n 2012, Russians experienced echoes of Cold War censorship and suspicion with the adoption of Russia’s foreign agent law, which was roundly criticized by the world of independent reporting. The law defined any Russian organizations as “foreign agents” if they received any support from any foreign institution, requiring they include a “foreign agent” label on each of their publications while also making financial disclosures to the Ministry of Justice. The situation worsened in 2017, when the Russian government increased penalties for non–compliance and expanded the law to apply to bloggers, media organizations, and independent journalists. Controversy spiked as increased state scrutiny of media networks and journalists regarding “foreign influence” and divergence from state narratives threatened journalistic independence and objective reporting.
To examine the change in media output before and after the 2017 amendment, analysts from DisinfoLab, a student-led think tank at the College of William & Mary's Global Research Institute, collected headline titles from five media outlets, categorized the headlines by topic, and compared the findings. DisinfoLab found that while foreign agents’ coverage was mostly unaffected, non–foreign agents decreased their opposition related content while increasing their output of “filler” content. This behavior is referred to as “bread and circuses,” or the politics of superficial appeasement, and was likely used to distract the Russian population from their deference to government policies. As readers were captivated by the filler content in non-foreign agents’ publications, it was intended for them to miss non-foreign agents’ transition away from a critical government narrative toward a more appeasing one. Post–Soviet countries enacting foreign agent laws should expect a decrease in journalistic integrity, as organizations that avoided the initial foreign agent label take a “bread and circuses” approach to avoid foreign agent status.
Methodology
To analyze the changes in media output before and after the 2017 amendment, DisinfoLab examined three media outlets labeled as foreign agents: Radio Svoboda, the Russian version of U.S.--funded Radio Free Europe; Current Time TV, a Russian online newspaper founded by Radio Svoboda; and Voice of America, another U.S.--funded media outlet. Also included in this study were two independent Russian organizations not labeled as foreign agents: Gazeta.ru and Interfax. For each organization, we scraped the headlines of about 400 news articles from a year before the law went into effect and about 400 news articles from a year after the law went into effect. Using the sumgram Python tool, we then identified the most significant phrases in each group and classified them under the following topics: minorities, opposition, protests, foreign policy, foreign media and culture, terrorism, pro–Putin and Russian government, and other. Finally, we identified how frequently each categorical topic was reported on before and after the 2017 amendment and compared results.
Foreign Agents Seemingly Unaffected
The Russian foreign agent law was ineffective in silencing “foreign agents” already publishing controversial content. DisinfoLab analysts observed that the three organizations labeled as foreign agents remained consistent with some variation in their media coverage. Interestingly, the data show a slight increase in opposition related content and a slight decrease in foreign media and culture coverage.
These foreign agents likely swapped “filler content,” such as the birthdays of U.S. presidents captured in the foreign media/culture category, with more politically relevant material, such as opposition leader Alexei Navalny’s corruption allegations levelled against Russian politicians. All three organizations receive funding from the U.S. government, which explains their unwillingness to change their content to appease Russian authorities. The continued coverage of opposition politics may be interpreted as a U.S. effort to expand its influence in the region and reflect a “nothing to lose” sentiment among these journalists.
While these organizations appear to retain journalistic integrity, they may lose their audience’s trust. The foreign agent label is already intended to alienate and create a sentiment of distrust towards organizations publishing opposition related content. The increase in controversial reporting in addition to this label will likely amplify the Russian state’s intended effect.
Non–Foreign Agents Play It Safe
By contrast, “non-foreign agents” decreased their output of opposition–related content while significantly increasing coverage of foreign media and culture after the law was applied to media organizations. They also increased output of explicitly pro–Russia and pro–Putin content, publishing articles about Russian humanitarian aid and Putin’s new puppies.
These organizations may be trying to appear “worldly” by providing insight into pop culture to distract from their lack of politically relevant content. We interpret this response to the Russian foreign agent law as fearful and reactionary. Organizations not yet labeled as foreign agents agents seek to demonstrate their continued loyalty to Putin by adapting their content to suit state narratives and redirecting audience attention.
Foreign Agent Laws Are Spreading
Russian–style foreign agent laws are spreading, especially in formerly communist states. Some nations are not too surprising—Hungary and Serbia, both with complex relationships with the West and eroding democracies—but Russia’s influence extends farther than that. Bulgaria and Slovakia, each with membership in the EU and NATO, are considering their own versions of the foreign agent law. Georgia, despite border disputes with Russia, recently passed its own foreign agent law. Kyrgyzstan and Kazakhstan have also passed laws that mimic Russia’s. We expect to see a divide in domestic media in these countries, where the political commentary of “foreign agents” is less affected than that of organizations with an incentive to avoid the label.
Conclusion
Citizens in states with foreign agent laws should not be fooled by the media’s renewed focus on foreign culture and entertainment. While this “fluff” creates the illusion of journalistic freedom and independence, it may be a mere facade for self–censorship. As DisinfoLab observed, for organizations not yet labeled as foreign agents after the law, an increase in coverage over foreign media and culture coincided with a sharp decrease in opposition related content. Foreign audiences must be aware of this “bread and circuses” approach to properly evaluate the quality of independent media under foreign agent laws.
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Russia’s media swaps political opposition for entertainment
Photo by Tim Mossholder via Pexels.
February 12, 2025
Russia’s media has shifted from airing political opposition to entertainment as foreign agent laws expand censorship and self-censorship, according to College of William & Mary DisinfoLab's research.
I
n 2012, Russians experienced echoes of Cold War censorship and suspicion with the adoption of Russia’s foreign agent law, which was roundly criticized by the world of independent reporting. The law defined any Russian organizations as “foreign agents” if they received any support from any foreign institution, requiring they include a “foreign agent” label on each of their publications while also making financial disclosures to the Ministry of Justice. The situation worsened in 2017, when the Russian government increased penalties for non–compliance and expanded the law to apply to bloggers, media organizations, and independent journalists. Controversy spiked as increased state scrutiny of media networks and journalists regarding “foreign influence” and divergence from state narratives threatened journalistic independence and objective reporting.
To examine the change in media output before and after the 2017 amendment, analysts from DisinfoLab, a student-led think tank at the College of William & Mary's Global Research Institute, collected headline titles from five media outlets, categorized the headlines by topic, and compared the findings. DisinfoLab found that while foreign agents’ coverage was mostly unaffected, non–foreign agents decreased their opposition related content while increasing their output of “filler” content. This behavior is referred to as “bread and circuses,” or the politics of superficial appeasement, and was likely used to distract the Russian population from their deference to government policies. As readers were captivated by the filler content in non-foreign agents’ publications, it was intended for them to miss non-foreign agents’ transition away from a critical government narrative toward a more appeasing one. Post–Soviet countries enacting foreign agent laws should expect a decrease in journalistic integrity, as organizations that avoided the initial foreign agent label take a “bread and circuses” approach to avoid foreign agent status.
Methodology
To analyze the changes in media output before and after the 2017 amendment, DisinfoLab examined three media outlets labeled as foreign agents: Radio Svoboda, the Russian version of U.S.--funded Radio Free Europe; Current Time TV, a Russian online newspaper founded by Radio Svoboda; and Voice of America, another U.S.--funded media outlet. Also included in this study were two independent Russian organizations not labeled as foreign agents: Gazeta.ru and Interfax. For each organization, we scraped the headlines of about 400 news articles from a year before the law went into effect and about 400 news articles from a year after the law went into effect. Using the sumgram Python tool, we then identified the most significant phrases in each group and classified them under the following topics: minorities, opposition, protests, foreign policy, foreign media and culture, terrorism, pro–Putin and Russian government, and other. Finally, we identified how frequently each categorical topic was reported on before and after the 2017 amendment and compared results.
Foreign Agents Seemingly Unaffected
The Russian foreign agent law was ineffective in silencing “foreign agents” already publishing controversial content. DisinfoLab analysts observed that the three organizations labeled as foreign agents remained consistent with some variation in their media coverage. Interestingly, the data show a slight increase in opposition related content and a slight decrease in foreign media and culture coverage.
These foreign agents likely swapped “filler content,” such as the birthdays of U.S. presidents captured in the foreign media/culture category, with more politically relevant material, such as opposition leader Alexei Navalny’s corruption allegations levelled against Russian politicians. All three organizations receive funding from the U.S. government, which explains their unwillingness to change their content to appease Russian authorities. The continued coverage of opposition politics may be interpreted as a U.S. effort to expand its influence in the region and reflect a “nothing to lose” sentiment among these journalists.
While these organizations appear to retain journalistic integrity, they may lose their audience’s trust. The foreign agent label is already intended to alienate and create a sentiment of distrust towards organizations publishing opposition related content. The increase in controversial reporting in addition to this label will likely amplify the Russian state’s intended effect.
Non–Foreign Agents Play It Safe
By contrast, “non-foreign agents” decreased their output of opposition–related content while significantly increasing coverage of foreign media and culture after the law was applied to media organizations. They also increased output of explicitly pro–Russia and pro–Putin content, publishing articles about Russian humanitarian aid and Putin’s new puppies.
These organizations may be trying to appear “worldly” by providing insight into pop culture to distract from their lack of politically relevant content. We interpret this response to the Russian foreign agent law as fearful and reactionary. Organizations not yet labeled as foreign agents agents seek to demonstrate their continued loyalty to Putin by adapting their content to suit state narratives and redirecting audience attention.
Foreign Agent Laws Are Spreading
Russian–style foreign agent laws are spreading, especially in formerly communist states. Some nations are not too surprising—Hungary and Serbia, both with complex relationships with the West and eroding democracies—but Russia’s influence extends farther than that. Bulgaria and Slovakia, each with membership in the EU and NATO, are considering their own versions of the foreign agent law. Georgia, despite border disputes with Russia, recently passed its own foreign agent law. Kyrgyzstan and Kazakhstan have also passed laws that mimic Russia’s. We expect to see a divide in domestic media in these countries, where the political commentary of “foreign agents” is less affected than that of organizations with an incentive to avoid the label.
Conclusion
Citizens in states with foreign agent laws should not be fooled by the media’s renewed focus on foreign culture and entertainment. While this “fluff” creates the illusion of journalistic freedom and independence, it may be a mere facade for self–censorship. As DisinfoLab observed, for organizations not yet labeled as foreign agents after the law, an increase in coverage over foreign media and culture coincided with a sharp decrease in opposition related content. Foreign audiences must be aware of this “bread and circuses” approach to properly evaluate the quality of independent media under foreign agent laws.
