al Brands and Michael Beckley’s “Danger Zone” opens with a fictional nightmare scenario—war between the United States and China. An increasingly common scene found in the pages of thrillers and policy books alike, but Brands and Beckley take a different, and welcome, tack to the outbreak of this scenario. In so doing they offer up one of the more thought-provoking non-fiction entries into this crowded genre.
The authors argue that the traditional understanding of the causes of great power conflict alone is insufficient. Under classic interpretations, power transitions are the point of maximum risk—or put another way, when a state is about to be eclipsed by a rising competitor, the risks of conflict are most significant. Following this assessment Beijing’s increasing political and economic power and America’s relative decline could lead to war.
Brands and Beckley do not seek to replace that theory, but instead offer a corrective addendum. It is not the power transition alone that creates the greatest risk, it is the potential of China as a “peaking power” that could lead to war. A China that fails to meet its own ambitions and expectations could see expansionist conflict as a way to close a window of vulnerability or seize upon a closing window of opportunity. This is an interesting argument to consider, especially given the panoply of books that accept China’s continued rise as inevitable and merely regurgitate the bog-standard line of great power conflict—books that reference the often cited, but little read, Graham Allison’s “Destined for War: Can America and China Escape Thucydides’s Trap?”
The authors make a compelling and well-supported argument about how conflict could arise from a nation-state peaking or fearing a peak in its power prior to an inevitable decline or stagnation. Referencing Germany prior to the First World War and Japan prior to the Second World War, the authors write that Berlin and Tokyo found themselves in politically and economically dire straits. Once their unstoppable rise had stalled, they then found themselves with few options other than acting to offset the peak and decline. They were politically confident at home, but uncertain of themselves abroad. Katja Hoyer charts the rise and fall of the German Empire in her superb book “Blood and Iron,” which provides further support for Brands and Beckley’s argument.
For the authors, economically, Beijing has been padding the books for years and much of the sustained growth came from government infusion of state capital into the economy. Demographically, China’s population risks considerable contraction as a result of the one-child policy and gender preferences for boys. The country will face a booming elderly population without the attendant younger cohort to sustain economic growth or the tax base necessary to support the aging population. The country sees environment degradation at an alarming rate. Politically, and as a result of President Xi Jinping’s centralization of power, there is little flexibility or institutional responsiveness—China is, in their view, increasingly looking like a late-stage Soviet Union. For Brands and Beckley, there are few if any attractive options for the Chinese Communist Party—reforming the economy would require breaking patronage networks which is politically unpalatable or loosening the reins of the Party which is as equally untenable for the CCP.
This creates the “Danger Zone”—a politically and economically stagnating China that could see its only option as aggressive expansion and forcing its desired aims on regional and global communities to offset its peak and inevitable decline. This strikes a welcome balance between dismissing China outright and assuming its rise is an unstoppable force.
The authors note that Beijing is undertaking efforts to stop this stagnation in terms of investment in high-tech industries and aggressive engagement in multilateral institutions. However, these efforts are unlikely to achieve the structural changes necessary to fully avoid China’s peak and the failure of the “China dream.” In their mind, these are longer-term solutions to what are ultimately short-term pressing challenges.
The authors draw lessons from the Cold War and apply it to the present conflict and potential danger zone. It is an interesting approach and one well informed by the authors’ expertise. The recommendations are sensible and cogent, but predicated on two inter-related and mutually reinforcing distinctions that separate the current environment from the Cold War period. To their credit, they rightly note that it is not a perfect analogue, but that the Cold War’s ideological struggle provided a far more coherent narrative and mobilizing function than the present dynamic—at least thus far. This could well change should Beijing launch a war of aggression against Taiwan, the Philippines, Indonesia, or elsewhere in the region. Indeed, Beijing’s (over)reaction to House Speaker Nancy Pelosi’s visit to Taiwan exposed China’s deep insecurities on the world stage.
While the appreciation of the threat from China’s power and ambitions has risen, it does not yet possess the same whole-of-nation urgency that the fight against the Soviet Union provided during the Cold War. This is changing. There is an emerging whole-of-government consensus in the United States that is to be welcomed, but Washington was slow getting off the starting block. Perhaps even more importantly, the Cold War’s ideological struggle was far better understood and shared by America’s allies in Europe—which is not the case now. As one think tank head commented to me, Europe finds issues with China’s behavior, not its power. While this may oversimplify the dynamic, it is indicative of the differing attitudes between Washington and its European counterparts. China’s attractiveness as a large market, its financial largesse, and its willingness to engage in economic warfare in pursuit of its interests could all limit European unity on perceived Chinese aggression. This too is changing, but remains far from the animating factor of the Warsaw Pact on Europe’s eastern front.
With Russia’s war in Ukraine, the likelihood that Europe will be able to pivot toward the Indo-Pacific is even more circumscribed. Ironically, Brands and Beckley point to Russia as illustrative of the “danger zone” in practice—a weakening political and economic position that drives expansionist and aggressive action. They also note, quite rightly, that Washington cannot afford to neglect Europe and Russia as it pivots to the Indo-Pacific. Indeed, in some ways Russia’s war could help the U.S. efforts to pivot toward China—a mobilized and re-militarized Europe would free American assets to focus on the Indo-Pacific. Without question, Washington needs sustained mobilization in Europe to ensure it does not find itself engaged in a two-front strategic conflict.
Early in the book, Brands and Beckley offer an underlying, but much welcomed, critique of the consensus that prior hopes that China would politically liberalize as it economically opened and would benefit the United States were wholly without intellectual merit. This is a slowly emerging, if unwelcome consensus, in the policy community. Naïve hopes that Beijing would politically liberalize as it economically opened to the West were founded on irrational beliefs and were in stark contrast with the words of China’s own leaders.
The other challenge facing America’s response to China’s challenge is that the most useful tools in avoiding the risks of the danger zone are not wholly in the hands of Washington. Silicon Valley, Wall Street, Hollywood, and other power centers are not as ideologically sympathetic as they perhaps were during the Cold War. The flawed political and economic consensus remains heavily imbibed by many within those institutions (though this too is changing). At the same time, Washington has fewer levers than it once did to affect their collective behavior. Here again, China’s own actions are helping spur a change in that attitude—Hollywood is increasingly unwilling to change its films to suit Chinese markets and both Washington and Silicon Valley are working to onshore or “friend-shore” semiconductor manufacturing.
Unique among many China policy books, “Danger Zone” also posits what happens when Washington gets through the titular risk and when the trends underpinning the danger come to pass. This too is a welcome change from many of the China-focused policy books. While it is wholly speculative, thinking through the longer-term, as Brands and Beckley do, is exceedingly vital for policymaking and planning. Competition with China—and one does hope it remains competition and not conflict—is a long-term endeavor.
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The Dangers of a Great Leap Missed
Beijing, China. Photo by Markus Winkler via Unsplash.
October 8, 2022
“Danger Zone” by Hal Brands and Michael Beckley looks at U.S. competition—and potential conflict—with China. In his latest review, Joshua Huminksi explores this book, writing that it’s one of the more thought-provoking non-fiction entries in this crowded genre.
H
al Brands and Michael Beckley’s “Danger Zone” opens with a fictional nightmare scenario—war between the United States and China. An increasingly common scene found in the pages of thrillers and policy books alike, but Brands and Beckley take a different, and welcome, tack to the outbreak of this scenario. In so doing they offer up one of the more thought-provoking non-fiction entries into this crowded genre.
The authors argue that the traditional understanding of the causes of great power conflict alone is insufficient. Under classic interpretations, power transitions are the point of maximum risk—or put another way, when a state is about to be eclipsed by a rising competitor, the risks of conflict are most significant. Following this assessment Beijing’s increasing political and economic power and America’s relative decline could lead to war.
Brands and Beckley do not seek to replace that theory, but instead offer a corrective addendum. It is not the power transition alone that creates the greatest risk, it is the potential of China as a “peaking power” that could lead to war. A China that fails to meet its own ambitions and expectations could see expansionist conflict as a way to close a window of vulnerability or seize upon a closing window of opportunity. This is an interesting argument to consider, especially given the panoply of books that accept China’s continued rise as inevitable and merely regurgitate the bog-standard line of great power conflict—books that reference the often cited, but little read, Graham Allison’s “Destined for War: Can America and China Escape Thucydides’s Trap?”
The authors make a compelling and well-supported argument about how conflict could arise from a nation-state peaking or fearing a peak in its power prior to an inevitable decline or stagnation. Referencing Germany prior to the First World War and Japan prior to the Second World War, the authors write that Berlin and Tokyo found themselves in politically and economically dire straits. Once their unstoppable rise had stalled, they then found themselves with few options other than acting to offset the peak and decline. They were politically confident at home, but uncertain of themselves abroad. Katja Hoyer charts the rise and fall of the German Empire in her superb book “Blood and Iron,” which provides further support for Brands and Beckley’s argument.
For the authors, economically, Beijing has been padding the books for years and much of the sustained growth came from government infusion of state capital into the economy. Demographically, China’s population risks considerable contraction as a result of the one-child policy and gender preferences for boys. The country will face a booming elderly population without the attendant younger cohort to sustain economic growth or the tax base necessary to support the aging population. The country sees environment degradation at an alarming rate. Politically, and as a result of President Xi Jinping’s centralization of power, there is little flexibility or institutional responsiveness—China is, in their view, increasingly looking like a late-stage Soviet Union. For Brands and Beckley, there are few if any attractive options for the Chinese Communist Party—reforming the economy would require breaking patronage networks which is politically unpalatable or loosening the reins of the Party which is as equally untenable for the CCP.
This creates the “Danger Zone”—a politically and economically stagnating China that could see its only option as aggressive expansion and forcing its desired aims on regional and global communities to offset its peak and inevitable decline. This strikes a welcome balance between dismissing China outright and assuming its rise is an unstoppable force.
The authors note that Beijing is undertaking efforts to stop this stagnation in terms of investment in high-tech industries and aggressive engagement in multilateral institutions. However, these efforts are unlikely to achieve the structural changes necessary to fully avoid China’s peak and the failure of the “China dream.” In their mind, these are longer-term solutions to what are ultimately short-term pressing challenges.
The authors draw lessons from the Cold War and apply it to the present conflict and potential danger zone. It is an interesting approach and one well informed by the authors’ expertise. The recommendations are sensible and cogent, but predicated on two inter-related and mutually reinforcing distinctions that separate the current environment from the Cold War period. To their credit, they rightly note that it is not a perfect analogue, but that the Cold War’s ideological struggle provided a far more coherent narrative and mobilizing function than the present dynamic—at least thus far. This could well change should Beijing launch a war of aggression against Taiwan, the Philippines, Indonesia, or elsewhere in the region. Indeed, Beijing’s (over)reaction to House Speaker Nancy Pelosi’s visit to Taiwan exposed China’s deep insecurities on the world stage.
While the appreciation of the threat from China’s power and ambitions has risen, it does not yet possess the same whole-of-nation urgency that the fight against the Soviet Union provided during the Cold War. This is changing. There is an emerging whole-of-government consensus in the United States that is to be welcomed, but Washington was slow getting off the starting block. Perhaps even more importantly, the Cold War’s ideological struggle was far better understood and shared by America’s allies in Europe—which is not the case now. As one think tank head commented to me, Europe finds issues with China’s behavior, not its power. While this may oversimplify the dynamic, it is indicative of the differing attitudes between Washington and its European counterparts. China’s attractiveness as a large market, its financial largesse, and its willingness to engage in economic warfare in pursuit of its interests could all limit European unity on perceived Chinese aggression. This too is changing, but remains far from the animating factor of the Warsaw Pact on Europe’s eastern front.
With Russia’s war in Ukraine, the likelihood that Europe will be able to pivot toward the Indo-Pacific is even more circumscribed. Ironically, Brands and Beckley point to Russia as illustrative of the “danger zone” in practice—a weakening political and economic position that drives expansionist and aggressive action. They also note, quite rightly, that Washington cannot afford to neglect Europe and Russia as it pivots to the Indo-Pacific. Indeed, in some ways Russia’s war could help the U.S. efforts to pivot toward China—a mobilized and re-militarized Europe would free American assets to focus on the Indo-Pacific. Without question, Washington needs sustained mobilization in Europe to ensure it does not find itself engaged in a two-front strategic conflict.
Early in the book, Brands and Beckley offer an underlying, but much welcomed, critique of the consensus that prior hopes that China would politically liberalize as it economically opened and would benefit the United States were wholly without intellectual merit. This is a slowly emerging, if unwelcome consensus, in the policy community. Naïve hopes that Beijing would politically liberalize as it economically opened to the West were founded on irrational beliefs and were in stark contrast with the words of China’s own leaders.
The other challenge facing America’s response to China’s challenge is that the most useful tools in avoiding the risks of the danger zone are not wholly in the hands of Washington. Silicon Valley, Wall Street, Hollywood, and other power centers are not as ideologically sympathetic as they perhaps were during the Cold War. The flawed political and economic consensus remains heavily imbibed by many within those institutions (though this too is changing). At the same time, Washington has fewer levers than it once did to affect their collective behavior. Here again, China’s own actions are helping spur a change in that attitude—Hollywood is increasingly unwilling to change its films to suit Chinese markets and both Washington and Silicon Valley are working to onshore or “friend-shore” semiconductor manufacturing.
Unique among many China policy books, “Danger Zone” also posits what happens when Washington gets through the titular risk and when the trends underpinning the danger come to pass. This too is a welcome change from many of the China-focused policy books. While it is wholly speculative, thinking through the longer-term, as Brands and Beckley do, is exceedingly vital for policymaking and planning. Competition with China—and one does hope it remains competition and not conflict—is a long-term endeavor.
