In American politics, the “October surprise” is an unforeseen event that could change the outcome of the election. The idea goes back to the 1968 when Richard Nixon’s campaign helped sabotage President Lyndon Johnson’s negotiations to end the Vietnam War and consequently undermined President Johnson’s claim that he was ending the war. Since then, the October surprise has included the Iranian hostage crisis (1980) and Casper Weinberger’s implication in the Iran-Contra Affair (1992), but the 2000s have been especially packed with surprises like the release of a new video from Osama bin Laden, rumors of weapons stolen from caches in Iraq, and the 2008 financial crisis (technically in September but practically close enough to qualify). In fact, it is hard to determine if any of these surprises actually changed anything, especially in races that are not close, but they are still a useful reminder of the inherent unpredictability of the news cycle, even if some of the surprises were deliberate bombs thrown to sabotage a campaign. Since many of the October surprises have been foreign policy-related, it is worth speculating about what could be this year’s surprise.
The problem is not so much what could happen, but what hasn’t happened already? For an election that was supposed to be fought on economic issues and domestic concerns, there have been plenty of foreign policy issues that have gotten attention: persistent rumors of war against Iran; belligerent overtures between a possible rival and a close ally; a protracted civil war, and maybe even a proxy war, over a an area of huge geopolitical significance; allegations that the administration has abandoned a close ally; a still-unsolved economic crisis in Europe coupled with growing protests; violent anti-American protests in the Middle East; and an attack on an American consulate that killed an ambassador that may have been orchestrated by al Qaeda.
Some of these events could have been worse and some might still take a sharp turn for the worse—the fact that many of these have not so far (at least as far as the U.S. is concerned) is partly due to the administration’s understandable desire to keep these crises in a “holding pattern” to prevent a possible surprise. This tentativeness could be called “playing politics” with events, but the test to determine if that is accurate is to see if any of the administration’s policy choices would be different if this was not an election year.
It might be that the U.S. is preventing Israel from attacking Iran before the American election, but it is likely that the U.S. would not want an Israeli strike against Iran anyway regardless of the electoral calendar or regardless of what Israel wants to do unilaterally (or, cynically, rumors of a U.S.-Israel joint military action against Iran are filler for when it is a slow news cycle). The administration might be “meeting the Syrian massacre with silence” in the sense that it could take a more overt role to stop the fighting, but the U.S. is already involved in supporting the Syrian opposition with non-lethal assistance and vetting the different rebel groups for a post-Assad takeover. At this point, doing more (lethal assistance or direct intervention) could be ineffective or could get the U.S. stuck in a proxy war. There is also no agreement in the administration or in Congress about what to do with too many stakeholders divided on too many questions. None of those factors are affected by an election cycle; while there is a strong argument to be made for direct intervention, the arguments against are also compelling. With no unity in the government about how to proceed, the administration is taking the best course available given the circumstances.
The elephant in the room is the fallout from the Benghazi attack. Romney may have stepped back from public comment after his initial misfires, but Congressional Republicans have been aggressive in their inquiries into the State Department’s handling of the attack and the security situation in general. The State Department seems to be uneasy with the questions, with even Secretary Clinton appearing to back away from scrutiny; the administration’s larger response has been an awkward mix of finger-pointing, refusing media questions, and contradictory statements. The Republican inquiries have obvious political motivations and the State Department is setting up an independent panel to investigate the attack, but the administration has not made its case any easier. While the investigations might have a negative impact on the State Department’s image and for Secretary Clinton’s legacy in the long run, unless some radical, game-changing findings are unearthed soon, this will not qualify as an October surprise--even if Romney tries to compare it to September 11th.
A lot can change in an election with Gallup’s polling switching its audience from “eligible” to “likely” voters and one Presidential debate left to be held. Obviously this does not consider the possibility of unforeseen events which are, naturally, unforeseeable. Even then, it seems that the candidates will shape their own future more than foreign policy events will.
U.S. Navy photo by Mass Communication Specialist Seaman Declan Barnes/Released (cc).
a global affairs media network
Will the "October Surprise" be an International Issue?
October 19, 2012
In American politics, the “October surprise” is an unforeseen event that could change the outcome of the election. The idea goes back to the 1968 when Richard Nixon’s campaign helped sabotage President Lyndon Johnson’s negotiations to end the Vietnam War and consequently undermined President Johnson’s claim that he was ending the war. Since then, the October surprise has included the Iranian hostage crisis (1980) and Casper Weinberger’s implication in the Iran-Contra Affair (1992), but the 2000s have been especially packed with surprises like the release of a new video from Osama bin Laden, rumors of weapons stolen from caches in Iraq, and the 2008 financial crisis (technically in September but practically close enough to qualify). In fact, it is hard to determine if any of these surprises actually changed anything, especially in races that are not close, but they are still a useful reminder of the inherent unpredictability of the news cycle, even if some of the surprises were deliberate bombs thrown to sabotage a campaign. Since many of the October surprises have been foreign policy-related, it is worth speculating about what could be this year’s surprise.
The problem is not so much what could happen, but what hasn’t happened already? For an election that was supposed to be fought on economic issues and domestic concerns, there have been plenty of foreign policy issues that have gotten attention: persistent rumors of war against Iran; belligerent overtures between a possible rival and a close ally; a protracted civil war, and maybe even a proxy war, over a an area of huge geopolitical significance; allegations that the administration has abandoned a close ally; a still-unsolved economic crisis in Europe coupled with growing protests; violent anti-American protests in the Middle East; and an attack on an American consulate that killed an ambassador that may have been orchestrated by al Qaeda.
Some of these events could have been worse and some might still take a sharp turn for the worse—the fact that many of these have not so far (at least as far as the U.S. is concerned) is partly due to the administration’s understandable desire to keep these crises in a “holding pattern” to prevent a possible surprise. This tentativeness could be called “playing politics” with events, but the test to determine if that is accurate is to see if any of the administration’s policy choices would be different if this was not an election year.
It might be that the U.S. is preventing Israel from attacking Iran before the American election, but it is likely that the U.S. would not want an Israeli strike against Iran anyway regardless of the electoral calendar or regardless of what Israel wants to do unilaterally (or, cynically, rumors of a U.S.-Israel joint military action against Iran are filler for when it is a slow news cycle). The administration might be “meeting the Syrian massacre with silence” in the sense that it could take a more overt role to stop the fighting, but the U.S. is already involved in supporting the Syrian opposition with non-lethal assistance and vetting the different rebel groups for a post-Assad takeover. At this point, doing more (lethal assistance or direct intervention) could be ineffective or could get the U.S. stuck in a proxy war. There is also no agreement in the administration or in Congress about what to do with too many stakeholders divided on too many questions. None of those factors are affected by an election cycle; while there is a strong argument to be made for direct intervention, the arguments against are also compelling. With no unity in the government about how to proceed, the administration is taking the best course available given the circumstances.
The elephant in the room is the fallout from the Benghazi attack. Romney may have stepped back from public comment after his initial misfires, but Congressional Republicans have been aggressive in their inquiries into the State Department’s handling of the attack and the security situation in general. The State Department seems to be uneasy with the questions, with even Secretary Clinton appearing to back away from scrutiny; the administration’s larger response has been an awkward mix of finger-pointing, refusing media questions, and contradictory statements. The Republican inquiries have obvious political motivations and the State Department is setting up an independent panel to investigate the attack, but the administration has not made its case any easier. While the investigations might have a negative impact on the State Department’s image and for Secretary Clinton’s legacy in the long run, unless some radical, game-changing findings are unearthed soon, this will not qualify as an October surprise--even if Romney tries to compare it to September 11th.
A lot can change in an election with Gallup’s polling switching its audience from “eligible” to “likely” voters and one Presidential debate left to be held. Obviously this does not consider the possibility of unforeseen events which are, naturally, unforeseeable. Even then, it seems that the candidates will shape their own future more than foreign policy events will.
U.S. Navy photo by Mass Communication Specialist Seaman Declan Barnes/Released (cc).
