n unstable Tajikistan may be around the corner as the central Asian nation launches an anti-terrorist operation in its restive Gorno-Badakhshan Autonomous Oblast (GBAO). Fighting in the GBAO broke out in mid-May, following anti-government protests in Tajikistan’s eastern province bordering China and Kyrgyzstan. Although Gorno-Badakhshan covers more than 40% of Tajikistan, it is home to only 230,000 people—less than three percent of the country’s population. Most residents of the mountainous region are ethnic Pamiris.
Unlike Tajiks, who adhere to Sunni Islam, the Pamiris follow the Ismaili faith, an offshoot of Shia Islam. After clashes escalated, the Pamirs appealed to the United Nations, the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, the European Union, and the Organization for Security Co-operation in Europe with a request to pressure Dushanbe to “stop the repressions” in the GBAO. It is worth noting that they have not appealed to Russia, even though Tajikistan remains deeply in Moscow’s geopolitical orbit.
But why did the situation in Gorno-Badakhshan escalate? According to reports, on May 14, more than 1,000 people gathered in the region’s capital Khorog demanding the dismissal of the GBAO governor as well as the release of people detained during unrest in November 2021. Protests turned violent and, on May 18, Tajikistan’s authorities launched an anti-terrorist operation in the GBOA. Four days later, Mamadbokir Mamadbokirov, the informal leader of the Pamirs, was killed by the Tajik security forces—a move which could lead to further escalation in the region.
Although the Kremlin’s first reaction to the events in Gorno-Badakhshan was rather limited—with the Russian Foreign Ministry expressing concerns over the escalation—there are indications that Moscow is deeply concerned about the overall situation in Tajikistan. The central Asian country hosts an estimated 7,000 Russian troops and is a member of the Russia-dominated Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO).
Russian forces have long secured Tajikistan’s southern border with Afghanistan. Still, on May 7, the Islamic State-Khorasan (IS-K) group reportedly fired rockets from Afghanistan into Tajikistan. Given that Tajik President Emomali Rahmon and his government continue their strong opposition to Taliban rule in Afghanistan, there are fears in Russia that such a policy could lead to destabilization of Moscow’s ally.
“Our task is to make it clear to Dushanbe that we do not intend to support the Afghan Tajiks, whose leaders are clients of London and Washington,” said Mikhail Aleksandrov, a leading expert at the Moscow State Institute of International Relations.
Some Russian analysts believe that the Tajik leadership’s actions in the GBOA could lead to an escalation of the conflict—and to potential Afghan and CSTO involvement in the Gorno-Badakhshan crisis. According to Andrei Grozin, head of the department of Central Asia and Kazakhstan at the Institute of CIS Countries, if Russia remains passive and does not intervene, the territory of Gorno-Badakhshan could eventually become a conflict zone that could spread to the rest of Tajikistan and to parts of Afghanistan. Russian analyst Alexander Knyazev also claims that Dushanbe’s approach regarding the GBOA could lead to the internationalization of this conflict.
“If that happens, Emomali Rahmon will appeal to both the CSTO and Russia for help,” Knyazev stressed.
Gorno-Badakhshan was the center of the brutal Tajik civil war of 1992-1997, which is when the region declared secession from Tajikistan. During the conflict, Russia supported Rahmon and peace was achieved by granting greater autonomy to the GBAO. It is, however, rather debatable whether the recent clashes in the region were motivated by existing ethnic and religious divisions or by economic welfare. Indeed, Gorno-Badakhshan’s economy is wracked by unemployment, difficult living conditions, and rising food prices. However, the economic situation in the rest of the country also continues to deteriorate.
In 2021, Tajikistan’s public debt amounted to $3.7 billion, or 44.9% of the Tajik GDP. The Central Asian nation is heavily dependent on remittances from Russia, where some 1.5 million Tajik migrants live and work—many of whom have Russian citizenship. However, if the Russian economy does not manage to withstand Western sanctions imposed for the Ukrainian invasion, many Tajiks will likely have to return home. This will create an additional burden for the national budget.
Given Russian preoccupation with Ukraine, Moscow does not seem interested in intervening in the Central Asian country. Even during the recent border conflict between Tajikistan and neighboring Kyrgyzstan—another CSTO member—the Kremlin stood aside. Turkey saw these border incidents as an opportunity to increase its influence in the region. Ankara sold Bayraktar drones to Bishkek and some reports suggest that Dushanbe also purchased Turkish-made unmanned aerial vehicles.
Besides Turkey, other actors also aim to benefit from Russia’s isolation in the global arena to strengthen their positions in Central Asia. Rahmonov’s recent visit to Tehran suggests that Iran may aim to improve relations with Tajikistan. The Islamic Republic has already opened a drone factory in Dushanbe, and some Tajik experts think that Tehran is interested in selling weapons to its Persian-speaking neighbor. For the foreseeable future, regional and global actors are expected to continue competing for influence in Tajikistan. The Tajik conflict in Gorno-Badakhshan and the Russian invasion of Ukraine may provide the window they are looking for.
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Tajikistan Teeters on the Brink
Tajikistan. Photo by EJ Wolfson via Unsplash.
June 8, 2022
Tajikistan is in trouble as it faces economic hardship and launches anti-terrorist operations within its borders. With Russia preoccupied with Ukraine, other actors may seek to gain influence in the country, writes Nikola Mikovic.
A
n unstable Tajikistan may be around the corner as the central Asian nation launches an anti-terrorist operation in its restive Gorno-Badakhshan Autonomous Oblast (GBAO). Fighting in the GBAO broke out in mid-May, following anti-government protests in Tajikistan’s eastern province bordering China and Kyrgyzstan. Although Gorno-Badakhshan covers more than 40% of Tajikistan, it is home to only 230,000 people—less than three percent of the country’s population. Most residents of the mountainous region are ethnic Pamiris.
Unlike Tajiks, who adhere to Sunni Islam, the Pamiris follow the Ismaili faith, an offshoot of Shia Islam. After clashes escalated, the Pamirs appealed to the United Nations, the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, the European Union, and the Organization for Security Co-operation in Europe with a request to pressure Dushanbe to “stop the repressions” in the GBAO. It is worth noting that they have not appealed to Russia, even though Tajikistan remains deeply in Moscow’s geopolitical orbit.
But why did the situation in Gorno-Badakhshan escalate? According to reports, on May 14, more than 1,000 people gathered in the region’s capital Khorog demanding the dismissal of the GBAO governor as well as the release of people detained during unrest in November 2021. Protests turned violent and, on May 18, Tajikistan’s authorities launched an anti-terrorist operation in the GBOA. Four days later, Mamadbokir Mamadbokirov, the informal leader of the Pamirs, was killed by the Tajik security forces—a move which could lead to further escalation in the region.
Although the Kremlin’s first reaction to the events in Gorno-Badakhshan was rather limited—with the Russian Foreign Ministry expressing concerns over the escalation—there are indications that Moscow is deeply concerned about the overall situation in Tajikistan. The central Asian country hosts an estimated 7,000 Russian troops and is a member of the Russia-dominated Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO).
Russian forces have long secured Tajikistan’s southern border with Afghanistan. Still, on May 7, the Islamic State-Khorasan (IS-K) group reportedly fired rockets from Afghanistan into Tajikistan. Given that Tajik President Emomali Rahmon and his government continue their strong opposition to Taliban rule in Afghanistan, there are fears in Russia that such a policy could lead to destabilization of Moscow’s ally.
“Our task is to make it clear to Dushanbe that we do not intend to support the Afghan Tajiks, whose leaders are clients of London and Washington,” said Mikhail Aleksandrov, a leading expert at the Moscow State Institute of International Relations.
Some Russian analysts believe that the Tajik leadership’s actions in the GBOA could lead to an escalation of the conflict—and to potential Afghan and CSTO involvement in the Gorno-Badakhshan crisis. According to Andrei Grozin, head of the department of Central Asia and Kazakhstan at the Institute of CIS Countries, if Russia remains passive and does not intervene, the territory of Gorno-Badakhshan could eventually become a conflict zone that could spread to the rest of Tajikistan and to parts of Afghanistan. Russian analyst Alexander Knyazev also claims that Dushanbe’s approach regarding the GBOA could lead to the internationalization of this conflict.
“If that happens, Emomali Rahmon will appeal to both the CSTO and Russia for help,” Knyazev stressed.
Gorno-Badakhshan was the center of the brutal Tajik civil war of 1992-1997, which is when the region declared secession from Tajikistan. During the conflict, Russia supported Rahmon and peace was achieved by granting greater autonomy to the GBAO. It is, however, rather debatable whether the recent clashes in the region were motivated by existing ethnic and religious divisions or by economic welfare. Indeed, Gorno-Badakhshan’s economy is wracked by unemployment, difficult living conditions, and rising food prices. However, the economic situation in the rest of the country also continues to deteriorate.
In 2021, Tajikistan’s public debt amounted to $3.7 billion, or 44.9% of the Tajik GDP. The Central Asian nation is heavily dependent on remittances from Russia, where some 1.5 million Tajik migrants live and work—many of whom have Russian citizenship. However, if the Russian economy does not manage to withstand Western sanctions imposed for the Ukrainian invasion, many Tajiks will likely have to return home. This will create an additional burden for the national budget.
Given Russian preoccupation with Ukraine, Moscow does not seem interested in intervening in the Central Asian country. Even during the recent border conflict between Tajikistan and neighboring Kyrgyzstan—another CSTO member—the Kremlin stood aside. Turkey saw these border incidents as an opportunity to increase its influence in the region. Ankara sold Bayraktar drones to Bishkek and some reports suggest that Dushanbe also purchased Turkish-made unmanned aerial vehicles.
Besides Turkey, other actors also aim to benefit from Russia’s isolation in the global arena to strengthen their positions in Central Asia. Rahmonov’s recent visit to Tehran suggests that Iran may aim to improve relations with Tajikistan. The Islamic Republic has already opened a drone factory in Dushanbe, and some Tajik experts think that Tehran is interested in selling weapons to its Persian-speaking neighbor. For the foreseeable future, regional and global actors are expected to continue competing for influence in Tajikistan. The Tajik conflict in Gorno-Badakhshan and the Russian invasion of Ukraine may provide the window they are looking for.
