razilian president Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva is seeking to forge a leadership role in the Global South. Given he leads Latin America’s largest country, one of the world’s largest economies, and a country blessed with agricultural and commodity wealth, Lula is well placed to achieve that ambition.
Although there are many detractors to the idea of a Global South, which is a somewhat amorphous term, it has increasing appeal for a sizeable group of countries in Africa, Asia, and Latin America that have little interest in picking a side between the competing influences of the U.S. and the West on the one hand and authoritarian states including China, Iran, and Russia on the other. The U.S. has an interest in Brazil’s leadership ambitions in the Global South as both countries are democratic, value a healthy private sector, and favor the upholding of the rule of law. U.S. policymakers need to consider the benefit of Lula’s Brazil balancing Xi Jinping’s China’s role in offering leadership to an emerging bloc of countries. But the path ahead is complicated, because Brazilian and U.S. interests are often at odds.
Brazilian, U.S. interest misalignment
President Lula’s Global South leadership aspirations are demonstrated by his aim to be a peacemaker in the Russo–Ukrainian war (with little success) and his neutrality in that conflict. But these efforts also create tensions with the U.S., as has Brazil’s stance on the Israel–Hamas conflict. Brazil has supported South Africa’s case brought to the International Court of Justice which alleged Israeli genocide.
Lula’s leadership aspirations are also illustrated by his support for greater Latin American unity (holding a South American heads of state summit in Brasilia in 2023) and his use of Brazil’s 2024 leadership of the G20 group of countries to push for giving the Global South a larger voice in world decision making. Furthermore, Lula is vocal about climate change and developing a more coherent approach to the Amazon River basin with regional partners.
Lula has also become an active spokesperson for BRICS, an organization which was established in 2006 by Brazil, Russia, India and China and later joined by South Africa (2010), with the intention to bring together the world’s most significant developing countries to challenge the economic and political hegemony of the advanced economies in Europe and North America. That challenge includes calls for de–dollarization of which Lula has been a major advocate. Lula was instrumental in finding a new president for the BRICS New Development Bank, Dilma Rousseff, herself a former head of state for Brazil. Yet, while BRICS membership was recently expanded to include Egypt, Ethiopia, Iran, and the United Arab Emirates, significantly, Argentina rejected an offer of membership sponsored by Brazil.
Challenges to Brazilian leadership
Lula’s efforts face considerable headwinds. He must deal with an economy that has not fully regained its feet from several challenging years (including being hit hard by Covid–19 and inflationary pressures from the Russo–Ukrainian War) and a highly polarized domestic political landscape. At the same time, while the international environment may be open to Lula as a Global South spokesperson, he is on a crowded stage. China, India and Russia all have their own aspirations to Global South leadership, while BRICS runs the risk of becoming a Trojan Horse for Beijing and Russia.
Lula’s leadership bid faces Latin American headwinds as well. The region is increasingly polarized between left and right, with the former represented by Colombia’s President Gustavo Petro and Chile’s Gabriel Boric and the latter by a rising hardline law and order conservative/libertarian constituency represented by Argentina’s President Milei and El Salvador’s President Bukele. Venezuela is another huge headache.
A future for Brazilian leadership?
Lula’s best opportunity to play a Global South leadership role is in food security. Brazil is the world’s lead exporter of soy, meat, coffee, and sugar. Focusing on food security would provide an important strategic niche for Brazil, contrasting with China’s and India’s bids for Global South leadership driven by digital infrastructure and emerging technologies.
In a narrower context, Lula could also buttress his Global South profile by providing logistical and economic support to the international community’s efforts in addressing Haiti’s crises—and in the process encourage other key Latin American countries to do the same.
The post–Cold War international system is running on fumes and the Global South is one example of many countries groping for alternatives. This is something that U.S. policymakers need to come to grips with. Although Brasilia and Washington have their differences (as with Lula’s calls for de–dollarization and over Gaza–Israel), the relationship between this hemisphere’s two largest countries needs to be more productive, notably as a potential counterpart to a growing clique of authoritarian countries, heavily influenced by China and, to varying degrees, Russia.
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Of the Global South, Brazilian aspirations and U.S. interest
Rio de Janeiro, Brazil. Image by Andrea Meakin from Pixabay
July 22, 2024
Brazil’s president is well–placed to become a leader of the Global South, and the U.S. has an interest in seeing Brazil succeed. But the path ahead is complicated because U.S. and Brazilian interests are often at odds, write Georges A. Fauriol and Scott B. MacDonald.
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razilian president Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva is seeking to forge a leadership role in the Global South. Given he leads Latin America’s largest country, one of the world’s largest economies, and a country blessed with agricultural and commodity wealth, Lula is well placed to achieve that ambition.
Although there are many detractors to the idea of a Global South, which is a somewhat amorphous term, it has increasing appeal for a sizeable group of countries in Africa, Asia, and Latin America that have little interest in picking a side between the competing influences of the U.S. and the West on the one hand and authoritarian states including China, Iran, and Russia on the other. The U.S. has an interest in Brazil’s leadership ambitions in the Global South as both countries are democratic, value a healthy private sector, and favor the upholding of the rule of law. U.S. policymakers need to consider the benefit of Lula’s Brazil balancing Xi Jinping’s China’s role in offering leadership to an emerging bloc of countries. But the path ahead is complicated, because Brazilian and U.S. interests are often at odds.
Brazilian, U.S. interest misalignment
President Lula’s Global South leadership aspirations are demonstrated by his aim to be a peacemaker in the Russo–Ukrainian war (with little success) and his neutrality in that conflict. But these efforts also create tensions with the U.S., as has Brazil’s stance on the Israel–Hamas conflict. Brazil has supported South Africa’s case brought to the International Court of Justice which alleged Israeli genocide.
Lula’s leadership aspirations are also illustrated by his support for greater Latin American unity (holding a South American heads of state summit in Brasilia in 2023) and his use of Brazil’s 2024 leadership of the G20 group of countries to push for giving the Global South a larger voice in world decision making. Furthermore, Lula is vocal about climate change and developing a more coherent approach to the Amazon River basin with regional partners.
Lula has also become an active spokesperson for BRICS, an organization which was established in 2006 by Brazil, Russia, India and China and later joined by South Africa (2010), with the intention to bring together the world’s most significant developing countries to challenge the economic and political hegemony of the advanced economies in Europe and North America. That challenge includes calls for de–dollarization of which Lula has been a major advocate. Lula was instrumental in finding a new president for the BRICS New Development Bank, Dilma Rousseff, herself a former head of state for Brazil. Yet, while BRICS membership was recently expanded to include Egypt, Ethiopia, Iran, and the United Arab Emirates, significantly, Argentina rejected an offer of membership sponsored by Brazil.
Challenges to Brazilian leadership
Lula’s efforts face considerable headwinds. He must deal with an economy that has not fully regained its feet from several challenging years (including being hit hard by Covid–19 and inflationary pressures from the Russo–Ukrainian War) and a highly polarized domestic political landscape. At the same time, while the international environment may be open to Lula as a Global South spokesperson, he is on a crowded stage. China, India and Russia all have their own aspirations to Global South leadership, while BRICS runs the risk of becoming a Trojan Horse for Beijing and Russia.
Lula’s leadership bid faces Latin American headwinds as well. The region is increasingly polarized between left and right, with the former represented by Colombia’s President Gustavo Petro and Chile’s Gabriel Boric and the latter by a rising hardline law and order conservative/libertarian constituency represented by Argentina’s President Milei and El Salvador’s President Bukele. Venezuela is another huge headache.
A future for Brazilian leadership?
Lula’s best opportunity to play a Global South leadership role is in food security. Brazil is the world’s lead exporter of soy, meat, coffee, and sugar. Focusing on food security would provide an important strategic niche for Brazil, contrasting with China’s and India’s bids for Global South leadership driven by digital infrastructure and emerging technologies.
In a narrower context, Lula could also buttress his Global South profile by providing logistical and economic support to the international community’s efforts in addressing Haiti’s crises—and in the process encourage other key Latin American countries to do the same.
The post–Cold War international system is running on fumes and the Global South is one example of many countries groping for alternatives. This is something that U.S. policymakers need to come to grips with. Although Brasilia and Washington have their differences (as with Lula’s calls for de–dollarization and over Gaza–Israel), the relationship between this hemisphere’s two largest countries needs to be more productive, notably as a potential counterpart to a growing clique of authoritarian countries, heavily influenced by China and, to varying degrees, Russia.
