.
Looking back on Michael Gove’s February announcement in the Spectator that he would be backing Brexit, it reads like the opening salvo of what we know would turn out to be a brutal, even bloody, war that tore through the British body politic. What he wrote in the Spectator,  before the world turned upside down, is certainly worth remembering, if only because the victory that it helped secure for the Brexiters turned out to be such a poisoned chalice that it first felled Boris Johnson, then Michael Gove himself, and now turns to the lips of the British people as they face their post-Brexit future. Gove’s pretense in the article was to project himself as an elected representative of the British people who found his earnest efforts to do right by the people constantly thwarted by faceless Eurocrats and their arbitrary laws. The kind of cruel and unusual legislation that could only be dreamed up by the unaccountable, people who aren’t elected yet wield terrible power. In Gove’s own words, “...our membership of the European Union prevents us being able to change huge swathes of law and stops us being able to choose who makes critical decisions which affect all our lives.” One question that this statement should have raised, but remarkably never really featured in the referendum debate, is how did such “huge swathes” of European law, from which Gove and co. have set Britain free, come to be passed in the first place? Who signed off on them? Can the EU really be as opaque as Boris Johnson claims that Europe’s laws are imposed from on high by officials “whose names and functions we don’t know”? How did Jean Claude Juncker and his college of unelected commissioners come to command such power over us all? Well, Mr. Juncker became President of the European Commission...by election. After being put forward as a candidate by (elected) EU leaders he was elected president by a majority of the European parliament, who were themselves elected by popular vote. His team of commissioners was put forward by their respective governments and was also vetted by the European Parliament, who has the power to reject commissioners if they feel the candidate is unsuitable. The legislation that they create is rung through so many rounds of stakeholder input and democratic oversight, that if the EU is a spoiled broth it is not for lack of democratically elected chefs in the kitchen. First, the Commission tables a green paper. These are documents intended to foster discussion about given topics at a European level. Interested parties (bodies or individuals) are encouraged to participate and debate the proposals. If any clear proposals are agreed on during this consultation process they then form the basis of a White Paper and then to subsequent legislation. Following their approval within the Commission the nascent legislation must pass an assessment of its environmental, social and economic impacts, including on small and medium enterprises. Then of course there are the various rebates, exemptions, and not to mention, structural funds all designed to cushion any adverse effects on member states’ industries that a piece of EU legislation may cause. But unless both the democratically elected European Parliament and the Council of the EU (made up of ministers from national governments) sign off on the legislation, the act does not pass. The infamous ACTA treaty on counterfeited goods that sparked heated opposition everywhere in Europe and led to tens of thousands marching across 200 European cities in 2012, was laid to rest after the European Parliament voted against it, even if member states were in favor of it. Which brings us to another jarring claim from Gove’s article: the EU prevents governments from giving aid to struggling industries. This is indicative how tone deaf the Brexit campaign was that Michael Gove, whose government lobbied to prevent the EU from supporting British steel producers through higher tariffs on Chinese imports; Michael Gove, of the UK Conservative party - who are not exactly known for rushing to the aid of struggling domestic industries - would brazenly accuse the EU of being the ones siding with market forces at the expense of the British worker. And therein lies the rub, and a possible explanation for why Farage and Johnson chose to get out while the going was good: once Britain leaves the EU, it won’t have Brussels to kick around anymore. This has been a past-time engaged in by most member states: invoking the bogey man of the EU to explain why the government in question is unwilling or unable to act. That hypocrisy was on full display in late June, after the EC decided to extend the license on glyphosate, a popular herbicide, after member states (especially France) spoke out publically against the substance while encouraging the Commission to go ahead with its plans. The controversy stems from allegations put forth by IARC (the UN’s cancer research agency) that the pesticide could cause cancer – allegations that were rejected by both European and American regulatory bodies. The EU was essentially used as a scapegoat by national governments who want the legislation to pass, but don’t want to suffer the backlash. In this sense, the EU falls squarely into the category of problems that would have been created, if they didn't already exist. Which is not to say that it is not a problem worth having: freedom of movement, the ability to live, work, travel, and set up business anywhere in a market of 500 million people make the EU a problem worth having; the extension of the world’s most progressive labor and consumer rights throughout the continent make the EU a problem worth having; and the fifty year reign of peace it has brought to Europe make the EU a problem worth having. The question Britain must face now is will Brexit result in problems worth having or just problems.

About
Caroline Holmund
:
Caroline Holmund is a management consultant and freelance writer in European affairs, transatlantic relations, and governance issues.
The views presented in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily represent the views of any other organization.

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What will Britain do without the EU to kick around?

European union. Concept image.
August 4, 2016

Looking back on Michael Gove’s February announcement in the Spectator that he would be backing Brexit, it reads like the opening salvo of what we know would turn out to be a brutal, even bloody, war that tore through the British body politic. What he wrote in the Spectator,  before the world turned upside down, is certainly worth remembering, if only because the victory that it helped secure for the Brexiters turned out to be such a poisoned chalice that it first felled Boris Johnson, then Michael Gove himself, and now turns to the lips of the British people as they face their post-Brexit future. Gove’s pretense in the article was to project himself as an elected representative of the British people who found his earnest efforts to do right by the people constantly thwarted by faceless Eurocrats and their arbitrary laws. The kind of cruel and unusual legislation that could only be dreamed up by the unaccountable, people who aren’t elected yet wield terrible power. In Gove’s own words, “...our membership of the European Union prevents us being able to change huge swathes of law and stops us being able to choose who makes critical decisions which affect all our lives.” One question that this statement should have raised, but remarkably never really featured in the referendum debate, is how did such “huge swathes” of European law, from which Gove and co. have set Britain free, come to be passed in the first place? Who signed off on them? Can the EU really be as opaque as Boris Johnson claims that Europe’s laws are imposed from on high by officials “whose names and functions we don’t know”? How did Jean Claude Juncker and his college of unelected commissioners come to command such power over us all? Well, Mr. Juncker became President of the European Commission...by election. After being put forward as a candidate by (elected) EU leaders he was elected president by a majority of the European parliament, who were themselves elected by popular vote. His team of commissioners was put forward by their respective governments and was also vetted by the European Parliament, who has the power to reject commissioners if they feel the candidate is unsuitable. The legislation that they create is rung through so many rounds of stakeholder input and democratic oversight, that if the EU is a spoiled broth it is not for lack of democratically elected chefs in the kitchen. First, the Commission tables a green paper. These are documents intended to foster discussion about given topics at a European level. Interested parties (bodies or individuals) are encouraged to participate and debate the proposals. If any clear proposals are agreed on during this consultation process they then form the basis of a White Paper and then to subsequent legislation. Following their approval within the Commission the nascent legislation must pass an assessment of its environmental, social and economic impacts, including on small and medium enterprises. Then of course there are the various rebates, exemptions, and not to mention, structural funds all designed to cushion any adverse effects on member states’ industries that a piece of EU legislation may cause. But unless both the democratically elected European Parliament and the Council of the EU (made up of ministers from national governments) sign off on the legislation, the act does not pass. The infamous ACTA treaty on counterfeited goods that sparked heated opposition everywhere in Europe and led to tens of thousands marching across 200 European cities in 2012, was laid to rest after the European Parliament voted against it, even if member states were in favor of it. Which brings us to another jarring claim from Gove’s article: the EU prevents governments from giving aid to struggling industries. This is indicative how tone deaf the Brexit campaign was that Michael Gove, whose government lobbied to prevent the EU from supporting British steel producers through higher tariffs on Chinese imports; Michael Gove, of the UK Conservative party - who are not exactly known for rushing to the aid of struggling domestic industries - would brazenly accuse the EU of being the ones siding with market forces at the expense of the British worker. And therein lies the rub, and a possible explanation for why Farage and Johnson chose to get out while the going was good: once Britain leaves the EU, it won’t have Brussels to kick around anymore. This has been a past-time engaged in by most member states: invoking the bogey man of the EU to explain why the government in question is unwilling or unable to act. That hypocrisy was on full display in late June, after the EC decided to extend the license on glyphosate, a popular herbicide, after member states (especially France) spoke out publically against the substance while encouraging the Commission to go ahead with its plans. The controversy stems from allegations put forth by IARC (the UN’s cancer research agency) that the pesticide could cause cancer – allegations that were rejected by both European and American regulatory bodies. The EU was essentially used as a scapegoat by national governments who want the legislation to pass, but don’t want to suffer the backlash. In this sense, the EU falls squarely into the category of problems that would have been created, if they didn't already exist. Which is not to say that it is not a problem worth having: freedom of movement, the ability to live, work, travel, and set up business anywhere in a market of 500 million people make the EU a problem worth having; the extension of the world’s most progressive labor and consumer rights throughout the continent make the EU a problem worth having; and the fifty year reign of peace it has brought to Europe make the EU a problem worth having. The question Britain must face now is will Brexit result in problems worth having or just problems.

About
Caroline Holmund
:
Caroline Holmund is a management consultant and freelance writer in European affairs, transatlantic relations, and governance issues.
The views presented in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily represent the views of any other organization.