.
In mid-October 2015, Russia launched 26 long-range SS-N-30A Kalibr cruise missiles from four surface ships in the Caspian Sea against 11 targets in Syria, further complicating an already head-spinning entanglement of factional violence. Russia’s attacks in Syria support military operations conducted by loyalists of President Bashar al-Assad, directly contradicting the U.S. and Turkey’s objective to rid the country of its longtime ruler. Russia’s military offensive falls against the backdrop of an unraveling Turkey-Russia relationship, and may compel Turkey to double down in its commitments to the U.S. and Western allies.
At the American-Turkish Council’s 34th Annual Conference on U.S.-Turkey Relations, held in late September in Washington, DC, keynote speakers emphasized one theme in particular. Addressing approximately 400 political and business leaders from both sides of the bilateral relationship, speakers including Senator John McCain, U.S. Ambassador to Turkey John Bass, and NATO Supreme Allied Commander Europe General Philip Breedlove elucidated the common bonds between the U.S. and Turkey and asserted the need for Turkey to stand with the West against Russian aggression. Speakers echoed a clear desire to work together with Turkey to thwart Russia’s provocations. Although the desire may be mutual, Turkey’s hesitancy to meet the U.S. halfway reflects its heavy reliance on Russian energy resources. Over half of Ankara’s gas imports are supplied by Russia, and Turkey remains Gazprom’s second-largest export market.
While Turkey’s reliance on Russian oil prevents it from taking direct military action against Russia’s Syrian operations, Turkish state-owned pipeline company Botas made initial steps to push back against Russian intrusiveness. In late October, Botas filed a case for international arbitration to seek a price discount for Russian gas supplies. This comes on the heels of failed discussions regarding a pipeline that would pump Russian gas across the Black Sea into Turkey, and eventually into south-eastern Europe. Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan, irked by Russia’s Syrian operations, strongly condemned Russia’s incursion into Turkish airspace and asserted that Turkey could find other suppliers for its gas.
Turkey-Russia trade ties in other sectors have also cooled. Russia, in response to critiques by Turkish government officials, stopped issuing transit passage documents to Turkish trucks carrying exports to Central Asia and stiffened its inspections of Turkish produce at border crossings. Unofficial talks for a Russian solution to Turkey’s indigenous fighter jet program have fallen apart. Russia’s sharp economic downturn, triggered by low oil prices and Western sanctions, has resulted in an alarming reduction in the number of tourists travelling to Turkey.
The tension between Russia and Turkey will only worsen as the Syrian conflict escalates. Turkish officials now recognize that Turkish and Russian interests in the Middle East diverge, which may open up valuable opportunities for Turkey and the U.S. to strengthen their partnership. Turkey needs allies with similar priorities for post-war Syria, as well as the clout to temper Russian influence in the region.
Meanwhile, the U.S. ruled out strategic collaboration with Russia in the wake of its assault on opponents of the al-Assad regime. Their rift over the future of al-Assad thwarts potential points of agreement upon which a plan for Syria could be based, and U.S. Defense Secretary Ash Carter recently announced that the Obama administration is preparing to accelerate its military campaign against IS. Though multinational talks were initiated on October 29th, U.S. demands that Assad relinquish power will do little to change Russia’s mind. U.S. concern over Russian spy ships near critical undersea cable infrastructure has merely added tension to an increasingly antagonistic relationship.
The U.S.-Turkey relationship may be primed for rejuvenation as Russia alienates both countries. Not only has Turkey opened Incirlik Air Base to U.S.-led anti-IS combat efforts, but the harmonic statements by Turkish, U.S. and NATO officials disapproving Russia’s aggressive foray into the Syrian conflict signals close cooperation moving forward. Russian provocations in service of contrarian goals, as well as a sudden and tragic blowback from Turkey’s increased involvement in the anti-IS campaign, may indeed necessitate a closer U.S.-Turkey partnership.
Though the short term prospects for closer U.S.-Turkey ties were dimmed by Turkey’s refusal to facilitate the Kurdish Democratic Union Party (PYD) campaign against IS, both countries recognize that the crisis in Syria is a long-term project centered on a common anti-Assad and anti-IS agenda. The conflict will demand compromise from both sides, though U.S. boots on the ground should assuage fears that U.S.-supplied arms end up in the hands of forces opposed to the Turkish state. U.S. recognition and support of Turkey’s efforts to provide humanitarian assistance to millions of refugees within its borders may soften the at-times prickly partnership prior to this month’s G20 summit in Antalya.
Turkey maintains an ambitious vision for its role in the world. The U.S., too, has an interest in a strong, prosperous, and democratic Turkey. Indeed, its geostrategic significance and economic potential endow Turkey with significant clout. For decades, the U.S.-Turkey relationship has relied primarily on defense and security cooperation, and with the region’s security situation deteriorating, now is the right time to emphasize and strengthen these linkages while identifying other shared political and economic priorities. As Russia-Turkey relations continue to sour, the U.S. will hopefully be viewed as a superior political and economic partner, and the overall relationship, ripe with potential, will advance.
Eli K. Lovely is Communications and Marketing Director at the American-Turkish Council.
Photo by Freedom House. Photos of Assad and Russia’s Putin are seen during a pro-Assad protest in front of the Russian embassy in Damascus, Syria.
The views presented in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily represent the views of any other organization.
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Russian Meddling in Syria May Drive Turkey Closer to the U.S.
Photos of Assad and Russia's Putin are seen during a pro-Assad protest in front of the Russian embassy in Damascus, Syria
November 5, 2015
In mid-October 2015, Russia launched 26 long-range SS-N-30A Kalibr cruise missiles from four surface ships in the Caspian Sea against 11 targets in Syria, further complicating an already head-spinning entanglement of factional violence. Russia’s attacks in Syria support military operations conducted by loyalists of President Bashar al-Assad, directly contradicting the U.S. and Turkey’s objective to rid the country of its longtime ruler. Russia’s military offensive falls against the backdrop of an unraveling Turkey-Russia relationship, and may compel Turkey to double down in its commitments to the U.S. and Western allies.
At the American-Turkish Council’s 34th Annual Conference on U.S.-Turkey Relations, held in late September in Washington, DC, keynote speakers emphasized one theme in particular. Addressing approximately 400 political and business leaders from both sides of the bilateral relationship, speakers including Senator John McCain, U.S. Ambassador to Turkey John Bass, and NATO Supreme Allied Commander Europe General Philip Breedlove elucidated the common bonds between the U.S. and Turkey and asserted the need for Turkey to stand with the West against Russian aggression. Speakers echoed a clear desire to work together with Turkey to thwart Russia’s provocations. Although the desire may be mutual, Turkey’s hesitancy to meet the U.S. halfway reflects its heavy reliance on Russian energy resources. Over half of Ankara’s gas imports are supplied by Russia, and Turkey remains Gazprom’s second-largest export market.
While Turkey’s reliance on Russian oil prevents it from taking direct military action against Russia’s Syrian operations, Turkish state-owned pipeline company Botas made initial steps to push back against Russian intrusiveness. In late October, Botas filed a case for international arbitration to seek a price discount for Russian gas supplies. This comes on the heels of failed discussions regarding a pipeline that would pump Russian gas across the Black Sea into Turkey, and eventually into south-eastern Europe. Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan, irked by Russia’s Syrian operations, strongly condemned Russia’s incursion into Turkish airspace and asserted that Turkey could find other suppliers for its gas.
Turkey-Russia trade ties in other sectors have also cooled. Russia, in response to critiques by Turkish government officials, stopped issuing transit passage documents to Turkish trucks carrying exports to Central Asia and stiffened its inspections of Turkish produce at border crossings. Unofficial talks for a Russian solution to Turkey’s indigenous fighter jet program have fallen apart. Russia’s sharp economic downturn, triggered by low oil prices and Western sanctions, has resulted in an alarming reduction in the number of tourists travelling to Turkey.
The tension between Russia and Turkey will only worsen as the Syrian conflict escalates. Turkish officials now recognize that Turkish and Russian interests in the Middle East diverge, which may open up valuable opportunities for Turkey and the U.S. to strengthen their partnership. Turkey needs allies with similar priorities for post-war Syria, as well as the clout to temper Russian influence in the region.
Meanwhile, the U.S. ruled out strategic collaboration with Russia in the wake of its assault on opponents of the al-Assad regime. Their rift over the future of al-Assad thwarts potential points of agreement upon which a plan for Syria could be based, and U.S. Defense Secretary Ash Carter recently announced that the Obama administration is preparing to accelerate its military campaign against IS. Though multinational talks were initiated on October 29th, U.S. demands that Assad relinquish power will do little to change Russia’s mind. U.S. concern over Russian spy ships near critical undersea cable infrastructure has merely added tension to an increasingly antagonistic relationship.
The U.S.-Turkey relationship may be primed for rejuvenation as Russia alienates both countries. Not only has Turkey opened Incirlik Air Base to U.S.-led anti-IS combat efforts, but the harmonic statements by Turkish, U.S. and NATO officials disapproving Russia’s aggressive foray into the Syrian conflict signals close cooperation moving forward. Russian provocations in service of contrarian goals, as well as a sudden and tragic blowback from Turkey’s increased involvement in the anti-IS campaign, may indeed necessitate a closer U.S.-Turkey partnership.
Though the short term prospects for closer U.S.-Turkey ties were dimmed by Turkey’s refusal to facilitate the Kurdish Democratic Union Party (PYD) campaign against IS, both countries recognize that the crisis in Syria is a long-term project centered on a common anti-Assad and anti-IS agenda. The conflict will demand compromise from both sides, though U.S. boots on the ground should assuage fears that U.S.-supplied arms end up in the hands of forces opposed to the Turkish state. U.S. recognition and support of Turkey’s efforts to provide humanitarian assistance to millions of refugees within its borders may soften the at-times prickly partnership prior to this month’s G20 summit in Antalya.
Turkey maintains an ambitious vision for its role in the world. The U.S., too, has an interest in a strong, prosperous, and democratic Turkey. Indeed, its geostrategic significance and economic potential endow Turkey with significant clout. For decades, the U.S.-Turkey relationship has relied primarily on defense and security cooperation, and with the region’s security situation deteriorating, now is the right time to emphasize and strengthen these linkages while identifying other shared political and economic priorities. As Russia-Turkey relations continue to sour, the U.S. will hopefully be viewed as a superior political and economic partner, and the overall relationship, ripe with potential, will advance.
Eli K. Lovely is Communications and Marketing Director at the American-Turkish Council.
Photo by Freedom House. Photos of Assad and Russia’s Putin are seen during a pro-Assad protest in front of the Russian embassy in Damascus, Syria.
The views presented in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily represent the views of any other organization.
