Unlike his predecessors, Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan has taken on a much more robust and aggressive foreign policy with the country's neighbors. From supporting the Arab Spring movement to spearheading negotiations over Iran's nuclear program and supporting the Syrian opposition in its uprising against the Assad regime, Ankara is attempting to mirror its rising economic influence in the realm of foreign policy. But what are the implications of such a dramatic shift away from the "Good Neighbor" policy that has served Turkey so well for decades?
Since Erdoğan has taken office, Turkish foreign policy has become decidedly less passive and noninterventionist. The Prime Minister lashed out at Israeli President Shimon Peres in 2009 over what he believed was excessive force used by the Israelis against the Palestinians; tensions continued to rise during the flotilla crisis the next year. More recently, Erdoğan referred to Zionism as a "crime against humanity" during a speech to the United Nations Alliance of Civilizations in Vienna.
With regards to Syria, what were once thawing relations between the two countries early in Erdoğan's term have frosted over considerably since the Syrian uprising, with rumors circulating that the Turks are supplying arms to the rebels. What is known for certain is that the Turkish government has set up camps for refugees and has offered humanitarian support as well.
Generally speaking Turkey has in recent years recalibrated its Middle East policy to reflect that of the United States. However, where they have differed recently is over Iran; Turkey has taken an active role in talks over Iran's nuclear program and has stressed the need for diplomacy, as opposed to the more bellicose calls emanating from Washington. Part of this use of soft power stems from the fact that Turkey has important trade ties with Iran and clearly would not want to jeopardize that through siding with the United States and the European Union.
The new foreign policy strategy stems from Erdoğan's desire for Turkey to become a larger influence in the region. For years Turkey has wanted to join the European Union despite strong opposition both at home and in certain corners of Europe. However, meddling in the affairs of its neighboring countries could have a negative impact, a consequence currently developing with regards to Turkey's actions in Syria.
Considering the secular nature of the Assad regime, religious and ethnic minorities such as the Kurds tended to side with the government since the state offered the best chance of protection from persecution by the Sunni majority. Anything that undermines the safety of Kurds does not sit well with the PKK, and in the past months there have been reports of PKK attacks in Turkey's southeast.
This poses a significant problem as PKK attacks had lessened in the past few years. Is destabilizing a neighboring country really in the interest of Turkey, especially if it reignites conflict with the Kurdish population? Or does the idea of Turkey establishing itself as a regional power override domestic security concerns? Erdoğan's popularity stemmed from the booming Turkish economy, which gave him the maneuverability to "reset" Turkish foreign policy. Polls suggest that Erdoğan's support of the Syrian uprising has eroded support for him and his Freedom and Justice Party (AKP), a significant worry with the next elections only a year away.
Tensions have risen even further between Syria and Turkey in light of Syrian rockets landing in Turkish territory and calls from Ankara asking Washington for Patriot missiles along its border with Syria. On February 1st, the Revolutionary People's Liberation Party–Front detonated a bomb outside the U.S. Embassy in Ankara, citing the Turkish government's support for the Syrian rebels as one of the reasons for the attack.
If Erdoğan wants the Presidency, as some suggest he does, going back to Turkey's neutral stance may be the best way to go from a political standpoint. It would also relieve tensions along the Turkey-Syria border, placate the PKK, and put the public's collective mind at ease. Additionally, any sort of internal or external insecurity will do the Turkish economy no favors, especially if it means strained trade relations with Iran, a key ally of Syria (and their lone friend in the region).
Abandoning the "Good Neighbor" policy that has seen Turkey well throughout its existence has had both positive and negative effects. It has caused Erdoğan's stock to rise in the West, and his diplomatic efforts regarding Iran should be lauded. However, its meddling in the Syrian uprising has revived tensions between Ankara and its Kurdish population when relations between the two looked to be normalizing. Foreign Minister Ahmet Davutoğlu's visit to Iraqi Kurdistan and its recognition of its regional government was seen as a major step forward in Turkish-Kurd relations.
The Erdoğan administration miscalculated by throwing its support behind the Free Syrian Army. It created a burgeoning refugee problem (current estimates put the number of refugees at 150,000 and rising) and rekindled PKK attacks in its southeast. Erdoğan seems to be hoping that the rebels will win and install a Turkish-style democracy in Syria, one that would be Sunni-dominated. All well and good for Turkey to have a like-minded government on its border, but if relations were improving under Assad, why take a chance and support the opposition?
The AKP now has a dilemma on its hands. Facing elections in 2014, the question remains whether Davutoğlu's and Erdoğan's foreign policy will see the AKP ousted from power, in spite of the economic gains the country has made under them. Public opinion shows that the majority of Turks are uneasy with the more interventionist policies. Nevertheless, Erdoğan should keep pushing for a diplomatic solution in Iran. A war between Iran, Israel, and possibly the United States would be disastrous for the region as a whole, in addition to the economic damage it would cause Turkey. On the other hand, in order to hedge his and his party's bets, it would be wise for Erdoğan to scale back and let the situation in Syria play itself out. The last thing Ankara needs is for the conflict to spill over into its territory.
Frank Lopapa is a freelance writer focused on Mediterranean politics. A graduate of the John C. Whitehead School of Diplomacy and International Relations, Frank possesses a Master of Arts in Diplomacy and International Relations, with specializations in International Security and Global Negotiation and Conflict Management. He also holds a BA in History from Seton Hall University. Frank is proficient in Italian, and has a basic understanding of Spanish and Turkish.
Photo: United Nations Alliance of Civilizations (cc).
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The Implications of Turkey's Foreign Policy "Reset"
April 12, 2013
Unlike his predecessors, Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan has taken on a much more robust and aggressive foreign policy with the country's neighbors. From supporting the Arab Spring movement to spearheading negotiations over Iran's nuclear program and supporting the Syrian opposition in its uprising against the Assad regime, Ankara is attempting to mirror its rising economic influence in the realm of foreign policy. But what are the implications of such a dramatic shift away from the "Good Neighbor" policy that has served Turkey so well for decades?
Since Erdoğan has taken office, Turkish foreign policy has become decidedly less passive and noninterventionist. The Prime Minister lashed out at Israeli President Shimon Peres in 2009 over what he believed was excessive force used by the Israelis against the Palestinians; tensions continued to rise during the flotilla crisis the next year. More recently, Erdoğan referred to Zionism as a "crime against humanity" during a speech to the United Nations Alliance of Civilizations in Vienna.
With regards to Syria, what were once thawing relations between the two countries early in Erdoğan's term have frosted over considerably since the Syrian uprising, with rumors circulating that the Turks are supplying arms to the rebels. What is known for certain is that the Turkish government has set up camps for refugees and has offered humanitarian support as well.
Generally speaking Turkey has in recent years recalibrated its Middle East policy to reflect that of the United States. However, where they have differed recently is over Iran; Turkey has taken an active role in talks over Iran's nuclear program and has stressed the need for diplomacy, as opposed to the more bellicose calls emanating from Washington. Part of this use of soft power stems from the fact that Turkey has important trade ties with Iran and clearly would not want to jeopardize that through siding with the United States and the European Union.
The new foreign policy strategy stems from Erdoğan's desire for Turkey to become a larger influence in the region. For years Turkey has wanted to join the European Union despite strong opposition both at home and in certain corners of Europe. However, meddling in the affairs of its neighboring countries could have a negative impact, a consequence currently developing with regards to Turkey's actions in Syria.
Considering the secular nature of the Assad regime, religious and ethnic minorities such as the Kurds tended to side with the government since the state offered the best chance of protection from persecution by the Sunni majority. Anything that undermines the safety of Kurds does not sit well with the PKK, and in the past months there have been reports of PKK attacks in Turkey's southeast.
This poses a significant problem as PKK attacks had lessened in the past few years. Is destabilizing a neighboring country really in the interest of Turkey, especially if it reignites conflict with the Kurdish population? Or does the idea of Turkey establishing itself as a regional power override domestic security concerns? Erdoğan's popularity stemmed from the booming Turkish economy, which gave him the maneuverability to "reset" Turkish foreign policy. Polls suggest that Erdoğan's support of the Syrian uprising has eroded support for him and his Freedom and Justice Party (AKP), a significant worry with the next elections only a year away.
Tensions have risen even further between Syria and Turkey in light of Syrian rockets landing in Turkish territory and calls from Ankara asking Washington for Patriot missiles along its border with Syria. On February 1st, the Revolutionary People's Liberation Party–Front detonated a bomb outside the U.S. Embassy in Ankara, citing the Turkish government's support for the Syrian rebels as one of the reasons for the attack.
If Erdoğan wants the Presidency, as some suggest he does, going back to Turkey's neutral stance may be the best way to go from a political standpoint. It would also relieve tensions along the Turkey-Syria border, placate the PKK, and put the public's collective mind at ease. Additionally, any sort of internal or external insecurity will do the Turkish economy no favors, especially if it means strained trade relations with Iran, a key ally of Syria (and their lone friend in the region).
Abandoning the "Good Neighbor" policy that has seen Turkey well throughout its existence has had both positive and negative effects. It has caused Erdoğan's stock to rise in the West, and his diplomatic efforts regarding Iran should be lauded. However, its meddling in the Syrian uprising has revived tensions between Ankara and its Kurdish population when relations between the two looked to be normalizing. Foreign Minister Ahmet Davutoğlu's visit to Iraqi Kurdistan and its recognition of its regional government was seen as a major step forward in Turkish-Kurd relations.
The Erdoğan administration miscalculated by throwing its support behind the Free Syrian Army. It created a burgeoning refugee problem (current estimates put the number of refugees at 150,000 and rising) and rekindled PKK attacks in its southeast. Erdoğan seems to be hoping that the rebels will win and install a Turkish-style democracy in Syria, one that would be Sunni-dominated. All well and good for Turkey to have a like-minded government on its border, but if relations were improving under Assad, why take a chance and support the opposition?
The AKP now has a dilemma on its hands. Facing elections in 2014, the question remains whether Davutoğlu's and Erdoğan's foreign policy will see the AKP ousted from power, in spite of the economic gains the country has made under them. Public opinion shows that the majority of Turks are uneasy with the more interventionist policies. Nevertheless, Erdoğan should keep pushing for a diplomatic solution in Iran. A war between Iran, Israel, and possibly the United States would be disastrous for the region as a whole, in addition to the economic damage it would cause Turkey. On the other hand, in order to hedge his and his party's bets, it would be wise for Erdoğan to scale back and let the situation in Syria play itself out. The last thing Ankara needs is for the conflict to spill over into its territory.
Frank Lopapa is a freelance writer focused on Mediterranean politics. A graduate of the John C. Whitehead School of Diplomacy and International Relations, Frank possesses a Master of Arts in Diplomacy and International Relations, with specializations in International Security and Global Negotiation and Conflict Management. He also holds a BA in History from Seton Hall University. Frank is proficient in Italian, and has a basic understanding of Spanish and Turkish.
Photo: United Nations Alliance of Civilizations (cc).
