hile China seems to have a growing problem of foreign diplomats dying within its borders, Russia seems to be losing quite a few of its own ambassadors, senior governmental officials and captains of industry both at home and abroad.
Over the same period in which six ambassadors and one deputy ambassador from seven different nations died within China, an additional nine Russian senior diplomats died, all except one outside Russia.
Russian Diplomats and Senior Officials who Have Died in Office Since 2016
- Igor Sergun, Director of GRU, died of sudden and undisclosed circumstances at age 58 while reportedly on a diplomatic mission abroad in Jan 2016.
- Sergei Krivov, Duty Commander, Security at Russia's consulate in New York, USA died of blunt trauma to the head and possible defenestration at age 63 in New York in Nov 2016.
- Petr Polshikov, Chief Adviser, Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Latin American Affairs) died from gunshot wounds at age 56 while in Moscow in Dec 2016.
- Andrei Karlov, Russian Ambassador to Turkey died from gunshot wounds at age 62 while in Ankara in Dec 2016.
- Andrei Malanin, Head of Russian Consular Department in Greece died at age 55 at home in Athens, officially of natural causes, in Jan 2017.
- Alexander Kadakin, Russian Ambassador to India, died of heart failure at age 67 in New Delhi in January, 2017.
- Vitaly Churkin, Russian Ambassador to the UN, died of sudden, undisclosed causes at age 64 at the office in Manhattan in Feb 2017.
- Migayas Shirinskiy, Russian Ambassador to Sudan, died of an apparent heart attack at age 63 at his home in Khartoum in Aug 2017.
- Kirill Zhalo, 2nd Secretary at Russia's Embassy to Germany, died of apparent defenestration at age 35 just outside the embassy in Berlin in Oct 2021.
Many of these sudden deaths happened under suspicious circumstances, and there was a particular cluster around the time of the US elections in 2016 and the subsequent presidential inauguration in early 2017. During a mere ten months, from November 2016 to August 2017, at least seven senior Russian diplomats died, among them the ambassadors to Turkey, India, Sudan, and the UN. The 2021 case of a Russian diplomat found deceased in front of the Russian Embassy in Germany, on the other hand, has been tied to the 2019 case of a Russian state-sponsored assassination in Berlin’s Tiergarten.
If any other nation were experiencing the death of so many of its own diplomats abroad, this would most likely lead to intense scrutiny of each case by the country’s security organs, and to heightened security for its serving personnel abroad; and it would most certainly attract a good deal of public interest and outcry within that country. Contrast, for example, the years of high-profile attention that went to the death of Christopher Stevens, the United States ambassador to Libya, in Benghazi on 11 September 2012. The relative complacency that the Russian state and public have shown towards so many suspicious deaths among their own envoys seems to indicate that no external foul play is expected to have taken place, at least in most of them, indicating that a worrisome new normal of thuggish infighting among Russian elites now also spills over into the way Russia conducts its foreign policy.
One noteworthy instance affecting the safety of foreign envoys negotiating with Russian counterparts occurred during peace negotiations in early March 2022 in Istanbul. Reports indicated that several members of the Ukrainian negotiation team, in addition to the Russian oligarch Roman Abramovich who had offered to mediate, suffered serious symptoms of apparent poisoning and were consequently advised not to eat or drink anything during further talks with Russian counterparts. While this apparent poisoning incident did not lead to a physical death among the negotiators at the time and may have been intended as a warning or an attempt to intimidate, it raises concerns about Russia’s commitment to respecting and ensuring the physical safety of foreign envoys.
While the wave of mysterious Russian diplomat deaths abroad seems to have mostly subsided after 2017, 2022, and the first months of 2023 have seen another cluster of suspicious deaths, dubbed “Sudden Russian Death Syndrome.” The deceased have predominantly been Russian energy functionaries and other business leaders and high-ranking officials in the Russian arms industries and in cryptocurrency companies, and some cases could be connected to the war in Ukraine, the halt of the Nord Stream projects, and resultant infighting within the Russian elite. A Wikipedia entry listing such deaths in 2022 alone had grown to 25 cases by the end of the year. By 24 February 2023, the one year anniversary since the start of the war, it had further grown to 30 cases. This list does not include the unusually high number of flag officers and commanders who have died in combat in Ukraine, which was as high as 29 by one count, including at least 10 generals.
In sum, the Russian power vertical under Russian President Vladimir Putin has an unparalleled track record of condoning if not participating in political assassination domestically and abroad. Many of the victims of such attempts have been critics of the regime and opposition figures such as Boris Nemtsov and Alexei Navalny; defectors that are seen as traitors by the Kremlin, such as Alexander Litvinenko or Sergei Skripal; or foreign political figures that are deemed a threat to Russian interests, such as Ukraine’s Viktor Yushchenko. Overall, such disregard for human life is quite distinct, even without taking into account the brutal Russian way of warfare evident in Chechnya, Syria, and Ukraine. In the words of the London-based professor Svetlana Stephenson, who writes about what she calls an “idealization of death under Putin:”
“This type of sinister performance — openly demonstrating the rejection of morality and law, and taking joy in the humiliation of the weak — appears designed to demonstrate Russia's sovereignty to its enemies and to stress that the conventions of Western civilization, with its norms of basic decency, do not apply here.”
“This type of sinister performance — openly demonstrating the rejection of morality and law, and taking joy in the humiliation of the weak — appears designed to demonstrate Russia's sovereignty to its enemies and to stress that the conventions of Western civilization, with its norms of basic decency, do not apply here.”
Any country that values human life should be concerned about this dynamic and what it means for any sort of relationship—political, trade, energy, or otherwise—with Russia. But even beyond human decency, the instability that comes with such high-level turbulence is a problem. As a country that takes pride in its ancient civilization, for example, China might want to reconsider whether Putin’s Russia is truly the best counterpart with which to conduct a “friendship without limits.”
Russia has clearly shown no regard for the lives of Ukrainians—military or civilians—but it also seems to be unperturbed by the frequency with which its own officials and captains of industry fall from windows or die from ingesting poison. If the Russian government shows such low regard for its own “elite,” it makes a lot more sense why it would take such aggressive action in Ukraine, knowing that sanctions were coming. The Russian people would suffer, but to the Russian government, they do not really matter. That mentality must be understood when analyzing decision-making about diplomatic, trade or military engagements elsewhere. No human life can stand in the way of the narrative of Russian greatness—a narrative controlled by Putin—and thus, everyone, no matter how senior, is expendable.
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Making Sense of ‘Sudden Russian Death Syndrome’
Russia's embassy in Berlin. Photo by Jonathan Kemper on Unsplash
March 20, 2023
Russia's senior diplomatic corps officials suffer a high rate of mortality while positioned abroad, with nine dying since 2016. Many of these deaths are suspicious, something governments should keep in mind when considering their relationship with Russia, write Drs. Sarah Kirchberger and Ian Ralby.
W
hile China seems to have a growing problem of foreign diplomats dying within its borders, Russia seems to be losing quite a few of its own ambassadors, senior governmental officials and captains of industry both at home and abroad.
Over the same period in which six ambassadors and one deputy ambassador from seven different nations died within China, an additional nine Russian senior diplomats died, all except one outside Russia.
Russian Diplomats and Senior Officials who Have Died in Office Since 2016
- Igor Sergun, Director of GRU, died of sudden and undisclosed circumstances at age 58 while reportedly on a diplomatic mission abroad in Jan 2016.
- Sergei Krivov, Duty Commander, Security at Russia's consulate in New York, USA died of blunt trauma to the head and possible defenestration at age 63 in New York in Nov 2016.
- Petr Polshikov, Chief Adviser, Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Latin American Affairs) died from gunshot wounds at age 56 while in Moscow in Dec 2016.
- Andrei Karlov, Russian Ambassador to Turkey died from gunshot wounds at age 62 while in Ankara in Dec 2016.
- Andrei Malanin, Head of Russian Consular Department in Greece died at age 55 at home in Athens, officially of natural causes, in Jan 2017.
- Alexander Kadakin, Russian Ambassador to India, died of heart failure at age 67 in New Delhi in January, 2017.
- Vitaly Churkin, Russian Ambassador to the UN, died of sudden, undisclosed causes at age 64 at the office in Manhattan in Feb 2017.
- Migayas Shirinskiy, Russian Ambassador to Sudan, died of an apparent heart attack at age 63 at his home in Khartoum in Aug 2017.
- Kirill Zhalo, 2nd Secretary at Russia's Embassy to Germany, died of apparent defenestration at age 35 just outside the embassy in Berlin in Oct 2021.
Many of these sudden deaths happened under suspicious circumstances, and there was a particular cluster around the time of the US elections in 2016 and the subsequent presidential inauguration in early 2017. During a mere ten months, from November 2016 to August 2017, at least seven senior Russian diplomats died, among them the ambassadors to Turkey, India, Sudan, and the UN. The 2021 case of a Russian diplomat found deceased in front of the Russian Embassy in Germany, on the other hand, has been tied to the 2019 case of a Russian state-sponsored assassination in Berlin’s Tiergarten.
If any other nation were experiencing the death of so many of its own diplomats abroad, this would most likely lead to intense scrutiny of each case by the country’s security organs, and to heightened security for its serving personnel abroad; and it would most certainly attract a good deal of public interest and outcry within that country. Contrast, for example, the years of high-profile attention that went to the death of Christopher Stevens, the United States ambassador to Libya, in Benghazi on 11 September 2012. The relative complacency that the Russian state and public have shown towards so many suspicious deaths among their own envoys seems to indicate that no external foul play is expected to have taken place, at least in most of them, indicating that a worrisome new normal of thuggish infighting among Russian elites now also spills over into the way Russia conducts its foreign policy.
One noteworthy instance affecting the safety of foreign envoys negotiating with Russian counterparts occurred during peace negotiations in early March 2022 in Istanbul. Reports indicated that several members of the Ukrainian negotiation team, in addition to the Russian oligarch Roman Abramovich who had offered to mediate, suffered serious symptoms of apparent poisoning and were consequently advised not to eat or drink anything during further talks with Russian counterparts. While this apparent poisoning incident did not lead to a physical death among the negotiators at the time and may have been intended as a warning or an attempt to intimidate, it raises concerns about Russia’s commitment to respecting and ensuring the physical safety of foreign envoys.
While the wave of mysterious Russian diplomat deaths abroad seems to have mostly subsided after 2017, 2022, and the first months of 2023 have seen another cluster of suspicious deaths, dubbed “Sudden Russian Death Syndrome.” The deceased have predominantly been Russian energy functionaries and other business leaders and high-ranking officials in the Russian arms industries and in cryptocurrency companies, and some cases could be connected to the war in Ukraine, the halt of the Nord Stream projects, and resultant infighting within the Russian elite. A Wikipedia entry listing such deaths in 2022 alone had grown to 25 cases by the end of the year. By 24 February 2023, the one year anniversary since the start of the war, it had further grown to 30 cases. This list does not include the unusually high number of flag officers and commanders who have died in combat in Ukraine, which was as high as 29 by one count, including at least 10 generals.
In sum, the Russian power vertical under Russian President Vladimir Putin has an unparalleled track record of condoning if not participating in political assassination domestically and abroad. Many of the victims of such attempts have been critics of the regime and opposition figures such as Boris Nemtsov and Alexei Navalny; defectors that are seen as traitors by the Kremlin, such as Alexander Litvinenko or Sergei Skripal; or foreign political figures that are deemed a threat to Russian interests, such as Ukraine’s Viktor Yushchenko. Overall, such disregard for human life is quite distinct, even without taking into account the brutal Russian way of warfare evident in Chechnya, Syria, and Ukraine. In the words of the London-based professor Svetlana Stephenson, who writes about what she calls an “idealization of death under Putin:”
“This type of sinister performance — openly demonstrating the rejection of morality and law, and taking joy in the humiliation of the weak — appears designed to demonstrate Russia's sovereignty to its enemies and to stress that the conventions of Western civilization, with its norms of basic decency, do not apply here.”
“This type of sinister performance — openly demonstrating the rejection of morality and law, and taking joy in the humiliation of the weak — appears designed to demonstrate Russia's sovereignty to its enemies and to stress that the conventions of Western civilization, with its norms of basic decency, do not apply here.”
Any country that values human life should be concerned about this dynamic and what it means for any sort of relationship—political, trade, energy, or otherwise—with Russia. But even beyond human decency, the instability that comes with such high-level turbulence is a problem. As a country that takes pride in its ancient civilization, for example, China might want to reconsider whether Putin’s Russia is truly the best counterpart with which to conduct a “friendship without limits.”
Russia has clearly shown no regard for the lives of Ukrainians—military or civilians—but it also seems to be unperturbed by the frequency with which its own officials and captains of industry fall from windows or die from ingesting poison. If the Russian government shows such low regard for its own “elite,” it makes a lot more sense why it would take such aggressive action in Ukraine, knowing that sanctions were coming. The Russian people would suffer, but to the Russian government, they do not really matter. That mentality must be understood when analyzing decision-making about diplomatic, trade or military engagements elsewhere. No human life can stand in the way of the narrative of Russian greatness—a narrative controlled by Putin—and thus, everyone, no matter how senior, is expendable.
