recent Newsweek investigation detailed growing Chinese influence on the island nation of Antigua and Barbuda. From burgeoning debt to Chinese ports with potential military uses, the investigation highlights the growing Chinese presence not only in that country, but also its growing influence across the Americas. This report furthered U.S. policymakers’ and the military's concerns over China’s presence in the region. Indeed, in response to reporting on Chinese activity in Antigua and Barbuda, a U.S. congressman called for a new Monroe Doctrine—a policy associated with U.S. imperialism in the region.
U.S. Southern Command’s General Laura Richardson and others have noted that the best way to counter Chinese influence is for the United States to step up and compete in the region. However, some of the policies being considered to compete in the region may actually undermine U.S. efforts to effectively counter China due to their framing and scope. If the U.S. is serious about competing with China, it needs to better understand the interests and needs of Latin America and the Caribbean and do more to be a neighbor rather than just seeking to counter Chinese influence.
Potential partnerships for Strengthening U.S.–Hemispheric Relations
There is a long history of the U.S. supporting deeper regional trade integration. Although efforts to develop the Free Trade Agreement of the Americas (FTAA) in the 1990s and 2000s ultimately failed, this led to the creation of several free trade agreements between the United States and the region. Following a lackluster performance in hosting the IX Summit of the Americas in 2022, the Biden administration is touting the Americas Partnership for Economic Prosperity (APEP)—announced at the Summit—as one of its most important tools for challenging Chinese influence in the region. At the Concordia Americas Summit in Miami, Christopher Dodd—Special Presidential Advisor for the Americas—noted that 10 countries from the region (not including the U.S. and Canada) are already APEP members with another seven countries that have expressed interest in joining. Thus far, APEP nations have made important strides with a gathering of their Heads of State in November 2023 and a recent meeting of finance ministers.
Congress has also viewed APEP as an important tool for engaging with Latin America and the Caribbean, introducing the Americas Trade and Investment Act (Americas Act) this March. The Act would expand financing, create incentives for near–shoring, and promote deeper people–to–people engagement between the U.S. and countries that are members of the Americas Partnership. The sponsors of the Americas Act referred to it as the “…cornerstone upon which we build a stronger hemisphere...” and some have gone so far as to herald the Act as “…the most comprehensive U.S. policy attempt to deepen relations with the Western Hemisphere in more than two decades… [and] a major effort to offset China’s increasing influence in the hemisphere.”
Neighborhood or Preferred Partners?
While National Security Advisor Jake Sullivan recently noted the importance of partnership as core to the Biden administration’s approach to the Americas, APEP and the Americas Act do not fully embrace the Americas as a whole as partners and are insufficient for rewriting U.S. foreign policy toward the region or addressing Chinese influence. This is in part due to their narrow and exclusionary nature. While there is interest in more countries joining APEP, the relatively small number of initial countries, explicit bans on members of different regional organizations, and limitations on expanding APEP deters the potential of the initiative. Additionally, although the Americas Partnership is focused on deepening regional trade and investment, the vast majority of APEP member states already have FTAs with the United States. The decision not to expand free trade agreements fits current U.S. policy preferences, but limits APEP’s potential.
Despite the Americas Act taking the important step of institutionalizing APEP and supporting investment among member countries, the Act makes APEP expansion more difficult. The Americas Act lays out specific criteria for who may seek membership, including the need for countries to both adhere to the Inter–American Democratic Charter and not be members of the Bolivarian Alliance for the Peoples of Our America (ALBA). It is important for the United States to defend democracy in the region, but the ban on the 10 ALBA nations makes the defense of democracy appear ideological rather than genuine—particularly given that several of ALBA’s Caribbean members have robust democracies.
Despite the Biden administration’s emphasis on partnership, the administration’s decision to turn toward minilateralism—or smaller regional coalitions—and global “coalitions of the willing” approach limits the ability of APEP and the Americas Act to create the necessary regional coalition to effectively counter Chinese influence. Perhaps the clearest example comes from Antigua and Barbuda—the same country where China’s influence was recently reported on. The Caribbean nation is a member of ALBA and as such is not eligible to join APEP. However, as Sir Ronald Sanders, the nation’s ambassador to the U.S. and the Organization of American States, noted in 2022, the Biden and Trump administrations’ approach to and neglect of the Caribbean could have “…unintended, but not surprising consequences, of pushing those Caribbean countries with diplomatic relations closer to China…”
Understanding Your Neighbors’ Interests
The United States needs to better understand how the region views China. While the U.S. views the Asian nation as a threat, many regional leaders do not—instead viewing China as an opportunity. Framing APEP as a tool to combat Chinese influence may drive a wedge between the U.S. and countries that the U.S. is trying to improve relations with. Coupled with calls to reinstitute the Monroe Doctrine, it increasingly appears that the U.S. is out of touch with the region and seeking to force its vision of the Americas upon its neighbors.
Despite differing views of China, there are numerous shared challenges facing the Americas, including the erosion of democracy, high levels of inequality, climate change, and many more. These challenges affect the U.S. as well, providing an opportunity to collaborate and learn from each other—an action that could further improve perceptions of the United States as a partner rather than a bully.
Holistic Approach to U.S.–Hemispheric Policy
If the U.S. wants to be the preferred partner in the region and counter the rise of Chinese influence, it must do more than just invest in a small subset of like minded countries. APEP and the Americas Act mark an important and critical shift in the U.S. approach to the region—and one that should be taken. However, these actions must not become the primary tool through which the U.S. approaches the region. The exclusion of countries from the region, its lack of understanding of the region’s view of China, and the ideological landscape all hinder broader efforts to improve U.S. foreign policy toward the region. To parallel the trade and investment activities within APEP and the Americas Act, the United States must engage with all countries in the region to foster shared interests and collaborative solutions to the challenges facing the Americas. Only by partnering with the broadest possible coalition of countries in the region can the United States truly be a partner to the Americas.
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Ideology and minilateralism hinder U.S.–hemispheric affairs
Antigua, Guatemala. Photo by Rodrigo Escalante from Unsplash.
May 21, 2024
The recent growing Chinese influence across the Americas is met with several proposals for how the U.S. can best counter this influence, including a new Monroe Doctrine and efforts to compete in the region, writes Adam Ratzlaff.
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recent Newsweek investigation detailed growing Chinese influence on the island nation of Antigua and Barbuda. From burgeoning debt to Chinese ports with potential military uses, the investigation highlights the growing Chinese presence not only in that country, but also its growing influence across the Americas. This report furthered U.S. policymakers’ and the military's concerns over China’s presence in the region. Indeed, in response to reporting on Chinese activity in Antigua and Barbuda, a U.S. congressman called for a new Monroe Doctrine—a policy associated with U.S. imperialism in the region.
U.S. Southern Command’s General Laura Richardson and others have noted that the best way to counter Chinese influence is for the United States to step up and compete in the region. However, some of the policies being considered to compete in the region may actually undermine U.S. efforts to effectively counter China due to their framing and scope. If the U.S. is serious about competing with China, it needs to better understand the interests and needs of Latin America and the Caribbean and do more to be a neighbor rather than just seeking to counter Chinese influence.
Potential partnerships for Strengthening U.S.–Hemispheric Relations
There is a long history of the U.S. supporting deeper regional trade integration. Although efforts to develop the Free Trade Agreement of the Americas (FTAA) in the 1990s and 2000s ultimately failed, this led to the creation of several free trade agreements between the United States and the region. Following a lackluster performance in hosting the IX Summit of the Americas in 2022, the Biden administration is touting the Americas Partnership for Economic Prosperity (APEP)—announced at the Summit—as one of its most important tools for challenging Chinese influence in the region. At the Concordia Americas Summit in Miami, Christopher Dodd—Special Presidential Advisor for the Americas—noted that 10 countries from the region (not including the U.S. and Canada) are already APEP members with another seven countries that have expressed interest in joining. Thus far, APEP nations have made important strides with a gathering of their Heads of State in November 2023 and a recent meeting of finance ministers.
Congress has also viewed APEP as an important tool for engaging with Latin America and the Caribbean, introducing the Americas Trade and Investment Act (Americas Act) this March. The Act would expand financing, create incentives for near–shoring, and promote deeper people–to–people engagement between the U.S. and countries that are members of the Americas Partnership. The sponsors of the Americas Act referred to it as the “…cornerstone upon which we build a stronger hemisphere...” and some have gone so far as to herald the Act as “…the most comprehensive U.S. policy attempt to deepen relations with the Western Hemisphere in more than two decades… [and] a major effort to offset China’s increasing influence in the hemisphere.”
Neighborhood or Preferred Partners?
While National Security Advisor Jake Sullivan recently noted the importance of partnership as core to the Biden administration’s approach to the Americas, APEP and the Americas Act do not fully embrace the Americas as a whole as partners and are insufficient for rewriting U.S. foreign policy toward the region or addressing Chinese influence. This is in part due to their narrow and exclusionary nature. While there is interest in more countries joining APEP, the relatively small number of initial countries, explicit bans on members of different regional organizations, and limitations on expanding APEP deters the potential of the initiative. Additionally, although the Americas Partnership is focused on deepening regional trade and investment, the vast majority of APEP member states already have FTAs with the United States. The decision not to expand free trade agreements fits current U.S. policy preferences, but limits APEP’s potential.
Despite the Americas Act taking the important step of institutionalizing APEP and supporting investment among member countries, the Act makes APEP expansion more difficult. The Americas Act lays out specific criteria for who may seek membership, including the need for countries to both adhere to the Inter–American Democratic Charter and not be members of the Bolivarian Alliance for the Peoples of Our America (ALBA). It is important for the United States to defend democracy in the region, but the ban on the 10 ALBA nations makes the defense of democracy appear ideological rather than genuine—particularly given that several of ALBA’s Caribbean members have robust democracies.
Despite the Biden administration’s emphasis on partnership, the administration’s decision to turn toward minilateralism—or smaller regional coalitions—and global “coalitions of the willing” approach limits the ability of APEP and the Americas Act to create the necessary regional coalition to effectively counter Chinese influence. Perhaps the clearest example comes from Antigua and Barbuda—the same country where China’s influence was recently reported on. The Caribbean nation is a member of ALBA and as such is not eligible to join APEP. However, as Sir Ronald Sanders, the nation’s ambassador to the U.S. and the Organization of American States, noted in 2022, the Biden and Trump administrations’ approach to and neglect of the Caribbean could have “…unintended, but not surprising consequences, of pushing those Caribbean countries with diplomatic relations closer to China…”
Understanding Your Neighbors’ Interests
The United States needs to better understand how the region views China. While the U.S. views the Asian nation as a threat, many regional leaders do not—instead viewing China as an opportunity. Framing APEP as a tool to combat Chinese influence may drive a wedge between the U.S. and countries that the U.S. is trying to improve relations with. Coupled with calls to reinstitute the Monroe Doctrine, it increasingly appears that the U.S. is out of touch with the region and seeking to force its vision of the Americas upon its neighbors.
Despite differing views of China, there are numerous shared challenges facing the Americas, including the erosion of democracy, high levels of inequality, climate change, and many more. These challenges affect the U.S. as well, providing an opportunity to collaborate and learn from each other—an action that could further improve perceptions of the United States as a partner rather than a bully.
Holistic Approach to U.S.–Hemispheric Policy
If the U.S. wants to be the preferred partner in the region and counter the rise of Chinese influence, it must do more than just invest in a small subset of like minded countries. APEP and the Americas Act mark an important and critical shift in the U.S. approach to the region—and one that should be taken. However, these actions must not become the primary tool through which the U.S. approaches the region. The exclusion of countries from the region, its lack of understanding of the region’s view of China, and the ideological landscape all hinder broader efforts to improve U.S. foreign policy toward the region. To parallel the trade and investment activities within APEP and the Americas Act, the United States must engage with all countries in the region to foster shared interests and collaborative solutions to the challenges facing the Americas. Only by partnering with the broadest possible coalition of countries in the region can the United States truly be a partner to the Americas.
