estled in the heart of the Eurasian landmass, the Central Asian states find themselves in a difficult geopolitical position. Historically tied to Russia and geographically close to China and South Asia, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan, and Kyrgyzstan have balanced engagement with external actors since their independence in 1991. Remaining under Russia’s political and security clout, the republics of Central Asia have embraced Chinese economic engagement and welcomed western investments, but developed only limited economic connectivity with South Asia. Unstable and unsafe, Afghanistan continues to fulfill the role designated to it during eighteenth century geopolitical rivalry, separating the then British–controlled Indian Subcontinent from Russia’s client states in Central Asia. Modern Central Asia, while geographically close to South Asia, remains distant from the subcontinent as much as it was during the past 150 years.
Following the Taliban’s 2021 return to power, Afghanistan recognized the importance of a transition from diplomatic isolationism. Facing economic shortfalls, a dearth of foreign aid, and a desperate water crisis, the Taliban have become concerned with stability on their territory—aware that it must engage in economic activity, but suspicious about the authenticity of regional partnerships. China has extended a hand toward the Taliban, becoming the first major state to grant diplomatic recognition in February 2024. Kabul has been receptive to Chinese gestures, but the Taliban are cautious of Chinese expansionism. Russia, despite no official recognition, has also hosted the Taliban for discussion on regional threats and has committed to further funding Afghanistan. Both Russia and China have to thread a careful line between cooperation with the fundamentalist Taliban regime and the restrain of Islamic radical movements on their own territories.
Afghanistan’s neighbors with conflicting interests
Other major regional actors, Iran and Pakistan, cannot serve as viable, long–term partners for Afghanistan, considering the status of both in the international system and their oscillating mutual discord. Persian elites of Iran are generally more supportive of Afghanistan’s Tajik Dari–speaking minority, ethnically and culturally related to Persian civilization, and traditionally acting as an opposition to Pashto–dominated Taliban. Historical animosity has, occasionally, resulted in violent disagreements over the control of water resources with Iranian security forces at the border. Similarly, there are major geopolitical hurdles in Kabul’s relationship with Islamabad—many concerning security challenges posed by insurgent terrorist groups in the borderlands between Afghanistan and Pakistan. In late 2023, Pakistan ramped up its pressure on the Taliban to eradicate Tehreek–e–Taliban (TTP), a Pakistan–focused splinter group that the Taliban is interested in making politically legitimate. Furthermore, the relations between Iran and Pakistan are precarious, preventing them from coordinating cooperation with Afghanistan. Under a common energy project Tehran has allegedly invested over $2 billion into the pipeline’s development, but became unsettled with Islamabad’s lack of action. In March 2024, Pakistan asked for an international sanctions waiver to move forward with the project, but the U.S. rejected the move, expressing discontent at the nature of the project and cautioning Islamabad about joint business deals with Tehran. However, for the Central Asian states, relations with Afghanistan’s current government serve pragmatic purposes of maintaining security, developing economic cooperation, and gaining access to alternative infrastructural routes outside of the established networks tied to Russia and new, Chinese–developed transportation and energy lines.
Reaffirming Afghanistan’s geostrategic importance is the long–delayed Turkmenistan–Afghanistan–Pakistan–India Pipeline (TAPI), a multilateral infrastructure project that would be grounded on Turkmen gas but rely on Afghanistan for transit. The project was politically supported by the U.S. during initial discussions in the mid 1990s, considering that the completion would enhance connectivity between Central Asia and South Asia while bypassing Iran. During better days of U.S.–Russia relations, TAPI also received support from Russia. At its core, the revenues from TAPI could amount to up to 85 percent of Afghanistan’s central budget. TAPI would undermine the need for the competing Iran–Pakistan gas pipeline, nicknamed the ‘Peace Pipeline,’ further diminishing its chances to get off the ground due to international sanctions and geopolitical tensions. Visibly, American and Russian interests converge in TAPI as Moscow is interested in reaching South Asian markets and the U.S. is interested in isolating Iran. Hence, TAPI’s fate depends on the dynamics between the two rival powers.
Elsewhere, the Central Asian states bordering Afghanistan provide additional opportunities for engagement with the Taliban.
Engaging in Central Asia through different means
Despite the absence of diplomatic recognition, the trade between Uzbekistan and Afghanistan increased six fold in 2023, a poignant marker of flourishment despite the Taliban’s authoritative rule. The trade facilitated a slight upward trend in Afghanistan’s economy. More importantly, Afghanistan’s geostrategic importance is reinforced by plans to construct a trans–Afghan railroad, through Mazar–i–Sharif and Logar, connecting Uzbekistan and Pakistan. In July 2023, authorities from Islamabad, Kabul, and Tashkent met in Pakistan to affirm their commitment to the project. The railroad is slated to cut trade costs between Uzbekistan and Pakistan by over 40%. As regional collaboration increases, so do diplomatic linkages. In November, officials from Pakistan, Uzbekistan, and Afghanistan inaugurated the Trilateral Meeting on Trade and Transit, aimed to catalyze pathways for trade and reduce transportation costs. Uzbekistan is critical in developing any regional multilateral initiative, as the most populous Central Asian state that borders all the others and Afghanistan. The importance of Uzbekistan is clear, given the competition between all the major powers vying for its loyalty—from Chinese trade and investment agreements, Russia’s commitment to build a nuclear power plant, to a renewed invitation to join the Russia–led Eurasian Economic Union. America, too, provides continuous diplomatic attention to Uzbekistan, the most ‘central’ of Central Asian states.
The Taliban’s more contentious relationship with Tajikistan is representative of porous cross–border violence and organized crime. In January 2024, acting Afghan Defense Minister Mohammad Yaqoob Mujahid claimed that scores of Tajiks, as well as Pakistanis, were killed or arrested by Taliban security forces—reporting that the foreigners were complicit in smuggling. Even prior to 2021, the Taliban employed Jamaat Ansarullah, nicknamed the ‘Tajik Taliban,’ as a border security force to operate in the sparse border areas. In August 2023, Tajik officials claimed they thwarted an attempted terrorist attack, but the Taliban’s reliance on Dushanbe has created some dissonance. Taliban leadership believes Afghanistan has become too dependent on Tajik security personnel, and that Dushanbe is encroaching on the borderlands to challenge the Taliban regime. At a 2023 meeting of Russia–led Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO), the Taliban rejected a proposal from the Tajik government to erect a security belt around Afghanistan. Stabilizing Tajik–Afghan relationship is arguably the biggest challenge for engagement with Afghanistan through Central Asia.
Conversely, Turkmenistan has maintained a delicate balance with Afghanistan. Apparently committed to its policy of neutrality, Turkmenistan has to manage its relations with Afghanistan considering its long borders and reliance on water sharing arrangements. Qosh Tepa Canal, currently under construction in northern Afghanistan, would divert significant amounts of water from Amu Darya, a natural Afghan border for Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, and Turkmenistan. Turkmenistan, laying the lowest downstream, would be impacted the most. To secure water resources for its southern regions, Turkmenistan has maintained dialogues with Afghanistan. The U.S., which promoted construction of the canal through the USAID during American occupation of Afghanistan, may use the expertise to engage with both parties with the intent of spillover to further cooperation.
Can the U.S. re–engage?
U.S. engagement with the Taliban always runs the risk of legitimizing the regime; although, Washington’s humanitarian aid via Central Asia provides a much needed relief to the despondent Afghan people. The American security assistance commitment, made during the September 2023 C5+1 Summit, offers a critical reassurance for the Central Asian states that there are possible alternatives for security cooperation outside of Russia–led defense alliance and China’s nascent regional security initiatives. As U.S. officials publicly admit that their attention has shifted to Ukraine and Israel, they suggest that walking the tightrope between implementing sanctions and offering aid to Kabul is a difficult balance to strike. American reluctance to re–engage with Afghanistan following the shock of Washington’s withdrawal weakens the U.S.’s capacity to even offer aid, let alone facilitate development and potentially stabilize Afghanistan.
Tellingly, the Central Asian republics overestimate American influence in the region. In contrast, the republics of Central Asia themselves have the potential to play a role in leveraging Washington’s access to the Taliban’s Afghanistan as, to a different extent, they have assisted in coordination of energy connectivity, water resources, and the support of industry. As such, the Central Asian republics are profoundly important in the establishment of the U.S.’s presence in the region and will continue to be pivotal in the shifting dynamics of South–Central Asia.
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Taliban diplomacy with Central Asian republics, implications for Washington
Image by Rob Armbruster from Pixaby.
July 1, 2024
Central Asian states navigate complex geopolitical landscapes due to the Taliban's quest for stability in Afghanistan—balancing the potential to engage with Russia and China coupled with limited South Asian ties and U.S. reluctance to re–engage, write Joshua Bowes and Peter Krasnopolsky.
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estled in the heart of the Eurasian landmass, the Central Asian states find themselves in a difficult geopolitical position. Historically tied to Russia and geographically close to China and South Asia, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan, and Kyrgyzstan have balanced engagement with external actors since their independence in 1991. Remaining under Russia’s political and security clout, the republics of Central Asia have embraced Chinese economic engagement and welcomed western investments, but developed only limited economic connectivity with South Asia. Unstable and unsafe, Afghanistan continues to fulfill the role designated to it during eighteenth century geopolitical rivalry, separating the then British–controlled Indian Subcontinent from Russia’s client states in Central Asia. Modern Central Asia, while geographically close to South Asia, remains distant from the subcontinent as much as it was during the past 150 years.
Following the Taliban’s 2021 return to power, Afghanistan recognized the importance of a transition from diplomatic isolationism. Facing economic shortfalls, a dearth of foreign aid, and a desperate water crisis, the Taliban have become concerned with stability on their territory—aware that it must engage in economic activity, but suspicious about the authenticity of regional partnerships. China has extended a hand toward the Taliban, becoming the first major state to grant diplomatic recognition in February 2024. Kabul has been receptive to Chinese gestures, but the Taliban are cautious of Chinese expansionism. Russia, despite no official recognition, has also hosted the Taliban for discussion on regional threats and has committed to further funding Afghanistan. Both Russia and China have to thread a careful line between cooperation with the fundamentalist Taliban regime and the restrain of Islamic radical movements on their own territories.
Afghanistan’s neighbors with conflicting interests
Other major regional actors, Iran and Pakistan, cannot serve as viable, long–term partners for Afghanistan, considering the status of both in the international system and their oscillating mutual discord. Persian elites of Iran are generally more supportive of Afghanistan’s Tajik Dari–speaking minority, ethnically and culturally related to Persian civilization, and traditionally acting as an opposition to Pashto–dominated Taliban. Historical animosity has, occasionally, resulted in violent disagreements over the control of water resources with Iranian security forces at the border. Similarly, there are major geopolitical hurdles in Kabul’s relationship with Islamabad—many concerning security challenges posed by insurgent terrorist groups in the borderlands between Afghanistan and Pakistan. In late 2023, Pakistan ramped up its pressure on the Taliban to eradicate Tehreek–e–Taliban (TTP), a Pakistan–focused splinter group that the Taliban is interested in making politically legitimate. Furthermore, the relations between Iran and Pakistan are precarious, preventing them from coordinating cooperation with Afghanistan. Under a common energy project Tehran has allegedly invested over $2 billion into the pipeline’s development, but became unsettled with Islamabad’s lack of action. In March 2024, Pakistan asked for an international sanctions waiver to move forward with the project, but the U.S. rejected the move, expressing discontent at the nature of the project and cautioning Islamabad about joint business deals with Tehran. However, for the Central Asian states, relations with Afghanistan’s current government serve pragmatic purposes of maintaining security, developing economic cooperation, and gaining access to alternative infrastructural routes outside of the established networks tied to Russia and new, Chinese–developed transportation and energy lines.
Reaffirming Afghanistan’s geostrategic importance is the long–delayed Turkmenistan–Afghanistan–Pakistan–India Pipeline (TAPI), a multilateral infrastructure project that would be grounded on Turkmen gas but rely on Afghanistan for transit. The project was politically supported by the U.S. during initial discussions in the mid 1990s, considering that the completion would enhance connectivity between Central Asia and South Asia while bypassing Iran. During better days of U.S.–Russia relations, TAPI also received support from Russia. At its core, the revenues from TAPI could amount to up to 85 percent of Afghanistan’s central budget. TAPI would undermine the need for the competing Iran–Pakistan gas pipeline, nicknamed the ‘Peace Pipeline,’ further diminishing its chances to get off the ground due to international sanctions and geopolitical tensions. Visibly, American and Russian interests converge in TAPI as Moscow is interested in reaching South Asian markets and the U.S. is interested in isolating Iran. Hence, TAPI’s fate depends on the dynamics between the two rival powers.
Elsewhere, the Central Asian states bordering Afghanistan provide additional opportunities for engagement with the Taliban.
Engaging in Central Asia through different means
Despite the absence of diplomatic recognition, the trade between Uzbekistan and Afghanistan increased six fold in 2023, a poignant marker of flourishment despite the Taliban’s authoritative rule. The trade facilitated a slight upward trend in Afghanistan’s economy. More importantly, Afghanistan’s geostrategic importance is reinforced by plans to construct a trans–Afghan railroad, through Mazar–i–Sharif and Logar, connecting Uzbekistan and Pakistan. In July 2023, authorities from Islamabad, Kabul, and Tashkent met in Pakistan to affirm their commitment to the project. The railroad is slated to cut trade costs between Uzbekistan and Pakistan by over 40%. As regional collaboration increases, so do diplomatic linkages. In November, officials from Pakistan, Uzbekistan, and Afghanistan inaugurated the Trilateral Meeting on Trade and Transit, aimed to catalyze pathways for trade and reduce transportation costs. Uzbekistan is critical in developing any regional multilateral initiative, as the most populous Central Asian state that borders all the others and Afghanistan. The importance of Uzbekistan is clear, given the competition between all the major powers vying for its loyalty—from Chinese trade and investment agreements, Russia’s commitment to build a nuclear power plant, to a renewed invitation to join the Russia–led Eurasian Economic Union. America, too, provides continuous diplomatic attention to Uzbekistan, the most ‘central’ of Central Asian states.
The Taliban’s more contentious relationship with Tajikistan is representative of porous cross–border violence and organized crime. In January 2024, acting Afghan Defense Minister Mohammad Yaqoob Mujahid claimed that scores of Tajiks, as well as Pakistanis, were killed or arrested by Taliban security forces—reporting that the foreigners were complicit in smuggling. Even prior to 2021, the Taliban employed Jamaat Ansarullah, nicknamed the ‘Tajik Taliban,’ as a border security force to operate in the sparse border areas. In August 2023, Tajik officials claimed they thwarted an attempted terrorist attack, but the Taliban’s reliance on Dushanbe has created some dissonance. Taliban leadership believes Afghanistan has become too dependent on Tajik security personnel, and that Dushanbe is encroaching on the borderlands to challenge the Taliban regime. At a 2023 meeting of Russia–led Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO), the Taliban rejected a proposal from the Tajik government to erect a security belt around Afghanistan. Stabilizing Tajik–Afghan relationship is arguably the biggest challenge for engagement with Afghanistan through Central Asia.
Conversely, Turkmenistan has maintained a delicate balance with Afghanistan. Apparently committed to its policy of neutrality, Turkmenistan has to manage its relations with Afghanistan considering its long borders and reliance on water sharing arrangements. Qosh Tepa Canal, currently under construction in northern Afghanistan, would divert significant amounts of water from Amu Darya, a natural Afghan border for Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, and Turkmenistan. Turkmenistan, laying the lowest downstream, would be impacted the most. To secure water resources for its southern regions, Turkmenistan has maintained dialogues with Afghanistan. The U.S., which promoted construction of the canal through the USAID during American occupation of Afghanistan, may use the expertise to engage with both parties with the intent of spillover to further cooperation.
Can the U.S. re–engage?
U.S. engagement with the Taliban always runs the risk of legitimizing the regime; although, Washington’s humanitarian aid via Central Asia provides a much needed relief to the despondent Afghan people. The American security assistance commitment, made during the September 2023 C5+1 Summit, offers a critical reassurance for the Central Asian states that there are possible alternatives for security cooperation outside of Russia–led defense alliance and China’s nascent regional security initiatives. As U.S. officials publicly admit that their attention has shifted to Ukraine and Israel, they suggest that walking the tightrope between implementing sanctions and offering aid to Kabul is a difficult balance to strike. American reluctance to re–engage with Afghanistan following the shock of Washington’s withdrawal weakens the U.S.’s capacity to even offer aid, let alone facilitate development and potentially stabilize Afghanistan.
Tellingly, the Central Asian republics overestimate American influence in the region. In contrast, the republics of Central Asia themselves have the potential to play a role in leveraging Washington’s access to the Taliban’s Afghanistan as, to a different extent, they have assisted in coordination of energy connectivity, water resources, and the support of industry. As such, the Central Asian republics are profoundly important in the establishment of the U.S.’s presence in the region and will continue to be pivotal in the shifting dynamics of South–Central Asia.
