espite optimistic announcements coming from Yerevan and Baku, Armenia and Azerbaijan did not sign a long-awaited peace treaty in 2023. Although normalization of relations between the two South Caucasus archenemies seems to be closer than ever, there are still plenty of obstacles and challenges that stand in their way. But will the two former Soviet republics finally bury the hatchet in 2024?
When Armenia and Azerbaijan issued a joint statement on 08 December 2023 stating there is “a historical chance to achieve a long-awaited peace in the region,” Armenian officials said Yerevan was ready to sign a deal with Baku by the end of the year. But it did not happen. Russian sources claim [Russian-language link] that the two parties could reach a peace agreement “soon after New Year’s Eve.”
Although Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan and Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev discussed the peace agenda issues on the sidelines of the informal Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) summit in St. Petersburg, that does not necessarily mean that Russia will once again play the role of a peace broker in the South Caucasus. In 2024, the Kremlin will undoubtedly seek to preserve the remnants of its influence in the region. The problem for Moscow: neither Baku nor Yerevan seem interested in staying in Russia’s geopolitical orbit.
Still, the fact that the two leaders met on Russian soil, even though a large number of countries reportedly offered themselves as mediators, indicates Russia still sees the region as within its zone of influence. Thus if Aliyev and Pashinyan or their representatives sign a peace deal in Russia, rather than in Georgia or at the border between the two countries, such a move will be interpreted as a huge success of Russian diplomacy.
Moreover, Pashinyan’s presence at the CIS summit, as well as his participation in the regular session of the Russian-dominated Supreme Eurasian Economic Council in St. Petersburg, suggests the Kremlin plans to continue its diplomatic battle for Armenia, Moscow’s nominal ally in the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) that is actively seeking to distance itself from Russia. Yerevan, on the other hand, is expected to continue developing close ties with the West. Armenian Security Council Secretary Armen Grigoryan’s recent meetings with U.S. and British security officials clearly indicates that the landlocked former Soviet republic no longer sees Moscow as a major guarantor of its territorial integrity.
Grigoryan is seen by Russia’s political establishment as an Armenian politician who has “anti-Russian views” [Russian-language link], which is why meeting with the Ukrainian president's Chief of Staff Andriy Yermak in October 2023 hardly surprised anyone in the Kremlin. But it is unlikely that Moscow, preoccupied with its adventure in Ukraine, can prevent Armenia from getting closer to Kyiv and the West.
As Pashinyan stressed in November 2023, Yerevan is looking for new security partners. Although Russia has long been Armenia’s principal supplier of weapons and ammunition, the nation of around 2.7 million people now aims to increase military cooperation with India—an action that seems to be mutually beneficial. For New Delhi, it represents the opportunity to advertise its military-industrial complex, while for Yerevan, purchasing weapons from India allows Armenia to reduce its dependence on Russia.
Azerbaijan, for its part, is strengthening military ties with India’s archenemy Pakistan, and continues to increase defense spending. According to reports, Baku is set to allocate over 6.4 billion manats ($3.77 billion) to defense and national security expenditures from the state budget in 2024, which is 6% up compared to 2023. Could that mean that Azerbaijan and Armenia, despite attempts to reach a peace deal, are preparing for another war?
Although Azerbaijan and neighboring Iran on 31 December 2023 inaugurated a cross-border bridge over the Astarachay River—a project which is part of the Nakhchivan Corridor (also known as the Zangezur corridor), connecting mainland Azerbaijan with its Nakhchivan exclave through Iranian territory—Baku is unlikely to put all its eggs in one basket. In other words, Azerbaijan will almost certainly seek to build another section of the Nakhchivan corridor, passing through Armenia’s Syunik province.
If built under Baku’s terms, such a transportation network would allow Azerbaijan a passport-free passage through southern Armena, and would connect the energy rich Caucasus nation not only with Nakhchivan, but also with its ally Turkey. As a result, Iran would get semi-encircled by its Turkic neighbors. Even though Iran has repeatedly stated that maintaining the border with Armenia is its red line, there is no guarantee that Baku and Ankara will easily give up on the construction of the Zangezur corridor through Armenia.
Given that the Nakhchivan corridor issue could eventually lead to another conflict in the South Caucasus, it is not surprising that both Armenia and Azerbaijan continue to actively strengthen their military capabilities, even while talking about a peace agreement.
Finally, even if the two nations sign a peace treaty in the coming weeks or months, it will take years before they fully normalize relations. Thus, 2024 might mark the beginning of a long-term process whose ultimate outcome remains highly uncertain.
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Armenia and Azerbaijan: A Peace Treaty or Pending War?
January 4, 2024
Normalization of relations between Armenia and Azerbaijan seems closer than ever, but many obstacles remain. There is some hope that the two countries will reach a peace agreement early in 2024, but both are also preparing for a return to hostilities, writes Nikola Mikovic.
D
espite optimistic announcements coming from Yerevan and Baku, Armenia and Azerbaijan did not sign a long-awaited peace treaty in 2023. Although normalization of relations between the two South Caucasus archenemies seems to be closer than ever, there are still plenty of obstacles and challenges that stand in their way. But will the two former Soviet republics finally bury the hatchet in 2024?
When Armenia and Azerbaijan issued a joint statement on 08 December 2023 stating there is “a historical chance to achieve a long-awaited peace in the region,” Armenian officials said Yerevan was ready to sign a deal with Baku by the end of the year. But it did not happen. Russian sources claim [Russian-language link] that the two parties could reach a peace agreement “soon after New Year’s Eve.”
Although Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan and Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev discussed the peace agenda issues on the sidelines of the informal Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) summit in St. Petersburg, that does not necessarily mean that Russia will once again play the role of a peace broker in the South Caucasus. In 2024, the Kremlin will undoubtedly seek to preserve the remnants of its influence in the region. The problem for Moscow: neither Baku nor Yerevan seem interested in staying in Russia’s geopolitical orbit.
Still, the fact that the two leaders met on Russian soil, even though a large number of countries reportedly offered themselves as mediators, indicates Russia still sees the region as within its zone of influence. Thus if Aliyev and Pashinyan or their representatives sign a peace deal in Russia, rather than in Georgia or at the border between the two countries, such a move will be interpreted as a huge success of Russian diplomacy.
Moreover, Pashinyan’s presence at the CIS summit, as well as his participation in the regular session of the Russian-dominated Supreme Eurasian Economic Council in St. Petersburg, suggests the Kremlin plans to continue its diplomatic battle for Armenia, Moscow’s nominal ally in the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) that is actively seeking to distance itself from Russia. Yerevan, on the other hand, is expected to continue developing close ties with the West. Armenian Security Council Secretary Armen Grigoryan’s recent meetings with U.S. and British security officials clearly indicates that the landlocked former Soviet republic no longer sees Moscow as a major guarantor of its territorial integrity.
Grigoryan is seen by Russia’s political establishment as an Armenian politician who has “anti-Russian views” [Russian-language link], which is why meeting with the Ukrainian president's Chief of Staff Andriy Yermak in October 2023 hardly surprised anyone in the Kremlin. But it is unlikely that Moscow, preoccupied with its adventure in Ukraine, can prevent Armenia from getting closer to Kyiv and the West.
As Pashinyan stressed in November 2023, Yerevan is looking for new security partners. Although Russia has long been Armenia’s principal supplier of weapons and ammunition, the nation of around 2.7 million people now aims to increase military cooperation with India—an action that seems to be mutually beneficial. For New Delhi, it represents the opportunity to advertise its military-industrial complex, while for Yerevan, purchasing weapons from India allows Armenia to reduce its dependence on Russia.
Azerbaijan, for its part, is strengthening military ties with India’s archenemy Pakistan, and continues to increase defense spending. According to reports, Baku is set to allocate over 6.4 billion manats ($3.77 billion) to defense and national security expenditures from the state budget in 2024, which is 6% up compared to 2023. Could that mean that Azerbaijan and Armenia, despite attempts to reach a peace deal, are preparing for another war?
Although Azerbaijan and neighboring Iran on 31 December 2023 inaugurated a cross-border bridge over the Astarachay River—a project which is part of the Nakhchivan Corridor (also known as the Zangezur corridor), connecting mainland Azerbaijan with its Nakhchivan exclave through Iranian territory—Baku is unlikely to put all its eggs in one basket. In other words, Azerbaijan will almost certainly seek to build another section of the Nakhchivan corridor, passing through Armenia’s Syunik province.
If built under Baku’s terms, such a transportation network would allow Azerbaijan a passport-free passage through southern Armena, and would connect the energy rich Caucasus nation not only with Nakhchivan, but also with its ally Turkey. As a result, Iran would get semi-encircled by its Turkic neighbors. Even though Iran has repeatedly stated that maintaining the border with Armenia is its red line, there is no guarantee that Baku and Ankara will easily give up on the construction of the Zangezur corridor through Armenia.
Given that the Nakhchivan corridor issue could eventually lead to another conflict in the South Caucasus, it is not surprising that both Armenia and Azerbaijan continue to actively strengthen their military capabilities, even while talking about a peace agreement.
Finally, even if the two nations sign a peace treaty in the coming weeks or months, it will take years before they fully normalize relations. Thus, 2024 might mark the beginning of a long-term process whose ultimate outcome remains highly uncertain.
