he fundamental premise of the emergence of a “third wave” of terrorism is flawed. Terrorism, at its most basic, is a tactic used by groups of varying varietals and ideologies to pursue their individual ends and advance their aims. Indeed, depending on how one defines the “waves” of terrorism, the world could well be witnessing the fifth or even sixth iteration.
What we are seeing is, however, the continuation of the emergence, evolution, and adaptation of groups in response to external and internal stimuli. Externally, the Western–led interventions in Syria and Iraq degraded but did not defeat the Islamic States as evidenced by attacks in the region, as well as further afield such as the Crocus City Hall attack in Moscow. Israel’s response to Hamas’ attack provided additional impetus for expanded attacks and could well serve as justification for violence beyond Israel’s borders against Jerusalem’s supporters or to affect the “propaganda of the deed.” This certainly raises concerns about the forthcoming Olympics in Paris and Euro 2024 football championship in Germany.
Internally, the increasing prominence and activity of far–right groups in Europe and the United States—while not new—has accelerated due to domestic developments within those countries. Anger over immigration, fears of an overreaching government (at least in the United States), and other domestic drivers of radicalization are both spurring those groups and priming their desire to use terrorist tactics, which are fundamentally tools of weaker actors. Focusing on “terrorism” per se is to miss the drivers of the threats themselves. Indeed, the reality is that neither terrorism’s character nor nature are in flux.
In a time of “polycrisis,” militant groups will likely aim to leverage nation–state distraction or perceived weakness to their advantage. With Western attention focused predominantly on the war against Ukraine and Washington’s desire to pivot to the Indo–Pacific, groups—like Hamas—will aim to seize the perceived opportunity to act. Regional militant activity may increase as limited attention on sub–Saharan Africa or even the Middle East (beyond Israel), and finite resources will constrain U.S.–led action—or indeed its willingness to act. Attacks against or within Western countries or their interests could well provoke a response depending on their severity.
Militant groups’ use of terrorism should not come as a surprise, but it will undoubtedly be unexpected. When it does occur it will be yet another entry into the additive series of concurrent crises that will strain governments’ attention and resources. The question is the size and scale of the attack and, in turn, governments’ response. The impact will, inevitably, be tied to the size and scope of the attack.
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The flawed premise of terrorism’s ‘new wave’
Ruined side–street in Shingal (Sinjar) following war with the Islamic State. Image by Levi Meir Clancy from Unsplash.
May 24, 2024
The concept of "third wave" terrorism is flawed as focusing on “terrorism” is to miss the drivers of the threats themselves. From Western interventions to rising far–right activity, these dynamics demand vigilance in a time of polycrisis and global distractions, writes Joshua Huminski.
T
he fundamental premise of the emergence of a “third wave” of terrorism is flawed. Terrorism, at its most basic, is a tactic used by groups of varying varietals and ideologies to pursue their individual ends and advance their aims. Indeed, depending on how one defines the “waves” of terrorism, the world could well be witnessing the fifth or even sixth iteration.
What we are seeing is, however, the continuation of the emergence, evolution, and adaptation of groups in response to external and internal stimuli. Externally, the Western–led interventions in Syria and Iraq degraded but did not defeat the Islamic States as evidenced by attacks in the region, as well as further afield such as the Crocus City Hall attack in Moscow. Israel’s response to Hamas’ attack provided additional impetus for expanded attacks and could well serve as justification for violence beyond Israel’s borders against Jerusalem’s supporters or to affect the “propaganda of the deed.” This certainly raises concerns about the forthcoming Olympics in Paris and Euro 2024 football championship in Germany.
Internally, the increasing prominence and activity of far–right groups in Europe and the United States—while not new—has accelerated due to domestic developments within those countries. Anger over immigration, fears of an overreaching government (at least in the United States), and other domestic drivers of radicalization are both spurring those groups and priming their desire to use terrorist tactics, which are fundamentally tools of weaker actors. Focusing on “terrorism” per se is to miss the drivers of the threats themselves. Indeed, the reality is that neither terrorism’s character nor nature are in flux.
In a time of “polycrisis,” militant groups will likely aim to leverage nation–state distraction or perceived weakness to their advantage. With Western attention focused predominantly on the war against Ukraine and Washington’s desire to pivot to the Indo–Pacific, groups—like Hamas—will aim to seize the perceived opportunity to act. Regional militant activity may increase as limited attention on sub–Saharan Africa or even the Middle East (beyond Israel), and finite resources will constrain U.S.–led action—or indeed its willingness to act. Attacks against or within Western countries or their interests could well provoke a response depending on their severity.
Militant groups’ use of terrorism should not come as a surprise, but it will undoubtedly be unexpected. When it does occur it will be yet another entry into the additive series of concurrent crises that will strain governments’ attention and resources. The question is the size and scale of the attack and, in turn, governments’ response. The impact will, inevitably, be tied to the size and scope of the attack.
