n just over two decades since the turn of the 21st century, only around 50 ambassadors have died while in office, globally. This can be largely attributed to Article 29 of the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations, which holds the person of diplomatic agents to be inviolable and requires governments to prevent harm to diplomats. About 10% of those deaths occurred in China alone over the last three years. On December 22nd, 2022, Solomon Islands’ Ambassador to China John Moffat Fugui died. Officially, he died of cardiac arrest in Beijing. As an isolated incident, this might appear as nothing more than the tragic death of a sovereign state’s most senior representative to China. But the sudden demise of two other senior foreign envoys to China earlier in the year–the ambassadors of Myanmar and the Philippines–as well as the prior untimely deaths of the ambassadors of Germany and Ukraine in 2021 shows that Beijing is not only failing to look after the wellbeing of its people but also struggling to safeguard the lives of its most esteemed foreign residents.
The Solomon Islands had previously recognized the Republic of China on Taiwan and switched diplomatic recognition to the People’s Republic of China only in September 2019, paving the way for Ambassador Fugui’s appointment. Given the global attention paid to China’s new relationship with the Solomon Islands–one which provides China a substantial strategic foothold in the South Pacific–it is striking that its first ambassador to Beijing did not survive his first tour there.
Since 2016, six ambassadors and one deputy ambassador have died in China, all officially unrelated to COVID-19.
Five of the seven deaths in the graphic above occurred suddenly and without warning. The respective causes of death in those five cases remain either labeled as cardiac arrest or publicly undisclosed.
Looking for Explanations
Each death might be explained individually by bad luck or the poor health of the incumbents, but the totality of the circumstances raises questions. Given China’s global significance, the caliber of the diplomats sent to Beijing is generally higher than average. As such, their respective governments go to greater than usual lengths to ensure their safety and wellbeing. Diplomats are typically well screened for health problems and as a rule receive excellent healthcare.
Among the various hypothetical factors that could, in theory, explain the occurrence of such a cluster of deceased diplomats, none appear particularly compelling.
Though there have been concerns about poor air quality and other health hazards in China such as food safety and pollution, it seems unlikely that environmental characteristics could be behind the majority of the listed cases. This is especially true given that some ambassadors died very early into their respective tours. Whether the strict “zero-COVID” policy that was enforced by China throughout 2020-2022, with its extended lockdowns and lengthy quarantine requirements, might have caused excessive levels of psychological and psychosomatic stress on diplomatic personnel is of course an open question. At least one of the listed diplomats died during and another shortly after leaving a lengthy mandatory quarantine. But again, diplomats at this level are generally better prepared for the quarantine that so many civilians have had to withstand, as well.
Could China’s government even for some reason have been purposely harming foreign diplomats and camouflaging attacks on them as deaths by natural causes? This seems equally unlikely, not least since it is hard to see what benefit China could have gained by these particular deaths. On the contrary, at least in some cases, particularly Jan Hecker of Germany or John Moffat Fugui of the Solomon Islands, China has lost foreign ambassadors who were extremely friendly to China and would have been seen as assets to Chinese ambitions regarding their countries of origin rather than liabilities.
This leaves another possibility to consider, namely that some other nefarious actor could have staged at least some of these deaths for their own purposes and made use of a permissive environment for accomplishing that purpose in China. Given the extreme extent to which state surveillance has been developed in China, however, it is hard to see how China could be seen as a country offering easy conditions for such a type of clandestine operation against foreign envoys unbeknownst to Chinese authorities.
Compared with other rogue states and sponsors of state terrorism such as Iran and North Korea, Russia in particular has a long history of assassinations abroad made to look like disease or heart attack. Ukraine’s ambassador to China who died a year and ten days before the Russian invasion of his country might have been a particularly attractive target, given China’s long-standing strategic partnership with Ukraine. In that context, it is noteworthy that one of China’s own diplomats, Du Wei (57), the Chinese ambassador to Israel, died suddenly of a heart attack in his sleep in Tel Aviv, on 17 May 2020. Before his tour in Israel he had served as China’s ambassador to Ukraine until the end of 2019. While in that post, he had been heavily involved in China’s efforts to take over a Ukrainian aerospace company, Motor Sich. This takeover would not have been in Russia’s interests, as it would have strengthened China’s independence from Russia as one of its main suppliers of aero-engine technology. Oddly, China’s initial intention to send an investigation team to probe Du Wei’s death in Israel was not followed through, without any public closure.
Why These Deaths Matter
In the context of rising global uncertainty and growing risk of conflict, diplomatic missions fulfill a crucial function by keeping communication channels open, transmitting messages discreetly and directly and offering governments first-hand assessments of the situation on the ground. Concerns for the physical health and wellbeing of diplomats, no matter where in the world and from what circumstances they arise, are therefore cause for serious concern. While an increased risk to diplomats abroad due to terrorism and other types of crimes has been noted for some time, unexplained sudden deaths of senior diplomats seem to remain a rarity in most countries.
It is therefore worrisome to note that China has in recent years become such a frequent location for ambassadors to die. Governments around the world should take note of this trend and take steps to ensure that the safety of their own envoys is not undermined.
As China continues to compete with Western powers to become the security partner of states around the world, those states should question how serious and safe that partnership is if China cannot guarantee the security and wellbeing of senior diplomats? And as China builds closer ties to Russia despite the latter’s ongoing assault on Ukrainian sovereignty, what of the 2013 binding “Friendship” Treaty President Xi personally signed, assuring Ukraine’s territorial integrity? If China’s government not only fails to safeguard the sovereignty of a state when legally bound to do so, but even supports the invader, how likely is it to respect the sovereignty of states they see as small or weak? And if it does not respect the sovereignty of a state to that extent, how much will it respect the life of any sovereign state’s representatives?
While there are no definitive answers to these questions, states should be proactive in asking them, considering the answers, and recognizing the bearing of those answers on their relations with this ascendant world power. Furthermore, they should be proactive in reminding Beijing of its legal obligations regarding the safety of diplomats. And finally, they should not be afraid to institute and publicize enhancements to the security of their diplomats, giving notice that they will not be the next country added to a list of deceased ambassadors.
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Diplomatic Mortality in China
State funeral in Bonn, Germany. Image by boo_ist_online from Pixabay.
February 6, 2023
Host governments usually look carefully after the wellbeing of high-level diplomats, but in China there has been an improbable number of diplomat mortalities in recent years. Drs. Ian Ralby and Sarah Kirchberger examine the phenomenon, possible causes, and why it matters.
I
n just over two decades since the turn of the 21st century, only around 50 ambassadors have died while in office, globally. This can be largely attributed to Article 29 of the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations, which holds the person of diplomatic agents to be inviolable and requires governments to prevent harm to diplomats. About 10% of those deaths occurred in China alone over the last three years. On December 22nd, 2022, Solomon Islands’ Ambassador to China John Moffat Fugui died. Officially, he died of cardiac arrest in Beijing. As an isolated incident, this might appear as nothing more than the tragic death of a sovereign state’s most senior representative to China. But the sudden demise of two other senior foreign envoys to China earlier in the year–the ambassadors of Myanmar and the Philippines–as well as the prior untimely deaths of the ambassadors of Germany and Ukraine in 2021 shows that Beijing is not only failing to look after the wellbeing of its people but also struggling to safeguard the lives of its most esteemed foreign residents.
The Solomon Islands had previously recognized the Republic of China on Taiwan and switched diplomatic recognition to the People’s Republic of China only in September 2019, paving the way for Ambassador Fugui’s appointment. Given the global attention paid to China’s new relationship with the Solomon Islands–one which provides China a substantial strategic foothold in the South Pacific–it is striking that its first ambassador to Beijing did not survive his first tour there.
Since 2016, six ambassadors and one deputy ambassador have died in China, all officially unrelated to COVID-19.
Five of the seven deaths in the graphic above occurred suddenly and without warning. The respective causes of death in those five cases remain either labeled as cardiac arrest or publicly undisclosed.
Looking for Explanations
Each death might be explained individually by bad luck or the poor health of the incumbents, but the totality of the circumstances raises questions. Given China’s global significance, the caliber of the diplomats sent to Beijing is generally higher than average. As such, their respective governments go to greater than usual lengths to ensure their safety and wellbeing. Diplomats are typically well screened for health problems and as a rule receive excellent healthcare.
Among the various hypothetical factors that could, in theory, explain the occurrence of such a cluster of deceased diplomats, none appear particularly compelling.
Though there have been concerns about poor air quality and other health hazards in China such as food safety and pollution, it seems unlikely that environmental characteristics could be behind the majority of the listed cases. This is especially true given that some ambassadors died very early into their respective tours. Whether the strict “zero-COVID” policy that was enforced by China throughout 2020-2022, with its extended lockdowns and lengthy quarantine requirements, might have caused excessive levels of psychological and psychosomatic stress on diplomatic personnel is of course an open question. At least one of the listed diplomats died during and another shortly after leaving a lengthy mandatory quarantine. But again, diplomats at this level are generally better prepared for the quarantine that so many civilians have had to withstand, as well.
Could China’s government even for some reason have been purposely harming foreign diplomats and camouflaging attacks on them as deaths by natural causes? This seems equally unlikely, not least since it is hard to see what benefit China could have gained by these particular deaths. On the contrary, at least in some cases, particularly Jan Hecker of Germany or John Moffat Fugui of the Solomon Islands, China has lost foreign ambassadors who were extremely friendly to China and would have been seen as assets to Chinese ambitions regarding their countries of origin rather than liabilities.
This leaves another possibility to consider, namely that some other nefarious actor could have staged at least some of these deaths for their own purposes and made use of a permissive environment for accomplishing that purpose in China. Given the extreme extent to which state surveillance has been developed in China, however, it is hard to see how China could be seen as a country offering easy conditions for such a type of clandestine operation against foreign envoys unbeknownst to Chinese authorities.
Compared with other rogue states and sponsors of state terrorism such as Iran and North Korea, Russia in particular has a long history of assassinations abroad made to look like disease or heart attack. Ukraine’s ambassador to China who died a year and ten days before the Russian invasion of his country might have been a particularly attractive target, given China’s long-standing strategic partnership with Ukraine. In that context, it is noteworthy that one of China’s own diplomats, Du Wei (57), the Chinese ambassador to Israel, died suddenly of a heart attack in his sleep in Tel Aviv, on 17 May 2020. Before his tour in Israel he had served as China’s ambassador to Ukraine until the end of 2019. While in that post, he had been heavily involved in China’s efforts to take over a Ukrainian aerospace company, Motor Sich. This takeover would not have been in Russia’s interests, as it would have strengthened China’s independence from Russia as one of its main suppliers of aero-engine technology. Oddly, China’s initial intention to send an investigation team to probe Du Wei’s death in Israel was not followed through, without any public closure.
Why These Deaths Matter
In the context of rising global uncertainty and growing risk of conflict, diplomatic missions fulfill a crucial function by keeping communication channels open, transmitting messages discreetly and directly and offering governments first-hand assessments of the situation on the ground. Concerns for the physical health and wellbeing of diplomats, no matter where in the world and from what circumstances they arise, are therefore cause for serious concern. While an increased risk to diplomats abroad due to terrorism and other types of crimes has been noted for some time, unexplained sudden deaths of senior diplomats seem to remain a rarity in most countries.
It is therefore worrisome to note that China has in recent years become such a frequent location for ambassadors to die. Governments around the world should take note of this trend and take steps to ensure that the safety of their own envoys is not undermined.
As China continues to compete with Western powers to become the security partner of states around the world, those states should question how serious and safe that partnership is if China cannot guarantee the security and wellbeing of senior diplomats? And as China builds closer ties to Russia despite the latter’s ongoing assault on Ukrainian sovereignty, what of the 2013 binding “Friendship” Treaty President Xi personally signed, assuring Ukraine’s territorial integrity? If China’s government not only fails to safeguard the sovereignty of a state when legally bound to do so, but even supports the invader, how likely is it to respect the sovereignty of states they see as small or weak? And if it does not respect the sovereignty of a state to that extent, how much will it respect the life of any sovereign state’s representatives?
While there are no definitive answers to these questions, states should be proactive in asking them, considering the answers, and recognizing the bearing of those answers on their relations with this ascendant world power. Furthermore, they should be proactive in reminding Beijing of its legal obligations regarding the safety of diplomats. And finally, they should not be afraid to institute and publicize enhancements to the security of their diplomats, giving notice that they will not be the next country added to a list of deceased ambassadors.
