With the imminent release of the oft-delayed UN Palmer Report over the 2010 Gaza Flotilla on the horizon, it is becoming increasingly clear that neither Jerusalem nor Ankara is willing to take the necessary steps to save their relationship. Though their alliance deteriorated over diplomatic tensions arising from the Flotilla operation, it is domestic politics that is have prevented Israel and Turkey’s reconciliation. In Ankara, a leader that seeks to demonize Israel has grown stronger, while in Jerusalem, a leader hoping to settle the dispute has been weakened. With Turkey’s sure support for the UN vote on Palestinian statehood looming in September, any remaining hopes of an already unlikely deal could be dashed for good.
Turkey demanded an Israeli apology for the Israeli Defense Force operation aboard the Mavi Marmara, in which nine Turkish citizens were killed, as well as an end to Israel’s blockade of Gaza. Israel, meanwhile, maintained that any apology would set a poor precedent for protecting its soldiers from further international provocations, as well as for enforcing its blockade of Hamas-controlled Gaza in the future. Though it was in the clear national interest of both countries to resume their once-warm and mutually beneficial relationship, it appears that changes in Ankara and Jerusalem were what prevented a resolution.
In Turkey, the recent resignation of Turkey’s top military brass allowed Prime Minister Erdogan to further marginalize the Turkish Armed Forces from politics. As the most secular and Western-facing institution in Turkey, the TAF has been the leading advocate of normalizing Ankara’s relationship with Israel. The history of robust military cooperation between the TAF and IDF has been a pillar of each country’s foreign policy for decades. The Turkish Military’s dwindling relevance and clout resulting from the resignations rendered the leading organization in favor of reconciliation practically powerless. Consequently, the biggest constraint against an increasingly bellicose Prime Minister Erdogan was removed - and with it, the leading voice for normalizing ties with Israel was all but silenced.
Similarly, in Israel, domestic developments in recent weeks made an agreement with Turkey more unlikely than ever. Social protests have swept across the entire country, and for the first time since its formation in 2009, the viability of Netanyahu’s coalition came into question. As a result, Netanyahu could not take risks in his foreign policy that would rankle more members of the coalition to the point of its collapse. In particular, power-wielding members such as Foreign Minister Avigdor Lieberman and Vice Prime Minister Moshe Ya’alon signaled their opposition to offering Turkey an apology, arguing that Israel had every right to enforce its blockade against Turkish provocation. Indeed, Netanyahu’s eventual refusal to offer an official apology came amid fears that Lieberman’s Yisrael Beiteinu party would leave the coalition, causing its demise. The recent terrorist acts in Israel’s south has further pushed Netanyahu to retrench, making an apology all the more unlikely.
With domestic politics on each side having prevented momentum toward a breakthrough, the outlook for the Turkish-Israeli relationship is even bleaker this September. The imminent publication of the UN’s flotilla report will only serve to further drive a wedge between the countries, as evidenced by both sides’ efforts to delay its release. Equally important, Turkey’s assured vote in favor of Palestinian statehood at the UN General Assembly will only exacerbate the current stalemate. The vote will also complicate relations between Turkey and the U.S., impairing the latter’s ability to mediate a solution. The already improbable reconciliation will soon become impossible, and the Turkish-Israeli relationship will be lost, at least for the foreseeable future.
With a miracle agreement no longer in sight, it seems the best days of Israel and Turkey’s relationship are a thing of the past.
Gabriel Kohan is a former Israel Government Fellow and Mark Donig is a former Dean’s Fellow at the Interdisciplinary Center, Herzliya’s Program for the Diplomatic Corps. The authors can be followed on Twitter at @TheMidEastBeast.
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Turkish-Israeli Reconciliation: From the Improbable to the Impossible
September 1, 2011
With the imminent release of the oft-delayed UN Palmer Report over the 2010 Gaza Flotilla on the horizon, it is becoming increasingly clear that neither Jerusalem nor Ankara is willing to take the necessary steps to save their relationship. Though their alliance deteriorated over diplomatic tensions arising from the Flotilla operation, it is domestic politics that is have prevented Israel and Turkey’s reconciliation. In Ankara, a leader that seeks to demonize Israel has grown stronger, while in Jerusalem, a leader hoping to settle the dispute has been weakened. With Turkey’s sure support for the UN vote on Palestinian statehood looming in September, any remaining hopes of an already unlikely deal could be dashed for good.
Turkey demanded an Israeli apology for the Israeli Defense Force operation aboard the Mavi Marmara, in which nine Turkish citizens were killed, as well as an end to Israel’s blockade of Gaza. Israel, meanwhile, maintained that any apology would set a poor precedent for protecting its soldiers from further international provocations, as well as for enforcing its blockade of Hamas-controlled Gaza in the future. Though it was in the clear national interest of both countries to resume their once-warm and mutually beneficial relationship, it appears that changes in Ankara and Jerusalem were what prevented a resolution.
In Turkey, the recent resignation of Turkey’s top military brass allowed Prime Minister Erdogan to further marginalize the Turkish Armed Forces from politics. As the most secular and Western-facing institution in Turkey, the TAF has been the leading advocate of normalizing Ankara’s relationship with Israel. The history of robust military cooperation between the TAF and IDF has been a pillar of each country’s foreign policy for decades. The Turkish Military’s dwindling relevance and clout resulting from the resignations rendered the leading organization in favor of reconciliation practically powerless. Consequently, the biggest constraint against an increasingly bellicose Prime Minister Erdogan was removed - and with it, the leading voice for normalizing ties with Israel was all but silenced.
Similarly, in Israel, domestic developments in recent weeks made an agreement with Turkey more unlikely than ever. Social protests have swept across the entire country, and for the first time since its formation in 2009, the viability of Netanyahu’s coalition came into question. As a result, Netanyahu could not take risks in his foreign policy that would rankle more members of the coalition to the point of its collapse. In particular, power-wielding members such as Foreign Minister Avigdor Lieberman and Vice Prime Minister Moshe Ya’alon signaled their opposition to offering Turkey an apology, arguing that Israel had every right to enforce its blockade against Turkish provocation. Indeed, Netanyahu’s eventual refusal to offer an official apology came amid fears that Lieberman’s Yisrael Beiteinu party would leave the coalition, causing its demise. The recent terrorist acts in Israel’s south has further pushed Netanyahu to retrench, making an apology all the more unlikely.
With domestic politics on each side having prevented momentum toward a breakthrough, the outlook for the Turkish-Israeli relationship is even bleaker this September. The imminent publication of the UN’s flotilla report will only serve to further drive a wedge between the countries, as evidenced by both sides’ efforts to delay its release. Equally important, Turkey’s assured vote in favor of Palestinian statehood at the UN General Assembly will only exacerbate the current stalemate. The vote will also complicate relations between Turkey and the U.S., impairing the latter’s ability to mediate a solution. The already improbable reconciliation will soon become impossible, and the Turkish-Israeli relationship will be lost, at least for the foreseeable future.
With a miracle agreement no longer in sight, it seems the best days of Israel and Turkey’s relationship are a thing of the past.
Gabriel Kohan is a former Israel Government Fellow and Mark Donig is a former Dean’s Fellow at the Interdisciplinary Center, Herzliya’s Program for the Diplomatic Corps. The authors can be followed on Twitter at @TheMidEastBeast.
