n 1834, Sir Robert Peel, the prime minister of the United Kingdom, delivered what came to be known as the Tamworth Manifesto. This speech is largely seen as containing founding principles of the modern Conservative or Tory party. In Peel’s speech, most strikingly he declared:
I have the firmest convictions that that confidence cannot be secured by any other course than that of a frank and explicit declaration of principle; that vague and unmeaning professions of popular opinion may quiet distrust for a time, may influence this or that election but that such professions must ultimately and signally fail, if, being made, they are not adhered to, or if they are inconsistent with the honour and character of those who made them.
He went on to promise that the party would undertake a "careful review of institutions, civil and ecclesiastical" and seek “the correction of proved abuses and the redress of real grievances.” The party would, ultimately, avoid unnecessary change, which he believed would lead to "a perpetual vortex of agitation." Reading Sir Robert’s manifesto today provides a striking juxtaposition between principles and practice, especially when reading Tim Bale’s thorough accounting of the Tory party in the wake of the Brexit vote in his aptly titled “The Conservative Party After Brexit: Turmoil and Transformation,” a copy of which was kindly provided by the publisher.
The party that emerges from Bale’s accounting is one that is indeed in turmoil, riven by factions, struggling with the devastating consequences of the unanticipated success of one of those factions, while focusing overwhelmingly on politics as opposed to governance. Indeed, the consequences of Brexit for both the party and the country are almost singularly “a perpetual vortex of agitation,” one for which the end—recent progress notwithstanding—is not even in sight.
Indeed, the country that had enjoyed relatively stable politics until 2016 was repeatedly and violently buffeted by waves almost wholly created by its own hand. This is particularly striking to reflect on given the period that Bale covers. By contrast the governance of Tony Blair, Gordon Brown, and David Cameron (until Brexit) seems incredibly steady, even given the domestic and international winds that buffered each of them. For party political leadership that almost certainly wishes to see itself as mirroring “House of Cards” (the original 1990 version, of course), the Tories come across far more like “The Thick of It” (the brilliant television program that it is, notwithstanding).
What began as a gamble by then-PM Cameron to offset the vulnerability of his right flank to UKIP—a far-right independence party—led to the disastrous referendum on whether the United Kingdom should remain or leave the European Union. The referendum itself was wholly binary, missing the complexity of what unpacking the interrelationships meant in practice. Brexit meant different things to different people, even if they were aware of what the EU was and how it affected their daily lives: a significant number of Britons were Googling “What is the EU” and “What is Brexit” after the polls closed.
What “leaving” meant in practice was never articulated. Brexiteers focused on slogans and cliches, played upon jingoistic fears, and avoided answering the question, inserting enough doubt in the minds of voters to achieve victory. The advocates of departing the political and economic bloc had caught the metaphorical car but had no idea what came next. This single decision shaped all that was to follow both for the country and the Tory party, with factions vying for power and dominance, attempting to define what Brexit meant in principle and practice, and determine who could deliver whatever it was that was decided.
The story that follows is told in exceptional, but dispassionate, detail by Bale. It is very much an academic look at the trials and self-inflicted tribulations of the Conservative Party. While it lacks the inside-the-room breathlessness of Tim Shipman (whose Brexit trilogy comes to an end later this summer), the book doesn’t suffer from that absence. Bale finds a highly readable balance that marries the insider cricket of back-and-forth political machinations of the Tories with a detail-focused academic approach. One certainly does not envy Bale’s efforts to revise this book and get to print with all that happened through the end of 2022.
The book would benefit from a dramatis personae listing for readers less familiar with the Shakespearean cast of characters that make up the Conservative Party, its surrounding ecosystem, and the broader British political establishment. Certainly, after reading Bale’s account, one suspects there is a tragi-comedy worthy of the great Bard with (forgive the mixing of the plays) Boris Johnson’s Hamlet without the self-reflection, Michael Gove’s Brutus to Johnson’s Caesar, the Tory-supporting broadsheets serving as the witches of Macbeth, and the Iago-like Dominic Cummings (though Cummings has a far smaller role in this account that many (himself included) would suspect).
In Bale’s accounting and that which has followed in British politics, the central challenge or tragedy of the Conservative Party is that it is ideologically and politically strait-jacketed from criticizing Brexit, yet addressing the issues facing the country necessitates a recognition of from where these problems originated. Anyone seen as “weak” on Brexit risks the wrath (however real a fear it may be) of the Brexiteers and their purported supporters. The result is this bizarre contortion by Tory MPs to acknowledge that a problem exists, but deny its origin, or to suggest that the problem that resulted from Brexit is a reason why Brexit was the right vote.
This tension animates Bale’s account. The Tory party sought to ensure electoral victory amidst a chaotic and ever-changing political landscape, half of which was opposed to Brexit and an increasing number were doubting the wisdom of their vote. The Tories suffered from an unwillingness to grapple with their long-term electoral prospects amidst a shifting landscape of political loyalties and identities. The party appears to be increasingly catering to a shrinking segment of the electorate at a time when the trends were shifting decidedly against them. According to post-Brexit analysis of 30 areas surveyed: of those with the most elderly voters, 27 voted to leave; with the fewest graduates, 28 voted to leave; and with the most identifying as “English”, 30 decided to leave. Yet, of 18-24- and 25-34-year-olds 73% and 62%, respectively, voted to remain.
This necessitated a doubling-down on policies that largely catered to the party’s base, a decision that risked alienating moderates or undecided voters. Despite introspection from some within the party, particularly after May’s lackluster general election performance, this reality does not seem to have penetrated the party writ large. In many ways the Tories appear like the Republicans after President Barack Obama’s reelection. A wide-ranging and sensible report in 2013 warned the Republicans of shifting political sands and necessary actions to offset future political disasters. That report is now consigned to irrelevance, doubly-so in the wake of Donald Trump’s radical populism and the forces he has since unleashed.
Were this not enough, the political and human failings of the party’s politicians all but doomed the Tory party’s ability to govern. May’s inability to secure a Brexit deal opened the door for Johnson. The braggart prime minister appeared concerned only with power and its trappings, as opposed to governance, which was particularly ill-suited for the COVID-19 crisis. His bluster and bloviation was ultimately unable to weather the near constant storm of controversy including “Partygate”—when 10 Downing Street was hosting gatherings in contravention with the government’s own social distancing policies—and was finally brought down by what he knew and when he knew it about allegations of sexual assault from an MP.
The leadership contest that followed saw the election of Liz Truss whose disastrous economic policies sent the country’s markets into a tailspin and saw her out the door only after a few weeks in office. Rishi Sunak, the current occupant of the office behind the famous black door is a paragon of stability by comparison (one certainly does not envy Bale’s constant revisions that must have taken place whilst this was all happening). Sunak has inherited the ongoing Brexit crisis, new controversies both about and from Johnson, to say nothing of a country in dire straits. From a National Health Service on life-support, a housing crisis, rising energy costs, an underperforming economy, and more—much of which is either tied directly to or exacerbated by Brexit. To Sunak’s credit, he has asserted a competent managerial grip on 10 Downing Street and achieved successes internationally—the Windsor Agreement with the EU marks a more normalized relationship with Brussels, and AUKUS signals London’s intent (and emerging capability) to play in the Indo-Pacific. Whether he can translate these into domestic political capital is unclear, particularly as he seeks to balance the competing wings of a fractious party.
What the Tories transform into remains to be seen. The party’s doubling-down on support from the more conservative members of its coalition—the odd mélange of older, wealthier, less educated, more isolationist voters—reduces the party’s attraction to younger, better educated, and more urban voters. It is hard to see how the Tories can attract the latter when they only focus on the former, or at least appear to do so. Can the Tories politically survive in the near term if they are unwilling to violate the shibboleth that is Brexit? The political flexibility required to govern without doing so can only last so long without breaking, but the Conservatives have shown surprising dexterity and survivability amidst this chaos.
Bale’s account is utterly fascinating and deeply insightful into British politics today. The United Kingdom is a country in flux because of the Tory party’s fractiousness and the Brexit vote, a decision for which the consequences are still becoming clear. Brexit upended the country’s worldview, and its sense of place in Europe and the world more broadly and shook the foundations of how much of the world viewed London—from staid sensibility to reckless risk-taking. What comes next for the country, but also the Conservatives themselves, is anything but clear, but Bale offers a rich accounting on how they found themselves in the political thick of it and what Sunak and his successors (Tory or Labour) are likely to inherit.
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The National Consequences of Tory Party Politics
Photo by Kristina Gadeikyte on Unsplash
March 25, 2023
Brexit had powerful political, economic, and cultural implications for the United Kingdom-and the pursuit of Brexit was uncharacteristic for the Conservative Party. Tim Bale's new book follows a colorful cast of Conservative leaders, laying bare a party and nation in turmoil, writes Joshua Huminski.
I
n 1834, Sir Robert Peel, the prime minister of the United Kingdom, delivered what came to be known as the Tamworth Manifesto. This speech is largely seen as containing founding principles of the modern Conservative or Tory party. In Peel’s speech, most strikingly he declared:
I have the firmest convictions that that confidence cannot be secured by any other course than that of a frank and explicit declaration of principle; that vague and unmeaning professions of popular opinion may quiet distrust for a time, may influence this or that election but that such professions must ultimately and signally fail, if, being made, they are not adhered to, or if they are inconsistent with the honour and character of those who made them.
He went on to promise that the party would undertake a "careful review of institutions, civil and ecclesiastical" and seek “the correction of proved abuses and the redress of real grievances.” The party would, ultimately, avoid unnecessary change, which he believed would lead to "a perpetual vortex of agitation." Reading Sir Robert’s manifesto today provides a striking juxtaposition between principles and practice, especially when reading Tim Bale’s thorough accounting of the Tory party in the wake of the Brexit vote in his aptly titled “The Conservative Party After Brexit: Turmoil and Transformation,” a copy of which was kindly provided by the publisher.
The party that emerges from Bale’s accounting is one that is indeed in turmoil, riven by factions, struggling with the devastating consequences of the unanticipated success of one of those factions, while focusing overwhelmingly on politics as opposed to governance. Indeed, the consequences of Brexit for both the party and the country are almost singularly “a perpetual vortex of agitation,” one for which the end—recent progress notwithstanding—is not even in sight.
Indeed, the country that had enjoyed relatively stable politics until 2016 was repeatedly and violently buffeted by waves almost wholly created by its own hand. This is particularly striking to reflect on given the period that Bale covers. By contrast the governance of Tony Blair, Gordon Brown, and David Cameron (until Brexit) seems incredibly steady, even given the domestic and international winds that buffered each of them. For party political leadership that almost certainly wishes to see itself as mirroring “House of Cards” (the original 1990 version, of course), the Tories come across far more like “The Thick of It” (the brilliant television program that it is, notwithstanding).
What began as a gamble by then-PM Cameron to offset the vulnerability of his right flank to UKIP—a far-right independence party—led to the disastrous referendum on whether the United Kingdom should remain or leave the European Union. The referendum itself was wholly binary, missing the complexity of what unpacking the interrelationships meant in practice. Brexit meant different things to different people, even if they were aware of what the EU was and how it affected their daily lives: a significant number of Britons were Googling “What is the EU” and “What is Brexit” after the polls closed.
What “leaving” meant in practice was never articulated. Brexiteers focused on slogans and cliches, played upon jingoistic fears, and avoided answering the question, inserting enough doubt in the minds of voters to achieve victory. The advocates of departing the political and economic bloc had caught the metaphorical car but had no idea what came next. This single decision shaped all that was to follow both for the country and the Tory party, with factions vying for power and dominance, attempting to define what Brexit meant in principle and practice, and determine who could deliver whatever it was that was decided.
The story that follows is told in exceptional, but dispassionate, detail by Bale. It is very much an academic look at the trials and self-inflicted tribulations of the Conservative Party. While it lacks the inside-the-room breathlessness of Tim Shipman (whose Brexit trilogy comes to an end later this summer), the book doesn’t suffer from that absence. Bale finds a highly readable balance that marries the insider cricket of back-and-forth political machinations of the Tories with a detail-focused academic approach. One certainly does not envy Bale’s efforts to revise this book and get to print with all that happened through the end of 2022.
The book would benefit from a dramatis personae listing for readers less familiar with the Shakespearean cast of characters that make up the Conservative Party, its surrounding ecosystem, and the broader British political establishment. Certainly, after reading Bale’s account, one suspects there is a tragi-comedy worthy of the great Bard with (forgive the mixing of the plays) Boris Johnson’s Hamlet without the self-reflection, Michael Gove’s Brutus to Johnson’s Caesar, the Tory-supporting broadsheets serving as the witches of Macbeth, and the Iago-like Dominic Cummings (though Cummings has a far smaller role in this account that many (himself included) would suspect).
In Bale’s accounting and that which has followed in British politics, the central challenge or tragedy of the Conservative Party is that it is ideologically and politically strait-jacketed from criticizing Brexit, yet addressing the issues facing the country necessitates a recognition of from where these problems originated. Anyone seen as “weak” on Brexit risks the wrath (however real a fear it may be) of the Brexiteers and their purported supporters. The result is this bizarre contortion by Tory MPs to acknowledge that a problem exists, but deny its origin, or to suggest that the problem that resulted from Brexit is a reason why Brexit was the right vote.
This tension animates Bale’s account. The Tory party sought to ensure electoral victory amidst a chaotic and ever-changing political landscape, half of which was opposed to Brexit and an increasing number were doubting the wisdom of their vote. The Tories suffered from an unwillingness to grapple with their long-term electoral prospects amidst a shifting landscape of political loyalties and identities. The party appears to be increasingly catering to a shrinking segment of the electorate at a time when the trends were shifting decidedly against them. According to post-Brexit analysis of 30 areas surveyed: of those with the most elderly voters, 27 voted to leave; with the fewest graduates, 28 voted to leave; and with the most identifying as “English”, 30 decided to leave. Yet, of 18-24- and 25-34-year-olds 73% and 62%, respectively, voted to remain.
This necessitated a doubling-down on policies that largely catered to the party’s base, a decision that risked alienating moderates or undecided voters. Despite introspection from some within the party, particularly after May’s lackluster general election performance, this reality does not seem to have penetrated the party writ large. In many ways the Tories appear like the Republicans after President Barack Obama’s reelection. A wide-ranging and sensible report in 2013 warned the Republicans of shifting political sands and necessary actions to offset future political disasters. That report is now consigned to irrelevance, doubly-so in the wake of Donald Trump’s radical populism and the forces he has since unleashed.
Were this not enough, the political and human failings of the party’s politicians all but doomed the Tory party’s ability to govern. May’s inability to secure a Brexit deal opened the door for Johnson. The braggart prime minister appeared concerned only with power and its trappings, as opposed to governance, which was particularly ill-suited for the COVID-19 crisis. His bluster and bloviation was ultimately unable to weather the near constant storm of controversy including “Partygate”—when 10 Downing Street was hosting gatherings in contravention with the government’s own social distancing policies—and was finally brought down by what he knew and when he knew it about allegations of sexual assault from an MP.
The leadership contest that followed saw the election of Liz Truss whose disastrous economic policies sent the country’s markets into a tailspin and saw her out the door only after a few weeks in office. Rishi Sunak, the current occupant of the office behind the famous black door is a paragon of stability by comparison (one certainly does not envy Bale’s constant revisions that must have taken place whilst this was all happening). Sunak has inherited the ongoing Brexit crisis, new controversies both about and from Johnson, to say nothing of a country in dire straits. From a National Health Service on life-support, a housing crisis, rising energy costs, an underperforming economy, and more—much of which is either tied directly to or exacerbated by Brexit. To Sunak’s credit, he has asserted a competent managerial grip on 10 Downing Street and achieved successes internationally—the Windsor Agreement with the EU marks a more normalized relationship with Brussels, and AUKUS signals London’s intent (and emerging capability) to play in the Indo-Pacific. Whether he can translate these into domestic political capital is unclear, particularly as he seeks to balance the competing wings of a fractious party.
What the Tories transform into remains to be seen. The party’s doubling-down on support from the more conservative members of its coalition—the odd mélange of older, wealthier, less educated, more isolationist voters—reduces the party’s attraction to younger, better educated, and more urban voters. It is hard to see how the Tories can attract the latter when they only focus on the former, or at least appear to do so. Can the Tories politically survive in the near term if they are unwilling to violate the shibboleth that is Brexit? The political flexibility required to govern without doing so can only last so long without breaking, but the Conservatives have shown surprising dexterity and survivability amidst this chaos.
Bale’s account is utterly fascinating and deeply insightful into British politics today. The United Kingdom is a country in flux because of the Tory party’s fractiousness and the Brexit vote, a decision for which the consequences are still becoming clear. Brexit upended the country’s worldview, and its sense of place in Europe and the world more broadly and shook the foundations of how much of the world viewed London—from staid sensibility to reckless risk-taking. What comes next for the country, but also the Conservatives themselves, is anything but clear, but Bale offers a rich accounting on how they found themselves in the political thick of it and what Sunak and his successors (Tory or Labour) are likely to inherit.
