When students enrolled in academic programs on international relations talk about contemporary world order, invariably the idea of Sino-American competition for world dominance comes up. This point has become so ubiquitous that is often accepted axiomatically by the vast majority of the world. The Obama administration’s “Pivot to Asia” and a growing Chinese nationalistic appetite vis-à-vis U.S. allies notwithstanding, there is another, more overwhelming challenge that is welcoming the world to its difficult terrain: the growing Sino-Indian competition in South Asia, South-East Asia, and the Asia Pacific. The tremendous unease between two giants can be referred to as “Chindia,” a portmanteau that the credit for the coining of goes to Indian MP Jairam Ramesh. Will global development be bedeviled by this “Chindian” overwhelming challenge? Here are a number of clues to the real nitty-gritty of Chindia
First, population, size of economies, and the potential for further economic growth greatly matter in relation to Chindia. Together, China and India contain over one-third of the world's population (2.5 billion). These economies collectively accounted for more than 19 percent of the global GDP on a Purchasing Power Parity (PPP) scale in 2010. And this is expected to grow even more in the foreseeable future, according to the International Monetary Fund. Both countries are vastly dependent on importing resources and the severe competition between them throughout the world markets for resources such as oil and gas is guaranteed. In addition to this, predicted food scarcity and “farms” races will accelerate the possibility of tete-a-tete clash between two gigantic consumer societies.
Second, the disparities between socio-political circumstances of Chinese and Indian societies are of paramount importance. While India is the largest democracy in the world, China still follows a one-party system. India is building a pluralistic society based on hundreds of political parties, while the Chinese government rejects political freedoms and healthy political competition. For example, we can look to the famous case of the Nobel Prize winner, Liu Xiaobo, who is serving an 11-year term for his activism demanding more democracy and independent courts in his country. His wife, who has never been convicted of any crime, is under house arrest. Today, he remains in jail, as China's most famous political prisoner. This once more reminds us of the notorious Tienanmen Square protests of 1989, also known as the "June Fourth Incident" in Chinese or the June 4 Massacre. Thus, this socio-political gap can grow to an ideological level: democracy vs authoritarianism.
Third, disputed territories alongside the Sino-Indian border have created a historical enmity between the two nations. In the modern world, the possibility of deployment of conventional as well as nuclear forces during a possible escalation of conflict raises fears. China's sudden resurrection of a claim to the large Himalayan Indian state of Arunachal Pradesh indicates that both sides have not forgotten the harsh days of Sino-Indian war (20 October to 21 November 1962). Moreover, on April 19th, India successfully launched a long-range intercontinental ballistic missile capable of carrying a nuclear warhead. The missile had a range of more than 5,000km (3,100 miles), potentially bringing targets in China within range. The BBC's Andrew North in Delhi said Indian officials deny it, but everyone believes the missile is mainly aimed at deterring China. Thus, an indirect “Chindian” arms race has already begun to visit a population of 2.5 billion.
Last but not least, China and India have not historically been great powers, in contrast to the United States, European states, and Russia, and the relative “geopolitical virginity” of the two countries on the world stage could lead to some problems. In that process, a series of blunders and miscalculations would lead the countries to the brink of misadventures and political havoc. They cannot abruptly pave the way for prudently managing Sino-Indian strategic relations as the Soviets and the U.S. once did.
Vahram Ayvazyan is a 2012 graduate of the Genocide and Human Rights University Program at the International Institute for Genocide and Human Rights Studies in Toronto. Follow him on Twitter.
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The Chindian Challenge
December 29, 2012
When students enrolled in academic programs on international relations talk about contemporary world order, invariably the idea of Sino-American competition for world dominance comes up. This point has become so ubiquitous that is often accepted axiomatically by the vast majority of the world. The Obama administration’s “Pivot to Asia” and a growing Chinese nationalistic appetite vis-à-vis U.S. allies notwithstanding, there is another, more overwhelming challenge that is welcoming the world to its difficult terrain: the growing Sino-Indian competition in South Asia, South-East Asia, and the Asia Pacific. The tremendous unease between two giants can be referred to as “Chindia,” a portmanteau that the credit for the coining of goes to Indian MP Jairam Ramesh. Will global development be bedeviled by this “Chindian” overwhelming challenge? Here are a number of clues to the real nitty-gritty of Chindia
First, population, size of economies, and the potential for further economic growth greatly matter in relation to Chindia. Together, China and India contain over one-third of the world's population (2.5 billion). These economies collectively accounted for more than 19 percent of the global GDP on a Purchasing Power Parity (PPP) scale in 2010. And this is expected to grow even more in the foreseeable future, according to the International Monetary Fund. Both countries are vastly dependent on importing resources and the severe competition between them throughout the world markets for resources such as oil and gas is guaranteed. In addition to this, predicted food scarcity and “farms” races will accelerate the possibility of tete-a-tete clash between two gigantic consumer societies.
Second, the disparities between socio-political circumstances of Chinese and Indian societies are of paramount importance. While India is the largest democracy in the world, China still follows a one-party system. India is building a pluralistic society based on hundreds of political parties, while the Chinese government rejects political freedoms and healthy political competition. For example, we can look to the famous case of the Nobel Prize winner, Liu Xiaobo, who is serving an 11-year term for his activism demanding more democracy and independent courts in his country. His wife, who has never been convicted of any crime, is under house arrest. Today, he remains in jail, as China's most famous political prisoner. This once more reminds us of the notorious Tienanmen Square protests of 1989, also known as the "June Fourth Incident" in Chinese or the June 4 Massacre. Thus, this socio-political gap can grow to an ideological level: democracy vs authoritarianism.
Third, disputed territories alongside the Sino-Indian border have created a historical enmity between the two nations. In the modern world, the possibility of deployment of conventional as well as nuclear forces during a possible escalation of conflict raises fears. China's sudden resurrection of a claim to the large Himalayan Indian state of Arunachal Pradesh indicates that both sides have not forgotten the harsh days of Sino-Indian war (20 October to 21 November 1962). Moreover, on April 19th, India successfully launched a long-range intercontinental ballistic missile capable of carrying a nuclear warhead. The missile had a range of more than 5,000km (3,100 miles), potentially bringing targets in China within range. The BBC's Andrew North in Delhi said Indian officials deny it, but everyone believes the missile is mainly aimed at deterring China. Thus, an indirect “Chindian” arms race has already begun to visit a population of 2.5 billion.
Last but not least, China and India have not historically been great powers, in contrast to the United States, European states, and Russia, and the relative “geopolitical virginity” of the two countries on the world stage could lead to some problems. In that process, a series of blunders and miscalculations would lead the countries to the brink of misadventures and political havoc. They cannot abruptly pave the way for prudently managing Sino-Indian strategic relations as the Soviets and the U.S. once did.
Vahram Ayvazyan is a 2012 graduate of the Genocide and Human Rights University Program at the International Institute for Genocide and Human Rights Studies in Toronto. Follow him on Twitter.
