t’s not often that one is asked existential questions at a business lunch.
Yet, on sitting down with Keir Giles at a fashionable restaurant near St. James’ Park in London, he rather directly posed one: “Why do you exist?” I had traveled to meet the Chatham House–based Russia expert in support of research I had undertaken about Russia, Ukraine, and the future of European security. I had read his first book “Moscow Rules” and many of his policy papers, and eager as I was to discuss his expertise, I was unprepared for his pointed though surely well–meaning question.
His query was less about me, specifically (or so I hope) and more about the Center for the Study of the Presidency & Congress where I work. He was seeking to understand where the Center stood on the question of policy towards Russia.
Giles’ bluntness came with no malice but reflected his clarity of vision and indeed purpose, one that has suffused his writings for both NATO and the public. Giles is a firebrand voice of conscience on the threat that Russia poses to the West and the certainty with which it must be dealt a strategic defeat, and he must surely feel vindicated (disappointingly so) in the wake of the February 2022 expanded invasion of Ukraine.
“Who Will Defend Europe?”—Giles latest book—is a manifesto of sorts, a call to arms, and the final volume (at least thus far) in what could be referred to as the ‘Giles trilogy’ of increasingly forceful books on Russia. His book “Moscow Rules” was a detailed accounting of how Russia manipulates the West into accepting the Kremlin’s world views and actions. The second volume of this trilogy, “Russia’s War on Everybody,” detailed how Moscow’s hybrid warfare activities targeted not just governments, but individuals, telling the stories of the Kremlin’s victims well beyond hoodwinked politicians and legislators.
“Who Will Defend Europe?” continues Giles’ streak of lamentations and castigations, warning that the worst is yet to come, especially if the present course continues. It is a forcefully argued, often bitingly vehement attack on the state of European security policy in the wake of Russia’s expanded invasion of Ukraine. He spares no punches at political leadership on either side of the pond. Taking in turn the United Kingdom, the United States, and Europe, he finds that their deeds have not matched their words when it comes to national security and defense policy. It is less action and more foreign policy by press release.
The United Kingdom’s continued underinvestment in its military has left it unable to field the forces necessary to confront a revanchist Russia. While elements of London’s civil service have long recognized the threat from Moscow, not least of which was due to the Kremlin’s assassination of defected spies on British soil, its political, financial, and military arms have fallen short. The free flow of Russian money into London’s property market and the City’s financial institutions, an unwillingness to acknowledge political interference in recent elections, and a Treasury that has dictated how much threat the Ministry of Defence can afford, has left the British military with insufficient tools in the cupboard, and the country an insufficient sense of urgency.
Europe, long lulled by cheap Russian energy, the safety of America’s security umbrella, and a naïve belief that both were enough to ensure that continental war would never return, is nearly naked in the face of Kremlin bellicosity. Giles’ hellfire for Europe is not universally applicable, of course. He finds the traditional powers of Europe, those ‘West of Warsaw’ as he phrases it, having abdicated their leadership, while the Baltic States and Scandinavia—which have long warned about the threat—are stepping up, investing in their own defense, and preparing for the current and future predation from Moscow. Indeed, the two treaties advanced by Moscow ahead of its expanded invasion of Ukraine in 2022 were not about Ukraine per se, but about the removal of the Baltic States from Europe’s sphere of influence and neutering them as a security threat in Russia’s calculus.
For Giles, the threat from Russia is as urgent as ever, despite the battlefield degradation it is experiencing in Ukraine. President Vladimir Putin’s desire to show the hollowness of NATO remains. Giles sees the possibility of a Russian incursion into a NATO member–state, taking a small piece of territory and daring NATO to respond, as a highly likely course of action. If the defensive alliance fails to respond, the credibility of NATO and the Western states writ large would be fatally undermined.
The future threat from Russia is one that is somewhat difficult to square for the public. As of October 2024, Russia has suffered 615,000 casualties in Ukraine, including over 100,000 killed, and lost over 10,000 armored combat vehicles. Its conventional ground forces in Europe have been materially degraded, though certainly not defeated. The addition of Finland and Sweden to NATO is a strategic setback for Russia. Europe is, arguably, more focused on defense than at any point since the Cold War. Moscow has largely avoided overt challenges to NATO’s Article Five and the alliance’s collective defense. There are signs of potential horizontal escalation—sabotage, subversion, and continued political warfare campaigns—but the Kremlin’s actions against NATO and the United States thus far have not matched its rhetoric. One could argue that Europe and NATO are in their strongest and most secure position in a generation, the war notwithstanding.
How then can Moscow hope to take on a NATO–standard military? In Giles’ telling it is insufficient to look at Ukraine in isolation. Russia’s tactical and strategic air forces, its naval forces, and its strategic capabilities e.g. cyber, space, and nuclear, have largely escaped material impact from the war. It is recruiting some 25,000 to 30,000 troops per month—quantitatively significant, though qualitatively less so. Russia’s increasing militarization of its economy and groundbreaking on expanded munitions factories suggest it is planning not just for a longer war in Ukraine, but a longer conflict with Europe full–stop. As more of the Russian economy shifts towards defense production, it will become increasingly reliant on state spending or need export markets to sustain overall productivity, or risk economic stagnation and decline.
Putin (and Giles) are expecting that a distracted and politically debilitated America would be disinclined to respond to provocations in Europe. As this review goes to print, the United States is less than ten days away from the general election which could see either a second Trump administration or the presidency of Kamala Harris. The former has expressed his doubts about NATO and suggested that America would only defend those who pay their fair share—the minimum 2% of GDP on defense. Whether a hyperbolic negotiating position or a principled statement, it has raised concerns in Brussels and in Europe more broadly.
A Harris presidency may provide more policy constancy from the Biden Administration especially on Ukraine, but America will nonetheless seek to rebalance its strategic posture toward the Indo–Pacific, meaning Europe will need to be more responsible for its own security and defense. Ultimately, under a Trump presidency, Giles sees the credibility of America as a security partner ending; under Harris the strategic attention of America shifts decidedly and decisively to China, yielding a similar result differing only in degrees.
Giles is understandably, though lamentably, perhaps too dismissive of any alternative futures. There is no room for dialogue or communication, both of which are at the heart of the ongoing and evolving dynamic of strategic deterrence. If the course of European defense and security is changeable (and Giles believes it so), so too is Moscow’s behavior, with the application of pressure—pressure Giles has previously outlined. The policy will and creativity have been absent, but certainly not the necessary ideas.
The polemical equation Giles pens in “Who Will Defend Europe?” yields a clear result: Europe, collectively, needs to spend more on defense with more urgency to deter future Russian aggression, and strengthen societal resilience to manage Moscow’s interference and hybrid warfare activity. There is certainly room for interpretation of the variables of this equation, but the outcome remains the same—to avoid the risks of war, Europe must take its defense more seriously than it does and invest accordingly.
The collective West is not nearly as weak as it may see itself, but neither is Russia as intractable and powerful as the Kremlin may believe. Strategic dialogue is about shaping conditions for possible futures, ideally in one’s favor and to the adversary’s disadvantage. The West’s strategic creativity and understanding of Moscow’s pressure points, and willingness to leverage these strengths, is what has been missing, more than anything else.
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War, peace, and the future of European security
Fort Douaumont, an important French stronghold in the late 19th and early 20th centuries. Image by Loyloy Thal from Pixabay
October 26, 2024
Keir Giles’ latest book, “Who Will Defend Europe,” is both a manifesto and a call to arms, where he warns of what the repercussions will be if Europe and the U.S. continue to underestimate the long–term threat of Russia, writes Joshua Huminski.
I
t’s not often that one is asked existential questions at a business lunch.
Yet, on sitting down with Keir Giles at a fashionable restaurant near St. James’ Park in London, he rather directly posed one: “Why do you exist?” I had traveled to meet the Chatham House–based Russia expert in support of research I had undertaken about Russia, Ukraine, and the future of European security. I had read his first book “Moscow Rules” and many of his policy papers, and eager as I was to discuss his expertise, I was unprepared for his pointed though surely well–meaning question.
His query was less about me, specifically (or so I hope) and more about the Center for the Study of the Presidency & Congress where I work. He was seeking to understand where the Center stood on the question of policy towards Russia.
Giles’ bluntness came with no malice but reflected his clarity of vision and indeed purpose, one that has suffused his writings for both NATO and the public. Giles is a firebrand voice of conscience on the threat that Russia poses to the West and the certainty with which it must be dealt a strategic defeat, and he must surely feel vindicated (disappointingly so) in the wake of the February 2022 expanded invasion of Ukraine.
“Who Will Defend Europe?”—Giles latest book—is a manifesto of sorts, a call to arms, and the final volume (at least thus far) in what could be referred to as the ‘Giles trilogy’ of increasingly forceful books on Russia. His book “Moscow Rules” was a detailed accounting of how Russia manipulates the West into accepting the Kremlin’s world views and actions. The second volume of this trilogy, “Russia’s War on Everybody,” detailed how Moscow’s hybrid warfare activities targeted not just governments, but individuals, telling the stories of the Kremlin’s victims well beyond hoodwinked politicians and legislators.
“Who Will Defend Europe?” continues Giles’ streak of lamentations and castigations, warning that the worst is yet to come, especially if the present course continues. It is a forcefully argued, often bitingly vehement attack on the state of European security policy in the wake of Russia’s expanded invasion of Ukraine. He spares no punches at political leadership on either side of the pond. Taking in turn the United Kingdom, the United States, and Europe, he finds that their deeds have not matched their words when it comes to national security and defense policy. It is less action and more foreign policy by press release.
The United Kingdom’s continued underinvestment in its military has left it unable to field the forces necessary to confront a revanchist Russia. While elements of London’s civil service have long recognized the threat from Moscow, not least of which was due to the Kremlin’s assassination of defected spies on British soil, its political, financial, and military arms have fallen short. The free flow of Russian money into London’s property market and the City’s financial institutions, an unwillingness to acknowledge political interference in recent elections, and a Treasury that has dictated how much threat the Ministry of Defence can afford, has left the British military with insufficient tools in the cupboard, and the country an insufficient sense of urgency.
Europe, long lulled by cheap Russian energy, the safety of America’s security umbrella, and a naïve belief that both were enough to ensure that continental war would never return, is nearly naked in the face of Kremlin bellicosity. Giles’ hellfire for Europe is not universally applicable, of course. He finds the traditional powers of Europe, those ‘West of Warsaw’ as he phrases it, having abdicated their leadership, while the Baltic States and Scandinavia—which have long warned about the threat—are stepping up, investing in their own defense, and preparing for the current and future predation from Moscow. Indeed, the two treaties advanced by Moscow ahead of its expanded invasion of Ukraine in 2022 were not about Ukraine per se, but about the removal of the Baltic States from Europe’s sphere of influence and neutering them as a security threat in Russia’s calculus.
For Giles, the threat from Russia is as urgent as ever, despite the battlefield degradation it is experiencing in Ukraine. President Vladimir Putin’s desire to show the hollowness of NATO remains. Giles sees the possibility of a Russian incursion into a NATO member–state, taking a small piece of territory and daring NATO to respond, as a highly likely course of action. If the defensive alliance fails to respond, the credibility of NATO and the Western states writ large would be fatally undermined.
The future threat from Russia is one that is somewhat difficult to square for the public. As of October 2024, Russia has suffered 615,000 casualties in Ukraine, including over 100,000 killed, and lost over 10,000 armored combat vehicles. Its conventional ground forces in Europe have been materially degraded, though certainly not defeated. The addition of Finland and Sweden to NATO is a strategic setback for Russia. Europe is, arguably, more focused on defense than at any point since the Cold War. Moscow has largely avoided overt challenges to NATO’s Article Five and the alliance’s collective defense. There are signs of potential horizontal escalation—sabotage, subversion, and continued political warfare campaigns—but the Kremlin’s actions against NATO and the United States thus far have not matched its rhetoric. One could argue that Europe and NATO are in their strongest and most secure position in a generation, the war notwithstanding.
How then can Moscow hope to take on a NATO–standard military? In Giles’ telling it is insufficient to look at Ukraine in isolation. Russia’s tactical and strategic air forces, its naval forces, and its strategic capabilities e.g. cyber, space, and nuclear, have largely escaped material impact from the war. It is recruiting some 25,000 to 30,000 troops per month—quantitatively significant, though qualitatively less so. Russia’s increasing militarization of its economy and groundbreaking on expanded munitions factories suggest it is planning not just for a longer war in Ukraine, but a longer conflict with Europe full–stop. As more of the Russian economy shifts towards defense production, it will become increasingly reliant on state spending or need export markets to sustain overall productivity, or risk economic stagnation and decline.
Putin (and Giles) are expecting that a distracted and politically debilitated America would be disinclined to respond to provocations in Europe. As this review goes to print, the United States is less than ten days away from the general election which could see either a second Trump administration or the presidency of Kamala Harris. The former has expressed his doubts about NATO and suggested that America would only defend those who pay their fair share—the minimum 2% of GDP on defense. Whether a hyperbolic negotiating position or a principled statement, it has raised concerns in Brussels and in Europe more broadly.
A Harris presidency may provide more policy constancy from the Biden Administration especially on Ukraine, but America will nonetheless seek to rebalance its strategic posture toward the Indo–Pacific, meaning Europe will need to be more responsible for its own security and defense. Ultimately, under a Trump presidency, Giles sees the credibility of America as a security partner ending; under Harris the strategic attention of America shifts decidedly and decisively to China, yielding a similar result differing only in degrees.
Giles is understandably, though lamentably, perhaps too dismissive of any alternative futures. There is no room for dialogue or communication, both of which are at the heart of the ongoing and evolving dynamic of strategic deterrence. If the course of European defense and security is changeable (and Giles believes it so), so too is Moscow’s behavior, with the application of pressure—pressure Giles has previously outlined. The policy will and creativity have been absent, but certainly not the necessary ideas.
The polemical equation Giles pens in “Who Will Defend Europe?” yields a clear result: Europe, collectively, needs to spend more on defense with more urgency to deter future Russian aggression, and strengthen societal resilience to manage Moscow’s interference and hybrid warfare activity. There is certainly room for interpretation of the variables of this equation, but the outcome remains the same—to avoid the risks of war, Europe must take its defense more seriously than it does and invest accordingly.
The collective West is not nearly as weak as it may see itself, but neither is Russia as intractable and powerful as the Kremlin may believe. Strategic dialogue is about shaping conditions for possible futures, ideally in one’s favor and to the adversary’s disadvantage. The West’s strategic creativity and understanding of Moscow’s pressure points, and willingness to leverage these strengths, is what has been missing, more than anything else.
