Until November 1989 a “Wall of Shame” separated Eastern and Western societies. The mere sight of its watchtowers and barbed wire were enough to make anyone’s blood run cold. Then a little over 20 years ago an unstoppable crowd tore it to pieces in just a few weeks.
The Egyptians have just destroyed another type of ‘wall,’ that of fear and resignation. On every street corner the “Mukhabarat” (General Intelligence Service or “police state”) had put up a ‘wall’ which prevented many potential young protesters from rebelling and enjoying freedom of speech.
On February 10, Hosni Mubarak missed his last chance to leave with some semblance of dignity. In a speech that had an unbearable paternalistic tone, he proved that he had misunderstood Egyptians. The “danger of chaos” argument would not do the trick. In one speech, he demonstrated that he remained an autocrat crushing the future of disillusioned young people.
Ultimately Mubarak’s police regime could not deprive the Egyptian people of their human dignity or destroy their ability to organize. In just over two weeks, Egyptians have surmounted the ‘barriers’ erected against them by many Western pundits too: “Arab societies are incapable of internally driven reform,” “Islam and democracy are incompatible” (in 2006, Pope Benedict XVI declared that Islam cannot be reformed and is incompatible with democracy). For more than two weeks, Egyptians have had the courage to demand more democracy and transparency, even at the risk of their lives in hundreds of cases. They have at least obtained the right to be fully heard.
The Middle East region, in which Egypt plays a central role, continues to be a powder keg. What has happened in Cairo and other major Egyptian cities, especially the obstinate resistance of hundreds of thousands of protesters, testifies to the extent of the frustration, bitterness and grievances which have accumulated in that country and in a very large segment of the Arab world. In similar circumstances, Palestinians put to power the main Islamist movement in the Palestinian territories, Hamas, in free and democratic elections in 2006.
Egyptian demonstrators defied the dilatory reaction of many Western governments. A great number of Western leaders and officials doubt that democratization is possible in Muslim countries as Muslim political systems firmly safeguard elite interests. For the United States, Egypt is the cornerstone of its security strategy in the Middle East. Along with Saudi Arabia, Jordan, Morocco and the oil-rich states of the Persian Gulf, Egypt is part of the pro-Western alliance which counters Iran’s nuclear program and objectives in the Muslim world. U.S. and Egyptian interests coincide in the Middle East, with Egypt presenting a moderate voice in Arab councils. The Egyptian army is partially funded by U.S. grants, which amount to $1.5 billion annually. Americans educate and train Egyptian officers at American military colleges under the International Military and Education Training program. U.S. warships enter and sail through the Suez Canal without queuing.
Egypt signed a peace treaty with Israel in 1979 as a direct result of the Camp David Peace Accords. It has since faithfully sought to promote dialogue between Palestinians and Israelis. In the ‘Global War on Terror’ Egypt has assisted Washington by detaining Islamic terror suspects on its soil. Terror suspects can be subjected to ‘special treatment’ in the land of the Pharaohs, while U.S. law forbids the use of torture.
Until January 24, the day when the protests started, the Mubarak regime’s stability was taken for granted in Washington. The Egyptian Security Service was legally monitoring and harassing Egypt’s civil society. Some experts estimate that it has two million agents and informants at its disposal: one for each forty adult inhabitants. The National Democratic Party, at Mubarak’s beck and call, controlled more than 90 percent of the seats in parliament. There is no longer an effective and organized opposition in Egypt.
During the crisis, President Obama, despite his human rights rhetoric, prioritized cooperation with Egypt over other considerations, including the path towards democratization. America has gone so far as cutting half its funding for democracy assistance and training in Egypt, and has accepted that money can only be allocated to support organizations endorsed by the Egyptian authorities. In Washington’s eyes, the regime in Cairo had the prime function of ensuring the security of the Middle East and serving vested long-term U.S. interests.
Did the Obama Administration remain lethargic for too long in the midst of the dramatic and overwhelming events, which perhaps herald ‘the fourth global wave of democratization’?
The late political science professor Samuel Huntington, the man behind the most controversial book published in the last 20 years—The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order, 1996—had published five years earlier another interesting but now outdated book: The Third Wave: Democratization in the Late Twentieth Century. His analysis focused on the wave which culminated in the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989. The book investigates some 40 European, Latin American, South East and East Asian countries which had shifted from an authoritarian to a democratic government between 1974 and 1990. Huntington settled on the expression “wave” because the number of countries shifting from a non-democratic to a democratic regime was significantly greater than those doing the contrary during that period.
Sometime after the publication of his book, Huntington declared that the third wave of “global democratic revolution” was perhaps the most important event of the late twentieth century. The first wave, experienced by some 30 countries, began in the early nineteenth century and peaked at the end of World War I. The second, which involved approximately 36 countries, kicked off after the Second World War and reached its peak during the decolonization movement, subsiding in the early 1960s. The first two waves suffered setbacks, since democratization in some countries did not become entrenched and survive.
Samuel Huntington presented a list of subtle criteria which must be met before a nation becomes ripe for democracy. The bottom line is that only members of a country’s middle class are capable of conducting democratic uprisings. In a country like Egypt, where a small educated middle class dominates key social institutions and the streets are filled with a large uneducated underclass, the blossoming of democracy is impossible, according to Huntington. However, the regime change in Egypt and the popular call for more democracy has contradicted Huntington’s theory in that approximately half the Egyptian population lives on or below the poverty line of two dollars per day. Forty percent of Egypt’s 85 million people are under 30 years old and half of these are either unemployed, underemployed, or working far below their professional qualification level. Over half of Cairo’s population of 20 million people has no access to clean water.
Interestingly, Huntington insists that an additional factor is necessary for democratization to begin to roll, and in the light of what is happening in the Middle East this factor may now turn out to be just as important as economic prosperity. He calls it the “demonstration effect”—or what could be called the snowball effect.
TV channel Al-Jazeera has spread images of the crowded Tahrir Square around most of the Middle East. This inspired hundreds of thousands of people, from Tunis to Amman to Sana’a, to emulate their co-religionists, although the Egyptian movement was non-religious in essence. News streams may no longer be contained, despite strenuous attempts by various states’ security agencies and intelligence services. Information spreads faster today than at the time Huntington wrote. Blogs, Facebook and especially global broadcasters like Al-Jazeera have enhanced the “demonstration effect.” The Jasmine Revolution, which began in Tunisia with the suicide of a desperate young man, and the unfolding Egyptian rebellion offer new hope that not only digital information, but also peoples’ lives, will be freer in the 21st century.
Huntington, the great ‘neocon’ guru, made two important mistakes in his analysis of contemporary conflicts: First, a high level of poverty was given too much weight as an obstacle to democratization in his 1991 book; second, conflicts between civilizations with different cultural traditions will not inevitably be as antagonistic as he claimed in The Clash of Civilizations in 1996.
A process of democratization does not come without risk. Democratic developments in Eastern Europe have been marked by troubling setbacks. The most recent example is the rise of the openly anti-Semitic nationalist Jobbik Party, which clinched 47 seats in the Hungarian legislature in the second round of parliamentary elections in April 2010. In Belarus, Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan and Kazakhstan authoritarian leaders still abnormally reign over both the executive and legislature assemblies almost 20 years after these countries fought for, and gained, their independence. Furthermore, democratic elections do not always lead to greater personal freedom and peace between social groups, as the election of Hamas in the Palestinian territories has demonstrated. A similar scenario could unfold in Egypt if the Muslim Brotherhood grabs the lion’s share of the vote in the election, which must be soon scheduled.
However, setbacks to the possible fourth wave of democratization will not change the long term trend: more and more people on this planet long for freedom, dignity, and respect for their rights. Bottom-up rebellions in Egypt, Libya, and Tunisia—and hopefully some others in the too many petro-dictatorships in the Middle East—are a heartening sign that a fourth wave of democratization is in fact underway.
a global affairs media network
The Fourth Global Wave of Democratization
March 6, 2011
Until November 1989 a “Wall of Shame” separated Eastern and Western societies. The mere sight of its watchtowers and barbed wire were enough to make anyone’s blood run cold. Then a little over 20 years ago an unstoppable crowd tore it to pieces in just a few weeks.
The Egyptians have just destroyed another type of ‘wall,’ that of fear and resignation. On every street corner the “Mukhabarat” (General Intelligence Service or “police state”) had put up a ‘wall’ which prevented many potential young protesters from rebelling and enjoying freedom of speech.
On February 10, Hosni Mubarak missed his last chance to leave with some semblance of dignity. In a speech that had an unbearable paternalistic tone, he proved that he had misunderstood Egyptians. The “danger of chaos” argument would not do the trick. In one speech, he demonstrated that he remained an autocrat crushing the future of disillusioned young people.
Ultimately Mubarak’s police regime could not deprive the Egyptian people of their human dignity or destroy their ability to organize. In just over two weeks, Egyptians have surmounted the ‘barriers’ erected against them by many Western pundits too: “Arab societies are incapable of internally driven reform,” “Islam and democracy are incompatible” (in 2006, Pope Benedict XVI declared that Islam cannot be reformed and is incompatible with democracy). For more than two weeks, Egyptians have had the courage to demand more democracy and transparency, even at the risk of their lives in hundreds of cases. They have at least obtained the right to be fully heard.
The Middle East region, in which Egypt plays a central role, continues to be a powder keg. What has happened in Cairo and other major Egyptian cities, especially the obstinate resistance of hundreds of thousands of protesters, testifies to the extent of the frustration, bitterness and grievances which have accumulated in that country and in a very large segment of the Arab world. In similar circumstances, Palestinians put to power the main Islamist movement in the Palestinian territories, Hamas, in free and democratic elections in 2006.
Egyptian demonstrators defied the dilatory reaction of many Western governments. A great number of Western leaders and officials doubt that democratization is possible in Muslim countries as Muslim political systems firmly safeguard elite interests. For the United States, Egypt is the cornerstone of its security strategy in the Middle East. Along with Saudi Arabia, Jordan, Morocco and the oil-rich states of the Persian Gulf, Egypt is part of the pro-Western alliance which counters Iran’s nuclear program and objectives in the Muslim world. U.S. and Egyptian interests coincide in the Middle East, with Egypt presenting a moderate voice in Arab councils. The Egyptian army is partially funded by U.S. grants, which amount to $1.5 billion annually. Americans educate and train Egyptian officers at American military colleges under the International Military and Education Training program. U.S. warships enter and sail through the Suez Canal without queuing.
Egypt signed a peace treaty with Israel in 1979 as a direct result of the Camp David Peace Accords. It has since faithfully sought to promote dialogue between Palestinians and Israelis. In the ‘Global War on Terror’ Egypt has assisted Washington by detaining Islamic terror suspects on its soil. Terror suspects can be subjected to ‘special treatment’ in the land of the Pharaohs, while U.S. law forbids the use of torture.
Until January 24, the day when the protests started, the Mubarak regime’s stability was taken for granted in Washington. The Egyptian Security Service was legally monitoring and harassing Egypt’s civil society. Some experts estimate that it has two million agents and informants at its disposal: one for each forty adult inhabitants. The National Democratic Party, at Mubarak’s beck and call, controlled more than 90 percent of the seats in parliament. There is no longer an effective and organized opposition in Egypt.
During the crisis, President Obama, despite his human rights rhetoric, prioritized cooperation with Egypt over other considerations, including the path towards democratization. America has gone so far as cutting half its funding for democracy assistance and training in Egypt, and has accepted that money can only be allocated to support organizations endorsed by the Egyptian authorities. In Washington’s eyes, the regime in Cairo had the prime function of ensuring the security of the Middle East and serving vested long-term U.S. interests.
Did the Obama Administration remain lethargic for too long in the midst of the dramatic and overwhelming events, which perhaps herald ‘the fourth global wave of democratization’?
The late political science professor Samuel Huntington, the man behind the most controversial book published in the last 20 years—The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order, 1996—had published five years earlier another interesting but now outdated book: The Third Wave: Democratization in the Late Twentieth Century. His analysis focused on the wave which culminated in the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989. The book investigates some 40 European, Latin American, South East and East Asian countries which had shifted from an authoritarian to a democratic government between 1974 and 1990. Huntington settled on the expression “wave” because the number of countries shifting from a non-democratic to a democratic regime was significantly greater than those doing the contrary during that period.
Sometime after the publication of his book, Huntington declared that the third wave of “global democratic revolution” was perhaps the most important event of the late twentieth century. The first wave, experienced by some 30 countries, began in the early nineteenth century and peaked at the end of World War I. The second, which involved approximately 36 countries, kicked off after the Second World War and reached its peak during the decolonization movement, subsiding in the early 1960s. The first two waves suffered setbacks, since democratization in some countries did not become entrenched and survive.
Samuel Huntington presented a list of subtle criteria which must be met before a nation becomes ripe for democracy. The bottom line is that only members of a country’s middle class are capable of conducting democratic uprisings. In a country like Egypt, where a small educated middle class dominates key social institutions and the streets are filled with a large uneducated underclass, the blossoming of democracy is impossible, according to Huntington. However, the regime change in Egypt and the popular call for more democracy has contradicted Huntington’s theory in that approximately half the Egyptian population lives on or below the poverty line of two dollars per day. Forty percent of Egypt’s 85 million people are under 30 years old and half of these are either unemployed, underemployed, or working far below their professional qualification level. Over half of Cairo’s population of 20 million people has no access to clean water.
Interestingly, Huntington insists that an additional factor is necessary for democratization to begin to roll, and in the light of what is happening in the Middle East this factor may now turn out to be just as important as economic prosperity. He calls it the “demonstration effect”—or what could be called the snowball effect.
TV channel Al-Jazeera has spread images of the crowded Tahrir Square around most of the Middle East. This inspired hundreds of thousands of people, from Tunis to Amman to Sana’a, to emulate their co-religionists, although the Egyptian movement was non-religious in essence. News streams may no longer be contained, despite strenuous attempts by various states’ security agencies and intelligence services. Information spreads faster today than at the time Huntington wrote. Blogs, Facebook and especially global broadcasters like Al-Jazeera have enhanced the “demonstration effect.” The Jasmine Revolution, which began in Tunisia with the suicide of a desperate young man, and the unfolding Egyptian rebellion offer new hope that not only digital information, but also peoples’ lives, will be freer in the 21st century.
Huntington, the great ‘neocon’ guru, made two important mistakes in his analysis of contemporary conflicts: First, a high level of poverty was given too much weight as an obstacle to democratization in his 1991 book; second, conflicts between civilizations with different cultural traditions will not inevitably be as antagonistic as he claimed in The Clash of Civilizations in 1996.
A process of democratization does not come without risk. Democratic developments in Eastern Europe have been marked by troubling setbacks. The most recent example is the rise of the openly anti-Semitic nationalist Jobbik Party, which clinched 47 seats in the Hungarian legislature in the second round of parliamentary elections in April 2010. In Belarus, Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan and Kazakhstan authoritarian leaders still abnormally reign over both the executive and legislature assemblies almost 20 years after these countries fought for, and gained, their independence. Furthermore, democratic elections do not always lead to greater personal freedom and peace between social groups, as the election of Hamas in the Palestinian territories has demonstrated. A similar scenario could unfold in Egypt if the Muslim Brotherhood grabs the lion’s share of the vote in the election, which must be soon scheduled.
However, setbacks to the possible fourth wave of democratization will not change the long term trend: more and more people on this planet long for freedom, dignity, and respect for their rights. Bottom-up rebellions in Egypt, Libya, and Tunisia—and hopefully some others in the too many petro-dictatorships in the Middle East—are a heartening sign that a fourth wave of democratization is in fact underway.
