The Ottoman Empire, the predecessor of current-day Turkey was once called “the sick man of Europe”. This was during the First World War when the Ottoman Empire was increasingly controlled by Europe and lost war after war successively. This epithet seemed to stick to Turkey in its course of development especially in discussions regarding its application for membership in the European Union where it became a pivotal argument. Somehow these words also seemed to be attached to the political, economic, and international image of Turkey, even though Turkey was no longer being controlled by European powers and it was no longer losing wars.
One of the reasons why this negative image stuck so hard on Turkey was the fact that its economy was stagnant for many decades after the Ottoman Empire. The level of economic growth and development was not as sophisticated as the rest of Europe. Until the end of last century, Turkey’s economy was associated with crises and with annual inflation figures sometimes over a 100 percent. A bad economic profile is never a good public and international image builder.
The image of Turkey reflected its inner disposition—a lack of self-confidence. However, despite this apparent ailment and a traditional foreign policy, Turkey tried to play a role on the world and the diplomatic stage as a bridge between East and West, especially after the fall of the Soviet Union. Because of its Ottoman roots and history, it has always wanted to maintain a more than ephemeral role in the immediate and Middle Eastern region and put efforts into it. Most efforts were not acknowledged or didn’t have any results that were fundamentally reforming. This was partly due to the fact that Turkey’s foreign policy in general was defensive and lacked vibrant outreach.
In the new millennium a whole new Turkey arose: healthier, stronger and dynamic. Still, it had a few shortcomings, namely a financial crisis in 2001. But that was far from being the sick man of Europe. The economy showed steady and marvellous growth. In combination with a new foreign policy wanting “zero problems” with its neighbors Turkey propelled itself to a new image of stability and prosperity while gaining self-confidence. Its foreign policy became pro-active. Turkey’s profile as a bridge between East and West surpassed that image; it became a country with multidimensional ambitions. Not only as part of Europe and Asia but also close to Africa, close to the Mediterranean Sea, and close to Russia.
This self confidence stimulated new dimensions and actions in Turkey instigated by Foreign Minister Ahmet Davutoglu, the architect of this foreign policy whose philosophy has been leading. One of the most intriguing examples is Turkey’s role as mediator regarding the nuclear issue in Iran, a role they took on together with Brazil. In 2009 Turkey and Brazil set on to solve the nuclear crisis. All the diplomatic efforts were initiated, organized and executed independently by the two countries, without any outside influence, advice or coordination. This was a clear sign Turkey felt more than ready to claim its role as a mediator and leader; and not only in its immediate region.
On January 9th State Department Spokesman and Assistant Secretary Philip J. Crowley acknowledged the importance of Turkey’s international role because of the responsibility it displayed. “Turkey is rightfully trying to put itself into a position from which it can strategically affect the events in the 21st century. U.S. welcomes Turkey’s new role.” It was the first time that the U.S. officially declared its position on the role of Turkey.
While the new and invigorated Turkey and its role in the region may be lauded, it is also being frowned upon—internally as well as externally. Internally, the secular elite is suspicions that the government—who is economically liberal but conservative when it comes to religion—has a hidden agenda. The secular elite is quite fearful of a Turkey where Islam rules. Its actions and position regarding Iran have fuelled doubt regarding the friendship between the U.S. and Turkey as traditional allies. When it comes to the EU, the rapprochement of Turkey to the (Middle) East was interpreted by some opinion-makers as turning its back on the accession.
Despite these criticisms, Turkey keeps following self-assuredly the philosophy of “zero problems” with its neighbors, stimulated by Turkey’s booming economy with almost two-digit economic growth figures.
a global affairs media network
Turkey’s Newfound Self-Confidence
January 17, 2011
The Ottoman Empire, the predecessor of current-day Turkey was once called “the sick man of Europe”. This was during the First World War when the Ottoman Empire was increasingly controlled by Europe and lost war after war successively. This epithet seemed to stick to Turkey in its course of development especially in discussions regarding its application for membership in the European Union where it became a pivotal argument. Somehow these words also seemed to be attached to the political, economic, and international image of Turkey, even though Turkey was no longer being controlled by European powers and it was no longer losing wars.
One of the reasons why this negative image stuck so hard on Turkey was the fact that its economy was stagnant for many decades after the Ottoman Empire. The level of economic growth and development was not as sophisticated as the rest of Europe. Until the end of last century, Turkey’s economy was associated with crises and with annual inflation figures sometimes over a 100 percent. A bad economic profile is never a good public and international image builder.
The image of Turkey reflected its inner disposition—a lack of self-confidence. However, despite this apparent ailment and a traditional foreign policy, Turkey tried to play a role on the world and the diplomatic stage as a bridge between East and West, especially after the fall of the Soviet Union. Because of its Ottoman roots and history, it has always wanted to maintain a more than ephemeral role in the immediate and Middle Eastern region and put efforts into it. Most efforts were not acknowledged or didn’t have any results that were fundamentally reforming. This was partly due to the fact that Turkey’s foreign policy in general was defensive and lacked vibrant outreach.
In the new millennium a whole new Turkey arose: healthier, stronger and dynamic. Still, it had a few shortcomings, namely a financial crisis in 2001. But that was far from being the sick man of Europe. The economy showed steady and marvellous growth. In combination with a new foreign policy wanting “zero problems” with its neighbors Turkey propelled itself to a new image of stability and prosperity while gaining self-confidence. Its foreign policy became pro-active. Turkey’s profile as a bridge between East and West surpassed that image; it became a country with multidimensional ambitions. Not only as part of Europe and Asia but also close to Africa, close to the Mediterranean Sea, and close to Russia.
This self confidence stimulated new dimensions and actions in Turkey instigated by Foreign Minister Ahmet Davutoglu, the architect of this foreign policy whose philosophy has been leading. One of the most intriguing examples is Turkey’s role as mediator regarding the nuclear issue in Iran, a role they took on together with Brazil. In 2009 Turkey and Brazil set on to solve the nuclear crisis. All the diplomatic efforts were initiated, organized and executed independently by the two countries, without any outside influence, advice or coordination. This was a clear sign Turkey felt more than ready to claim its role as a mediator and leader; and not only in its immediate region.
On January 9th State Department Spokesman and Assistant Secretary Philip J. Crowley acknowledged the importance of Turkey’s international role because of the responsibility it displayed. “Turkey is rightfully trying to put itself into a position from which it can strategically affect the events in the 21st century. U.S. welcomes Turkey’s new role.” It was the first time that the U.S. officially declared its position on the role of Turkey.
While the new and invigorated Turkey and its role in the region may be lauded, it is also being frowned upon—internally as well as externally. Internally, the secular elite is suspicions that the government—who is economically liberal but conservative when it comes to religion—has a hidden agenda. The secular elite is quite fearful of a Turkey where Islam rules. Its actions and position regarding Iran have fuelled doubt regarding the friendship between the U.S. and Turkey as traditional allies. When it comes to the EU, the rapprochement of Turkey to the (Middle) East was interpreted by some opinion-makers as turning its back on the accession.
Despite these criticisms, Turkey keeps following self-assuredly the philosophy of “zero problems” with its neighbors, stimulated by Turkey’s booming economy with almost two-digit economic growth figures.
