t the end of 2022, the world watched as parts of China were convulsed by significant protests in response to the government’s Zero-COVID-19 policy—a policy which saw large parts of major cities in forced isolation. For some more zealous analysts, these protests signified an erosion of the Chinese Communist Party’s power and authority, something not seen since Tiananmen Square in 1989. The Party eased the restrictions in the wake of the protests, but fears of a renewed surge in cases remained. Andrew Small opens his book “No Limits” at the early days of the pandemic, when some feared that China’s behavior would all but ensure the spread of COVID-19, by failing to stop the travel of Chinese citizens abroad and sharply criticizing those, such as the United States, that blocked travel from China.
This riveting story, about more than just COVID-19, describes how China’s own behaviors catalyzed the West and hardened its resolve toward Beijing, and how the Chinese Communist Party is working to develop its own partnerships and alliances to counter the West. “No Limits” is a penetrating account of this dynamic, and one that avoids the traditional Washington-centric focus. Small looks at Beijing’s impact from a primarily European view, and in so doing seats strategic competition in a far more nuanced perspective.
The subtitle of the American edition of Small’s book doesn’t quite sit as well as his American editors perhaps hoped. Its international edition is better titled: “Rupture: China and the Global Race for the Future.” Indeed, the book focuses more on alliances and relationships rather than China’s titular war with the West. Readers will certainly agree with Small that the contest with China has parallels in the Cold War, it is one that will largely and indeed is being fought with non-military means.
At a macro level, Small shows just how complex strategic competition is in practice, and what a significant shift in economic, political, and diplomatic foci it represents. He lands on an interesting consideration: Is strategic competition really a contest between the United States and China, with Europe a moderating factor or a bystander, or is it truly a systemic competition between liberal democracy and China’s authoritarian capitalism? The answer to this question will certainly define the long-term contours of geopolitics in the Indo-Pacific, but also further afield.
While the United States—not surprisingly—looms large, Europe is really the heart of the story. For Europe, the United States stood on shaky ground when it sought to mobilize Brussels and other capitals to counter China. For example, Washington’s criticism of Beijing’s surveillance state and Huawei was undermined by the Snowden revelations which showed how the United States was spying on its allies (even if the allied intelligence agencies were not surprised by these disclosures). Domestic incentives to mobilize American industry against China were often seen as tantamount to protectionism in the eyes of many Europeans. It also did not help that while Europe may have agreed with the challenge China represented, it often worried more about Beijing’s actions, rather than seeing it as a systemic competitor.
This is the challenge identified by Small: the alignment of competing interests across Europe and the United States and the development of not just restrictions on China, but opportunities for Western businesses. Simply banning Chinese companies or technology transfers is only one part of the equation, it is also about developing longer-term incentives that can offset the economic disruption or dislocation that results from the contest with Beijing. It is about the development of a holistic approach to a systemic challenge over a longer period of time, something that is challenging in the face of an agreed-upon adversary, but far more difficult when, as noted above, the threat is not universally shared.
There is some irony in the fact, as others such as Susan Shirk in her book “Overreach: How China Derailed its Peaceful Rise” have noted, that China’s premature aggressive “wolf warrior” diplomacy may have undermined its rise. Had Beijing followed Deng Xiaoping’s admonition to “bide your time” longer, it would have been in a far stronger position in the longer term, and not wasted its slow, measured growth and increase in reach. Had it been a more reliable partner in COVID-19, had it played by the rules longer, had it not aggressively moved out against India and throughout the Indo-Pacific, had it avoided any number of provocative behaviors, China would have avoided playing into the hands of its opponents, feeding their narrative.
Indeed, many of today’s European critics of China were, at one point, its most vocal advocates and supporters. Beijing’s efforts to isolate Lithuania for its relationship with Taiwan, intimidate Australia for its rejection of Huawei, and use COVID-19 relief aid for propaganda gain, all drove a shift in Europe’s understanding of Beijing—from a soft authoritarian with which one could do business, to a threatening totalitarian state. This shift created interesting, if not strange, bedfellows—from members of the United Kingdom’s Tory Party, to Green Party members in Germany.
“No Limits” also looks at China’s efforts to develop its own system of partnerships and alliances to not only cement its own position, but counter the West. These have, thus far, met with limited success. Small explores Beijing’s relationships with Russia, Pakistan, the Maldives, and others, all of which have proven to be difficult partners. Moscow, in particular, in the wake of its February 2022 invasion, puts Beijing in a complicated and complex position. What this long-term dynamic looks like is far from clear. As Small discusses, it is important to look at China’s efforts less as a chance to secure formal alliances, and more as an effort to identify informal partners of convenience. This may look less familiar to the United States and its allies, but it may provide what China needs in the near term.
Reading Small’s account may leave readers with a measure of optimism at the end, showing that the West may have finally awoken to the systemic challenge that China represents, put aside parochial business and political interests, and will move forward with alacrity. They would likely be mistaken. There has been and will be progress, to be sure. That progress is, however, not sustainable without systemic change.
Almost certainly Xi Jinping’s China is learning from the West’s response to Ukraine and the West’s response to Beijing’s own behavior. In the case of the former, it is watching and mapping the vulnerabilities and opportunities that the West’s attention to Ukraine is creating. Perhaps most instructive is the West’s severing of 30 years of Russian economic connectivity. Beijing and indeed the West knows that similar disconnections with China are simply not possible without considerable economic pain. For all of the re-shoring or “friend-shoring” of critical industries, China’s economy is too large and too integrated into the global market. For all the talk about economic decoupling, substantial ties with Beijing will remain.
It remains to be seen whether Beijing will truly change its tone and style away from the aggressive and bold China, to something more restrained and muted, as it seeks to avoid provoking a further immune response, such as the one Small charts. China’s toning down of its “wolf warrior” diplomacy and reshuffling of vocal diplomats could presage, perhaps, a forthcoming charm offensive. Will China’s own political and economic weaknesses, and Xi’s efforts to offset those weaknesses, preclude Beijing from adapting to the new environment? Or will it continue down an aggressive path, throwing its weight around regardless of the consequences?
And there remains the question of Taiwan. Will China invade? If so, when and how will the West respond? There is a risk on the part of the West about making it all about Taiwan. While it may be the metaphorical “easy button” in policy discussions—arming Taipei is much easier to grasp than developing a coherent industrial policy—it also blinds analysis to the complexities and nuances of China’s worldwide efforts to advance its geopolitical position.
The greatest question centers on whether the West will be able to maintain the measure of strategic unity it has achieved thus far, especially in the face of rising economic pressures and the profit-seeking of shareholders. Early auguries are less than positive: at the end of December 2022 it emerged that Germany was allowing Huawei to increase its presence in the country’s telecom networks, this after as Small notes, Berlin pushed back against China’s entry into the sector.
As Lord Palmerston, a prime minister of the United Kingdom, said in 1848, “We have no eternal allies, and we have no perpetual enemies. Our interests are eternal and perpetual, and those interests it is our duty to follow.” It takes particularly astute and capable leadership to convince partner countries to go against near-term economic benefits, for the sake of longer-term security and political stability. The West’s diplomats would do well to keep this in mind as it looks to compete with China in the Indo-Pacific, but more globally, as well.
“No Limits” drills down into the complex heart of strategic competition with Beijing, showing that in practice it is much harder to align policies and offset interests than it is to merely regurgitate euphemisms or clichés. As Small shows, it’s not all about the Indo-Pacific and not all about Taiwan (something perhaps shocking in today’s social media discourse). Both are important, but the strategic contest with Beijing is central to far more than the fate of Taipei and the fevered dreams of defense pundits. It may well be in the boardrooms of Brussels and Berlin that the real outcome of competition with Beijing is decided—not the wardroom of the USS Nimitz, currently patrolling the South China Sea.
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Battling Beijing from the Boardrooms of Berlin & Brussels
Photo by Rostyslav Savchyn on Unsplash
February 4, 2023
The strategic competition between China and the West has been a popular subject of debate for years. Yet rarely does a book delve into the complex, significant shifts over how these competitions play out in time-and how important Europe's role is, writes Joshua Huminski in his latest book review.
A
t the end of 2022, the world watched as parts of China were convulsed by significant protests in response to the government’s Zero-COVID-19 policy—a policy which saw large parts of major cities in forced isolation. For some more zealous analysts, these protests signified an erosion of the Chinese Communist Party’s power and authority, something not seen since Tiananmen Square in 1989. The Party eased the restrictions in the wake of the protests, but fears of a renewed surge in cases remained. Andrew Small opens his book “No Limits” at the early days of the pandemic, when some feared that China’s behavior would all but ensure the spread of COVID-19, by failing to stop the travel of Chinese citizens abroad and sharply criticizing those, such as the United States, that blocked travel from China.
This riveting story, about more than just COVID-19, describes how China’s own behaviors catalyzed the West and hardened its resolve toward Beijing, and how the Chinese Communist Party is working to develop its own partnerships and alliances to counter the West. “No Limits” is a penetrating account of this dynamic, and one that avoids the traditional Washington-centric focus. Small looks at Beijing’s impact from a primarily European view, and in so doing seats strategic competition in a far more nuanced perspective.
The subtitle of the American edition of Small’s book doesn’t quite sit as well as his American editors perhaps hoped. Its international edition is better titled: “Rupture: China and the Global Race for the Future.” Indeed, the book focuses more on alliances and relationships rather than China’s titular war with the West. Readers will certainly agree with Small that the contest with China has parallels in the Cold War, it is one that will largely and indeed is being fought with non-military means.
At a macro level, Small shows just how complex strategic competition is in practice, and what a significant shift in economic, political, and diplomatic foci it represents. He lands on an interesting consideration: Is strategic competition really a contest between the United States and China, with Europe a moderating factor or a bystander, or is it truly a systemic competition between liberal democracy and China’s authoritarian capitalism? The answer to this question will certainly define the long-term contours of geopolitics in the Indo-Pacific, but also further afield.
While the United States—not surprisingly—looms large, Europe is really the heart of the story. For Europe, the United States stood on shaky ground when it sought to mobilize Brussels and other capitals to counter China. For example, Washington’s criticism of Beijing’s surveillance state and Huawei was undermined by the Snowden revelations which showed how the United States was spying on its allies (even if the allied intelligence agencies were not surprised by these disclosures). Domestic incentives to mobilize American industry against China were often seen as tantamount to protectionism in the eyes of many Europeans. It also did not help that while Europe may have agreed with the challenge China represented, it often worried more about Beijing’s actions, rather than seeing it as a systemic competitor.
This is the challenge identified by Small: the alignment of competing interests across Europe and the United States and the development of not just restrictions on China, but opportunities for Western businesses. Simply banning Chinese companies or technology transfers is only one part of the equation, it is also about developing longer-term incentives that can offset the economic disruption or dislocation that results from the contest with Beijing. It is about the development of a holistic approach to a systemic challenge over a longer period of time, something that is challenging in the face of an agreed-upon adversary, but far more difficult when, as noted above, the threat is not universally shared.
There is some irony in the fact, as others such as Susan Shirk in her book “Overreach: How China Derailed its Peaceful Rise” have noted, that China’s premature aggressive “wolf warrior” diplomacy may have undermined its rise. Had Beijing followed Deng Xiaoping’s admonition to “bide your time” longer, it would have been in a far stronger position in the longer term, and not wasted its slow, measured growth and increase in reach. Had it been a more reliable partner in COVID-19, had it played by the rules longer, had it not aggressively moved out against India and throughout the Indo-Pacific, had it avoided any number of provocative behaviors, China would have avoided playing into the hands of its opponents, feeding their narrative.
Indeed, many of today’s European critics of China were, at one point, its most vocal advocates and supporters. Beijing’s efforts to isolate Lithuania for its relationship with Taiwan, intimidate Australia for its rejection of Huawei, and use COVID-19 relief aid for propaganda gain, all drove a shift in Europe’s understanding of Beijing—from a soft authoritarian with which one could do business, to a threatening totalitarian state. This shift created interesting, if not strange, bedfellows—from members of the United Kingdom’s Tory Party, to Green Party members in Germany.
“No Limits” also looks at China’s efforts to develop its own system of partnerships and alliances to not only cement its own position, but counter the West. These have, thus far, met with limited success. Small explores Beijing’s relationships with Russia, Pakistan, the Maldives, and others, all of which have proven to be difficult partners. Moscow, in particular, in the wake of its February 2022 invasion, puts Beijing in a complicated and complex position. What this long-term dynamic looks like is far from clear. As Small discusses, it is important to look at China’s efforts less as a chance to secure formal alliances, and more as an effort to identify informal partners of convenience. This may look less familiar to the United States and its allies, but it may provide what China needs in the near term.
Reading Small’s account may leave readers with a measure of optimism at the end, showing that the West may have finally awoken to the systemic challenge that China represents, put aside parochial business and political interests, and will move forward with alacrity. They would likely be mistaken. There has been and will be progress, to be sure. That progress is, however, not sustainable without systemic change.
Almost certainly Xi Jinping’s China is learning from the West’s response to Ukraine and the West’s response to Beijing’s own behavior. In the case of the former, it is watching and mapping the vulnerabilities and opportunities that the West’s attention to Ukraine is creating. Perhaps most instructive is the West’s severing of 30 years of Russian economic connectivity. Beijing and indeed the West knows that similar disconnections with China are simply not possible without considerable economic pain. For all of the re-shoring or “friend-shoring” of critical industries, China’s economy is too large and too integrated into the global market. For all the talk about economic decoupling, substantial ties with Beijing will remain.
It remains to be seen whether Beijing will truly change its tone and style away from the aggressive and bold China, to something more restrained and muted, as it seeks to avoid provoking a further immune response, such as the one Small charts. China’s toning down of its “wolf warrior” diplomacy and reshuffling of vocal diplomats could presage, perhaps, a forthcoming charm offensive. Will China’s own political and economic weaknesses, and Xi’s efforts to offset those weaknesses, preclude Beijing from adapting to the new environment? Or will it continue down an aggressive path, throwing its weight around regardless of the consequences?
And there remains the question of Taiwan. Will China invade? If so, when and how will the West respond? There is a risk on the part of the West about making it all about Taiwan. While it may be the metaphorical “easy button” in policy discussions—arming Taipei is much easier to grasp than developing a coherent industrial policy—it also blinds analysis to the complexities and nuances of China’s worldwide efforts to advance its geopolitical position.
The greatest question centers on whether the West will be able to maintain the measure of strategic unity it has achieved thus far, especially in the face of rising economic pressures and the profit-seeking of shareholders. Early auguries are less than positive: at the end of December 2022 it emerged that Germany was allowing Huawei to increase its presence in the country’s telecom networks, this after as Small notes, Berlin pushed back against China’s entry into the sector.
As Lord Palmerston, a prime minister of the United Kingdom, said in 1848, “We have no eternal allies, and we have no perpetual enemies. Our interests are eternal and perpetual, and those interests it is our duty to follow.” It takes particularly astute and capable leadership to convince partner countries to go against near-term economic benefits, for the sake of longer-term security and political stability. The West’s diplomats would do well to keep this in mind as it looks to compete with China in the Indo-Pacific, but more globally, as well.
“No Limits” drills down into the complex heart of strategic competition with Beijing, showing that in practice it is much harder to align policies and offset interests than it is to merely regurgitate euphemisms or clichés. As Small shows, it’s not all about the Indo-Pacific and not all about Taiwan (something perhaps shocking in today’s social media discourse). Both are important, but the strategic contest with Beijing is central to far more than the fate of Taipei and the fevered dreams of defense pundits. It may well be in the boardrooms of Brussels and Berlin that the real outcome of competition with Beijing is decided—not the wardroom of the USS Nimitz, currently patrolling the South China Sea.
