rmenia appears to have begun the process of decoupling from Russia. With escalating conflicts with Azerbaijan, the landlocked Caucasus nation is increasingly attempting to distance itself from Moscow—Yerevan’s nominal ally as a member of the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO)—while establishing closer ties with the United States. For its part, the United States has increased its own engagement with Armenia. But will a U.S.-Armenian partnership emerge or will Russia maintain its hold?
Recent border clashes between Azerbaijan and Armenia have raised concerns in Yerevan that an escalation in the South Caucasus could represent an existential threat for the small country of about three million people. After Azerbaijani forces seized parts of Armenian territory, Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan turned to the CSTO—a treaty organization consisting of Russia, Belarus, Armenia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan—for support. Rather than backing the Armenian request, its CSTO allies sidestepped the issue and instead sent a monitoring mission. This lack of support comes as some CSTO members, namely Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan, have started to cooperate more closely with the Turkey military—a country that firmly backs Azerbaijan. For its part, Russia has repeatedly hesitated to openly side with Yerevan against Baku.
It is becoming increasingly clear that Armenia is on its own and cannot count on the CSTO for protection. This new reality resulted in an anti-CSTO rally in the Armenian capital on September 17. Protesters demanded that Armenia withdraw from the Russian-dominated alliance. One day later, U.S. House of Representatives Speaker Nancy Pelosi visited Yerevan and condemned Azerbaijan’s attacks on the country. During Pelosi’s meeting with the country’s leadership, a group of pro-Russian Armenians gathered in front of the U.S. Embassy in Yerevan, holding posters reading “Missis Pelosi, Armenia is always with Russia." Such an action was a clear indication of Moscow’s desire not to lose its influence in the South Caucasus nation.
Despite the Moscow’s continued support in Armenia, the United States seems to be increasing influence in the country. Baku and Yerevan agreed to ease tensions and end border clashes only after only after Colin Hackett Kahl, the U.S. Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, spoke with Azerbaijan’s Minister of Defense Zakir Hasanov. Following the agreement, Washington increased its diplomatic efforts to bring the two countries to the negotiation table. On September 19 in New York, U.S. Secretary of State Antony Blinken met with Armenian and Azerbaijani Foreign Ministers, Ararat Mirzoyan and Jeyhun Bayramov, encouraging them to hold another summit before the end of the month.
Additionally, on September 29 Armenia's Security Council secretary Armen Grigoryan and the Foreign Policy Advisor to the President of Azerbaijan, Hikmey Hajiyev, met at the White House. They reportedly discussed the peaceful settlement of long-term disputes as well as establishment of peace in the South Caucasus. On October 2, the two nations’ Foreign Ministers met again in Switzerland, where one of the main topics on the agenda was a future peace treaty.
If the two countries manage resolve their disputes with the United States—or the European Union—assisting in negotiations, Russia will effectively stop being the major mediator in the region. Despite border incidents, Armenia and Azerbaijan have continued working on normalization of relations, and reports suggest that the two nations could sign a peace treaty in November.
While the United States has started to help in negotiating a peace deal between Armenia and Azerbaijan, there are other tools that the Washington may employ in its efforts to court Armenia—even as military options remain unlikely. On the one hand, the United States is unlikely to sell weapons to Armenia as long as the country remains a member of the Russian-dominated CSTO. Moreover, the Pentagon is not expected to send the American troops to Armenia. In addition, the U.S. Congress is not expected to provide military assistance to Armenia or to impose sanctions on Azerbaijan. However, the United States will almost certainly attempt to increase its soft power in Armenia and diplomatic efforts. Pelosi’s visit to Yerevan could be interpreted as a sign that the United States has extended its hand to the landlocked country. However, Washington will likely still seek to preserve good ties with energy-rich Azerbaijan—particularly given European allies could soon become dependent on Azerbaijani gas as they seek alternatives to Russia.
While the United States is actively seeking to maintain stability in the region, Russia also benefits from this stability. Preoccupied with the Ukraine war, the Kremlin cannot afford to take part in another conflict in its “near aboard,” which may explain why Russia may welcome a potential peace deal between Yerevan and Baku. Even though Moscow and Washington are not interested in a destabilized South Caucasus, they will continue struggling to achieve their fundamentally different geopolitical interests in the region.
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The Russo-American Diplomatic Battle for Armenia
Yerevan, Armenia. Photo by Gevorg Avetisyan via Unsplash.
October 12, 2022
Armenia appears to have begun the process of decoupling from Russia while establishing closer ties with the United States. It remains uncertain, however, if a U.S.-Armenian partnership will emerge or if Russia will maintain its hold, writes Nikola Mikovic.
A
rmenia appears to have begun the process of decoupling from Russia. With escalating conflicts with Azerbaijan, the landlocked Caucasus nation is increasingly attempting to distance itself from Moscow—Yerevan’s nominal ally as a member of the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO)—while establishing closer ties with the United States. For its part, the United States has increased its own engagement with Armenia. But will a U.S.-Armenian partnership emerge or will Russia maintain its hold?
Recent border clashes between Azerbaijan and Armenia have raised concerns in Yerevan that an escalation in the South Caucasus could represent an existential threat for the small country of about three million people. After Azerbaijani forces seized parts of Armenian territory, Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan turned to the CSTO—a treaty organization consisting of Russia, Belarus, Armenia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan—for support. Rather than backing the Armenian request, its CSTO allies sidestepped the issue and instead sent a monitoring mission. This lack of support comes as some CSTO members, namely Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan, have started to cooperate more closely with the Turkey military—a country that firmly backs Azerbaijan. For its part, Russia has repeatedly hesitated to openly side with Yerevan against Baku.
It is becoming increasingly clear that Armenia is on its own and cannot count on the CSTO for protection. This new reality resulted in an anti-CSTO rally in the Armenian capital on September 17. Protesters demanded that Armenia withdraw from the Russian-dominated alliance. One day later, U.S. House of Representatives Speaker Nancy Pelosi visited Yerevan and condemned Azerbaijan’s attacks on the country. During Pelosi’s meeting with the country’s leadership, a group of pro-Russian Armenians gathered in front of the U.S. Embassy in Yerevan, holding posters reading “Missis Pelosi, Armenia is always with Russia." Such an action was a clear indication of Moscow’s desire not to lose its influence in the South Caucasus nation.
Despite the Moscow’s continued support in Armenia, the United States seems to be increasing influence in the country. Baku and Yerevan agreed to ease tensions and end border clashes only after only after Colin Hackett Kahl, the U.S. Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, spoke with Azerbaijan’s Minister of Defense Zakir Hasanov. Following the agreement, Washington increased its diplomatic efforts to bring the two countries to the negotiation table. On September 19 in New York, U.S. Secretary of State Antony Blinken met with Armenian and Azerbaijani Foreign Ministers, Ararat Mirzoyan and Jeyhun Bayramov, encouraging them to hold another summit before the end of the month.
Additionally, on September 29 Armenia's Security Council secretary Armen Grigoryan and the Foreign Policy Advisor to the President of Azerbaijan, Hikmey Hajiyev, met at the White House. They reportedly discussed the peaceful settlement of long-term disputes as well as establishment of peace in the South Caucasus. On October 2, the two nations’ Foreign Ministers met again in Switzerland, where one of the main topics on the agenda was a future peace treaty.
If the two countries manage resolve their disputes with the United States—or the European Union—assisting in negotiations, Russia will effectively stop being the major mediator in the region. Despite border incidents, Armenia and Azerbaijan have continued working on normalization of relations, and reports suggest that the two nations could sign a peace treaty in November.
While the United States has started to help in negotiating a peace deal between Armenia and Azerbaijan, there are other tools that the Washington may employ in its efforts to court Armenia—even as military options remain unlikely. On the one hand, the United States is unlikely to sell weapons to Armenia as long as the country remains a member of the Russian-dominated CSTO. Moreover, the Pentagon is not expected to send the American troops to Armenia. In addition, the U.S. Congress is not expected to provide military assistance to Armenia or to impose sanctions on Azerbaijan. However, the United States will almost certainly attempt to increase its soft power in Armenia and diplomatic efforts. Pelosi’s visit to Yerevan could be interpreted as a sign that the United States has extended its hand to the landlocked country. However, Washington will likely still seek to preserve good ties with energy-rich Azerbaijan—particularly given European allies could soon become dependent on Azerbaijani gas as they seek alternatives to Russia.
While the United States is actively seeking to maintain stability in the region, Russia also benefits from this stability. Preoccupied with the Ukraine war, the Kremlin cannot afford to take part in another conflict in its “near aboard,” which may explain why Russia may welcome a potential peace deal between Yerevan and Baku. Even though Moscow and Washington are not interested in a destabilized South Caucasus, they will continue struggling to achieve their fundamentally different geopolitical interests in the region.
