he Kremlin does not seem to like changes, be it in Russia or in countries that have developed close ties with Moscow. Prior to the “historic” elections in Turkey—Russia’s “situational frenemy”—the Russian leadership was indirectly supporting incumbent President Recep Tayyip Erdogan against his major rival, the opposition leader Kemal Kilicdaroglu. But what will be the future of the Russian-Turkish relations if Erdogan suffers a defeat in the second round of the presidential elections on 28 May 2023?
Afraid of a potential regime-change at home, the Kremlin, through its propagandists, spread rumors that what Moscow labels as “the collective West” allegedly prepares a “Euromaidan scenario for Turkey,” referring to the 2014 violent protests in Kyiv’s Maidan Square that resulted in the overthrow of Ukraine’s President Viktor Yanukovych. In reality, the election night (on 14 May 2023) in Turkey was rather peaceful, and the opposition supporters did not attempt to force a “color revolution” against Erdogan, who has been ruling the country for 20 years.
But unlike in Russia, where President Vladimir Putin never had any serious rivals—as those who represented a threat to his rule were either arrested or killed—in Turkey the opposition candidate can come to power through elections. Since Kilicdaroglu has already demonstrated that he can take a tough stance regarding Moscow, the Kremlin has all the reasons to fear that his potential victory can have an impact on Russian-Turkish ties.
On 12 May 2023, Erdogan’s rival warned Russia not to interfere in Turkish elections. He accused the Kremlin of responsibility for the release of fake material on social media ahead of the ballot, although did not specify to which material he referred. Moscow responded in an unusual and a rather undiplomatic manner. Kremlin spokesman Dmitry Peskov denied Kilicdaroglu’s accusations, pointing out that such information is “spread by liars.”
Despite the fact that Turkey openly arms Ukraine, the Kremlin never used such harsh rhetoric against Erdogan. Moreover, on 17 March 2023, Peskov openly praised the Turkish leader while commenting on former President of Turkmenistan Gurbanguly Berdymukhamedov’s idea of nominating Erdogan for the Nobel Peace Prize. “We highly appreciate Erdogan's efforts, his peacekeeping activities, his attempts to provide mediation services, and his attitude to the development of bilateral Russian-Turkish relations,” Peskov stressed.
For the Kremlin, Erdogan is a “tough but reliable partner” who did not impose sanctions on Moscow after the Russian invasion of Ukraine, and who has developed Turkey’s economic cooperation with Russia. Indeed, in 2022 trade turnover between the two countries exceeded $62 billion, while in April Putin and Erdogan joined virtually in a ceremony marking the first loading of nuclear fuel into the first power unit at the site at Akkuyu nuclear plant in Turkey's southern Mersin province. Under regular circumstances, the two leaders would wait for the plant—being built by Russia’s energy giant Rosatom—to become fully operational to attend the event. Thus, Putin’s move could be interpreted as his indirect support to Erdogan.
While Kilicdaroglu, if he becomes Turkey’s new president on 28 May 2023, is unlikely to end the $20 billion, 4,800-megawatt project, there is no guarantee that he will continue pursuing Erdogan’s policy regarding Russia. Some Turkish political analysts believe that the leader of the Republican People's Party (CHP) will not impose sanctions on Russia, and will seek to normalize ties with Moscow’s ally Syria. However, the Kremlin reportedly fears that Kilicdaroglu could hand over the Russian-made S-400 air-defense missile systems to Ukraine, which is what Ankara, according to Turkish Foreign Minister Mevlut Cavusoglu, refused to do. More importantly, it remains rather unclear if the CHP leader would be willing to cooperate with Putin on turning Turkey into a regional gas hub. Thus, from Moscow’s perspective, Erdogan’s victory would mean a continuation of the current Turkish policy vis-à-vis the Kremlin, while with Kilicdaroglu in power—especially if he takes a pro-Western geopolitical course—there would be too many risks and unknowns.
In order to additionally “help” Erdogan defeat his rival, Russia could extend the grain deal with Turkey and Ukraine. Coincidently or not, the Turkey-brokered agreement between the two warring countries is set to expire on 18 May 2023. If the Kremlin decides to extend the deal, Erdogan could portray such a move as another victory of his foreign policy. Previously, on 10 May 2023, Russia has allowed Turkey to delay payment of a $600 million gas bill to Russia until 2024, and has agreed that up to $4 billion in Turkish energy payments to Russia can be postponed until next year. The Kremlin’s “goodwill gesture” came as a perfect “gift” to Erdogan, who promised to provide free natural gas for household consumption up to 25 cubic meters monthly for one year.
But such actions did not help the Turkish leader win the elections in the first round. Therefore, the Kremlin will have a hard choice to make. It could choose not to interfere, be it directly or indirectly, in the Turkish runoff election, which would mean that it has backed down following Kilicdaroglu’s warning, or to continue inexplicitly backing Erdogan, a move that could have implications on relations between Moscow and Ankara if the CHP leader wins on 28 May 2023.
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Would Erdogan’s Election Defeat in Turkey Be a Blow to Russia?
Photo via Adobe Stock.
May 16, 2023
Turkey is no ally to Russia, but Erdogan's long hold on power has made Turkey a useful, known quantity for the Kremlin. If Erdogan loses the runoff election, it likely won't fundamentally alter Turkey's relationship with Russia but it could make the Kremlin less comfortable, writes Nikola Mikovic.
T
he Kremlin does not seem to like changes, be it in Russia or in countries that have developed close ties with Moscow. Prior to the “historic” elections in Turkey—Russia’s “situational frenemy”—the Russian leadership was indirectly supporting incumbent President Recep Tayyip Erdogan against his major rival, the opposition leader Kemal Kilicdaroglu. But what will be the future of the Russian-Turkish relations if Erdogan suffers a defeat in the second round of the presidential elections on 28 May 2023?
Afraid of a potential regime-change at home, the Kremlin, through its propagandists, spread rumors that what Moscow labels as “the collective West” allegedly prepares a “Euromaidan scenario for Turkey,” referring to the 2014 violent protests in Kyiv’s Maidan Square that resulted in the overthrow of Ukraine’s President Viktor Yanukovych. In reality, the election night (on 14 May 2023) in Turkey was rather peaceful, and the opposition supporters did not attempt to force a “color revolution” against Erdogan, who has been ruling the country for 20 years.
But unlike in Russia, where President Vladimir Putin never had any serious rivals—as those who represented a threat to his rule were either arrested or killed—in Turkey the opposition candidate can come to power through elections. Since Kilicdaroglu has already demonstrated that he can take a tough stance regarding Moscow, the Kremlin has all the reasons to fear that his potential victory can have an impact on Russian-Turkish ties.
On 12 May 2023, Erdogan’s rival warned Russia not to interfere in Turkish elections. He accused the Kremlin of responsibility for the release of fake material on social media ahead of the ballot, although did not specify to which material he referred. Moscow responded in an unusual and a rather undiplomatic manner. Kremlin spokesman Dmitry Peskov denied Kilicdaroglu’s accusations, pointing out that such information is “spread by liars.”
Despite the fact that Turkey openly arms Ukraine, the Kremlin never used such harsh rhetoric against Erdogan. Moreover, on 17 March 2023, Peskov openly praised the Turkish leader while commenting on former President of Turkmenistan Gurbanguly Berdymukhamedov’s idea of nominating Erdogan for the Nobel Peace Prize. “We highly appreciate Erdogan's efforts, his peacekeeping activities, his attempts to provide mediation services, and his attitude to the development of bilateral Russian-Turkish relations,” Peskov stressed.
For the Kremlin, Erdogan is a “tough but reliable partner” who did not impose sanctions on Moscow after the Russian invasion of Ukraine, and who has developed Turkey’s economic cooperation with Russia. Indeed, in 2022 trade turnover between the two countries exceeded $62 billion, while in April Putin and Erdogan joined virtually in a ceremony marking the first loading of nuclear fuel into the first power unit at the site at Akkuyu nuclear plant in Turkey's southern Mersin province. Under regular circumstances, the two leaders would wait for the plant—being built by Russia’s energy giant Rosatom—to become fully operational to attend the event. Thus, Putin’s move could be interpreted as his indirect support to Erdogan.
While Kilicdaroglu, if he becomes Turkey’s new president on 28 May 2023, is unlikely to end the $20 billion, 4,800-megawatt project, there is no guarantee that he will continue pursuing Erdogan’s policy regarding Russia. Some Turkish political analysts believe that the leader of the Republican People's Party (CHP) will not impose sanctions on Russia, and will seek to normalize ties with Moscow’s ally Syria. However, the Kremlin reportedly fears that Kilicdaroglu could hand over the Russian-made S-400 air-defense missile systems to Ukraine, which is what Ankara, according to Turkish Foreign Minister Mevlut Cavusoglu, refused to do. More importantly, it remains rather unclear if the CHP leader would be willing to cooperate with Putin on turning Turkey into a regional gas hub. Thus, from Moscow’s perspective, Erdogan’s victory would mean a continuation of the current Turkish policy vis-à-vis the Kremlin, while with Kilicdaroglu in power—especially if he takes a pro-Western geopolitical course—there would be too many risks and unknowns.
In order to additionally “help” Erdogan defeat his rival, Russia could extend the grain deal with Turkey and Ukraine. Coincidently or not, the Turkey-brokered agreement between the two warring countries is set to expire on 18 May 2023. If the Kremlin decides to extend the deal, Erdogan could portray such a move as another victory of his foreign policy. Previously, on 10 May 2023, Russia has allowed Turkey to delay payment of a $600 million gas bill to Russia until 2024, and has agreed that up to $4 billion in Turkish energy payments to Russia can be postponed until next year. The Kremlin’s “goodwill gesture” came as a perfect “gift” to Erdogan, who promised to provide free natural gas for household consumption up to 25 cubic meters monthly for one year.
But such actions did not help the Turkish leader win the elections in the first round. Therefore, the Kremlin will have a hard choice to make. It could choose not to interfere, be it directly or indirectly, in the Turkish runoff election, which would mean that it has backed down following Kilicdaroglu’s warning, or to continue inexplicitly backing Erdogan, a move that could have implications on relations between Moscow and Ankara if the CHP leader wins on 28 May 2023.
