hree years after the United States withdrew from Afghanistan, no country has officially recognized the Taliban as the legitimate government of the “Graveyard of Empires.” Although the group is still perceived as a terrorist organization by many nations, some former Soviet republics, as well as Russia and China, are seeking to normalize relations with the Afghan de facto rulers.
On 1 December 2023, China accepted the credentials of the Taliban ambassador to Beijing, a move that Chinese authorities portrayed as an “important chapter in growing ties between the two neighboring countries.” In reality, Beijing’s decision could be interpreted as the People’s Republic’s implicit recognition of the Taliban.
China’s engagement with the Taliban is based on both security and economic interests. It is not a secret that Beijing wants to prevent an entrenchment of the Eastern Turkistan Islamic Movement (ETIM)—an al–Qaeda–affiliated armed group that reportedly has bases in Afghanistan, and that seeks to create “East Turkistan” in Chinese territory. At the same time, the People’s Republic reportedly plans to expand its economic presence in Afghanistan, which explains its relatively warm relations with the Taliban.
China’s northeastern neighbor Kazakhstan also sees the Taliban–ruled Afghanistan as a potential economic partner. For Astana, Afghanistan is an important transit country, and it could eventually become a significant export destination. In 2022 the trade turnover between the former Soviet republic and Afghanistan reached almost $1 billion. Kazakh authorities plan to increase bilateral trade volume to $3 billion in the following years. The two sides recently struck $200 million in commercial deals, mainly commitments by Kazakhstan to supply Afghanistan with even more of the essential food. Presently, Kabul buys about 60% of all imported flour from Kazakh producers, which clearly indicates Astana has ambitious business interests in Afghanistan.
Following earthquakes that hit the troubled nation in early October 2023, Astana delivered over 1,600 tons of humanitarian aid to Afghanistan’s Herat province, a move that can be interpreted as the Central Asian nation’s attempt to develop “soft power” in the Taliban–ruled country. It is, therefore, not surprising that the Kazakh authorities, on 29 December 2023, decided to remove the Taliban from its registry of terrorist organizations. Astana undoubtedly aims to increase its presence in Afghanistan, and good political ties with the Afghan rulers could help the former Soviet republic achieve some of its goals in the strategically important region.
Quite aware of Afghanistan’s importance in the global arena, Azerbaijan—Kazakhstan’s fellow Turkic and Caspian Sea neighbor—also seems interested in normalization of relations with Afghanistan’s de facto authorities. That is why the energy–rich South Caucasus nation, on 29 December 2023, announced the opening of its embassy in Kabul. Baku will likely seek to strengthen economic ties with Afghanistan, be it in the form of bilateral trade or through the Lapis Lazuli corridor, connecting the two nations via Turkmenistan—another former Soviet republic that sees the Taliban–dominated Afghan government as a potential partner.
On 27 May 2023, the Taliban–led Ministry of Commerce and Industry of Afghanistan appointed a commercial attaché at the Afghan Embassy in Ashgabat, which suggests that the two neighbors—despite disputes over the Qosh Tepa canal—will continue developing economic cooperation, namely in the field of energy. Turkmenistan has already begun exporting its natural gas to Pakistan through Afghanistan, and one of Ashgabat’s priorities seems to be the realization of the TAPI pipeline, which connects Turkmenistan, Afghanistan, Pakistan, and India, with Afghanistan serving as a transit route.
In other words, besides China, Central Asian nations also see the economy (and to a certain extent, security) as a major driver of their policy vis–à–vis Taliban–ruled Afghanistan. The only exception is Tajikistan, Russia’s ally in the Collective Security Treaty Organization, that remains the strongest critic of the Taliban in Central Asia. The landlocked former Soviet republic continues building security checkpoints on its border with Afghanistan, because for Dushanbe the Taliban–ruled country is a threat to Tajik national security. At the same time, Russia frequently hosts Taliban delegations in Moscow, aiming not only to swell oil supplies to Afghanistan, but also to strengthen its positions in the region.
But in spite of that, the Kremlin still sees the Taliban as a terrorist group, which means that Russian officials, from the legal perspective, hold talks with terrorists. Given that, to this day, Russia still has not removed the Taliban from its list of terrorist organizations, it is improbable that Moscow will diplomatically recognize Afghanistan’s Taliban government, unless the radical group makes a “goodwill gesture” and recognize Russian annexation of Crimea, as well as four other Ukrainian regions—Zaporizhzhia, Kherson, Luhansk, and Donetsk.
Meanwhile, Moscow’s nominal allies in Central Asia will almost certainly continue developing economic relations with Afghanistan, although they are unlikely to implicitly recognize the Taliban before Russia and China do so. But the de facto recognition of the Afghan group has already taken place, and the Taliban seems to have become an unavoidable regional actor.
a global affairs media network
Who will be the first to recognize the Taliban?
January 22, 2024
While the Taliban has been in control of Afghanistan for three years, no government has yet recognized the Taliban as the legitimate government of Afghanistan. That could be poised to change as many former Soviet republics seek to normalize relations with the Taliban, writes Nikola Mikovic.
T
hree years after the United States withdrew from Afghanistan, no country has officially recognized the Taliban as the legitimate government of the “Graveyard of Empires.” Although the group is still perceived as a terrorist organization by many nations, some former Soviet republics, as well as Russia and China, are seeking to normalize relations with the Afghan de facto rulers.
On 1 December 2023, China accepted the credentials of the Taliban ambassador to Beijing, a move that Chinese authorities portrayed as an “important chapter in growing ties between the two neighboring countries.” In reality, Beijing’s decision could be interpreted as the People’s Republic’s implicit recognition of the Taliban.
China’s engagement with the Taliban is based on both security and economic interests. It is not a secret that Beijing wants to prevent an entrenchment of the Eastern Turkistan Islamic Movement (ETIM)—an al–Qaeda–affiliated armed group that reportedly has bases in Afghanistan, and that seeks to create “East Turkistan” in Chinese territory. At the same time, the People’s Republic reportedly plans to expand its economic presence in Afghanistan, which explains its relatively warm relations with the Taliban.
China’s northeastern neighbor Kazakhstan also sees the Taliban–ruled Afghanistan as a potential economic partner. For Astana, Afghanistan is an important transit country, and it could eventually become a significant export destination. In 2022 the trade turnover between the former Soviet republic and Afghanistan reached almost $1 billion. Kazakh authorities plan to increase bilateral trade volume to $3 billion in the following years. The two sides recently struck $200 million in commercial deals, mainly commitments by Kazakhstan to supply Afghanistan with even more of the essential food. Presently, Kabul buys about 60% of all imported flour from Kazakh producers, which clearly indicates Astana has ambitious business interests in Afghanistan.
Following earthquakes that hit the troubled nation in early October 2023, Astana delivered over 1,600 tons of humanitarian aid to Afghanistan’s Herat province, a move that can be interpreted as the Central Asian nation’s attempt to develop “soft power” in the Taliban–ruled country. It is, therefore, not surprising that the Kazakh authorities, on 29 December 2023, decided to remove the Taliban from its registry of terrorist organizations. Astana undoubtedly aims to increase its presence in Afghanistan, and good political ties with the Afghan rulers could help the former Soviet republic achieve some of its goals in the strategically important region.
Quite aware of Afghanistan’s importance in the global arena, Azerbaijan—Kazakhstan’s fellow Turkic and Caspian Sea neighbor—also seems interested in normalization of relations with Afghanistan’s de facto authorities. That is why the energy–rich South Caucasus nation, on 29 December 2023, announced the opening of its embassy in Kabul. Baku will likely seek to strengthen economic ties with Afghanistan, be it in the form of bilateral trade or through the Lapis Lazuli corridor, connecting the two nations via Turkmenistan—another former Soviet republic that sees the Taliban–dominated Afghan government as a potential partner.
On 27 May 2023, the Taliban–led Ministry of Commerce and Industry of Afghanistan appointed a commercial attaché at the Afghan Embassy in Ashgabat, which suggests that the two neighbors—despite disputes over the Qosh Tepa canal—will continue developing economic cooperation, namely in the field of energy. Turkmenistan has already begun exporting its natural gas to Pakistan through Afghanistan, and one of Ashgabat’s priorities seems to be the realization of the TAPI pipeline, which connects Turkmenistan, Afghanistan, Pakistan, and India, with Afghanistan serving as a transit route.
In other words, besides China, Central Asian nations also see the economy (and to a certain extent, security) as a major driver of their policy vis–à–vis Taliban–ruled Afghanistan. The only exception is Tajikistan, Russia’s ally in the Collective Security Treaty Organization, that remains the strongest critic of the Taliban in Central Asia. The landlocked former Soviet republic continues building security checkpoints on its border with Afghanistan, because for Dushanbe the Taliban–ruled country is a threat to Tajik national security. At the same time, Russia frequently hosts Taliban delegations in Moscow, aiming not only to swell oil supplies to Afghanistan, but also to strengthen its positions in the region.
But in spite of that, the Kremlin still sees the Taliban as a terrorist group, which means that Russian officials, from the legal perspective, hold talks with terrorists. Given that, to this day, Russia still has not removed the Taliban from its list of terrorist organizations, it is improbable that Moscow will diplomatically recognize Afghanistan’s Taliban government, unless the radical group makes a “goodwill gesture” and recognize Russian annexation of Crimea, as well as four other Ukrainian regions—Zaporizhzhia, Kherson, Luhansk, and Donetsk.
Meanwhile, Moscow’s nominal allies in Central Asia will almost certainly continue developing economic relations with Afghanistan, although they are unlikely to implicitly recognize the Taliban before Russia and China do so. But the de facto recognition of the Afghan group has already taken place, and the Taliban seems to have become an unavoidable regional actor.
