hat if Ukraine loses?
It is a rather uncomfortable question to ask or to consider. Leaders in North America and Europe have been nearly unanimous and unequivocal in their insistence that Ukraine must and will win. Yet they stop short of articulating what that means in practice and how Kyiv—with allied support—will get there. The strategic end is articulated, but the strategic ways and means are left unaddressed.
In the U.S., this strategic and logical vacuum has led to questions about Ukraine’s importance to America’s national interest. This is a break from Europe, where support for Ukraine is far more unified across political lines—aside from the fringes. Within the United States, some argue that money spent there is not available for the Indo–Pacific and a possible future conflict with China, a position that contains some strategic sense. Those on the more extreme end of the spectrum simply don’t believe that Ukraine’s survival matters to the U.S. and that it is a quintessentially “European” problem.
The truth is that a Ukrainian loss is as consequential to global geopolitical stability as is a victory for Kyiv. If Ukraine loses, the global strategic landscape will become far more unstable and insecure. Existing challenges will become far more difficult to manage, let alone solve, and new tensions will almost certainly emerge. If policymakers think handling present crises is challenging, a world in which Ukraine loses will be much, much worse.
Reading the warning signs
A Ukrainian loss would not come like a bolt from the blue. The warning signs are already present, and the risks regularly observed. Kyiv’s recent withdrawal from Avdiivka came about due in part to shortages of weapons and ammunition. Ukrainian munitions needs have received Western verbal commitments to increase production, but have—thus far—failed to meet battlefield requirements, While the preponderance of industrial power lies with Ukraine’s Western backers, that industrial power remains slow to generate. Kyiv will only lose if it does not receive enough arms or ammunition, or if its manpower reserves prove insufficient for force generation. The West can do something about the first; it can do little about the second.
The world is already witnessing the potential consequences of a Ukrainian loss. On the heels of Ukraine’s withdrawal from Avdiivka, Russian president Vladimir Putin said that it will press its successes. With the prospect of a return of Donald Trump to the Oval Office—and his antipathy toward Ukraine—European countries are actively considering what European security would look like in a post–America world. If America’s security umbrella is no longer inviolable, there are only two options—increased defense expenditures and significant remilitarization or seeking accommodation with a victorious Russia.
Implications of a Ukrainian loss
The former is as (fiscally) unsustainable over the long term as the latter is unthinkable in the near term. These difficult choices would almost certainly fragment European unity. Faced with a victorious Russia, some would likely pursue a pro–Russian alignment, others a Russia–friendly business stance, and still others would likely “hold the line” against Russia—greater instability will ensue.
In recent weeks, European leaders have made numerous public statements about Russia’s threat to NATO and European security. Germany's Defense Minister Boris Pistorius warned that Moscow could attack the defensive alliance within a decade. Other European defense officials have issued similar calls suggesting that NATO faced “the most dangerous world in decades.” This view of the future trajectory of European security is telling. Would Russia seek to challenge NATO? There are a variety of reasons to think Moscow would not, but the perception of a Russian challenge matters. Such a perception could swiftly become the central organizing principle in a post-Ukraine world.
A Ukrainian defeat that results from the withdrawal of American support would have cascading effects beyond Europe. Questions about America’s reliability in Europe would inevitably spill over into the Indo–Pacific. Washington’s allies would find themselves confronted with new and uncomfortable dynamics—should they pursue autonomous and independent defense and security policies without America? Should Washington’s allies seek greater accommodation with Beijing? A new arms race in the region would result in less security, not more. Tilting toward China would see the region fall further into Beijing’s hegemony, potentially raising the risks to global stability. Washington’s ostensible regional leadership will ring increasingly hollow, should Ukraine lose.
Put plainly, friends and adversaries alike will see a direct line that extends from Kabul to Kyiv—and wonder if Taipei, Seoul, or Warsaw could be next.
Focusing solely on the consequences at a macro–level misses the dire consequences for Ukraine and the Ukrainian people. Without question, Ukraine will not go quietly into the night. Even if American support ends and European assistance struggles, the will of the Ukrainian people seems likely to endure. But a catastrophic loss for Kyiv would see the country’s orientation toward the West end. Its people subjugated under Putin’s increasingly authoritarian regime. Its economy would be strangled. Its future would be irrevocably torn from its own agency and destiny. Instead of becoming a member of the European community of nations, it would likely become a second Belarus. Russia’s crimes against Ukraine at Bucha and beyond would remain unpunished.
The geostrategic consequences of Ukraine losing are significant, but perhaps too remote for the average American voter. The temptation to retreat behind one’s oceanic and land borders is real and alluring—it is also ultimately false. Problems ”over there” never remain so. Increased geopolitical instability means greater economic instability. Greater fragmentation means greater prospects for conflict and reduced ability to manage crises. Worse, a Ukrainian loss would send a signal to bad actors everywhere the consequences for acting are low; one merely needs to wait out American and European resolve.
Perhaps more damning is that the moral stain of a Ukrainian loss will not be so easily wiped away or forgotten. Commitments made and left unfulfilled will forever tarnish the credibility of the Western–led, liberal international order. That abstract concept has real and dire consequences. Russia and China—among others—will seize upon this as an opportunity to undermine any response from America or the broader West: “see” they will say, “you can’t rely on the promises from Washington”.
A world in which Ukraine wins does not automatically mean the problems of today and tomorrow will be easier to manage. A world in which Ukraine loses does, however, mean a far more dangerous world. That’s a world we cannot simply afford.
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What if Ukraine Loses?
February 24, 2024
It’s uncomfortable for many to even contemplate, but what if Ukraine loses? Europe would face some tough decisions, the Indo–Pacific would likely become a new flash point, and U.S. leadership would be further undermined—but the consequences wouldn’t end there, writes Joshua Huminski.
W
hat if Ukraine loses?
It is a rather uncomfortable question to ask or to consider. Leaders in North America and Europe have been nearly unanimous and unequivocal in their insistence that Ukraine must and will win. Yet they stop short of articulating what that means in practice and how Kyiv—with allied support—will get there. The strategic end is articulated, but the strategic ways and means are left unaddressed.
In the U.S., this strategic and logical vacuum has led to questions about Ukraine’s importance to America’s national interest. This is a break from Europe, where support for Ukraine is far more unified across political lines—aside from the fringes. Within the United States, some argue that money spent there is not available for the Indo–Pacific and a possible future conflict with China, a position that contains some strategic sense. Those on the more extreme end of the spectrum simply don’t believe that Ukraine’s survival matters to the U.S. and that it is a quintessentially “European” problem.
The truth is that a Ukrainian loss is as consequential to global geopolitical stability as is a victory for Kyiv. If Ukraine loses, the global strategic landscape will become far more unstable and insecure. Existing challenges will become far more difficult to manage, let alone solve, and new tensions will almost certainly emerge. If policymakers think handling present crises is challenging, a world in which Ukraine loses will be much, much worse.
Reading the warning signs
A Ukrainian loss would not come like a bolt from the blue. The warning signs are already present, and the risks regularly observed. Kyiv’s recent withdrawal from Avdiivka came about due in part to shortages of weapons and ammunition. Ukrainian munitions needs have received Western verbal commitments to increase production, but have—thus far—failed to meet battlefield requirements, While the preponderance of industrial power lies with Ukraine’s Western backers, that industrial power remains slow to generate. Kyiv will only lose if it does not receive enough arms or ammunition, or if its manpower reserves prove insufficient for force generation. The West can do something about the first; it can do little about the second.
The world is already witnessing the potential consequences of a Ukrainian loss. On the heels of Ukraine’s withdrawal from Avdiivka, Russian president Vladimir Putin said that it will press its successes. With the prospect of a return of Donald Trump to the Oval Office—and his antipathy toward Ukraine—European countries are actively considering what European security would look like in a post–America world. If America’s security umbrella is no longer inviolable, there are only two options—increased defense expenditures and significant remilitarization or seeking accommodation with a victorious Russia.
Implications of a Ukrainian loss
The former is as (fiscally) unsustainable over the long term as the latter is unthinkable in the near term. These difficult choices would almost certainly fragment European unity. Faced with a victorious Russia, some would likely pursue a pro–Russian alignment, others a Russia–friendly business stance, and still others would likely “hold the line” against Russia—greater instability will ensue.
In recent weeks, European leaders have made numerous public statements about Russia’s threat to NATO and European security. Germany's Defense Minister Boris Pistorius warned that Moscow could attack the defensive alliance within a decade. Other European defense officials have issued similar calls suggesting that NATO faced “the most dangerous world in decades.” This view of the future trajectory of European security is telling. Would Russia seek to challenge NATO? There are a variety of reasons to think Moscow would not, but the perception of a Russian challenge matters. Such a perception could swiftly become the central organizing principle in a post-Ukraine world.
A Ukrainian defeat that results from the withdrawal of American support would have cascading effects beyond Europe. Questions about America’s reliability in Europe would inevitably spill over into the Indo–Pacific. Washington’s allies would find themselves confronted with new and uncomfortable dynamics—should they pursue autonomous and independent defense and security policies without America? Should Washington’s allies seek greater accommodation with Beijing? A new arms race in the region would result in less security, not more. Tilting toward China would see the region fall further into Beijing’s hegemony, potentially raising the risks to global stability. Washington’s ostensible regional leadership will ring increasingly hollow, should Ukraine lose.
Put plainly, friends and adversaries alike will see a direct line that extends from Kabul to Kyiv—and wonder if Taipei, Seoul, or Warsaw could be next.
Focusing solely on the consequences at a macro–level misses the dire consequences for Ukraine and the Ukrainian people. Without question, Ukraine will not go quietly into the night. Even if American support ends and European assistance struggles, the will of the Ukrainian people seems likely to endure. But a catastrophic loss for Kyiv would see the country’s orientation toward the West end. Its people subjugated under Putin’s increasingly authoritarian regime. Its economy would be strangled. Its future would be irrevocably torn from its own agency and destiny. Instead of becoming a member of the European community of nations, it would likely become a second Belarus. Russia’s crimes against Ukraine at Bucha and beyond would remain unpunished.
The geostrategic consequences of Ukraine losing are significant, but perhaps too remote for the average American voter. The temptation to retreat behind one’s oceanic and land borders is real and alluring—it is also ultimately false. Problems ”over there” never remain so. Increased geopolitical instability means greater economic instability. Greater fragmentation means greater prospects for conflict and reduced ability to manage crises. Worse, a Ukrainian loss would send a signal to bad actors everywhere the consequences for acting are low; one merely needs to wait out American and European resolve.
Perhaps more damning is that the moral stain of a Ukrainian loss will not be so easily wiped away or forgotten. Commitments made and left unfulfilled will forever tarnish the credibility of the Western–led, liberal international order. That abstract concept has real and dire consequences. Russia and China—among others—will seize upon this as an opportunity to undermine any response from America or the broader West: “see” they will say, “you can’t rely on the promises from Washington”.
A world in which Ukraine wins does not automatically mean the problems of today and tomorrow will be easier to manage. A world in which Ukraine loses does, however, mean a far more dangerous world. That’s a world we cannot simply afford.
