ussia’s allies in the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) depend on Moscow in various ways. Yet none of them – except Belarus – provided political support for the Kremlin’s “special military operation” in Ukraine.
While Minsk allowed Russia to use Belarusian territory in its ongoing invasion of Ukraine, other CSTO members – Armenia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan – took a generally neutral stance on the Kremlin’s war in the Eastern European country. Unlike Belarus, which voted against the United Nations General Assembly March 2 resolution condemning Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, other Russian allies abstained. On April 7, the UN General Assembly voted to expel Russia UN Human Rights Council. This time, all CSTO nations except Armenia supported Russia. The Armenian delegation did not take part in the UN vote, which was another indication that Moscow cannot count on its nominal allies’ support in its Ukrainian adventure.
But can Russia count on the CSTO involvement in Ukraine? Despite speculation, it is rather questionable if the Kremlin ever intended to involve CSTO in the war directly. On April 1 Russia accused Kyiv of attacking a fuel depot in the southwestern Russian city of Belgorod. According to Article 4 of the CSTO Treaty, “an act of aggression (an armed attack that threatens security, stability, territorial integrity, and sovereignty) against one of the member states will be considered as a collective act of aggression on all member states of the CSTO”. In other words, if Ukraine really attacked Russia, the CSTO should have intervened. That did not happen. The Kremlin has not even formally appealed the CSTO for help. Indeed, on April 5 the Russian-led alliance held a meeting to discuss the international flights by the armed forces of the CSTO countries, but not the Belgorod attack.
This is not the first time the CSTO remained silent on the fate of its members. The organization did not intervene to protect Armenia in May 2021, even though Azerbaijani troops reportedly entered Armenian territory trying to “lay siege” to Lake Sev Lich (Black Lake), which both countries border. Although Yerevan officially applied to both Russia and CSTO, the alliance never reacted. In 2010, CSTO refused to intervene in Kyrgyzstan to quell inter-ethnic violence in the south of the country, claiming that was what was happening in the Central Asian nation was its “internal affair”.
On the other hand, in January 2022 Kazakhstan’s President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev requested the support of the CSTO following mass violent protests that have paralyzed the energy-rich country. As a result, around 2,000 CSTO troops have been deployed to the former Soviet republic, and Tokayev has managed to consolidate his power. In spite of that, Kazakhstan refuses to side with Russia against Ukraine. Nur-Sultan rules out a recognition of the Russia-backed Donetsk People’s Republic and Lugansk People’s Republic in Ukraine’s coal-rich Donbass region, as well as the Kremlin’s annexation of Crimea. Moreover, Timur Suleimenov, the first deputy chief of staff to the President of Kazakhstan, recently stressed that Nur-Sultan has demonstrated to its European partners that Kazakhstan “will not be a tool to circumvent the sanctions that the European Union has imposed on Russia”.
Such a statement can be interpreted as yet another attempt by Kazakhstan to distance itself from Moscow. The country has already sent tons of humanitarian aid to Ukraine, and on March 6 a large-scale pro-Ukraine rally took place in the most populous Kazakh city of Almaty. Neighboring Kyrgyzstan, on the other hand, has banned rallies connected to Russia's invasion of Ukraine, and the country’s President Sadyr Japarov told Kyrgyzstan’s parliament on March 9 that Bishkek “should take a neutral stance” in Russia’s war against the Eastern European country.
Meanwhile, reports suggest that many Kyrgyz and Tajik citizens – reportedly migrant workers living in Russia – are fighting alongside Russians in Ukraine. Indeed, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan are two of the world’s most migrant-dependent countries, with remittances contributing to 31.3% and 26.7% to the countries’ GDP, respectively. Given that migrant remittances from Russia fuel the economies of the two Central Asian nations, sanctions that the West has imposed on the Russian Federation is expected to have serious implications on Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan. More importantly, Russia’s decision to halt grain exports to former Soviet countries until June 30, could potentially result in food shortages in Central Asia – a region where Moscow struggles to preserve its influence.
Belarus, unlike its Central Asian allies, is unlikely to face food crises, even though Minsk found itself in a complete dependency on Russia both economically and politically. To this day, however, the Eastern European country has not recognized the self-proclaimed Donbass republic, although Minks “recognized Russia’s diplomatic recognition of Donetsk and Lugansk”. Such Belarus’ actions suggest that Russia’s only ally in Europe is not willing to burn bridges with Kyiv, and that President Alexander Lukashenko is still trying to find room for various political maneuvers.
Thus, the Kremlin, unlike Ukraine that is firmly backed by the West, seems to be on its own in a conflict that could reshape the current global order, and have an enormous effect on the very future of the CSTO.
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Are Russia’s CSTO Allies Turning Their Back on Moscow?
Flags of the countries of the Collective Security Treaty Organization. Flags of Armenia, Belarus, Kazakhstan. Photo via Adobe Stock.
April 20, 2022
While Russia's allies in the Collective Security Treaty Organization are all dependent on Moscow in some significant ways, none other than Belarus is supporting the invasion of Ukraine. This has troubling implications for the Kremlin, writes Diplomatic Courier correspondent Nikola Mikovic.
R
ussia’s allies in the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) depend on Moscow in various ways. Yet none of them – except Belarus – provided political support for the Kremlin’s “special military operation” in Ukraine.
While Minsk allowed Russia to use Belarusian territory in its ongoing invasion of Ukraine, other CSTO members – Armenia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan – took a generally neutral stance on the Kremlin’s war in the Eastern European country. Unlike Belarus, which voted against the United Nations General Assembly March 2 resolution condemning Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, other Russian allies abstained. On April 7, the UN General Assembly voted to expel Russia UN Human Rights Council. This time, all CSTO nations except Armenia supported Russia. The Armenian delegation did not take part in the UN vote, which was another indication that Moscow cannot count on its nominal allies’ support in its Ukrainian adventure.
But can Russia count on the CSTO involvement in Ukraine? Despite speculation, it is rather questionable if the Kremlin ever intended to involve CSTO in the war directly. On April 1 Russia accused Kyiv of attacking a fuel depot in the southwestern Russian city of Belgorod. According to Article 4 of the CSTO Treaty, “an act of aggression (an armed attack that threatens security, stability, territorial integrity, and sovereignty) against one of the member states will be considered as a collective act of aggression on all member states of the CSTO”. In other words, if Ukraine really attacked Russia, the CSTO should have intervened. That did not happen. The Kremlin has not even formally appealed the CSTO for help. Indeed, on April 5 the Russian-led alliance held a meeting to discuss the international flights by the armed forces of the CSTO countries, but not the Belgorod attack.
This is not the first time the CSTO remained silent on the fate of its members. The organization did not intervene to protect Armenia in May 2021, even though Azerbaijani troops reportedly entered Armenian territory trying to “lay siege” to Lake Sev Lich (Black Lake), which both countries border. Although Yerevan officially applied to both Russia and CSTO, the alliance never reacted. In 2010, CSTO refused to intervene in Kyrgyzstan to quell inter-ethnic violence in the south of the country, claiming that was what was happening in the Central Asian nation was its “internal affair”.
On the other hand, in January 2022 Kazakhstan’s President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev requested the support of the CSTO following mass violent protests that have paralyzed the energy-rich country. As a result, around 2,000 CSTO troops have been deployed to the former Soviet republic, and Tokayev has managed to consolidate his power. In spite of that, Kazakhstan refuses to side with Russia against Ukraine. Nur-Sultan rules out a recognition of the Russia-backed Donetsk People’s Republic and Lugansk People’s Republic in Ukraine’s coal-rich Donbass region, as well as the Kremlin’s annexation of Crimea. Moreover, Timur Suleimenov, the first deputy chief of staff to the President of Kazakhstan, recently stressed that Nur-Sultan has demonstrated to its European partners that Kazakhstan “will not be a tool to circumvent the sanctions that the European Union has imposed on Russia”.
Such a statement can be interpreted as yet another attempt by Kazakhstan to distance itself from Moscow. The country has already sent tons of humanitarian aid to Ukraine, and on March 6 a large-scale pro-Ukraine rally took place in the most populous Kazakh city of Almaty. Neighboring Kyrgyzstan, on the other hand, has banned rallies connected to Russia's invasion of Ukraine, and the country’s President Sadyr Japarov told Kyrgyzstan’s parliament on March 9 that Bishkek “should take a neutral stance” in Russia’s war against the Eastern European country.
Meanwhile, reports suggest that many Kyrgyz and Tajik citizens – reportedly migrant workers living in Russia – are fighting alongside Russians in Ukraine. Indeed, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan are two of the world’s most migrant-dependent countries, with remittances contributing to 31.3% and 26.7% to the countries’ GDP, respectively. Given that migrant remittances from Russia fuel the economies of the two Central Asian nations, sanctions that the West has imposed on the Russian Federation is expected to have serious implications on Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan. More importantly, Russia’s decision to halt grain exports to former Soviet countries until June 30, could potentially result in food shortages in Central Asia – a region where Moscow struggles to preserve its influence.
Belarus, unlike its Central Asian allies, is unlikely to face food crises, even though Minsk found itself in a complete dependency on Russia both economically and politically. To this day, however, the Eastern European country has not recognized the self-proclaimed Donbass republic, although Minks “recognized Russia’s diplomatic recognition of Donetsk and Lugansk”. Such Belarus’ actions suggest that Russia’s only ally in Europe is not willing to burn bridges with Kyiv, and that President Alexander Lukashenko is still trying to find room for various political maneuvers.
Thus, the Kremlin, unlike Ukraine that is firmly backed by the West, seems to be on its own in a conflict that could reshape the current global order, and have an enormous effect on the very future of the CSTO.
