brokerage built on cooperation
Modern conflict arenas are not as easily dominated by the U.S. as recent wars have inculcated, a narrative this space has covered at length in previous entries. Further, the mechanisms of warfighting are not as straightforward as traditional means of conflict, demonstrated by the use of the information domain for shaping public opinion, leveraging propaganda to undermine military lines of effort, with the space and information domains residing among avenues where power rivals aim to reduce U.S. and allied freedom of maneuver. Where a revised SOF strategy would yield tremendous benefits is in leveraging the joint nature of special operations elements into improving existing relationships and fostering new security partnerships abroad.
While the waning strategic value of the two-decades conflict in Afghanistan faces its potential final terminus, multiple benefits for the special operations enterprise may be ascribed from the Global War on Terror into the great power’s paradigm. Afghanistan demonstrated a new capability between the United States and partners abroad by engaging in a collaborative, direct intervention against hostile actors abroad. While the campaign in Afghanistan ebbed and flowed over the years, new locales continued the theme of rapid, proficient integration between coalition partners in meeting sudden threats to world stability. The anti-ISIS coalition began as a SOF-led counter-punch to the rapid spread of the Islamic State across Syria and Iraq, eventually supported by 83 states with U.S. and coalition special forces elements leading the fight to reclaim lost territory and prevent a greater conflagration of violence across the Middle East.
This model of rapid integration and deployment demonstrates a unique capability for SOF elements to coordinate efforts between partner states against a common foe, to say nothing of the unique roles of many SOF units who specialize in building and supporting indigenous forces against violent regimes. As this research has covered previously, this is a critical core competency that must return as the focus for SOF elements, in a stark departure from one-and-all tactical SOF components performing direct action counter-terror missions.
In 2021, the old familiars and still emerging arenas of competition and potential conflict are known, but unfamiliar by recent doctrinal SOF methodologies. Chinese aggression, Russian grey-zone operations, African continental vulnerabilities, and the Arctic region have entered the fray as pivotal zones of power influence, vulnerable to rapid escalation into conflict. Special Operations Forces are among the most lethal components in the defense enterprise, yet unilateral force application in these arenas is far too widespread a burden for the U.S. SOF enterprise to tackle alone. Utilizing the template established in Afghanistan, the Anti-ISIS coalition, and similar collaborative efforts, the SOF enterprise should engage partner state defense forces in security operations and response capabilities for deterring adversarial threats.
Operational Constructs
Building on the collaborative counter-terror referential model of Afghanistan and Islamic State responses, rapid deployment and streamlined force projection are the hallmarks of the SOF enterprise. Afghanistan, Iraq, and similar locales served as a demonstration for special operations elements to rapidly enter into areas of conflict. But the idea of relying on crisis to induce crisis-response is a recipe for disadvantage, particularly when considering that the next conflict will likely consist of adversaries whose capabilities easily rival the United States and Allies.
Forward staging SOF elements in the Afghan campaign model does not mean deploying combat troops to allied shores, expecting a combat theater warm-base and ready-made target deck. Rather, this analysis suggests identifying opportunities for training and security operations with partner nations vulnerable to adversary influence. There are many states who’s diplomatic and political entities would benefit tremendously from the overt signaling that coincides with the presence of U.S. Special Operations elements working hand-in-hand with military forces abroad, in particular those NATO partners and states surrounding the South China Sea. Additionally, redefining the role of SOF components arrayed and deployed to the Middle East falls in line with this proposed new construct of security cooperation, albeit where CVEO is certain to remain a foundational cog in the operational wheel.
In short, rather than a constant rotational cycle of special operations teams, aircraft, and multi-domain capabilities returning to catalyzed conflict zones, and targeting the same sites over and over, the enterprise should identify locales to forward stage in collaborative exercises and presence operations, improving the capabilities of host-nations military and security forces against the threat of aggressor forces. Presence alone can serve as a deterrent to adversary interference, whereas the absence of commitment to collaborative security partnerships invites the kind of destabilizing events that have become the trademark of liminal warfare/gray zone operations. In the event of necessary CVEO operations, this construct places SOF elements at forward areas to address such a ‘traditional’ threat requiring specialized and sensitive operational capabilities, but with supported partners incorporated.
Such security partnerships exist across the military spectrum; indeed, the idea of countering state aggression is not a new idea in the SOF community. In Europe, the U.S. SOCEUR-led “Trojan Footprint” exercise pits coalition SOF elements against a simulated Eastern European threat, unifying the special operations capabilities of ten different states forces, building on interoperability, command and control, and improving functional partnerships for multi-lateral operations. In Australia, Exercise Talisman Sabre has fused operational capabilities between U.S. and Australian SOF commands in order to improve force projection, austere operational capabilities, and cross-command force application.
A fusion of these existing exercise templates, further supported by the lessons learned from the GWOT-era for rapid mobilization, offers an opportunity for special operations to insert itself directly into the Great Powers paradigm as a heavyweight power broker. When aligned under a revised, concentrated effort by the U.S. SOF enterprise to identify and develop new opportunities for these events, this construct may act as an extension of political and diplomatic channels. Not only would this approach result in rebuilding international political goodwill, but this model also enables those same forces to be forward staged in the event of potential confrontation.
The aim of this new paradigm of SOF employment is to deter aggression and ensure stability. It serves to push the ‘battle lines’ back, but not to the point of forcing and outbreak of hostilities unless provoked. The goal of forward staging SOF elements with partners old and new would not seek to recreate the conditions of volatility such as those found at the Indo-Chinese border, but would act as a hardline against expansion, incursion, and destabilizing efforts by adversaries in areas of vulnerability.
The New SOF model
Typified by ‘quiet professionalism’, special operations elements have addressed the most sensitive threats to U.S. national security since inception, operating well-below the median of public awareness for many global events. These proposed shifts in SOF application denote a more public, overt application of the force, by deliberate design. Adversaries like Russia have made great efforts to bolster domestic public opinion and promote their special forces capabilities, no doubt saber-rattling to the world order as part of liminal aggression. The Chinese Peoples Liberation Army’s Special Operations Units continue to modernize as well, pursuing opportunities for collaborative development, albeit closer to home field.
Where the U.S. possesses an advantage over these rivals remains in the lessons learned from Afghanistan—we have already adapted to long-distance force projection. While the two-decade war on terror may first appear to have been a disadvantage due to the sheer resources and venture costs, the U.S. and allies are well ahead of competitors in the groundwork of security operations. Despite the spirited attempts at undoing alliances in the previous four years, the foundation for sustaining and growing global partnerships remains ripe for increased cooperation.
This is an opportunity that the SOF enterprise cannot afford to ignore. The U.S. and key NATO/Indo-Pacific partners enjoy the potential for growing the network of allies wherein security cooperation may expand, and fuse like-minded liberal democratic ideals through such ventures. Re-aligning SOF to take on a more profound role of partnership building is a critical paradigm shift that will reset the security environment for 2021, and beyond.
