he world remains transfixed on Ukraine’s front lines, but it’s not too soon to consider how the balance of power in Europe will look once the military confrontation is concluded. At the other end of this conflict, Europe will face a vastly different regional environment, one where conventional war has come back to Europe; Ukraine will likely have increased influence; and Russia will dramatically altered, especially if this past weekends bizarre Prigozhin rebellion is indicative of Putin’s weakness. Strategists have already begun wondering how NATO should look on the other side of this conflict, and the same question should be asked of the European Union and regional balance of power.
Key players throughout Europe have deepened their commitment to multilateral cooperation with Ukraine, France, Germany and Poland—committing to sustained aid for Ukraine’s counteroffensive well ahead of a NATO summit meant to address the same issue. The European Union continues to support Ukraine with sanctions packages and considerable financial aid for reconstruction—not to mention approving Ukraine’s EU membership bid a year ago.
Smaller regional country groupings continue to work together as well. In the early spring, Norway, Sweden, Finland, and Denmark announced a “common Nordic Warfighting Concept for Joint Air Operations,” indicating another significant shift in warfighting capabilities within the European ecosystem. This change allocates roughly 250 total Nordic aircraft towards a collective defense system on par with NATO heavyweights such as France and the U.K.
Ukraine, for its part, is consistent with pursuing security guarantees from the alliance as a path towards full NATO membership. It should be noted that, while this conflict remains ongoing (an objective for Moscow), Ukraine’s entry into the alliance is not an option until the conflict is resolved one way or another.
These trends denote that the present hierarchy of European states and the European Union as an institution remains committed to increased collaboration, but actors throughout Europe are looking at a means for offsetting the complexities of regional instability in the coming years postwar.
Military Metrics and Regional Balancing
Regardless of whether or not Ukraine is successfully admitted into the alliance, it already possesses a military on par with some of NATO’s strongest and most advanced defense forces, and this is before the arrival of fourth-generation fighter jets promised by the United States and European partners. According to the Global Firepower Index, which tracks military capabilities by data collection and quantitative analysis, Ukraine is a Top 15 world power due to their security enterprise effectively built on the fly since February 2022.
For reference, if Ukraine joined NATO today, it would be the alliances sixth-most powerful military—out-stripping Poland, Germany, Canada, and nearly equaling Turkey (who sits comfortably in fifth place within NATO.) Kyiv has been the recipient of an unprecedented amount of security and defense aid, which inarguably serves the interests of the liberal order of states in contending with Moscow’s imperialist aggression.
However, sponsoring the rapid military marshaling of Ukraine—who has yet to define long-term strategic goals relative to Europe—or how Kyiv envisions integrating into the European balance of power, creates questions that must be addressed sooner than later. It is understandable that the present fixation is the summer counteroffensive against a staunch Russian defense in the East, one which promises to be a bloody and exhausting affair, but Ukraine has failed to define a role for itself or determine which opportunities to pursue post-conflict—none of which are a positive net gain for NATO or the EU.
The Fallout of a Sudden, New Regional Power
First, Ukraine’s potential accession into NATO will immediately alter the influence and leverage of various key actors within the alliance. The UK, for one, has concerns over its waning influence in the Alliance due to shrinking defense inventories. Turkey, with its 5th-rated military force, owns outsized influence over key NATO decisions—demonstrated by the delay on Sweden and Finland’s enrollment. The groundwork already exists for internal competition between Turkey and Ukraine based on the former’s ties with Russia in recent years, as well as a geographic competitive arena involving the Black Sea and its lucrative trade routes. Turkey is not above undermining NATO alliance stability, exhibited by its ongoing dispute with Greece over territory and maritime rights in the Mediterranean. Turkey’s close and complicated relationship with Russia has undermined NATO efforts, even during the recent conflict where they have failed to employ sanctions against Moscow and have increased Russian energy purchases. Additionally, the sudden rise of an influential Ukraine would present a direct challenge to Turkey’s continued balancing act between its NATO obligations and ongoing collaboration with Russia.
The question on future European power balancing assumes the emergence of Ukraine after the conflict is concluded. The legitimacy given to Kyiv after such an endeavor is incalculable, but it requires Moscow’s descent from its precarious perch as a driver of regional and international affairs. This would require far greater international intervention (escalation and scope of conflict). Therefore, even if Ukraine prevails after the war—and this should be the objective of the West—Europe will need to find a means of coexisting with a weakened Russia. The EU is capable of doing as much, certainly, but Ukraine will have an important role in post-conflict balance of power in Europe, especially as a potential new EU member state.
What the Trends Indicate
Zooming out further, global trends have highlighted the reality that multilateralism and globalization writ large remain fragile as states continue isolated policies and focus more on domestic sovereignty over volatile international integration. The COVID-19 pandemic had notable influence in this growing trend, but regionalization is not a new phenomenon, and the war in Ukraine appears to signal a potential renewed effort for multilateralism. Kyiv faces the long-term challenge of rebuilding a broken nation after this war, albeit with considerable European investment and cooperation. The Russian invasion calcified NATO by necessity, coming a long way from its alleged “brain death” just a few years ago.
Further, the European Union has openly supported a Ukraine reconstruction over the long term. Sentiment across European states is strong that the best path forward for international cooperation would be Ukraine’s admission to the EU before NATO, an option which hasn’t been discussed enough. Yet not all is positive, the war has created division inside of the EU, especially amongst Eastern European nations and the France-Germany heart of the Union.
While the war in Ukraine has strengthened the EU as both a bloc and the representative regional power in Europe, the EU is traditionally focused on promoting free trade and prosperity between its members, and Ukraine’s war has increased the Union’s focus on providing military, humanitarian, and financial support—as well as cementing further trans-Atlantic cooperation. Thus, the EU is in the process of reinventing itself as a foreign and security political actor—a welcome development.
Ukraine will be focused on a short-term goal of rebuilding once the Russia threat has been deterred, making it a fragile state with a modernized military and figurative indebtedness to the West influx. While Kyiv has openly declared its intention for deepened EU integration, its sudden leap in European power rankings might be a challenge for the rest of the bloc. What remains unclear is how Ukraine’s rapid military growth will impact its future integration into the European Union, the North Atlantic Alliance, and, generally speaking, the wider balance of power in Europe.
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The European Order After the Ukraine War
Image by Cuong DUONG Viet from Pixabay
July 5, 2023
The war in Ukraine has strengthened the EU as a bloc and the representative regional power in Europe. While this is a welcome development, Ukraine's inclusion in the EU could represent significant challenges for the bloc as a whole, write Ethan Brown and Veera Parko.
T
he world remains transfixed on Ukraine’s front lines, but it’s not too soon to consider how the balance of power in Europe will look once the military confrontation is concluded. At the other end of this conflict, Europe will face a vastly different regional environment, one where conventional war has come back to Europe; Ukraine will likely have increased influence; and Russia will dramatically altered, especially if this past weekends bizarre Prigozhin rebellion is indicative of Putin’s weakness. Strategists have already begun wondering how NATO should look on the other side of this conflict, and the same question should be asked of the European Union and regional balance of power.
Key players throughout Europe have deepened their commitment to multilateral cooperation with Ukraine, France, Germany and Poland—committing to sustained aid for Ukraine’s counteroffensive well ahead of a NATO summit meant to address the same issue. The European Union continues to support Ukraine with sanctions packages and considerable financial aid for reconstruction—not to mention approving Ukraine’s EU membership bid a year ago.
Smaller regional country groupings continue to work together as well. In the early spring, Norway, Sweden, Finland, and Denmark announced a “common Nordic Warfighting Concept for Joint Air Operations,” indicating another significant shift in warfighting capabilities within the European ecosystem. This change allocates roughly 250 total Nordic aircraft towards a collective defense system on par with NATO heavyweights such as France and the U.K.
Ukraine, for its part, is consistent with pursuing security guarantees from the alliance as a path towards full NATO membership. It should be noted that, while this conflict remains ongoing (an objective for Moscow), Ukraine’s entry into the alliance is not an option until the conflict is resolved one way or another.
These trends denote that the present hierarchy of European states and the European Union as an institution remains committed to increased collaboration, but actors throughout Europe are looking at a means for offsetting the complexities of regional instability in the coming years postwar.
Military Metrics and Regional Balancing
Regardless of whether or not Ukraine is successfully admitted into the alliance, it already possesses a military on par with some of NATO’s strongest and most advanced defense forces, and this is before the arrival of fourth-generation fighter jets promised by the United States and European partners. According to the Global Firepower Index, which tracks military capabilities by data collection and quantitative analysis, Ukraine is a Top 15 world power due to their security enterprise effectively built on the fly since February 2022.
For reference, if Ukraine joined NATO today, it would be the alliances sixth-most powerful military—out-stripping Poland, Germany, Canada, and nearly equaling Turkey (who sits comfortably in fifth place within NATO.) Kyiv has been the recipient of an unprecedented amount of security and defense aid, which inarguably serves the interests of the liberal order of states in contending with Moscow’s imperialist aggression.
However, sponsoring the rapid military marshaling of Ukraine—who has yet to define long-term strategic goals relative to Europe—or how Kyiv envisions integrating into the European balance of power, creates questions that must be addressed sooner than later. It is understandable that the present fixation is the summer counteroffensive against a staunch Russian defense in the East, one which promises to be a bloody and exhausting affair, but Ukraine has failed to define a role for itself or determine which opportunities to pursue post-conflict—none of which are a positive net gain for NATO or the EU.
The Fallout of a Sudden, New Regional Power
First, Ukraine’s potential accession into NATO will immediately alter the influence and leverage of various key actors within the alliance. The UK, for one, has concerns over its waning influence in the Alliance due to shrinking defense inventories. Turkey, with its 5th-rated military force, owns outsized influence over key NATO decisions—demonstrated by the delay on Sweden and Finland’s enrollment. The groundwork already exists for internal competition between Turkey and Ukraine based on the former’s ties with Russia in recent years, as well as a geographic competitive arena involving the Black Sea and its lucrative trade routes. Turkey is not above undermining NATO alliance stability, exhibited by its ongoing dispute with Greece over territory and maritime rights in the Mediterranean. Turkey’s close and complicated relationship with Russia has undermined NATO efforts, even during the recent conflict where they have failed to employ sanctions against Moscow and have increased Russian energy purchases. Additionally, the sudden rise of an influential Ukraine would present a direct challenge to Turkey’s continued balancing act between its NATO obligations and ongoing collaboration with Russia.
The question on future European power balancing assumes the emergence of Ukraine after the conflict is concluded. The legitimacy given to Kyiv after such an endeavor is incalculable, but it requires Moscow’s descent from its precarious perch as a driver of regional and international affairs. This would require far greater international intervention (escalation and scope of conflict). Therefore, even if Ukraine prevails after the war—and this should be the objective of the West—Europe will need to find a means of coexisting with a weakened Russia. The EU is capable of doing as much, certainly, but Ukraine will have an important role in post-conflict balance of power in Europe, especially as a potential new EU member state.
What the Trends Indicate
Zooming out further, global trends have highlighted the reality that multilateralism and globalization writ large remain fragile as states continue isolated policies and focus more on domestic sovereignty over volatile international integration. The COVID-19 pandemic had notable influence in this growing trend, but regionalization is not a new phenomenon, and the war in Ukraine appears to signal a potential renewed effort for multilateralism. Kyiv faces the long-term challenge of rebuilding a broken nation after this war, albeit with considerable European investment and cooperation. The Russian invasion calcified NATO by necessity, coming a long way from its alleged “brain death” just a few years ago.
Further, the European Union has openly supported a Ukraine reconstruction over the long term. Sentiment across European states is strong that the best path forward for international cooperation would be Ukraine’s admission to the EU before NATO, an option which hasn’t been discussed enough. Yet not all is positive, the war has created division inside of the EU, especially amongst Eastern European nations and the France-Germany heart of the Union.
While the war in Ukraine has strengthened the EU as both a bloc and the representative regional power in Europe, the EU is traditionally focused on promoting free trade and prosperity between its members, and Ukraine’s war has increased the Union’s focus on providing military, humanitarian, and financial support—as well as cementing further trans-Atlantic cooperation. Thus, the EU is in the process of reinventing itself as a foreign and security political actor—a welcome development.
Ukraine will be focused on a short-term goal of rebuilding once the Russia threat has been deterred, making it a fragile state with a modernized military and figurative indebtedness to the West influx. While Kyiv has openly declared its intention for deepened EU integration, its sudden leap in European power rankings might be a challenge for the rest of the bloc. What remains unclear is how Ukraine’s rapid military growth will impact its future integration into the European Union, the North Atlantic Alliance, and, generally speaking, the wider balance of power in Europe.
