ay first marked the 11th anniversary of the successful Operation Neptune Spear, which saw U.S. Navy SEALs cross into Pakistan, flown by members of the Army’s elite 160 Night Stalkers, and kill Usama bin Laden (UBL). The anniversary likely passed with little, if any, notice by most. The death of the leader of al-Qa’ida may have brought some closure to the families and loved ones of those lost on 9/11, but the threat of radical Islamist Jihadist terrorism remains. The philosophical movement UBL crystalized into a global endeavor very much remains with us. While the threat is certainly much reduced, and Bin Laden is by no means the sole progenitor of the movement, his legacy lives on well beyond Abbottabad.
There remains much to learn about UBL and al-Qa’ida, a fact vividly illustrated in Nelly Lahoud’s “The Bin Laden Papers.” Thanks in no small part to the situational awareness of the Navy SEALs on-the-ground, and the forbearance of Admiral William McRaven—the commander of Neptune Spear—we have exceptional insights into the inner workings of al-Qa’ida and UBL’s worldview. The SEALs, seeing filing cabinets and computers, asked for additional time to conduct “sensitive site exploitation”—in effect grabbing as much useful intelligence and data as possible. Despite worries about remaining on site too long, McRaven granted them additional time— time that proved invaluable to our understanding of UBL and the group he co-founded.
Lahoud, previously an associate professor at West Point’s Combating Terrorism Center and now a senior fellow at New America’s International Security program, explores some 6,000 Arabic-language pages recovered from Abbottabad. The result is a gripping look at a starkly different UBL and al-Qa’ida.
The UBL that comes across in Lahoud’s pages is one that was outpaced and overcome by events. He singularly failed to anticipate the U.S. response to the 9/11 attacks. He expected America to retreat from the Middle East rather than double-down and invade Afghanistan. That miscalculation led to the effective destruction of al-Qa’ida and its inability to conduct attacks, despite the fears in Washington and other Western capitals. Throughout Lahoud’s analysis, it is hard to escape the disconnect between this larger-than-life figure in Western analysis and security fears and the diminutive leader struggling to retain control of his organization and movement he spawned.
It is clear from UBL’s papers that after the invasion of Afghanistan, the United States failed to appreciate just how effective its military campaign was in degrading al-Qa’ida. Indeed, UBL was effectively disconnected from al-Qa’ida’s broader network until 2004, his main focus was on hiding and survival. Prior to and after 9/11, he was wholly committed to and trusted the Taliban leader, Mullah Omar, but was exceptionally leery of those that surrounded him, expecting them to put personal and political interests ahead of global jihad.
Even when he reconnected in 2004, UBL’s ambitions far surpassed his ability and that of al-Qa’ida. A consummate micro-manager, he wrote letters detailing planned spectacular attacks such as derailing a train (including how much track to remove and what hydraulic jacks would be best) or acquiring a private jet to use in an attack as commercial airlines were hardened after 9/11. Indeed, nearly all of the terrorist attacks after 9/11 were claimed after the fact as al-Qa’ida planned and executed despite often not being the case. Inspired by? Sure, but directed and organized, decidedly less so. Here again the disconnect appears: at the same time bin Laden was planning his next grand attack, his internal letters show a movement that struggled to pay its personnel and cutting back marriage subsidies and other expenditures to the bare minimum.
In his relations with other Islamist Jihadist movements, he comes across as a franchise manager struggling to control his brand while being outpaced by other, more ambitious, franchisees— as though a militant Chik-fil-A decided to open on Sundays to corner more of the market despite the founder’s guidance. His letters reflect his inability to control these groups, groups that seemed keener on using the al-Qa’ida name to raise their own profiles and advance their own agendas than following UBL’s direction.
For instance, Al-Qa’ida in the Arabian Peninsula unilaterally adopted the al-Qa’ida brand, while ignoring UBL’s calls to end attacks on local government. Were the organization not so horrific or vile, the fact that the Islamic State simply stopped responding to al-Qa’ida’s letters would almost be amusing. Similarly, al-Qa’ida was frustrated by its members’ unwillingness to conduct basic operational security in the face of the drone campaign. As the al-Qa’ida’s security committee wrote:
The enemy’s success is not due to their brilliance or modern superior technology, but rather, it has to do with the brothers repeatedly neglecting to comply with basic security measures that should be clear to everyone by now.
In hindsight, this disconnect should not be surprising. Al-Qa’ida after 9/11 was more myth than an effective operational organization— even if the West did not know it at the time nor appreciate how effective their campaign was. This is, of course, all gained through Lahoud’s research and subsequent disclosures, but clearly the al-Qa’ida brand became far more important than al-Qa’ida itself. Try as UBL might, his efforts to unite the Ummah never amounted to his grand expectations. He was unable to unite the Muslim populations against the far enemy (America) before turning on the near enemy (apostate Muslim regimes in the region). To be sure he united those who shared his worldview—to a degree—but never the mass mobilization he hoped to inspire.
The events of the Arab Spring bore this out more than anything. While as Lahoud shows bin Laden welcomed these developments, he was unable to shape them or influence them. They happened without and in spite of him and al-Qa’ida not because of them. Indeed, he and his family struggled to come up with a statement to respond to the “revolutions.”
This messaging crisis also vividly illustrated the extent to which bin Laden relied on the women in his family to help craft narratives and statements— a striking feature of UBL’s family life that was underappreciated. Here, too, Lahoud explores the role that UBL’s extended family, some of which were captive in Iran, played in his calculus and Tehran’s relationships with the Sunni terrorist group. Iran had hoped to use these family members as leverage over UBL to avoid attacks on Shiite targets in Iraq and elsewhere.
By 2005, it appears UBL was resident in Abbottabad, where he would stay in near constant hiding and seclusion until Operation Neptune Spear and his death. Named “pacer” by the CIA, he would walk around his compound, which was designed to be self-sufficient, burning the family’s trash and awaiting a future that never came. If nothing else, the UBL that comes through Lahoud’s research is one wholly dedicated to his mission and believing in his cause. There was no self-doubt even as the movement suffered under the weight of America’s drone campaign.
One suspects that there will be a steady, yet perhaps slowing, flow of books on al-Qa’ida and UBL in the years ahead. Just as books about the Second World War and both the Nazis and Adolf Hitler continue to appear with regularity, books on the Jihadist leader will likely continue to be published. While there are those that seek to entertain and those that seek to educate, providing a much more nuanced and insightful look at the events of the past—Lahoud’s “The Bin Laden Papers” is very much in this latter camp.
Lahoud’s book is an invaluable contribution to the study of UBL and al-Qa’ida. It was one of my 2022 books to look forward to, and I was not disappointed. Its rich exploration of the priceless primary source documents recovered by the SEALs offers much more nuance and complexity to an already complex and misunderstood figure and organization— the legacy of which we continue to live with to this day.
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The Legacy of al-Qa’ida and Usama bin Laden From His Own Papers
Image courtesy of the Publisher.
May 28, 2022
Nelly Lahoud's "The Bin Laden Papers" effectively demonstrates how much we still have to learn about Usama bin Laden (UBL). Among the surprises learned from UBL's own writings is UBL's diminished influence in al-Qa'ida post-9/11, being relegated to a franchise manager role, writes Joshua Huminski.
M
ay first marked the 11th anniversary of the successful Operation Neptune Spear, which saw U.S. Navy SEALs cross into Pakistan, flown by members of the Army’s elite 160 Night Stalkers, and kill Usama bin Laden (UBL). The anniversary likely passed with little, if any, notice by most. The death of the leader of al-Qa’ida may have brought some closure to the families and loved ones of those lost on 9/11, but the threat of radical Islamist Jihadist terrorism remains. The philosophical movement UBL crystalized into a global endeavor very much remains with us. While the threat is certainly much reduced, and Bin Laden is by no means the sole progenitor of the movement, his legacy lives on well beyond Abbottabad.
There remains much to learn about UBL and al-Qa’ida, a fact vividly illustrated in Nelly Lahoud’s “The Bin Laden Papers.” Thanks in no small part to the situational awareness of the Navy SEALs on-the-ground, and the forbearance of Admiral William McRaven—the commander of Neptune Spear—we have exceptional insights into the inner workings of al-Qa’ida and UBL’s worldview. The SEALs, seeing filing cabinets and computers, asked for additional time to conduct “sensitive site exploitation”—in effect grabbing as much useful intelligence and data as possible. Despite worries about remaining on site too long, McRaven granted them additional time— time that proved invaluable to our understanding of UBL and the group he co-founded.
Lahoud, previously an associate professor at West Point’s Combating Terrorism Center and now a senior fellow at New America’s International Security program, explores some 6,000 Arabic-language pages recovered from Abbottabad. The result is a gripping look at a starkly different UBL and al-Qa’ida.
The UBL that comes across in Lahoud’s pages is one that was outpaced and overcome by events. He singularly failed to anticipate the U.S. response to the 9/11 attacks. He expected America to retreat from the Middle East rather than double-down and invade Afghanistan. That miscalculation led to the effective destruction of al-Qa’ida and its inability to conduct attacks, despite the fears in Washington and other Western capitals. Throughout Lahoud’s analysis, it is hard to escape the disconnect between this larger-than-life figure in Western analysis and security fears and the diminutive leader struggling to retain control of his organization and movement he spawned.
It is clear from UBL’s papers that after the invasion of Afghanistan, the United States failed to appreciate just how effective its military campaign was in degrading al-Qa’ida. Indeed, UBL was effectively disconnected from al-Qa’ida’s broader network until 2004, his main focus was on hiding and survival. Prior to and after 9/11, he was wholly committed to and trusted the Taliban leader, Mullah Omar, but was exceptionally leery of those that surrounded him, expecting them to put personal and political interests ahead of global jihad.
Even when he reconnected in 2004, UBL’s ambitions far surpassed his ability and that of al-Qa’ida. A consummate micro-manager, he wrote letters detailing planned spectacular attacks such as derailing a train (including how much track to remove and what hydraulic jacks would be best) or acquiring a private jet to use in an attack as commercial airlines were hardened after 9/11. Indeed, nearly all of the terrorist attacks after 9/11 were claimed after the fact as al-Qa’ida planned and executed despite often not being the case. Inspired by? Sure, but directed and organized, decidedly less so. Here again the disconnect appears: at the same time bin Laden was planning his next grand attack, his internal letters show a movement that struggled to pay its personnel and cutting back marriage subsidies and other expenditures to the bare minimum.
In his relations with other Islamist Jihadist movements, he comes across as a franchise manager struggling to control his brand while being outpaced by other, more ambitious, franchisees— as though a militant Chik-fil-A decided to open on Sundays to corner more of the market despite the founder’s guidance. His letters reflect his inability to control these groups, groups that seemed keener on using the al-Qa’ida name to raise their own profiles and advance their own agendas than following UBL’s direction.
For instance, Al-Qa’ida in the Arabian Peninsula unilaterally adopted the al-Qa’ida brand, while ignoring UBL’s calls to end attacks on local government. Were the organization not so horrific or vile, the fact that the Islamic State simply stopped responding to al-Qa’ida’s letters would almost be amusing. Similarly, al-Qa’ida was frustrated by its members’ unwillingness to conduct basic operational security in the face of the drone campaign. As the al-Qa’ida’s security committee wrote:
The enemy’s success is not due to their brilliance or modern superior technology, but rather, it has to do with the brothers repeatedly neglecting to comply with basic security measures that should be clear to everyone by now.
In hindsight, this disconnect should not be surprising. Al-Qa’ida after 9/11 was more myth than an effective operational organization— even if the West did not know it at the time nor appreciate how effective their campaign was. This is, of course, all gained through Lahoud’s research and subsequent disclosures, but clearly the al-Qa’ida brand became far more important than al-Qa’ida itself. Try as UBL might, his efforts to unite the Ummah never amounted to his grand expectations. He was unable to unite the Muslim populations against the far enemy (America) before turning on the near enemy (apostate Muslim regimes in the region). To be sure he united those who shared his worldview—to a degree—but never the mass mobilization he hoped to inspire.
The events of the Arab Spring bore this out more than anything. While as Lahoud shows bin Laden welcomed these developments, he was unable to shape them or influence them. They happened without and in spite of him and al-Qa’ida not because of them. Indeed, he and his family struggled to come up with a statement to respond to the “revolutions.”
This messaging crisis also vividly illustrated the extent to which bin Laden relied on the women in his family to help craft narratives and statements— a striking feature of UBL’s family life that was underappreciated. Here, too, Lahoud explores the role that UBL’s extended family, some of which were captive in Iran, played in his calculus and Tehran’s relationships with the Sunni terrorist group. Iran had hoped to use these family members as leverage over UBL to avoid attacks on Shiite targets in Iraq and elsewhere.
By 2005, it appears UBL was resident in Abbottabad, where he would stay in near constant hiding and seclusion until Operation Neptune Spear and his death. Named “pacer” by the CIA, he would walk around his compound, which was designed to be self-sufficient, burning the family’s trash and awaiting a future that never came. If nothing else, the UBL that comes through Lahoud’s research is one wholly dedicated to his mission and believing in his cause. There was no self-doubt even as the movement suffered under the weight of America’s drone campaign.
One suspects that there will be a steady, yet perhaps slowing, flow of books on al-Qa’ida and UBL in the years ahead. Just as books about the Second World War and both the Nazis and Adolf Hitler continue to appear with regularity, books on the Jihadist leader will likely continue to be published. While there are those that seek to entertain and those that seek to educate, providing a much more nuanced and insightful look at the events of the past—Lahoud’s “The Bin Laden Papers” is very much in this latter camp.
Lahoud’s book is an invaluable contribution to the study of UBL and al-Qa’ida. It was one of my 2022 books to look forward to, and I was not disappointed. Its rich exploration of the priceless primary source documents recovered by the SEALs offers much more nuance and complexity to an already complex and misunderstood figure and organization— the legacy of which we continue to live with to this day.
