ajikistan is Russia’s relatively loyal, and possibly most important, ally in Central Asia. Bogged down in Ukraine and abandoned by most former Soviet republics that were once in its geopolitical orbit, Moscow can unlikely afford to lose its influence in Dushanbe. But will the Crocus City Hall terror attack, where major suspects are Tajik nationals, have an impact on relations between the two countries?
Following the tragic event that took place in Moscow on 22 March 2024, Russian officials were quick to accuse the West and Ukraine for the concert hall massacre. Even though four suspected gunmen, as well as several other people allegedly involved in the crime, are Tajik citizens, the Kremlin did not even summon the Tajik ambassador to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.
But the anti–Tajik sentiment in Russia became very strong. Also, certain factions within the Russian ruling elite seem to have launched a campaign against migrants from Central Asia. Tajiks are among the most numerous foreign workers in Russia. According to the official statistics, in the first six months of 2023, almost one million Tajik labor migrants moved to the Russian Federation.
But in spite of tense relations between the Tajik diaspora and Russian society that came as a result of the Crocus City Hall attack, political relations between Moscow and Dushanbe remain friendly. At least on the surface.
Two days after the terror attack that killed at least 144 people, Tajikistan President Emomali Rahmon spoke with his Russian counterpart, Vladimir Putin, emphasizing that “terrorists have no nationality, no homeland, and no religion.” Such a statement likely represents his attempt to distance Tajikistan—a Muslim majority nation of around 10 million people—from the crime for which the Islamic State–Khorasan Province (also known as ISIS–K) claimed responsibility.
Aiming to show that they have nothing to do with the terror attack, the authorities in Dushanbe began arresting people for suspected contacts with the perpetrators of the massacre. Tajikistan also continued demonstrating its loyalty to the Kremlin by allowing Russian investigators to question families of the Moscow attack suspects. The Central Asian nation even agreed to sign an agreement with Moscow on training of specialists in the field of preventing extremism among youth.
Tajik authorities insist that they have been making significant efforts to counter terrorism, as well as religious extremism. The U.S. Department of State, however, argues that Tajikistan restricts freedom of religion, while the Tajik exiled opposition claims that Dushanbe’s attempts to suppress Islam help ISIS–K to recruit new fighters in the former Soviet republic.
Moscow remains worried about the growing presence of the Islamic terrorists in Tajikistan, a home of the Russian 201st military base, which is the largest military facility of Russia located beyond its borders. But the Kremlin seems to pay much more attention to Ukraine’s alleged ambitions to recruit mercenaries in the landlocked nation. However, Russia is reportedly doing the same thing.
Reports suggest Russian authorities pressure Tajiks, as well as other Central Asian migrant workers living in Russia, to sign contracts with the country’s Defense Ministry amid Moscow's efforts to bolster its troops in Ukraine. Russia’s Lawmaker Mikhail Matveyev even called for Central Asians who have recently been granted Russian citizenship to be drafted instead of ethnic Russians.
"Where are the Tajik battalions? There is a war going on, Russia needs soldiers. Welcome to our citizenship," he said in a post on Telegram.
Quite aware that the Tajik migrants in Russia might be forcefully mobilized, and that certain factions within the Kremlin have taken an anti–Tajik and anti–migrant stance, the Ministry of Labor of Tajikistan said a rising number of Tajik migrant workers wish to leave the Russian Federation out of fear for their safety. Their potential return home—to the poorest country in Central Asia—could have an impact on the radicalization of Tajik society.
In order to avoid such an outcome, Dushanbe does not seem to have much choice but to seek to preserve good ties with the Kremlin. Russia, on the other hand, faces significant labor shortages, which means that the Kremlin cannot continue pursuing its current anti–migrant policy for too long. More importantly, Russia remains isolated by the West, and continues losing its influence in the former Soviet space, from Armenia to Kazakhstan. Thus, jeopardizing relations with Tajikistan is the last thing Moscow needs at the moment.
There are, however, indications that Dushanbe aims to benefit from the Russian preoccupation with the war in Ukraine, and strengthens its positions vis–à–vis the Kremlin. In October 2022, Rahmon openly told Putin that he was not satisfied with the way Russia treats Tajikistan and other Central Asian states. Most recently, Alexander Dyukov, a member of the Commission of the Presidential Council of the Russian Federation on Interethnic Relations, complained that Russian–Tajik schools in Tajikistan teach the history of “Russian occupation” of the former Soviet republic.
“There is absolutely no doubt that, after listening to stories about Russian occupation and colonialism, graduates will integrate perfectly into Russian society,” Dyukov sarcastically said.
If his claims that Russia, rather than Tajikistan, is funding those schools are true, Moscow will undoubtedly have a hard time winning hearts and minds of the Tajik people. As a result, in the long–term, the Kremlin might begin to lose influence in the strategically important Central Asian nation.
a global affairs media network
Tajikistan and the Moscow terror attack fallout
Crocos City Hall, site of the March 2024 terror attack in Moscow. Image licensed under Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 License, image author Mosreg.ru.
April 15, 2024
Tajikistan is among Russia’s most important allies in Central Asia and has been relatively loyal. Yet the Moscow terror attack could strain relations, writes Nikola Mikovic.
T
ajikistan is Russia’s relatively loyal, and possibly most important, ally in Central Asia. Bogged down in Ukraine and abandoned by most former Soviet republics that were once in its geopolitical orbit, Moscow can unlikely afford to lose its influence in Dushanbe. But will the Crocus City Hall terror attack, where major suspects are Tajik nationals, have an impact on relations between the two countries?
Following the tragic event that took place in Moscow on 22 March 2024, Russian officials were quick to accuse the West and Ukraine for the concert hall massacre. Even though four suspected gunmen, as well as several other people allegedly involved in the crime, are Tajik citizens, the Kremlin did not even summon the Tajik ambassador to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.
But the anti–Tajik sentiment in Russia became very strong. Also, certain factions within the Russian ruling elite seem to have launched a campaign against migrants from Central Asia. Tajiks are among the most numerous foreign workers in Russia. According to the official statistics, in the first six months of 2023, almost one million Tajik labor migrants moved to the Russian Federation.
But in spite of tense relations between the Tajik diaspora and Russian society that came as a result of the Crocus City Hall attack, political relations between Moscow and Dushanbe remain friendly. At least on the surface.
Two days after the terror attack that killed at least 144 people, Tajikistan President Emomali Rahmon spoke with his Russian counterpart, Vladimir Putin, emphasizing that “terrorists have no nationality, no homeland, and no religion.” Such a statement likely represents his attempt to distance Tajikistan—a Muslim majority nation of around 10 million people—from the crime for which the Islamic State–Khorasan Province (also known as ISIS–K) claimed responsibility.
Aiming to show that they have nothing to do with the terror attack, the authorities in Dushanbe began arresting people for suspected contacts with the perpetrators of the massacre. Tajikistan also continued demonstrating its loyalty to the Kremlin by allowing Russian investigators to question families of the Moscow attack suspects. The Central Asian nation even agreed to sign an agreement with Moscow on training of specialists in the field of preventing extremism among youth.
Tajik authorities insist that they have been making significant efforts to counter terrorism, as well as religious extremism. The U.S. Department of State, however, argues that Tajikistan restricts freedom of religion, while the Tajik exiled opposition claims that Dushanbe’s attempts to suppress Islam help ISIS–K to recruit new fighters in the former Soviet republic.
Moscow remains worried about the growing presence of the Islamic terrorists in Tajikistan, a home of the Russian 201st military base, which is the largest military facility of Russia located beyond its borders. But the Kremlin seems to pay much more attention to Ukraine’s alleged ambitions to recruit mercenaries in the landlocked nation. However, Russia is reportedly doing the same thing.
Reports suggest Russian authorities pressure Tajiks, as well as other Central Asian migrant workers living in Russia, to sign contracts with the country’s Defense Ministry amid Moscow's efforts to bolster its troops in Ukraine. Russia’s Lawmaker Mikhail Matveyev even called for Central Asians who have recently been granted Russian citizenship to be drafted instead of ethnic Russians.
"Where are the Tajik battalions? There is a war going on, Russia needs soldiers. Welcome to our citizenship," he said in a post on Telegram.
Quite aware that the Tajik migrants in Russia might be forcefully mobilized, and that certain factions within the Kremlin have taken an anti–Tajik and anti–migrant stance, the Ministry of Labor of Tajikistan said a rising number of Tajik migrant workers wish to leave the Russian Federation out of fear for their safety. Their potential return home—to the poorest country in Central Asia—could have an impact on the radicalization of Tajik society.
In order to avoid such an outcome, Dushanbe does not seem to have much choice but to seek to preserve good ties with the Kremlin. Russia, on the other hand, faces significant labor shortages, which means that the Kremlin cannot continue pursuing its current anti–migrant policy for too long. More importantly, Russia remains isolated by the West, and continues losing its influence in the former Soviet space, from Armenia to Kazakhstan. Thus, jeopardizing relations with Tajikistan is the last thing Moscow needs at the moment.
There are, however, indications that Dushanbe aims to benefit from the Russian preoccupation with the war in Ukraine, and strengthens its positions vis–à–vis the Kremlin. In October 2022, Rahmon openly told Putin that he was not satisfied with the way Russia treats Tajikistan and other Central Asian states. Most recently, Alexander Dyukov, a member of the Commission of the Presidential Council of the Russian Federation on Interethnic Relations, complained that Russian–Tajik schools in Tajikistan teach the history of “Russian occupation” of the former Soviet republic.
“There is absolutely no doubt that, after listening to stories about Russian occupation and colonialism, graduates will integrate perfectly into Russian society,” Dyukov sarcastically said.
If his claims that Russia, rather than Tajikistan, is funding those schools are true, Moscow will undoubtedly have a hard time winning hearts and minds of the Tajik people. As a result, in the long–term, the Kremlin might begin to lose influence in the strategically important Central Asian nation.
