Conventional liberal market wisdom portends a general uprising of living standards as epiphenomenal – or even as corollary – of purchasing power increases: this is ineluctable.
There is however one associated saliency, which is often markedly dispensed, nevertheless deserving of duly contextualization: i.e. the social covenant that is enmeshed by the citizenry’s unceasing plight to 'barter’ labor and goods for currency. The dynamic goes: as long as ‘the people’ remain committed to this socio-economic exchange, then the unexpressed terms of the agreement are tacitly renewed, thus prevail. Now and therefore, currency holding entities emerge as strategically emplaced, for its domain administers control over labor, and arguably over the workforce.
There are however some paramount distinctions, perhaps even emphasized by contrasting thus conditioning factors: for democratic states are inherently inclined to produce liberal free markets, whereby products and services are exchanged in fairly optimal Pareto efficient economies. Accordingly, purchasing power coefficients – underscored by the presumed ability to control one’s labor – are harmoniously shared amongst a frenzied private sector that is fueled by vying individuals, entrepreneurs and corporations alike. Essentially: currency circulates freely between private and public sectors, whereas individuals, and corporations, enjoy unrestricted faculties aimed to secure and accumulate wealth.
Conversely, in states devoid of liberal political philosophies or idem political economies, it is likely that wealth accumulation is hypostatical to the stability of the state itself – its security, and subsequent preservation of interests, identities or institutions – where, financial resources in the form of currency – whether it be type commodity or fiat – are amassed by state governance, with little concern over GINI indices, or a sociably desirable, thus sustainable distribution of resources.
Pursuant to intrinsic socio-economic and political theory: the atmospherics are such, where the state overtly owns disproportionate wealth and assets; while in paradoxical contrast, the private sector dwells deprived of free market economics, and therefore subsists: financially stunted. In this case – the purchasing power coefficient shifts to the relatively exclusive dominion of the state instead; whose autonomous control over labor is therefore levied dexterously – as result. The upshot is: the state is now posited to vest its ability to command labor, hence machinate tactical ad hoc instruments, tailored to exert authority across the political, economic and social spheres of influence. Should the state ambition for international spillover, and leverage these instruments while in pursuit of its broader or regional interests? As rhetorical a nature, such profile seems awfully resembling that of China.
The United States' Unique Selling Proposition
United States' Administration officials have demonstrated laudable public animation concerning a picturesque China; alas, as if the latter indulges enamored of free market idyllics. These constructs, however, render the indulgence – qua – the abstraction of a China that allegedly could buy more products and services with the advent of a stronger currency; incidentally: the valuation of the Renminbi.
Here is the underlying premise, or say, the unique selling proposition, as heralded for the celebrated Chinese New Year – The Year of the Rabbit: a stronger currency will unavoidably grant China increases in purchasing power, along with the subsequent achievement of improved standards of living – for a floating, thus valuated Renminbi will ease capital accumulation, and produce incipient measures of enhanced Chinese income distribution.
Withal, this oblique denouement of Chinese ‘openness’ is then extraordinarily set for climax: the strategic American overture or funneling of products and services, aptly directed to sate the alleged Chinese demand. After all: the proposed pitch empowers economic expansion, hence the engendering of Chinese consumerism. Indeed, a pivotal event in economics and international trade, one which the bidding actor – the United States – must be positioned to attend to; better yet, expressly service.
The Consumer Gospel, According to the United States
The upward mobility of vigorous Chinese consumer strata – to the extent that it may procure the demand of United States’ commodities – goods and services – relies, fundamentally, on a presumable societal shift to western consumerism ideals. Nevertheless, the indispensable condition, say, the sine qua non is whether or not the Chinese Communist Party and the Politburo are in alignment with such socio-economic transformation.
For, while consulting the western lexicon of economics, a stronger buying power, in its traditional sense, implies that ultimately, society – encompassing both the individual and the private sector – is admittedly: a wealth holding entity. And that thereafter, private wealth or output accumulation, metastasizes throughout variegated social strata arrangements; while its reverberations develop patterns of efficient income distribution, which target to flatten the GINI coefficient.
While reverting to China – if the private sector secures the accumulation of capital, hence holds wealth, outputs are thereupon leveled; whereas, Chinese social strata will then benefit from overall surges in purchasing power.
A tactically depreciated Renminbi for a monetary policy, energizes, thus propels Chinese commercial exports to dimensions of global scale arguably seen heretofore. Said is the locus of considerable wealth – highly coveted supplies of revenue, which are almost exclusively channeled to, or owned by the state. Certainly, this is an area where private participation is not only nominal, but inexorably restricted.
China's Visible Hand, A Doctrine of Manipulation
Current Chinese monetary policy, together with associated treasury instruments thereof, follow constructionist state designs, where synthetic market restraints supersede the organic floating forces of the Foreign Exchange Market. Designs of such kin can only favor the Communist Party and the Politburo. For these contrivances buttress Chinese government traditions of self-centered development, preferred to liberal capitalism; whereby the imprint of China’s hand – however inconspicuous it may appear – lies seemingly exposed, visible, for the appraisal of the international community. Thereby, the disassociation of Chinese monetary policies, from the general manifest intent of the polity – as it relates to domestic, regional, and even global political interests, or aspirations – ought to be examined as a gross act of being remiss. The significance of a Sino-economic hegemony deserves duly consideration herein, for a currency that is managed, or pegged lower than market forces dictate otherwise, solely for reasons of external balance and subsequent balance of payments, is perhaps bent by sheer naïveté.
A devalued Renminbi does very little or nothing for the Chinese people; these policies are disconnected, hence asymmetrical to domestic spending. And, while Chinese social strata, hardly subsumes the categorical consumer profile – say, à la western – the Chinese government continues to amass swelling quantities of capital in its coffers. Whereas, localized market forces, by resisting wage growth and suffocating individual entrepreneurialism, embolden the accumulation of otherwise excessive savings; chiefly, as result of an under-compensated workforce.
On the other hand, assuming the Renminbi would respond to exogenous floats, as compelled by foreign currency exchange, and therefore valuate, due to feedback effects: Chinese consumer demand could effectively bolster; to which imports would then react and adjust thereupon, while eventually catering to the procuring purchasing power of 1.3 billion strong.
Socio-economic transformation will only occur following the politico-philosophical consent of the ruling polity: the Chinese Communist Party and the Politburo. Only then, will Chinese strata embody the suasions of adroit consumerism. In the interim, despite whether or not China is in transition, the GDP acclamation of 9.8% for Q4 2010, paired with the percentage decline of population living below poverty line from 65% in 1981 to 4% in 2007, are but clarion calls of growth and trumpeting prosperity – such portrays the ascending ethos of a political actor that merits diplomatic statecraft pleasantries, and who is worthy of international political etiquette – so be it.
Clearly, Chinese state interests come first – everything else must be devolved; matters pertaining to organized rudiments of civil society must be dispensed. The hypostasis of bona fide consumerism lies anchored in the dispersion of economic surplus to private entities in the form of capital – one could luxuriate, thus yield to the liberal conception that such should be well within the reach of the Chinese worker. The reality is: absent reform, the Chinese simply lack the capacity to consume their own output, equitably that is.
The advent of an empowered working class hatches from the implied relationship between economic expansion, wage growth and income inequality; said is not a creatio ex nihilo declaration; for its very realization hinges on philosophical, and ideological commitments, which in the case of China have been deepened and widened by the imposition of stern discipline, and the erosion of time itself. Whereby, now and therefore, the interstitials being so fine, and the fault lines so capillaric, that a true impersonation of Chinese consumerism necessitates the transmogrification of a system – or reform of governance.
Year of the Rabbit Economics
The Chinese New Year of the Rabbit is auspiciously promising; the outset unfolds as the United States presses for Chinese currency Exchange Rate Reform - a campaign that is packaged in the manner of, or homologous to, a unique selling proposition, which enjoins: the floating of the Renminbi, China’s imports increase, and the prospective sell of American products and services – a tough sell, indeed.
Moreover, irrespective of the imminent array of United States’ benefits – “sell [China] all kinds of stuff”, in the recent words of President Obama – one must obviate the obvious: similar propositions are well appointed thus resonate deeply, mostly, when directed at capitalist liberal economies – liberal is the key term herein – where, the individual, hence the private sector holds wealth. One may invoke the United States economy, the European Union, or even India’s developing economy as colorful – pluralistic, liberal – illustrations.
Contrastingly, in the case of actors denoting a liberal deficit – such as China – where the state holds the wealth instead, and cares exclusively well for the few – the ruling elites – while just barely providing for the majority – the poor, the working class – an economic leveling of the playing field is highly unlikely; for equitable income distribution serves as a medium for social liberalization.
The following rests for consideration: is the United States’ unique selling proposition calibrated before China’s political identity, and interests? For, Chinese Exchange Rate Reform seems to suggest more than just a mere currency appreciation; there are prevalent socio-economic emanations, which may challenge The Communist Party, and its institutions by way of ideological dilution.
China’s self-centered development, and professed state economic dependency, suppresses challenging ideological reverberations within its social strata; and most importantly, maintains the workforce on idle – right above poverty line, nevertheless vulnerable and notoriously co-dependent. Over a billion strong compete domestically for jobs, while state-controlled market forces keep labor wages down.
Thereby, providing the Chinese government with the allegorical invitation letter – this invite is directed towards the foreign investment community, and is drafted to perfection. In its preamble, China exhibits a paramount investment grade landscape; where an efficient, extremely productive, thus state controlled labor market is vended as: low-priced, and abiding to light thus reductive regulation. Bottom line: very inexpensive and quite attractive to core capitalist economies; therefore framed as the harbinger of profitability, and unparalleled returns on the investment.
This domestic social policy keeps the Chinese worker further distanced from professional high-paying service sector jobs. Whereas, today’s pseudo-modernized workforce is more so atavistic of the laborers’ profile of the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution of 1966, than is soliciting of the emancipated, thus globalized worker’s image of the twenty-first century. China’s such modus vivendi and profile of the Chinese worker are beneficial to state-centered development programmes, and state-run enterprise; which aims to ratchet up net exports, and model the environment as to draw foreign investment to the mainland.
At time of writing, the United States trade deficit with China amounts to approximately $252 billion. Unarguably, a condition the United States would intransigently like to see reversed, for the strategic-economic toll is both afflicting and imposing.
Whereupon, the American unique selling proposition targets to offset, and establish a trade equipoise between both economies; whereby the existential upcoming of the purported Chinese consumer is abetted, as the solution to an aspired détente, or relaxing of economic tensions.
Moreover, analogous to a débutante, whom the United States insists to intellectualize as mature – having developed successfully from within the echelons of Chinese civil strata – the Chinese consumer is now and therefore primed for a formal ‘coming-out’ presentation to world economies; to which the United States emerges poised as the eligible suitor. Whereas, the prospect of its integration, as an established new member of elite consumer circles, demands for duly consideration; for its respected attributes, and dormant potential, are showcased for both display and admiration – perhaps in anticipation of a social arrangement of hundreds of millions of Chinese workers, empowered, thus liberalized as Western like consumers.
But, make no mistake, the Chinese Communist Party and the Politburo, indeed, have the colloquial last say; for now, the consumer profile appears to be faux: a diplomatic pretense. And will remain as is until the ruling polity decides against it – such is likely to happen removed from the American nexus, thus impervious to American campaigning efforts.
The Chinese Year of the Rabbit is now at its outset; only the unfolding of the New Year may disclose whether Chinese consumerism is indeed faux, or whether said will succumb to American insistence. And fancy the world with the genuineness and grace of an aspiring débutante at a ‘coming-out ball’.
a global affairs media network
Chinese Faux Consumerism
November 22, 2011
Conventional liberal market wisdom portends a general uprising of living standards as epiphenomenal – or even as corollary – of purchasing power increases: this is ineluctable.
There is however one associated saliency, which is often markedly dispensed, nevertheless deserving of duly contextualization: i.e. the social covenant that is enmeshed by the citizenry’s unceasing plight to 'barter’ labor and goods for currency. The dynamic goes: as long as ‘the people’ remain committed to this socio-economic exchange, then the unexpressed terms of the agreement are tacitly renewed, thus prevail. Now and therefore, currency holding entities emerge as strategically emplaced, for its domain administers control over labor, and arguably over the workforce.
There are however some paramount distinctions, perhaps even emphasized by contrasting thus conditioning factors: for democratic states are inherently inclined to produce liberal free markets, whereby products and services are exchanged in fairly optimal Pareto efficient economies. Accordingly, purchasing power coefficients – underscored by the presumed ability to control one’s labor – are harmoniously shared amongst a frenzied private sector that is fueled by vying individuals, entrepreneurs and corporations alike. Essentially: currency circulates freely between private and public sectors, whereas individuals, and corporations, enjoy unrestricted faculties aimed to secure and accumulate wealth.
Conversely, in states devoid of liberal political philosophies or idem political economies, it is likely that wealth accumulation is hypostatical to the stability of the state itself – its security, and subsequent preservation of interests, identities or institutions – where, financial resources in the form of currency – whether it be type commodity or fiat – are amassed by state governance, with little concern over GINI indices, or a sociably desirable, thus sustainable distribution of resources.
Pursuant to intrinsic socio-economic and political theory: the atmospherics are such, where the state overtly owns disproportionate wealth and assets; while in paradoxical contrast, the private sector dwells deprived of free market economics, and therefore subsists: financially stunted. In this case – the purchasing power coefficient shifts to the relatively exclusive dominion of the state instead; whose autonomous control over labor is therefore levied dexterously – as result. The upshot is: the state is now posited to vest its ability to command labor, hence machinate tactical ad hoc instruments, tailored to exert authority across the political, economic and social spheres of influence. Should the state ambition for international spillover, and leverage these instruments while in pursuit of its broader or regional interests? As rhetorical a nature, such profile seems awfully resembling that of China.
The United States' Unique Selling Proposition
United States' Administration officials have demonstrated laudable public animation concerning a picturesque China; alas, as if the latter indulges enamored of free market idyllics. These constructs, however, render the indulgence – qua – the abstraction of a China that allegedly could buy more products and services with the advent of a stronger currency; incidentally: the valuation of the Renminbi.
Here is the underlying premise, or say, the unique selling proposition, as heralded for the celebrated Chinese New Year – The Year of the Rabbit: a stronger currency will unavoidably grant China increases in purchasing power, along with the subsequent achievement of improved standards of living – for a floating, thus valuated Renminbi will ease capital accumulation, and produce incipient measures of enhanced Chinese income distribution.
Withal, this oblique denouement of Chinese ‘openness’ is then extraordinarily set for climax: the strategic American overture or funneling of products and services, aptly directed to sate the alleged Chinese demand. After all: the proposed pitch empowers economic expansion, hence the engendering of Chinese consumerism. Indeed, a pivotal event in economics and international trade, one which the bidding actor – the United States – must be positioned to attend to; better yet, expressly service.
The Consumer Gospel, According to the United States
The upward mobility of vigorous Chinese consumer strata – to the extent that it may procure the demand of United States’ commodities – goods and services – relies, fundamentally, on a presumable societal shift to western consumerism ideals. Nevertheless, the indispensable condition, say, the sine qua non is whether or not the Chinese Communist Party and the Politburo are in alignment with such socio-economic transformation.
For, while consulting the western lexicon of economics, a stronger buying power, in its traditional sense, implies that ultimately, society – encompassing both the individual and the private sector – is admittedly: a wealth holding entity. And that thereafter, private wealth or output accumulation, metastasizes throughout variegated social strata arrangements; while its reverberations develop patterns of efficient income distribution, which target to flatten the GINI coefficient.
While reverting to China – if the private sector secures the accumulation of capital, hence holds wealth, outputs are thereupon leveled; whereas, Chinese social strata will then benefit from overall surges in purchasing power.
A tactically depreciated Renminbi for a monetary policy, energizes, thus propels Chinese commercial exports to dimensions of global scale arguably seen heretofore. Said is the locus of considerable wealth – highly coveted supplies of revenue, which are almost exclusively channeled to, or owned by the state. Certainly, this is an area where private participation is not only nominal, but inexorably restricted.
China's Visible Hand, A Doctrine of Manipulation
Current Chinese monetary policy, together with associated treasury instruments thereof, follow constructionist state designs, where synthetic market restraints supersede the organic floating forces of the Foreign Exchange Market. Designs of such kin can only favor the Communist Party and the Politburo. For these contrivances buttress Chinese government traditions of self-centered development, preferred to liberal capitalism; whereby the imprint of China’s hand – however inconspicuous it may appear – lies seemingly exposed, visible, for the appraisal of the international community. Thereby, the disassociation of Chinese monetary policies, from the general manifest intent of the polity – as it relates to domestic, regional, and even global political interests, or aspirations – ought to be examined as a gross act of being remiss. The significance of a Sino-economic hegemony deserves duly consideration herein, for a currency that is managed, or pegged lower than market forces dictate otherwise, solely for reasons of external balance and subsequent balance of payments, is perhaps bent by sheer naïveté.
A devalued Renminbi does very little or nothing for the Chinese people; these policies are disconnected, hence asymmetrical to domestic spending. And, while Chinese social strata, hardly subsumes the categorical consumer profile – say, à la western – the Chinese government continues to amass swelling quantities of capital in its coffers. Whereas, localized market forces, by resisting wage growth and suffocating individual entrepreneurialism, embolden the accumulation of otherwise excessive savings; chiefly, as result of an under-compensated workforce.
On the other hand, assuming the Renminbi would respond to exogenous floats, as compelled by foreign currency exchange, and therefore valuate, due to feedback effects: Chinese consumer demand could effectively bolster; to which imports would then react and adjust thereupon, while eventually catering to the procuring purchasing power of 1.3 billion strong.
Socio-economic transformation will only occur following the politico-philosophical consent of the ruling polity: the Chinese Communist Party and the Politburo. Only then, will Chinese strata embody the suasions of adroit consumerism. In the interim, despite whether or not China is in transition, the GDP acclamation of 9.8% for Q4 2010, paired with the percentage decline of population living below poverty line from 65% in 1981 to 4% in 2007, are but clarion calls of growth and trumpeting prosperity – such portrays the ascending ethos of a political actor that merits diplomatic statecraft pleasantries, and who is worthy of international political etiquette – so be it.
Clearly, Chinese state interests come first – everything else must be devolved; matters pertaining to organized rudiments of civil society must be dispensed. The hypostasis of bona fide consumerism lies anchored in the dispersion of economic surplus to private entities in the form of capital – one could luxuriate, thus yield to the liberal conception that such should be well within the reach of the Chinese worker. The reality is: absent reform, the Chinese simply lack the capacity to consume their own output, equitably that is.
The advent of an empowered working class hatches from the implied relationship between economic expansion, wage growth and income inequality; said is not a creatio ex nihilo declaration; for its very realization hinges on philosophical, and ideological commitments, which in the case of China have been deepened and widened by the imposition of stern discipline, and the erosion of time itself. Whereby, now and therefore, the interstitials being so fine, and the fault lines so capillaric, that a true impersonation of Chinese consumerism necessitates the transmogrification of a system – or reform of governance.
Year of the Rabbit Economics
The Chinese New Year of the Rabbit is auspiciously promising; the outset unfolds as the United States presses for Chinese currency Exchange Rate Reform - a campaign that is packaged in the manner of, or homologous to, a unique selling proposition, which enjoins: the floating of the Renminbi, China’s imports increase, and the prospective sell of American products and services – a tough sell, indeed.
Moreover, irrespective of the imminent array of United States’ benefits – “sell [China] all kinds of stuff”, in the recent words of President Obama – one must obviate the obvious: similar propositions are well appointed thus resonate deeply, mostly, when directed at capitalist liberal economies – liberal is the key term herein – where, the individual, hence the private sector holds wealth. One may invoke the United States economy, the European Union, or even India’s developing economy as colorful – pluralistic, liberal – illustrations.
Contrastingly, in the case of actors denoting a liberal deficit – such as China – where the state holds the wealth instead, and cares exclusively well for the few – the ruling elites – while just barely providing for the majority – the poor, the working class – an economic leveling of the playing field is highly unlikely; for equitable income distribution serves as a medium for social liberalization.
The following rests for consideration: is the United States’ unique selling proposition calibrated before China’s political identity, and interests? For, Chinese Exchange Rate Reform seems to suggest more than just a mere currency appreciation; there are prevalent socio-economic emanations, which may challenge The Communist Party, and its institutions by way of ideological dilution.
China’s self-centered development, and professed state economic dependency, suppresses challenging ideological reverberations within its social strata; and most importantly, maintains the workforce on idle – right above poverty line, nevertheless vulnerable and notoriously co-dependent. Over a billion strong compete domestically for jobs, while state-controlled market forces keep labor wages down.
Thereby, providing the Chinese government with the allegorical invitation letter – this invite is directed towards the foreign investment community, and is drafted to perfection. In its preamble, China exhibits a paramount investment grade landscape; where an efficient, extremely productive, thus state controlled labor market is vended as: low-priced, and abiding to light thus reductive regulation. Bottom line: very inexpensive and quite attractive to core capitalist economies; therefore framed as the harbinger of profitability, and unparalleled returns on the investment.
This domestic social policy keeps the Chinese worker further distanced from professional high-paying service sector jobs. Whereas, today’s pseudo-modernized workforce is more so atavistic of the laborers’ profile of the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution of 1966, than is soliciting of the emancipated, thus globalized worker’s image of the twenty-first century. China’s such modus vivendi and profile of the Chinese worker are beneficial to state-centered development programmes, and state-run enterprise; which aims to ratchet up net exports, and model the environment as to draw foreign investment to the mainland.
At time of writing, the United States trade deficit with China amounts to approximately $252 billion. Unarguably, a condition the United States would intransigently like to see reversed, for the strategic-economic toll is both afflicting and imposing.
Whereupon, the American unique selling proposition targets to offset, and establish a trade equipoise between both economies; whereby the existential upcoming of the purported Chinese consumer is abetted, as the solution to an aspired détente, or relaxing of economic tensions.
Moreover, analogous to a débutante, whom the United States insists to intellectualize as mature – having developed successfully from within the echelons of Chinese civil strata – the Chinese consumer is now and therefore primed for a formal ‘coming-out’ presentation to world economies; to which the United States emerges poised as the eligible suitor. Whereas, the prospect of its integration, as an established new member of elite consumer circles, demands for duly consideration; for its respected attributes, and dormant potential, are showcased for both display and admiration – perhaps in anticipation of a social arrangement of hundreds of millions of Chinese workers, empowered, thus liberalized as Western like consumers.
But, make no mistake, the Chinese Communist Party and the Politburo, indeed, have the colloquial last say; for now, the consumer profile appears to be faux: a diplomatic pretense. And will remain as is until the ruling polity decides against it – such is likely to happen removed from the American nexus, thus impervious to American campaigning efforts.
The Chinese Year of the Rabbit is now at its outset; only the unfolding of the New Year may disclose whether Chinese consumerism is indeed faux, or whether said will succumb to American insistence. And fancy the world with the genuineness and grace of an aspiring débutante at a ‘coming-out ball’.
