rmenian leaders have repeatedly warned that Azerbaijan may soon launch a full–scale invasion across its border. But in spite of such fears, the landlocked, South Caucasus nation of around 2.9 million people decided to suspend its participation in the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO)—a Russian–dominated military bloc that acts as a guarantor of Armenian security. Will this move have an impact on Armenia’s territorial integrity, and how will it affect the former Soviet republic’s relations with Moscow?
It is no secret that Azerbaijan, Armenia’s archenemy, continues to strengthen its military capabilities , almost half a year after it resolved the Nagorno–Karabakh conflict in its favor. On 9 February 2024, the energy–rich nation’s President Ilham Aliyev inaugurated the acquisition of new cruise missiles and new and bigger combat unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs), procured from Azerbaijan’s ally Turkey. There are also reports suggesting that Baku might have ordered B–52 155-mm howitzers from Serbia. Given that on 1 February 2024 Azerbaijani and Serbian defense ministry officials signed a bilateral military cooperation agreement, and that the two countries seek to actively reinforce energy and military ties, it is entirely possible that Serbian–made weapons will soon end up in Azerbaijan.
Amenia, on the other hand, is reportedly purchasing weapons from NATO member France, despite Yerevan’s (nominal) CSTO membership. Back in October 2023, Paris said it planned to assist Armenia in strengthening its air defense capabilities by selling it three radars, and reaching an agreement to supply Mistral anti–air missiles in the future. Thus, it is unlikely a pure coincidence that Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan chose France 24 TV to announce Yerevan’s decision to freeze its participation in the CSTO.
That, however, does not mean that Armenia (at least in the near future) will officially leave the Russian–led military bloc, whose other members are Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan. If Azerbaijan eventually invades southern Armenia—aiming to capture the strategically important Syunik province and create a land corridor to its Nakhchivan exclave, and further to Turkey—Yerevan will likely ask CSTO to intervene. But given that the military bloc has a history of ignoring Armenia’s calls, and that it never reacted to Ukraine’s frequent attacks on Russian territory, it is not very probable that the CSTO will protect Armenia against an Azerbaijani incursion. Such a development could lead to Yerevan’s formal withdrawal from the bloc.
Meanwhile, the former Soviet republic will likely seek to ensure the European Union’s protection given that, according to the EU foreign policy chief Josep Borrell, Brussels is working on an “ambitious plan” to bolster ties with Armenia. There is, however, no guarantee that the EU has the capacity and political will to protect Armenia. In August 2023, Yerevan accused the Azerbaijani military of opening fire on European Union observers monitoring the volatile border between the Caucasian former Soviet republics, while Baku recently questioned the impartiality of the EU mission and warned it against causing “damage to the country’s territorial integrity.”
Quite aware that the EU is not willing to deteriorate its ties with the energy–rich Azerbaijan over Armenia, Yerevan aims to strengthen its military cooperation with NATO, hoping that such an action would improve its position vis–à–vis Baku. At the same time, amid the relatively tense situation in the region, it continues distancing itself from the Kremlin. Pashinyan’s statement that his country is “not Russia's ally in its war against Ukraine,” as well as strong signals that Ukraine’s President Volodymyr Zelensky might soon visit Yerevan, will undoubtedly additionally jeopardize relations between Moscow and Yerevan. More importantly, given that Turkey, as a NATO member, is unlikely to ever back the alliance’s potential intervention against Azerbaijan, it is not very probable that Armenia can count on the U.S.–dominated military bloc support.
As a clear winner of the Second Karabakh War, Azerbaijan expects Armenia to fully implement the Moscow–brokered 2020 ceasefire agreement and build its section of the Nakhchivan corridor (also known as the Zangezur corridor) through the Syunik province. Baku insists that cargo, citizens and vehicles going from mainland Azerbaijan to Nakhchivan “should pass through the Zangezur corridor freely without undergoing any inspection and customs clearance.” Moreover, Azerbaijan expects Armenia to change its own constitution and get rid of the current preamble that “contains direct calls for the unification of Karabakh with Armenia.”
Since Pashinyan hinted he is ready to change Armenia’s constitution, it is very likely he will also agree to build the Zangezur corridor under Azerbaijani terms. But the problem is that the realization of the transportation route would effectively cut off the South Caucasus nation from Iran. As a result, the Islamic Republic would see its north semi–encircled by Turkic states Azerbaijan and Iran. That is why Iranian leadership repeatedly stated that the creation of a land corridor through Armenia to Nakhchivan is Tehran’s “red line.”
Although Turkish Transport and Infrastructure Minister Abdulkadir claims that a route passing from Azerbaijan, through Iranian territory, and further to Nakhchivan and Turkey, could represent the alternative to the initial Nakhchivan corridor route going through southern Armenia, it is not very probable that Baku and Ankara are willing to make themselves dependent on Tehran. Thus, Yerevan will likely remain under pressure to build its 26.7 mile (43-kilometer) long section of the corridor, and allow Azerbaijan to have passport and customs-free passage through Syunik.
Given Armenia’s extremely weak position in the global arena, Pashinyan has no choice but to accept building the road and railroad under Azerbaijani conditions, even though it could limit Armenian sovereignty over parts of the Syunik province. But whether Iran would interpret such a move as crossing its "red line," and take some concrete actions—at this point remains highly uncertain.
Armenia and Azerbaijan have agreed to hold another round of peace talks, which suggests that there is still a chance to avoid a wider regional conflict. But under the current circumstances, Yerevan seems to be on its own. In order to avoid a large–scale confrontation with its neighbor, it will likely have to make some significant concessions to Baku.
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How to prevent another war between Armenia and Azerbaijan
Photo by Ani Adigyozalyan on Unsplash.
March 4, 2024
Armenia and Azerbaijan have agreed to hold another round of peace talks, which suggests that there is still a chance to avoid a wider regional conflict. But under the current circumstances, Yerevan seems to be on its own, leaving it with some difficult choices, writes Nikola Mikovic.
A
rmenian leaders have repeatedly warned that Azerbaijan may soon launch a full–scale invasion across its border. But in spite of such fears, the landlocked, South Caucasus nation of around 2.9 million people decided to suspend its participation in the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO)—a Russian–dominated military bloc that acts as a guarantor of Armenian security. Will this move have an impact on Armenia’s territorial integrity, and how will it affect the former Soviet republic’s relations with Moscow?
It is no secret that Azerbaijan, Armenia’s archenemy, continues to strengthen its military capabilities , almost half a year after it resolved the Nagorno–Karabakh conflict in its favor. On 9 February 2024, the energy–rich nation’s President Ilham Aliyev inaugurated the acquisition of new cruise missiles and new and bigger combat unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs), procured from Azerbaijan’s ally Turkey. There are also reports suggesting that Baku might have ordered B–52 155-mm howitzers from Serbia. Given that on 1 February 2024 Azerbaijani and Serbian defense ministry officials signed a bilateral military cooperation agreement, and that the two countries seek to actively reinforce energy and military ties, it is entirely possible that Serbian–made weapons will soon end up in Azerbaijan.
Amenia, on the other hand, is reportedly purchasing weapons from NATO member France, despite Yerevan’s (nominal) CSTO membership. Back in October 2023, Paris said it planned to assist Armenia in strengthening its air defense capabilities by selling it three radars, and reaching an agreement to supply Mistral anti–air missiles in the future. Thus, it is unlikely a pure coincidence that Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan chose France 24 TV to announce Yerevan’s decision to freeze its participation in the CSTO.
That, however, does not mean that Armenia (at least in the near future) will officially leave the Russian–led military bloc, whose other members are Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan. If Azerbaijan eventually invades southern Armenia—aiming to capture the strategically important Syunik province and create a land corridor to its Nakhchivan exclave, and further to Turkey—Yerevan will likely ask CSTO to intervene. But given that the military bloc has a history of ignoring Armenia’s calls, and that it never reacted to Ukraine’s frequent attacks on Russian territory, it is not very probable that the CSTO will protect Armenia against an Azerbaijani incursion. Such a development could lead to Yerevan’s formal withdrawal from the bloc.
Meanwhile, the former Soviet republic will likely seek to ensure the European Union’s protection given that, according to the EU foreign policy chief Josep Borrell, Brussels is working on an “ambitious plan” to bolster ties with Armenia. There is, however, no guarantee that the EU has the capacity and political will to protect Armenia. In August 2023, Yerevan accused the Azerbaijani military of opening fire on European Union observers monitoring the volatile border between the Caucasian former Soviet republics, while Baku recently questioned the impartiality of the EU mission and warned it against causing “damage to the country’s territorial integrity.”
Quite aware that the EU is not willing to deteriorate its ties with the energy–rich Azerbaijan over Armenia, Yerevan aims to strengthen its military cooperation with NATO, hoping that such an action would improve its position vis–à–vis Baku. At the same time, amid the relatively tense situation in the region, it continues distancing itself from the Kremlin. Pashinyan’s statement that his country is “not Russia's ally in its war against Ukraine,” as well as strong signals that Ukraine’s President Volodymyr Zelensky might soon visit Yerevan, will undoubtedly additionally jeopardize relations between Moscow and Yerevan. More importantly, given that Turkey, as a NATO member, is unlikely to ever back the alliance’s potential intervention against Azerbaijan, it is not very probable that Armenia can count on the U.S.–dominated military bloc support.
As a clear winner of the Second Karabakh War, Azerbaijan expects Armenia to fully implement the Moscow–brokered 2020 ceasefire agreement and build its section of the Nakhchivan corridor (also known as the Zangezur corridor) through the Syunik province. Baku insists that cargo, citizens and vehicles going from mainland Azerbaijan to Nakhchivan “should pass through the Zangezur corridor freely without undergoing any inspection and customs clearance.” Moreover, Azerbaijan expects Armenia to change its own constitution and get rid of the current preamble that “contains direct calls for the unification of Karabakh with Armenia.”
Since Pashinyan hinted he is ready to change Armenia’s constitution, it is very likely he will also agree to build the Zangezur corridor under Azerbaijani terms. But the problem is that the realization of the transportation route would effectively cut off the South Caucasus nation from Iran. As a result, the Islamic Republic would see its north semi–encircled by Turkic states Azerbaijan and Iran. That is why Iranian leadership repeatedly stated that the creation of a land corridor through Armenia to Nakhchivan is Tehran’s “red line.”
Although Turkish Transport and Infrastructure Minister Abdulkadir claims that a route passing from Azerbaijan, through Iranian territory, and further to Nakhchivan and Turkey, could represent the alternative to the initial Nakhchivan corridor route going through southern Armenia, it is not very probable that Baku and Ankara are willing to make themselves dependent on Tehran. Thus, Yerevan will likely remain under pressure to build its 26.7 mile (43-kilometer) long section of the corridor, and allow Azerbaijan to have passport and customs-free passage through Syunik.
Given Armenia’s extremely weak position in the global arena, Pashinyan has no choice but to accept building the road and railroad under Azerbaijani conditions, even though it could limit Armenian sovereignty over parts of the Syunik province. But whether Iran would interpret such a move as crossing its "red line," and take some concrete actions—at this point remains highly uncertain.
Armenia and Azerbaijan have agreed to hold another round of peace talks, which suggests that there is still a chance to avoid a wider regional conflict. But under the current circumstances, Yerevan seems to be on its own. In order to avoid a large–scale confrontation with its neighbor, it will likely have to make some significant concessions to Baku.
