ith heightened tensions in the South China Sea (SCS), a new window of opportunity has opened for the U.S. and the Philippines to deepen relations.
Aggression from the People’s Republic of China (PRC)—firing water cannons at Philippine vessels, pointing “military–grade lasers” to disrupt troop resupply missions, colliding with Philippine ships in transit, and more— has spurred Manila to reinvigorate its longstanding alliance with Washington, with which it shares a mutual defense treaty.
Yet modern day security spans more than traditional military defense: it encompasses economic security, technological prowess, and democratic resilience. The U.S. and the Philippines should broaden their cooperation beyond defense into these areas of mutual interest. A renewed willingness from the current Philippine administration provides the impetus for Washington and Manila to do just that.
From Duterte to Marcos
Historically close U.S.–Philippines relations backtracked under previous Philippine president Rodrigo Duterte, who declared it was "time to say goodbye" to the U.S. He instead cozied up to Beijing, hoping to attract Chinese aid and investment.
Duterte’s hope did not pan out. By the end of his term, the expected economic assistance did not materialize. Meanwhile, the Chinese People’s Liberation Army (PLA) continued its aggression against the Philippines in the SCS, sending vessels into the Philippines’ exclusive economic zone and claiming control of the Spratly Islands.
Enter President Ferdinand “Bongbong” Marcos. Over the last two years, the Philippine government has shown a new willingness to engage with Washington. In February 2023, the U.S. and the Philippines announced that they would work to expand the 2014 Enhanced Defense Cooperation Arrangement (EDCA) to include four new military bases in the Philippines. The next month, President Marcos visited the White House, enhancing cooperation in areas ranging from defense and security to education and human rights.
President Marcos returned to Washington in April 2024, announcing new initiatives to deepen bilateral relations. He attended the first trilateral summit with the U.S. and Japan in May. Subsequently, the Philippines joined the “Squad” alongside Australia, Japan, and the U.S. to push back against PRC aggression in the region, reconfirming strengthened ties between Washington and Manila.
These developments have restored confidence in the alliance and demonstrate the Philippines’ future leadership potential in the Indo–Pacific region. Yet, in today’s world, ensuring national, regional, and global security requires more than traditional defense cooperation.
Optimism for Future U.S.— Philippines Relations
The U.S. should capitalize on President Marcos’s willingness to engage with a three–fold approach to broadening its security cooperation.
First, U.S. foreign policy leaders should include the Philippines in economic security discussions. As the U.S. strengthens relations with East Asian nations to bolster economic and national security, the Philippines’ strategic positioning and existing cooperation mechanisms with the U.S. can also make it a key partner.
Over the last two years, the White House and Malacañang announced a series of bilateral commitments to enhance trade and investment. Washington should directly link these efforts with its trilateral economic security dialogue with Japan and the ROK. With competitive labor costs and high English fluency, the Philippines could be a valuable friend to all three countries.
Secondly, Washington should seek help from the Philippines to improve relations with the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN). For years, ASEAN partners have lamented the lack of U.S. attention to the region. Though ASEAN countries notoriously prefer “not to choose” between the U.S. and China, most countries would still prefer U.S. leadership over the PRC.
Although the current U.S. administration has increased its engagement with Southeast Asia, there is still a gap between Washington’s perception of its achievements and what Southeast Asian nations believe constitutes a sincere commitment to improving relations. As the Philippines prepares to chair ASEAN in 2026, it can work with the U.S. to identify areas of engagement that matter most. For example, Southeast Asian nations are rapidly positioning themselves as hubs for artificial intelligence, and the Philippines can help U.S. investors understand the opportunities for investment in the Philippines and the region.
Finally, as democracies around the world fight to defend against authoritarianism, the U.S. should double down on efforts to strengthen democratic resilience in the Philippines. While public sentiment towards the U.S. remains high, American non-governmental and civil society organizations should increase their activity in the Philippines to preserve the democratic spirit that enabled the peaceful transition of power in 2022. This activity can include advocating for greater government transparency, safeguarding against corruption, and protecting freedoms of speech and press. U.S. investments in economic security, Southeast Asian relations, and democratic processes will strengthen the region’s security posture in the long term.
However, the time to achieve all this is short. Philippine presidents only serve single, six–year terms, and President Marcos has already completed a third of his. U.S. leaders must act quickly before the window of opportunity closes.
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U.S., Philippines should broaden cooperation beyond defense
July 25, 2024
With heightened tensions in the South China Sea, the U.S. and the Philippines are reinvigorating their security ties. It also poses an opportunity to rebuild stronger ties more broadly between the Philippines and the U.S., writes Channing Lee.
W
ith heightened tensions in the South China Sea (SCS), a new window of opportunity has opened for the U.S. and the Philippines to deepen relations.
Aggression from the People’s Republic of China (PRC)—firing water cannons at Philippine vessels, pointing “military–grade lasers” to disrupt troop resupply missions, colliding with Philippine ships in transit, and more— has spurred Manila to reinvigorate its longstanding alliance with Washington, with which it shares a mutual defense treaty.
Yet modern day security spans more than traditional military defense: it encompasses economic security, technological prowess, and democratic resilience. The U.S. and the Philippines should broaden their cooperation beyond defense into these areas of mutual interest. A renewed willingness from the current Philippine administration provides the impetus for Washington and Manila to do just that.
From Duterte to Marcos
Historically close U.S.–Philippines relations backtracked under previous Philippine president Rodrigo Duterte, who declared it was "time to say goodbye" to the U.S. He instead cozied up to Beijing, hoping to attract Chinese aid and investment.
Duterte’s hope did not pan out. By the end of his term, the expected economic assistance did not materialize. Meanwhile, the Chinese People’s Liberation Army (PLA) continued its aggression against the Philippines in the SCS, sending vessels into the Philippines’ exclusive economic zone and claiming control of the Spratly Islands.
Enter President Ferdinand “Bongbong” Marcos. Over the last two years, the Philippine government has shown a new willingness to engage with Washington. In February 2023, the U.S. and the Philippines announced that they would work to expand the 2014 Enhanced Defense Cooperation Arrangement (EDCA) to include four new military bases in the Philippines. The next month, President Marcos visited the White House, enhancing cooperation in areas ranging from defense and security to education and human rights.
President Marcos returned to Washington in April 2024, announcing new initiatives to deepen bilateral relations. He attended the first trilateral summit with the U.S. and Japan in May. Subsequently, the Philippines joined the “Squad” alongside Australia, Japan, and the U.S. to push back against PRC aggression in the region, reconfirming strengthened ties between Washington and Manila.
These developments have restored confidence in the alliance and demonstrate the Philippines’ future leadership potential in the Indo–Pacific region. Yet, in today’s world, ensuring national, regional, and global security requires more than traditional defense cooperation.
Optimism for Future U.S.— Philippines Relations
The U.S. should capitalize on President Marcos’s willingness to engage with a three–fold approach to broadening its security cooperation.
First, U.S. foreign policy leaders should include the Philippines in economic security discussions. As the U.S. strengthens relations with East Asian nations to bolster economic and national security, the Philippines’ strategic positioning and existing cooperation mechanisms with the U.S. can also make it a key partner.
Over the last two years, the White House and Malacañang announced a series of bilateral commitments to enhance trade and investment. Washington should directly link these efforts with its trilateral economic security dialogue with Japan and the ROK. With competitive labor costs and high English fluency, the Philippines could be a valuable friend to all three countries.
Secondly, Washington should seek help from the Philippines to improve relations with the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN). For years, ASEAN partners have lamented the lack of U.S. attention to the region. Though ASEAN countries notoriously prefer “not to choose” between the U.S. and China, most countries would still prefer U.S. leadership over the PRC.
Although the current U.S. administration has increased its engagement with Southeast Asia, there is still a gap between Washington’s perception of its achievements and what Southeast Asian nations believe constitutes a sincere commitment to improving relations. As the Philippines prepares to chair ASEAN in 2026, it can work with the U.S. to identify areas of engagement that matter most. For example, Southeast Asian nations are rapidly positioning themselves as hubs for artificial intelligence, and the Philippines can help U.S. investors understand the opportunities for investment in the Philippines and the region.
Finally, as democracies around the world fight to defend against authoritarianism, the U.S. should double down on efforts to strengthen democratic resilience in the Philippines. While public sentiment towards the U.S. remains high, American non-governmental and civil society organizations should increase their activity in the Philippines to preserve the democratic spirit that enabled the peaceful transition of power in 2022. This activity can include advocating for greater government transparency, safeguarding against corruption, and protecting freedoms of speech and press. U.S. investments in economic security, Southeast Asian relations, and democratic processes will strengthen the region’s security posture in the long term.
However, the time to achieve all this is short. Philippine presidents only serve single, six–year terms, and President Marcos has already completed a third of his. U.S. leaders must act quickly before the window of opportunity closes.
