n late February 2023, South Africa held joint naval drills with Russia and China, off the country’s coast. The 10-day exercises began roughly one year to the day of Moscow’s expanded invasion of Ukraine and prompted condemnation from Western capitals. Pretoria abstained from condemning Russia’s invasion at the United Nations in 2022 and has stated that its position in the war is neutral, going so far as to suggest that South Africa could serve as a mediator between the two countries.
The drills and South Africa’s position on Russia’s invasion of Ukraine highlight a key, if unwelcome, reality about the war in Ukraine: For as much as the West sees the “world” aligned against Moscow, the picture is far less clear with the Latin and South America, Africa, and other regions largely sitting on the sidelines of the conflict. The coalition against Russia is predominantly Western, with Latin and South America refusing to provide arms, and African countries abstaining from diplomatic condemnations.
Pretoria’s engagement with Russia, cited as the “natural course of relations” with “friends,” also brings renewed attention to Moscow’s courtship of the countries of Africa, which makes Samuel Ramani’s “Russia in Africa” all the more timely. Moscow’s interest in the continent is nothing new, though judging by the recent attention paid to what the Kremlin is officially doing (diplomatically and financially) and unofficially (via groups like the Wagner private military company, about which, more, below), one would suspect otherwise. Ramani views Russia’s engagement with Africa as a successor of the Soviet Union’s policies towards the continent, but he also fills a gap in the literature and understanding, showing how Russia’s policies have evolved.
Ramani finds a well-supported middle ground in answering his subtitle’s thesis: Is Russia a resurgent great power or a bellicose pretender? Russia combined “counterinsurgency operations, arms sales, autocratic promotion and soft power tools, such as media outreaches, educational diplomacy, debt forgiveness and humanitarian aid” and hybrid warfare tactics to reassert itself across the continent of Africa and emerge as a “virtual great power.” Yet, according to Ramani, Russia is merely “a ‘virtual great power” that “has many of the trappings of great power status but only occupies a second-tier position of influence” on the continent—one that will only get worse given Moscow’s expanded invasion of Ukraine, with which Ramani closes his analysis.
Moscow sought to elevate its position globally through an asserted effort on the continent, hoping to leverage bilateral and transactional relationships to elevate its standing. While Russia established a relatively strong posture on the continent under the Soviet Union, it was an open question as to whether these relationships would carry over into the successor governments. Yet, through the suite of tools and interests mentioned above, Russia worked to leverage existing relationships, exploit new opportunities, and position Moscow as an alternative to the West, and as a crisis-proof partner of choice across the continent. Russia was decidedly less interested in internal reform or human rights than the West, which proved attractive to some regimes.
In answering his thesis, Ramani provides a useful and timely reminder that Russia is not an exclusively opportunistic or reactionary actor, and certainly not one dancing to President Vladmir Putin’s ambitions alone. To be sure, Russia does respond to emerging developments and opportunities, but this does not mean it does not operate without a plan or a strategy. Strategy, as the Prussian strategist Helmuth von Moltke wrote, is a “system of expedients,” affording an actor the ability to seize upon opportunities, but in line with a stated plan. Russia is both a strategic and an opportunistic actor—having a strategy allows it to respond smartly (to its mind) to on-the-ground developments. As Ramani shows, Russia has a clear set of interests and objectives which guided its behavior and actions on the continent, and which coalesced particularly after Putin returned to office for his fourth term in office.
“Russia in Africa” also illustrated the diversity of tools available to Moscow to pursue its interests. It is not all about the sale of weapons or economic aid, though both of those are important. Ramani explores how Russia also used soft power and information to attract African partners. Had Russia solely pursued a narrow transactional approach, these more intangible elements of national power would almost certainly have remained on the shelf.
Ramani highlights the diversity of actors within the Kremlin policymaking ecosystem, and how domestic politics also played a role in Russia’s policy towards Africa. This is another key element that is often omitted in analysis of Russian foreign policy. The role that Russia’s think tanks, press, and even political parties (tame or otherwise) played in the formation of Moscow’s policies towards African countries are explored in detail by Ramani. While it remains to be seen how influential these groups remain or what role they will play in the years ahead, it is important to keep in mind that Russia is not as internally monolithic as many believe.
Indeed, Russia’s private military companies, such as Wagner, have received outsized attention as of late, seen both as direct tools of the Kremlin as well as entrepreneurial and mercenary actors. It is indeed the case that they can be, and often are, both at the same time. Private military companies pursue profit above all else. While perhaps not a determining factor, the fact that Russia’s PMCs are, by comparison, cheaper than UN peacekeepers or foreign security companies, is interesting to note. Should that profit-seeking incentive be directed from or driven by the Kremlin, or should there be a convenient overlap that happens to coincide with Moscow’s interests, so much the better.
Moscow repeatedly found challenges in marrying both its promises and commitments, with its resources. Debt forgiveness and transactional relationships are, by comparison, low-hanging fruits. Where Russia found challenges is in providing development aid and other financial resources to its partners. This is an issue Ramani rightly notes will almost certainly become acute following its invasion of Ukraine. “Beyond the poor efficiency of its conversion of rhetorical pledges into deals, Russia’s power projection in Africa can no longer be advanced in its preferred under-the-radar fashion.”
Ramani also vividly illustrates the fact that African countries had and do have agency in their relationships with Moscow. Too often Russia’s actions are viewed through one lens as is the continent’s response. It is often the story of a rapacious and insidious Russia running amok across the continent. Here, “Russia in Africa” quite sensibly places African countries very much front and center. The countries with which Russia engages are not merely bystanders, but retain active agency in developments, seeking to balance their own national interests, historical relationships, and power politics.
It is worth reiterating that Moscow remains an attractive partner. Russia’s transactional approach to engagement, anti-colonial history, and general disinterest in internal political affairs and staunch support for national sovereignty stands in contrast with how the United States is often viewed—aid and support being contingent on political reform or respect for human rights, driven by narrow interests (such as counter terrorism), and unreliable with changes in government. This approach is somewhat mirrored by China although Beijing’s approach is far more rapaciously capitalist and self-serving (advancing Chinese companies over African counterparts and using Africa as a vehicle to prop up Chinese domestic business concerns).
Ramani shows that not all of Russia’s efforts met with success and often achieved as many victories as it did losses in the same country. Tactics that worked in one country did not translate to another—Russia’s hybrid efforts in Madagascar were particularly poor (incorrectly spelling the name of one of the key figures they sought to promote, and failing to pay another interlocutor), for example. Russia’s COVID-19 response was also marked with far more promises and commitments than actual substance; unfulfilled promises further undermined Moscow’s stature for some.
Russia’s greatest successes in the continent were in areas where there were existing areas of interest and overlap on which Moscow both seized and exploited. As others have noted, Russia’s successes in the Sahel are certainly a function of its “hybrid warfare” efforts to undermine the role of France. Yet, this very success is far more rooted in the exploitation of existing attitudes and issues, not the least of which are anti-colonialism, local politics, and frustration with France’s contemporary role in the region. As is the case with Russia’s political warfare campaigns against the West, Moscow did not create these issues, merely served to successfully exploit and leverage them for the Kremlin’s interests. These efforts, thus far, have not met with a comparable counterprogram from France.
In the latter portion of the book, Ramani highlights the risks of friction in Africa between Russia and China. Ramani writes, “beneath optimistic rhetoric, the limitations of Russia-China cooperation in Africa are clear. Consultations between Russia and China on African security cries…are limited, especially outside the UN Security Council.” He adds, “as Russia views instability in Africa as a geopolitical opportunity and China sees security crises as an existential threat to its BRI investments, disagreements between both countries are likely to sharpen.”
Ramani closes his book writing “While Russia’s diverse array of tactics and strengthening partnerships in Africa are considerable advantages, the absence of Russian cooperation with external powers could place an upper limit on its great power status.” He continues, “as a result, Russia could find itself mired in between second-tier powers in Africa…and top-tier powers, with slim prospects of elevation and a high risk of relegation.”
“Russia in Africa” is exceptionally thorough and highly detailed. Ramani charts the ever-changing and evolving relationships Moscow has across the continent. Its depth and thoroughness are a strength, but also a bit of an obstacle. In the former, it successfully illustrates his thesis and fills in a not inconsiderable gap in the literature on post-Soviet Russia’s behavior on the continent. In the case of the latter, it is a weighty read and keeping track of the ups-and-downs of various relationships is challenging. It is fundamentally a Russia-centric analysis, but breaking the book up along country lines may have made for an easier read, whilst still maintaining the themes Ramani highlights.
Ramani’s book offers the most in-depth and extensively researched analysis on Russia’s efforts on the continent of Africa and serves as a useful corrective to the more breathless accounts about a new “Great Game” emerging on the continent. Moscow’s future success on the continent will almost certainly be sharply curtailed due to its war in Ukraine, but the continent will continue to offer a comparably cheap area for the Kremlin to compete with the United States specifically, and the West more broadly, while at the same time pursuing its own narrow commercial and political interests.
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Russia’s Great Power Ambitions in Africa
Church Square, Pretoria, South Africa. Photo by Kyle-Philip Coulson on Unsplash
April 22, 2023
The West sees the world as aligned against Russia following the Ukraine invasion, but in Africa things are less clear. In his latest book Samuel Ramani "offers the most in-depth and extensively researched analysis on Russia’s" strategic and diplomatic efforts on the continent, writes Joshua Huminski
I
n late February 2023, South Africa held joint naval drills with Russia and China, off the country’s coast. The 10-day exercises began roughly one year to the day of Moscow’s expanded invasion of Ukraine and prompted condemnation from Western capitals. Pretoria abstained from condemning Russia’s invasion at the United Nations in 2022 and has stated that its position in the war is neutral, going so far as to suggest that South Africa could serve as a mediator between the two countries.
The drills and South Africa’s position on Russia’s invasion of Ukraine highlight a key, if unwelcome, reality about the war in Ukraine: For as much as the West sees the “world” aligned against Moscow, the picture is far less clear with the Latin and South America, Africa, and other regions largely sitting on the sidelines of the conflict. The coalition against Russia is predominantly Western, with Latin and South America refusing to provide arms, and African countries abstaining from diplomatic condemnations.
Pretoria’s engagement with Russia, cited as the “natural course of relations” with “friends,” also brings renewed attention to Moscow’s courtship of the countries of Africa, which makes Samuel Ramani’s “Russia in Africa” all the more timely. Moscow’s interest in the continent is nothing new, though judging by the recent attention paid to what the Kremlin is officially doing (diplomatically and financially) and unofficially (via groups like the Wagner private military company, about which, more, below), one would suspect otherwise. Ramani views Russia’s engagement with Africa as a successor of the Soviet Union’s policies towards the continent, but he also fills a gap in the literature and understanding, showing how Russia’s policies have evolved.
Ramani finds a well-supported middle ground in answering his subtitle’s thesis: Is Russia a resurgent great power or a bellicose pretender? Russia combined “counterinsurgency operations, arms sales, autocratic promotion and soft power tools, such as media outreaches, educational diplomacy, debt forgiveness and humanitarian aid” and hybrid warfare tactics to reassert itself across the continent of Africa and emerge as a “virtual great power.” Yet, according to Ramani, Russia is merely “a ‘virtual great power” that “has many of the trappings of great power status but only occupies a second-tier position of influence” on the continent—one that will only get worse given Moscow’s expanded invasion of Ukraine, with which Ramani closes his analysis.
Moscow sought to elevate its position globally through an asserted effort on the continent, hoping to leverage bilateral and transactional relationships to elevate its standing. While Russia established a relatively strong posture on the continent under the Soviet Union, it was an open question as to whether these relationships would carry over into the successor governments. Yet, through the suite of tools and interests mentioned above, Russia worked to leverage existing relationships, exploit new opportunities, and position Moscow as an alternative to the West, and as a crisis-proof partner of choice across the continent. Russia was decidedly less interested in internal reform or human rights than the West, which proved attractive to some regimes.
In answering his thesis, Ramani provides a useful and timely reminder that Russia is not an exclusively opportunistic or reactionary actor, and certainly not one dancing to President Vladmir Putin’s ambitions alone. To be sure, Russia does respond to emerging developments and opportunities, but this does not mean it does not operate without a plan or a strategy. Strategy, as the Prussian strategist Helmuth von Moltke wrote, is a “system of expedients,” affording an actor the ability to seize upon opportunities, but in line with a stated plan. Russia is both a strategic and an opportunistic actor—having a strategy allows it to respond smartly (to its mind) to on-the-ground developments. As Ramani shows, Russia has a clear set of interests and objectives which guided its behavior and actions on the continent, and which coalesced particularly after Putin returned to office for his fourth term in office.
“Russia in Africa” also illustrated the diversity of tools available to Moscow to pursue its interests. It is not all about the sale of weapons or economic aid, though both of those are important. Ramani explores how Russia also used soft power and information to attract African partners. Had Russia solely pursued a narrow transactional approach, these more intangible elements of national power would almost certainly have remained on the shelf.
Ramani highlights the diversity of actors within the Kremlin policymaking ecosystem, and how domestic politics also played a role in Russia’s policy towards Africa. This is another key element that is often omitted in analysis of Russian foreign policy. The role that Russia’s think tanks, press, and even political parties (tame or otherwise) played in the formation of Moscow’s policies towards African countries are explored in detail by Ramani. While it remains to be seen how influential these groups remain or what role they will play in the years ahead, it is important to keep in mind that Russia is not as internally monolithic as many believe.
Indeed, Russia’s private military companies, such as Wagner, have received outsized attention as of late, seen both as direct tools of the Kremlin as well as entrepreneurial and mercenary actors. It is indeed the case that they can be, and often are, both at the same time. Private military companies pursue profit above all else. While perhaps not a determining factor, the fact that Russia’s PMCs are, by comparison, cheaper than UN peacekeepers or foreign security companies, is interesting to note. Should that profit-seeking incentive be directed from or driven by the Kremlin, or should there be a convenient overlap that happens to coincide with Moscow’s interests, so much the better.
Moscow repeatedly found challenges in marrying both its promises and commitments, with its resources. Debt forgiveness and transactional relationships are, by comparison, low-hanging fruits. Where Russia found challenges is in providing development aid and other financial resources to its partners. This is an issue Ramani rightly notes will almost certainly become acute following its invasion of Ukraine. “Beyond the poor efficiency of its conversion of rhetorical pledges into deals, Russia’s power projection in Africa can no longer be advanced in its preferred under-the-radar fashion.”
Ramani also vividly illustrates the fact that African countries had and do have agency in their relationships with Moscow. Too often Russia’s actions are viewed through one lens as is the continent’s response. It is often the story of a rapacious and insidious Russia running amok across the continent. Here, “Russia in Africa” quite sensibly places African countries very much front and center. The countries with which Russia engages are not merely bystanders, but retain active agency in developments, seeking to balance their own national interests, historical relationships, and power politics.
It is worth reiterating that Moscow remains an attractive partner. Russia’s transactional approach to engagement, anti-colonial history, and general disinterest in internal political affairs and staunch support for national sovereignty stands in contrast with how the United States is often viewed—aid and support being contingent on political reform or respect for human rights, driven by narrow interests (such as counter terrorism), and unreliable with changes in government. This approach is somewhat mirrored by China although Beijing’s approach is far more rapaciously capitalist and self-serving (advancing Chinese companies over African counterparts and using Africa as a vehicle to prop up Chinese domestic business concerns).
Ramani shows that not all of Russia’s efforts met with success and often achieved as many victories as it did losses in the same country. Tactics that worked in one country did not translate to another—Russia’s hybrid efforts in Madagascar were particularly poor (incorrectly spelling the name of one of the key figures they sought to promote, and failing to pay another interlocutor), for example. Russia’s COVID-19 response was also marked with far more promises and commitments than actual substance; unfulfilled promises further undermined Moscow’s stature for some.
Russia’s greatest successes in the continent were in areas where there were existing areas of interest and overlap on which Moscow both seized and exploited. As others have noted, Russia’s successes in the Sahel are certainly a function of its “hybrid warfare” efforts to undermine the role of France. Yet, this very success is far more rooted in the exploitation of existing attitudes and issues, not the least of which are anti-colonialism, local politics, and frustration with France’s contemporary role in the region. As is the case with Russia’s political warfare campaigns against the West, Moscow did not create these issues, merely served to successfully exploit and leverage them for the Kremlin’s interests. These efforts, thus far, have not met with a comparable counterprogram from France.
In the latter portion of the book, Ramani highlights the risks of friction in Africa between Russia and China. Ramani writes, “beneath optimistic rhetoric, the limitations of Russia-China cooperation in Africa are clear. Consultations between Russia and China on African security cries…are limited, especially outside the UN Security Council.” He adds, “as Russia views instability in Africa as a geopolitical opportunity and China sees security crises as an existential threat to its BRI investments, disagreements between both countries are likely to sharpen.”
Ramani closes his book writing “While Russia’s diverse array of tactics and strengthening partnerships in Africa are considerable advantages, the absence of Russian cooperation with external powers could place an upper limit on its great power status.” He continues, “as a result, Russia could find itself mired in between second-tier powers in Africa…and top-tier powers, with slim prospects of elevation and a high risk of relegation.”
“Russia in Africa” is exceptionally thorough and highly detailed. Ramani charts the ever-changing and evolving relationships Moscow has across the continent. Its depth and thoroughness are a strength, but also a bit of an obstacle. In the former, it successfully illustrates his thesis and fills in a not inconsiderable gap in the literature on post-Soviet Russia’s behavior on the continent. In the case of the latter, it is a weighty read and keeping track of the ups-and-downs of various relationships is challenging. It is fundamentally a Russia-centric analysis, but breaking the book up along country lines may have made for an easier read, whilst still maintaining the themes Ramani highlights.
Ramani’s book offers the most in-depth and extensively researched analysis on Russia’s efforts on the continent of Africa and serves as a useful corrective to the more breathless accounts about a new “Great Game” emerging on the continent. Moscow’s future success on the continent will almost certainly be sharply curtailed due to its war in Ukraine, but the continent will continue to offer a comparably cheap area for the Kremlin to compete with the United States specifically, and the West more broadly, while at the same time pursuing its own narrow commercial and political interests.
