ver the course of the summer, China found itself headed for a foreign debt crisis. Many of its loans, made under the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI)—Beijing’s globe-spanning infrastructure and influence project—were at risk of default. Loans made to foreign governments at favorable rates and intended to funnel money to Chinese companies were coming due and international debtors were unable to make their payments. As a result, Beijing found itself forced to issue new loans to cover the old loans—thereby protecting its own companies and economic growth.
The size and scale of the BRI is ambitious and is evidence of Beijing’s global ambitions. Though disinclined to formally interfere in foreign countries’ internal affairs—save for those of Taiwan—China finds itself with a remarkably expansive, though unintended, empire in Central Asia. How this came about and what it means for Beijing and the Chinese Communist Party is the subject of “Sinostan” by Alexandros Petersen and Raffaello Pantucci. A blend of travelogue, field research, and policy analysis, Petersen and Pantucci present a timely and nuanced picture of China’s aims and behavior in the region.
In the interests of full disclosure, I met Pantucci on a few occasions though a mutual friend and colleague in London and interacted with Petersen while he was leading the local arm of the Young Professionals in Foreign Policy. Pantucci’s research and writing have been superb—particularly his book “We Love Death as You Love Life” on Britain’s domestic terror challenge. Petersen, who sadly was killed in a terror attack in Afghanistan, was a thoughtful discussant who had the airs of an Oxford don—tweed jackets with elbow patches and all. Petersen’s murder, tragically and unsurprisingly, delayed the production of the book, which started as a rather clever excuse to travel the region as friends. Pantucci helmed the remaining research and updated the content. While I cannot say I knew him well, I do not doubt that Petersen would have been supremely pleased with Pantucci’s shepherding the book to a close.
It is worth noting, though, that at times there is a temporal gap between what the authors personally observed and experienced with more recent events. While the authors do a superb job of covering the period surrounding their Central Asian travels, a fair amount happened since 2010-2013. As they note, in the years since their first visit, Xi Jinping came to power and took the country in a much more confident and aggressive direction. Xi both solidified the Chinese Communist Party’s grip on power and provided renewed vigor in its purpose and announced the Belt and Road Initiative—in Kazakhstan, no less.
That observation aside, “Sinostan” remains a deeply nuanced and exceedingly necessary book on the BRI as well as Beijing’s actions and aims in the region. Their approach presents what is actually happening in reality rather than the fevered dreams of some policymakers.
The authors’ personal anecdotes illuminate the disconnect between Beijing’s high-level policy proclamations and the experiences of the average person. There may be less of a coherent plan or strategy and more a series of ad hoc actions notionally aimed at achieving a specific aim—increasing Chinese influence in Central Asia and securing China’s Western border. The authors recount how there are multiple competing and overlapping actors—government, security, business, multilateral organization, and others—all aiming to execute Beijing’s goals, but are largely accorded a measure of independence in doing so. Even the vaunted Confucius Institutes appear to be withering on the vine due to a combination of neglect and local resistance to Chinese influence.
It is this ad hoc-ness that policymakers would do well to recognize. China’s slow acquisition of influence in the region was less a concerted plan and more a response to developments on-the-ground. Even today, as the authors conclude, Beijing is less interested in having an active role in the region so much as allowing events to unfold and deal with the winners. By contrast, the United States often sees a centrally coordinated and managed plan underpinning Beijing’s actions. To be sure, Zhongnanhai makes grand and sweeping statements and articulates long-term plans, but that does not mean they are monolithically executed.
It is equally interesting to note just how little the United States appears in the authors’ recounting of events. It is not that Washington has a small presence in Central Asia, but rather appears to have nearly no presence at all. Occasionally the authors note that Peace Corps workers were evacuated or that U.S. embassies had done this or that, but American diplomats are practically absent. This is all the more surprising given the importance of Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, and Tajikistan to NATO’s Northern Distribution Network to Afghanistan—a conflict that was ten years old when the authors traveled the region.
The authors do however detail China’s inheritance of Afghanistan from the United States and the consequences of Washington’s tragic and premature withdrawal from the country. While Washington’s exit removed one of China’s primary concerns about Afghanistan—American presence in the region—it also unleashed instability including the risk of trans-national terrorism and drugs trafficking—two issues of paramount concern for Beijing. Beijing is seeking to make in-roads into the country, but appears reluctant and unwilling to accept responsibility or security primacy. Rather, with Kabul—and as with other countries—Beijing is keen to work with whomever is in power rather than get involved in internal affairs. That may yet change. Instability and potentially tumultuous political situations inevitably complicate business and may drive Beijing to more actively engage.
As deleterious as America’s withdrawal from Afghanistan was for China’s interests, arguably Russia’s invasion of Ukraine could be more advantageous for Beijing’s aims in the region. Moscow’s ill-considered (to Western eyes) invasion of Ukraine means that the Kremlin will have markedly fewer resources to maintain its historical leadership role in Central Asia. Indeed, some argue that Russia will increasingly fall into China’s orbit. Until recently, it appeared that most Central Asian and former Soviet states were keen to maintain security relationships to the north and business relationships to the east. A weakened Moscow may find that Central Asia looks to Beijing for both in the future.
Another key takeaway of “Sinostan” is Beijing’s interests in the region and its interplay with the Western part of the country—Xinjiang. The authors present a measure of understanding, though not moral acceptance (strategic empathy in practice), China’s perspective on the region and the Uyghur population. The region is China’s gateway to Central Asia and its vast resources as well as a land-bridge to Europe. Instability there, whether minor or potentially secessionist, is unacceptable for Beijing and drives its widespread program of repression.
It is by no means certain that Beijing will be able to have its cake and eat it too in Central Asia. There is, as the authors note, considerable suspicion of Beijing’s intentions and simmering tensions between the local populations and Chinese workers. As with China’s involvement in Africa, marked improvements in the lives of the local population have not materialized. It is also often the case that infrastructure development loans from Beijing are merely funneled back to Chinese companies—failing to provide jobs for locals. Other authors, like Luke Patey in “How China Loses,” have noted this dynamic as well and it could well be a self-defeating trend in the long-term.
The greatest contribution of “Sinostan” is its presentation of the reality on-the-ground and the ad hoc nature of much of China’s policy implementation. It is a necessary corrective to the monolithic analysis that assumes what Beijing says goes. While Beijing certainly enjoys a measure of political and practical control that is alien to democracies, it by no means guarantees that policies are implemented according to a plan. Central Asia may not receive the attention it once did in the Western press, but policymakers would do well to watch Beijing’s activities closely—developments there could well presage a more hands-on approach in the future.
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China’s Flawed “Sinostan” Ambitions
Photo by Christian Lue via Unsplash.
August 20, 2022
China finds itself with a remarkably expansive, though unintended, empire in Central Asia. Joshua Huminski reviews “Sinostan” by Alexandros Petersen and Raffaello Pantucci, which follows how this came about and what it means for Beijing and the Chinese Communist Party.
O
ver the course of the summer, China found itself headed for a foreign debt crisis. Many of its loans, made under the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI)—Beijing’s globe-spanning infrastructure and influence project—were at risk of default. Loans made to foreign governments at favorable rates and intended to funnel money to Chinese companies were coming due and international debtors were unable to make their payments. As a result, Beijing found itself forced to issue new loans to cover the old loans—thereby protecting its own companies and economic growth.
The size and scale of the BRI is ambitious and is evidence of Beijing’s global ambitions. Though disinclined to formally interfere in foreign countries’ internal affairs—save for those of Taiwan—China finds itself with a remarkably expansive, though unintended, empire in Central Asia. How this came about and what it means for Beijing and the Chinese Communist Party is the subject of “Sinostan” by Alexandros Petersen and Raffaello Pantucci. A blend of travelogue, field research, and policy analysis, Petersen and Pantucci present a timely and nuanced picture of China’s aims and behavior in the region.
In the interests of full disclosure, I met Pantucci on a few occasions though a mutual friend and colleague in London and interacted with Petersen while he was leading the local arm of the Young Professionals in Foreign Policy. Pantucci’s research and writing have been superb—particularly his book “We Love Death as You Love Life” on Britain’s domestic terror challenge. Petersen, who sadly was killed in a terror attack in Afghanistan, was a thoughtful discussant who had the airs of an Oxford don—tweed jackets with elbow patches and all. Petersen’s murder, tragically and unsurprisingly, delayed the production of the book, which started as a rather clever excuse to travel the region as friends. Pantucci helmed the remaining research and updated the content. While I cannot say I knew him well, I do not doubt that Petersen would have been supremely pleased with Pantucci’s shepherding the book to a close.
It is worth noting, though, that at times there is a temporal gap between what the authors personally observed and experienced with more recent events. While the authors do a superb job of covering the period surrounding their Central Asian travels, a fair amount happened since 2010-2013. As they note, in the years since their first visit, Xi Jinping came to power and took the country in a much more confident and aggressive direction. Xi both solidified the Chinese Communist Party’s grip on power and provided renewed vigor in its purpose and announced the Belt and Road Initiative—in Kazakhstan, no less.
That observation aside, “Sinostan” remains a deeply nuanced and exceedingly necessary book on the BRI as well as Beijing’s actions and aims in the region. Their approach presents what is actually happening in reality rather than the fevered dreams of some policymakers.
The authors’ personal anecdotes illuminate the disconnect between Beijing’s high-level policy proclamations and the experiences of the average person. There may be less of a coherent plan or strategy and more a series of ad hoc actions notionally aimed at achieving a specific aim—increasing Chinese influence in Central Asia and securing China’s Western border. The authors recount how there are multiple competing and overlapping actors—government, security, business, multilateral organization, and others—all aiming to execute Beijing’s goals, but are largely accorded a measure of independence in doing so. Even the vaunted Confucius Institutes appear to be withering on the vine due to a combination of neglect and local resistance to Chinese influence.
It is this ad hoc-ness that policymakers would do well to recognize. China’s slow acquisition of influence in the region was less a concerted plan and more a response to developments on-the-ground. Even today, as the authors conclude, Beijing is less interested in having an active role in the region so much as allowing events to unfold and deal with the winners. By contrast, the United States often sees a centrally coordinated and managed plan underpinning Beijing’s actions. To be sure, Zhongnanhai makes grand and sweeping statements and articulates long-term plans, but that does not mean they are monolithically executed.
It is equally interesting to note just how little the United States appears in the authors’ recounting of events. It is not that Washington has a small presence in Central Asia, but rather appears to have nearly no presence at all. Occasionally the authors note that Peace Corps workers were evacuated or that U.S. embassies had done this or that, but American diplomats are practically absent. This is all the more surprising given the importance of Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, and Tajikistan to NATO’s Northern Distribution Network to Afghanistan—a conflict that was ten years old when the authors traveled the region.
The authors do however detail China’s inheritance of Afghanistan from the United States and the consequences of Washington’s tragic and premature withdrawal from the country. While Washington’s exit removed one of China’s primary concerns about Afghanistan—American presence in the region—it also unleashed instability including the risk of trans-national terrorism and drugs trafficking—two issues of paramount concern for Beijing. Beijing is seeking to make in-roads into the country, but appears reluctant and unwilling to accept responsibility or security primacy. Rather, with Kabul—and as with other countries—Beijing is keen to work with whomever is in power rather than get involved in internal affairs. That may yet change. Instability and potentially tumultuous political situations inevitably complicate business and may drive Beijing to more actively engage.
As deleterious as America’s withdrawal from Afghanistan was for China’s interests, arguably Russia’s invasion of Ukraine could be more advantageous for Beijing’s aims in the region. Moscow’s ill-considered (to Western eyes) invasion of Ukraine means that the Kremlin will have markedly fewer resources to maintain its historical leadership role in Central Asia. Indeed, some argue that Russia will increasingly fall into China’s orbit. Until recently, it appeared that most Central Asian and former Soviet states were keen to maintain security relationships to the north and business relationships to the east. A weakened Moscow may find that Central Asia looks to Beijing for both in the future.
Another key takeaway of “Sinostan” is Beijing’s interests in the region and its interplay with the Western part of the country—Xinjiang. The authors present a measure of understanding, though not moral acceptance (strategic empathy in practice), China’s perspective on the region and the Uyghur population. The region is China’s gateway to Central Asia and its vast resources as well as a land-bridge to Europe. Instability there, whether minor or potentially secessionist, is unacceptable for Beijing and drives its widespread program of repression.
It is by no means certain that Beijing will be able to have its cake and eat it too in Central Asia. There is, as the authors note, considerable suspicion of Beijing’s intentions and simmering tensions between the local populations and Chinese workers. As with China’s involvement in Africa, marked improvements in the lives of the local population have not materialized. It is also often the case that infrastructure development loans from Beijing are merely funneled back to Chinese companies—failing to provide jobs for locals. Other authors, like Luke Patey in “How China Loses,” have noted this dynamic as well and it could well be a self-defeating trend in the long-term.
The greatest contribution of “Sinostan” is its presentation of the reality on-the-ground and the ad hoc nature of much of China’s policy implementation. It is a necessary corrective to the monolithic analysis that assumes what Beijing says goes. While Beijing certainly enjoys a measure of political and practical control that is alien to democracies, it by no means guarantees that policies are implemented according to a plan. Central Asia may not receive the attention it once did in the Western press, but policymakers would do well to watch Beijing’s activities closely—developments there could well presage a more hands-on approach in the future.
