zbekistan, a doubly landlocked Central Asian nation of around 35.5 million people, seems to have become one of the most desirable political and economic allies in the region. Global and regional powers, such as Russia, China, the European Union, and Kazakhstan, all seek to develop some form of partnership with Tashkent, while Uzbek authorities aim for greater economic openness and a balanced diplomacy.
Russian President Vladimir Putin has repeatedly stated the Kremlin sees Uzbekistan as a “a time–tested strategic ally of the Russian Federation.” Indeed, in September 2022 the two countries signed the Declaration on Comprehensive Strategic Partnership, and one year later Tashkent signaled it might join the Russian–led Eurasian Economic Union by 2026. However, on 9 February 2024, Russian Ambassador to Uzbekistan Oleg Malginov said “some external forces do not want Tashkent to move toward its EAEU accession.”
It is no secret that the European Union, Russia’s alleged geopolitical rival, aims to strengthen its presence in Central Asia—a region that has long been under Russian influence, but has received growing attention from other powers, as the Kremlin remains preoccupied with the war in Ukraine. Back in 2021, Uzbekistan joined the European Union’s Special System of Preferences for Sustainable Development and Good Governance (GSP+), which allowed Uzbek exporters to supply 6,200 types of goods to EU countries duty–free. Being rich in natural resources, and having a well–developed production base, Uzbekistan represents an ideal partner not only for the EU, but also for individual member states.
It is therefore not surprising that France aims to develop strategic ties with Uzbekistan, while the EU eyes Uzbek critical raw materials: copper, lithium, aluminum, titanium, platinum, graphite, nickel, cobalt, among others. In an attempt to achieve some of its strategic geopolitical goals, and strengthen economic and political ties not only with Uzbekistan, but also with other regional actors, over the past few years the EU representatives have held several meetings with leaders of Central Asian countries. But in April 2024, the first formal summit of the European Union and Central Asia will take place in Uzbekistan, which will likely further increase Tashkent’s importance in the global arena.
Moreover, this year the former Soviet republic plans to hold the Tashkent International Investment Forum, as well as the Uzbekistan Energy Forum—two events that can help the Central Asian nation develop closer economic and energy cooperation with various multinational corporations, and also with countries willing to invest in possibly the world’s fastest growing region. Neighboring Kazakhstan has been using the same pattern for years by hosting various global forums that allowed the energy–rich nation to position itself as an important bridge between East and West.
Now Kazakhstan, following Russian and French approaches, also aims to strengthen relations with Uzbekistan. In the coming weeks, Kazakh Prime Minister Olzhas Bektenov is expected to visit Tashkent, where he will meet with his Uzbek counterpart Abdulla Aripov to discuss the possibilities of increasing bilateral cooperation between the two countries.
Kazakhstan is one of Uzbekistan’s major trade partners. In 11 months of 2023, the trade turnover between the two former Soviet republics totaled $4.1 billion, which is slightly less than the mutual trade between Uzbekistan and the EU (consisting of 27 countries). Moreover, on 28 February 2024, the lower house of the Kazakhstan Parliament ratified the Treaty on Allied Relations with Uzbekistan, signed in Tashkent on 22 December 2022. The document specifically addresses food and environmental security issues, rational use of transboundary water resources, as well as the operation of water management facilities.
Water and energy seem to be the most pressing matters in Central Asia. Uzbekistan faces scarcity of water, and is trying to resolve the issue together with other regional nations who have the same problem. At the same time, Tashkent seeks to develop its renewable energy sector to help diversify the country’s gas supply policy. To reduce its dependence on gas–fired power plants, Uzbek authorities began building solar and wind farms, while in the mid–term the nation might completely stop exporting natural gas, and focus on developing other economic models instead.
Presently, Uzbekistan remains the second–largest natural gas producer in Central Asia, and one of China’s major gas suppliers, although over the past few years Tashkent was forced to begin importing energy from Russia. The fast–growing population is growing the demand for energy. In Uzbekistan between 2017 and 2023, the population grew by 3.6 million people, making it the most populous country in Central Asia. All that, as well as the country’s rapid economic growth—6% (more than in China and Russia)—resulted in Tashkent’s decision to significantly increase imports of Russian natural gas, although until recently Russia’s energy giant Gazprom was purchasing gas from Tashkent.
Now Uzbekistan plans to invest nearly $500 million in its pipeline system to accommodate extra volumes of Russian natural gas. Uzbek authorities hope the energy cooperation with Moscow can help Uzbekistan meet its growing consumption, and also allow it to continue fulfilling its energy obligations to neighboring China, while Beijing remains interested in an "all–weather" partnership with Tashkent.
Thus, in the coming years, Uzbekistan is expected to continue implementing its multi–vector foreign policy that, under the current circumstances, seems pivotal for the country’s economic development and stability.
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How Uzbekistan became the Central Asia ally everyone wants
A madrasa in Tashkent, Uzbekistan. Photo by AXP Photography on Unsplash.
March 13, 2024
Uzbekistan is in high demand these days, with the likes of Russia, China, and the EU all hoping to strengthen relations with Tashkent. For now, Uzbekistan will attempt to balance strengthened relations with all via a continuation of its multi–vector foreign policy, writes Nikola Mikovic.
U
zbekistan, a doubly landlocked Central Asian nation of around 35.5 million people, seems to have become one of the most desirable political and economic allies in the region. Global and regional powers, such as Russia, China, the European Union, and Kazakhstan, all seek to develop some form of partnership with Tashkent, while Uzbek authorities aim for greater economic openness and a balanced diplomacy.
Russian President Vladimir Putin has repeatedly stated the Kremlin sees Uzbekistan as a “a time–tested strategic ally of the Russian Federation.” Indeed, in September 2022 the two countries signed the Declaration on Comprehensive Strategic Partnership, and one year later Tashkent signaled it might join the Russian–led Eurasian Economic Union by 2026. However, on 9 February 2024, Russian Ambassador to Uzbekistan Oleg Malginov said “some external forces do not want Tashkent to move toward its EAEU accession.”
It is no secret that the European Union, Russia’s alleged geopolitical rival, aims to strengthen its presence in Central Asia—a region that has long been under Russian influence, but has received growing attention from other powers, as the Kremlin remains preoccupied with the war in Ukraine. Back in 2021, Uzbekistan joined the European Union’s Special System of Preferences for Sustainable Development and Good Governance (GSP+), which allowed Uzbek exporters to supply 6,200 types of goods to EU countries duty–free. Being rich in natural resources, and having a well–developed production base, Uzbekistan represents an ideal partner not only for the EU, but also for individual member states.
It is therefore not surprising that France aims to develop strategic ties with Uzbekistan, while the EU eyes Uzbek critical raw materials: copper, lithium, aluminum, titanium, platinum, graphite, nickel, cobalt, among others. In an attempt to achieve some of its strategic geopolitical goals, and strengthen economic and political ties not only with Uzbekistan, but also with other regional actors, over the past few years the EU representatives have held several meetings with leaders of Central Asian countries. But in April 2024, the first formal summit of the European Union and Central Asia will take place in Uzbekistan, which will likely further increase Tashkent’s importance in the global arena.
Moreover, this year the former Soviet republic plans to hold the Tashkent International Investment Forum, as well as the Uzbekistan Energy Forum—two events that can help the Central Asian nation develop closer economic and energy cooperation with various multinational corporations, and also with countries willing to invest in possibly the world’s fastest growing region. Neighboring Kazakhstan has been using the same pattern for years by hosting various global forums that allowed the energy–rich nation to position itself as an important bridge between East and West.
Now Kazakhstan, following Russian and French approaches, also aims to strengthen relations with Uzbekistan. In the coming weeks, Kazakh Prime Minister Olzhas Bektenov is expected to visit Tashkent, where he will meet with his Uzbek counterpart Abdulla Aripov to discuss the possibilities of increasing bilateral cooperation between the two countries.
Kazakhstan is one of Uzbekistan’s major trade partners. In 11 months of 2023, the trade turnover between the two former Soviet republics totaled $4.1 billion, which is slightly less than the mutual trade between Uzbekistan and the EU (consisting of 27 countries). Moreover, on 28 February 2024, the lower house of the Kazakhstan Parliament ratified the Treaty on Allied Relations with Uzbekistan, signed in Tashkent on 22 December 2022. The document specifically addresses food and environmental security issues, rational use of transboundary water resources, as well as the operation of water management facilities.
Water and energy seem to be the most pressing matters in Central Asia. Uzbekistan faces scarcity of water, and is trying to resolve the issue together with other regional nations who have the same problem. At the same time, Tashkent seeks to develop its renewable energy sector to help diversify the country’s gas supply policy. To reduce its dependence on gas–fired power plants, Uzbek authorities began building solar and wind farms, while in the mid–term the nation might completely stop exporting natural gas, and focus on developing other economic models instead.
Presently, Uzbekistan remains the second–largest natural gas producer in Central Asia, and one of China’s major gas suppliers, although over the past few years Tashkent was forced to begin importing energy from Russia. The fast–growing population is growing the demand for energy. In Uzbekistan between 2017 and 2023, the population grew by 3.6 million people, making it the most populous country in Central Asia. All that, as well as the country’s rapid economic growth—6% (more than in China and Russia)—resulted in Tashkent’s decision to significantly increase imports of Russian natural gas, although until recently Russia’s energy giant Gazprom was purchasing gas from Tashkent.
Now Uzbekistan plans to invest nearly $500 million in its pipeline system to accommodate extra volumes of Russian natural gas. Uzbek authorities hope the energy cooperation with Moscow can help Uzbekistan meet its growing consumption, and also allow it to continue fulfilling its energy obligations to neighboring China, while Beijing remains interested in an "all–weather" partnership with Tashkent.
Thus, in the coming years, Uzbekistan is expected to continue implementing its multi–vector foreign policy that, under the current circumstances, seems pivotal for the country’s economic development and stability.
