n most popular media China is presented as a monolithic actor. The Chinese Communist Party (CCP) itself is ideologically and doctrinally unified, marching in lockstep toward a future in which Beijing is the global prime mover with President Xi Jinping at its head. It certainly makes for easier framing and communication to an American audience. In practice, that overly simple framing rarely stays on cable news, but often embeds itself into policymakers’ and legislators’ understanding. That creates considerable room for misunderstanding and miscalculation, increasing the likelihood of policy conflicts. Add to that the complexity of Mandarin and layer on a healthy amount of Marxist-Leninist and Confucian ideology and tradition – it’s easy to see why understanding China is so challenging.
“The Avoidable War” by Kevin Rudd is one of the more interesting attempts at overcoming this oversimplified framing, instead unpacking complexity of both the CCP and bilateral China-U.S. relations. He articulates a model of “managed strategic competition” that is interesting but requires a high degree of trust (with verification) that arguably neither China’s nor America’s domestic politics—to say nothing of recent history—suggest will ever be feasible.
Rudd, who is a former Prime Minister of Australia, offers a unique perspective given his deep understanding of China (he speaks Mandarin and studied as a Sinologist with multiple postings in the country and its territories) and the U.S. He begins with a novel summary of U.S.-China relations, covering not just what happened but how it was viewed from Beijing—a key consideration that is often omitted in American perspectives of bilateral relations.
An interesting undercurrent that one finds in 20 century relations between Washington and Beijing is the West’s almost Marxist understanding of history. Policymakers and legislators in Washington (and the business community’s cheerleaders) believed that economic liberalization would lead to the creation of a growing middle class that, in turn, would demand greater political freedoms thereby forcing change from within China. An economically liberal China would become a more democratic China, joining the community of nations on the West’s terms. It’s an almost scientific view of history that one suspects Marx would have applauded in structure, if not its content.
Rudd makes clear that Beijing never had any intention of letting slip the reins of power. To be sure it was begrudgingly happy to open up economically to modernize the country and end the “century of humiliation”, but it never intended to import Jeffersonian democracy. This is a realization that many within D.C. have finally come to, but one that reflects Rudd’s underlying premise; the United States just doesn’t understand China.
Rudd presents one of the clearest frameworks for understanding “Xi Jinping Thought” and the president/general secretary’s worldview. Divided neatly into ten concentric circles, Rudd builds out Xi’s thoughts from his most pressing and immediate priority – ensuring that the CCP remains in power with him as the paramount leader – through to the tenth circle of changing the global rules-based order. Xi Jinping Thought now sits alongside Marx and Mao as the key foundational texts of the Chinese Communist Party. This is not to say that Xi Jinping Thought is ideologically rigid. Rudd explains, “Xi Jinping Thought has been designed to be politically elastic: to expand and contract to absorb new political and policy developments as they arise and, as a result, ideologically legitimize them”. Other books have explored Chinese policy and strategy, but few have attempted to distill Xi's central ideological framework with such simplicity and clarity.
Rudd goes beyond just providing this framework, presenting a much more nuanced picture of China’s president and the party’s general secretary. Xi, according to Rudd, is weakest when it comes to economics, being inherently suspicious of the market. He’s more comfortable on the international stage and orchestrating grand strategy. His anti-corruption campaigns were almost Maoist in their purges of political opponents, but couched in a criminal framework so as to mask his removal of potential threats. He’s moved to centralize control over more of the state’s apparatuses under the party and his personal control.
While Rudd believes Xi will be successful in extending his term in power, Xi is not without opposition from former presidents whose legacy he is undermining, PLA officers dismissed from office without pension, and the business community whose interests are encountering friction with party priorities. Xi may be unchallenged, but that could be, as Rudd writes, a function of the opposition not having any singular figure around whom it can rally. Moreover, if China faces an economic collapse, environmental catastrophe, or war, Xi’s fortunes could well change.
This exploration of the interparty dynamics (in advance of the next Party Congress) and Xi’s ideological framework are exceptionally interesting, and the reader is left wanting more as this is likely the one of the most nuanced and accessible explorations of the subjects.
Less compelling is Rudd’s concept of “managed strategic competition” as an alternative model for geo-strategic competition that would keep tensions from crossing the threshold of war. Anchored in three core principles: the development of a clear understanding of both country’s strategic redlines; channeling strategic rivalry into a competitive race short of war; and creating political space necessary to continue to engage in areas of strategic mutual and beneficial interest. For Rudd it is akin to the informal and formal aspects of the U.S.-Soviet framework that emerged in the wake of the Cuban Missile Crisis.
To Rudd’s credit it is an interesting concept. He details the benefits to both Beijing and Washington as well as its shortcomings. Under “managed strategic competition” there are verifiable elements to accompany the necessary (but fleeting) trust between Beijing and Washington.
The challenge in this framework is that it assumes too much in terms of the leadership of both China and America, and is too dismissive of the role of domestic politics in the United States. In the case of the former, it is difficult to establish parameters for competition when there is a power delta between the two parties, and one clearly believes it is ascendant. For example, Beijing has little incentive to engage in arms control agreements, such as the United States would like to secure along with Russia until it has achieved nuclear parity, something it is aggressively working toward. If the United States believes that China has regional hegemonic ambitions, it must prepare accordingly, as outlined by Elbridge Colby in his excellent “The Strategy of Denial”.
Moreover, Rudd is perhaps too optimistic about the potential for trust-building between China and the U.S. China has demonstrated an unwillingness to play with a straight bat, using all tools of national power to advance state industries and create an uneven economic playing field. Given the importance of a strong and prosperous economy for the survival of Xi and China’s social contract, it is unlikely that the Party would acquiesce to anything that would tie its hands. Washington certainly is not incentivized to trust Beijing’s agreements given recent history in terms of accords on cyber industrial espionage and militarization of islands in the South China Sea. At the same time, the two- and four-year election cycle within the United States does not incentivize moderation when it comes to China. On nearly every issue, from economics to security, being tough on China is an easy win, even if it complicates relations on entering office.
There is no small irony that Australia under Rudd was meant to be somewhat of an interlocutor between Washington and Beijing, advocating for better understanding, closer relations, all while balancing economic and security interests. Such an approach necessitated a high degree of trust, a quality that Canberra quickly found was in short-supply as Beijing’s wolf warrior diplomacy took aim at Australia, undermining Rudd’s hopes.
While Rudd does cite nationalism as a potential complicating factor, it is, arguably, underestimated on both sides of the Pacific. Rudd writes that Xi can and has used nationalism to legitimize his policies and it has also accelerated an increasing domestic hostility towards the Chinese Communist Party in the United States, particularly in the wake of COVID-19.
Rudd’s unique position offers a welcome vantage point from which to explore the emerging U.S.-China dynamic. Where the book truly shines is offering a far more nuanced and complex picture of Xi and China. While the “managed strategic competition” framework is interesting and a welcome contribution to the debate over how the bilateral relationship could mature (and motivated by the best of intentions—avoiding war), it doesn’t quite fulfill the realist intellectual foundations the former prime minister presents.
Rudd's problem is that he frames China very well, but is too much of an apologist for Beijing. Should we seek to understand China from China's view? Absolutely. And we should understand how they see us, but we need to be candid about both. The Chinese Communist Party isn't interested in cooperation for the sake of cooperation or building a better collective future. It wants to out compete the West in every domain, redefine the international order in its favor, and, ultimately, win.
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Understanding China, Managing Competition, and Avoiding War
Flags gusting in the wind in Tiananmen Square. Photo by Zachary Keimig via Unsplash.
April 16, 2022
Kevin Rudd's latest book "The Avoidable War" does a lot right, giving an important vantage point for understanding emerging U.S.-China relations. Yet Rudd's call for trust building and managed competition to avert war is overly optimistic, writes Joshua Huminski in his latest book review.
I
n most popular media China is presented as a monolithic actor. The Chinese Communist Party (CCP) itself is ideologically and doctrinally unified, marching in lockstep toward a future in which Beijing is the global prime mover with President Xi Jinping at its head. It certainly makes for easier framing and communication to an American audience. In practice, that overly simple framing rarely stays on cable news, but often embeds itself into policymakers’ and legislators’ understanding. That creates considerable room for misunderstanding and miscalculation, increasing the likelihood of policy conflicts. Add to that the complexity of Mandarin and layer on a healthy amount of Marxist-Leninist and Confucian ideology and tradition – it’s easy to see why understanding China is so challenging.
“The Avoidable War” by Kevin Rudd is one of the more interesting attempts at overcoming this oversimplified framing, instead unpacking complexity of both the CCP and bilateral China-U.S. relations. He articulates a model of “managed strategic competition” that is interesting but requires a high degree of trust (with verification) that arguably neither China’s nor America’s domestic politics—to say nothing of recent history—suggest will ever be feasible.
Rudd, who is a former Prime Minister of Australia, offers a unique perspective given his deep understanding of China (he speaks Mandarin and studied as a Sinologist with multiple postings in the country and its territories) and the U.S. He begins with a novel summary of U.S.-China relations, covering not just what happened but how it was viewed from Beijing—a key consideration that is often omitted in American perspectives of bilateral relations.
An interesting undercurrent that one finds in 20 century relations between Washington and Beijing is the West’s almost Marxist understanding of history. Policymakers and legislators in Washington (and the business community’s cheerleaders) believed that economic liberalization would lead to the creation of a growing middle class that, in turn, would demand greater political freedoms thereby forcing change from within China. An economically liberal China would become a more democratic China, joining the community of nations on the West’s terms. It’s an almost scientific view of history that one suspects Marx would have applauded in structure, if not its content.
Rudd makes clear that Beijing never had any intention of letting slip the reins of power. To be sure it was begrudgingly happy to open up economically to modernize the country and end the “century of humiliation”, but it never intended to import Jeffersonian democracy. This is a realization that many within D.C. have finally come to, but one that reflects Rudd’s underlying premise; the United States just doesn’t understand China.
Rudd presents one of the clearest frameworks for understanding “Xi Jinping Thought” and the president/general secretary’s worldview. Divided neatly into ten concentric circles, Rudd builds out Xi’s thoughts from his most pressing and immediate priority – ensuring that the CCP remains in power with him as the paramount leader – through to the tenth circle of changing the global rules-based order. Xi Jinping Thought now sits alongside Marx and Mao as the key foundational texts of the Chinese Communist Party. This is not to say that Xi Jinping Thought is ideologically rigid. Rudd explains, “Xi Jinping Thought has been designed to be politically elastic: to expand and contract to absorb new political and policy developments as they arise and, as a result, ideologically legitimize them”. Other books have explored Chinese policy and strategy, but few have attempted to distill Xi's central ideological framework with such simplicity and clarity.
Rudd goes beyond just providing this framework, presenting a much more nuanced picture of China’s president and the party’s general secretary. Xi, according to Rudd, is weakest when it comes to economics, being inherently suspicious of the market. He’s more comfortable on the international stage and orchestrating grand strategy. His anti-corruption campaigns were almost Maoist in their purges of political opponents, but couched in a criminal framework so as to mask his removal of potential threats. He’s moved to centralize control over more of the state’s apparatuses under the party and his personal control.
While Rudd believes Xi will be successful in extending his term in power, Xi is not without opposition from former presidents whose legacy he is undermining, PLA officers dismissed from office without pension, and the business community whose interests are encountering friction with party priorities. Xi may be unchallenged, but that could be, as Rudd writes, a function of the opposition not having any singular figure around whom it can rally. Moreover, if China faces an economic collapse, environmental catastrophe, or war, Xi’s fortunes could well change.
This exploration of the interparty dynamics (in advance of the next Party Congress) and Xi’s ideological framework are exceptionally interesting, and the reader is left wanting more as this is likely the one of the most nuanced and accessible explorations of the subjects.
Less compelling is Rudd’s concept of “managed strategic competition” as an alternative model for geo-strategic competition that would keep tensions from crossing the threshold of war. Anchored in three core principles: the development of a clear understanding of both country’s strategic redlines; channeling strategic rivalry into a competitive race short of war; and creating political space necessary to continue to engage in areas of strategic mutual and beneficial interest. For Rudd it is akin to the informal and formal aspects of the U.S.-Soviet framework that emerged in the wake of the Cuban Missile Crisis.
To Rudd’s credit it is an interesting concept. He details the benefits to both Beijing and Washington as well as its shortcomings. Under “managed strategic competition” there are verifiable elements to accompany the necessary (but fleeting) trust between Beijing and Washington.
The challenge in this framework is that it assumes too much in terms of the leadership of both China and America, and is too dismissive of the role of domestic politics in the United States. In the case of the former, it is difficult to establish parameters for competition when there is a power delta between the two parties, and one clearly believes it is ascendant. For example, Beijing has little incentive to engage in arms control agreements, such as the United States would like to secure along with Russia until it has achieved nuclear parity, something it is aggressively working toward. If the United States believes that China has regional hegemonic ambitions, it must prepare accordingly, as outlined by Elbridge Colby in his excellent “The Strategy of Denial”.
Moreover, Rudd is perhaps too optimistic about the potential for trust-building between China and the U.S. China has demonstrated an unwillingness to play with a straight bat, using all tools of national power to advance state industries and create an uneven economic playing field. Given the importance of a strong and prosperous economy for the survival of Xi and China’s social contract, it is unlikely that the Party would acquiesce to anything that would tie its hands. Washington certainly is not incentivized to trust Beijing’s agreements given recent history in terms of accords on cyber industrial espionage and militarization of islands in the South China Sea. At the same time, the two- and four-year election cycle within the United States does not incentivize moderation when it comes to China. On nearly every issue, from economics to security, being tough on China is an easy win, even if it complicates relations on entering office.
There is no small irony that Australia under Rudd was meant to be somewhat of an interlocutor between Washington and Beijing, advocating for better understanding, closer relations, all while balancing economic and security interests. Such an approach necessitated a high degree of trust, a quality that Canberra quickly found was in short-supply as Beijing’s wolf warrior diplomacy took aim at Australia, undermining Rudd’s hopes.
While Rudd does cite nationalism as a potential complicating factor, it is, arguably, underestimated on both sides of the Pacific. Rudd writes that Xi can and has used nationalism to legitimize his policies and it has also accelerated an increasing domestic hostility towards the Chinese Communist Party in the United States, particularly in the wake of COVID-19.
Rudd’s unique position offers a welcome vantage point from which to explore the emerging U.S.-China dynamic. Where the book truly shines is offering a far more nuanced and complex picture of Xi and China. While the “managed strategic competition” framework is interesting and a welcome contribution to the debate over how the bilateral relationship could mature (and motivated by the best of intentions—avoiding war), it doesn’t quite fulfill the realist intellectual foundations the former prime minister presents.
Rudd's problem is that he frames China very well, but is too much of an apologist for Beijing. Should we seek to understand China from China's view? Absolutely. And we should understand how they see us, but we need to be candid about both. The Chinese Communist Party isn't interested in cooperation for the sake of cooperation or building a better collective future. It wants to out compete the West in every domain, redefine the international order in its favor, and, ultimately, win.
