In the wake of the first BRICS Summit featuring nine members in Kazan, Russia, it is clear that BRICS have arrived as an economic and political force with increasing global influence. But what does BRICS want to accomplish with this new influence, and what is its identity? Is it a voice for emerging economies within the global economy largely defined by the G7? Is it a mechanism for making the G20 the dominant player in the reform of global finance and security? Or is it an independent group of nations seeking to define an alternative finance system not beholden to the economic architecture of the West? As the alliance gains prominence and apparent momentum, these questions are more important than ever, but the answers remain unclear, despite increased attention on this BRICS Summit.
There is little doubt that emerging markets should have more global influence. The collective GDP of the G7 nations has declined from above 60% of global GDP in 1970—to less than 30% today. BRICS nations now represent 30% of global GDP and 45% of the global population.
In 2024, the BRICS alliance moved beyond its core members—Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa—to include Egypt, Ethiopia, Iran, and the United Arab Emirates, giving it greater geographic, political, and economic reach. But BRICS expansion is not without its problems, as Iran is a considered a rouge state by many and Ethiopia’s internal conflict continues to undermine its progress. And unlike the G7, the political orientations underlying the BRICS have become even more conflicting, as India and Brazil are democracies with strong ties to the West, with India, in particular, concerned about China and its ambitions.
BRICS continues to advocate for a multipolar world less dominated by the West and more supportive of the emerging economies and the Global South, yet China represents 70% of BRICS economic output and the alliance’s new members are often driven by China, while Russia seems to promote its former Soviet–era partnerships, making India and Brazil nervous. Another complicating factor is that many of the countries BRICS seeks to advocate for are firmly aligned with the West—for instance Argentina, which is a G20 member, declined an offer to join BRICS, with its foreign minister saying, “We don’t want to be burdened with whatever politics anybody else has.” Whether BRICS aims to offer a reform of the current global financial system or an alternative to it, these facts make such prospects more difficult and its future more unclear, especially if there is a lack of consensus and direction within BRICS about its role in the world.
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Building a BRICS foundation to what end?
Kazan, Russia. Photo by Maksim Orlianskii via Pexels.
October 29, 2024
In the wake of the BRICS Summit, writes Jonathan Gregory, it is fair to ask: What does the BRICS alliance seek to accomplish and what is its identity?
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In the wake of the first BRICS Summit featuring nine members in Kazan, Russia, it is clear that BRICS have arrived as an economic and political force with increasing global influence. But what does BRICS want to accomplish with this new influence, and what is its identity? Is it a voice for emerging economies within the global economy largely defined by the G7? Is it a mechanism for making the G20 the dominant player in the reform of global finance and security? Or is it an independent group of nations seeking to define an alternative finance system not beholden to the economic architecture of the West? As the alliance gains prominence and apparent momentum, these questions are more important than ever, but the answers remain unclear, despite increased attention on this BRICS Summit.
There is little doubt that emerging markets should have more global influence. The collective GDP of the G7 nations has declined from above 60% of global GDP in 1970—to less than 30% today. BRICS nations now represent 30% of global GDP and 45% of the global population.
In 2024, the BRICS alliance moved beyond its core members—Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa—to include Egypt, Ethiopia, Iran, and the United Arab Emirates, giving it greater geographic, political, and economic reach. But BRICS expansion is not without its problems, as Iran is a considered a rouge state by many and Ethiopia’s internal conflict continues to undermine its progress. And unlike the G7, the political orientations underlying the BRICS have become even more conflicting, as India and Brazil are democracies with strong ties to the West, with India, in particular, concerned about China and its ambitions.
BRICS continues to advocate for a multipolar world less dominated by the West and more supportive of the emerging economies and the Global South, yet China represents 70% of BRICS economic output and the alliance’s new members are often driven by China, while Russia seems to promote its former Soviet–era partnerships, making India and Brazil nervous. Another complicating factor is that many of the countries BRICS seeks to advocate for are firmly aligned with the West—for instance Argentina, which is a G20 member, declined an offer to join BRICS, with its foreign minister saying, “We don’t want to be burdened with whatever politics anybody else has.” Whether BRICS aims to offer a reform of the current global financial system or an alternative to it, these facts make such prospects more difficult and its future more unclear, especially if there is a lack of consensus and direction within BRICS about its role in the world.
