ussia might be losing its influence in the post–Soviet space, but its presence in Tajikistan remains relatively strong. Unlike most other former Soviet republics in Central Asia, the landlocked nation of around 10 million people has still not fully developed a “multi–vector” foreign policy model. But there are signs indicating that Dushanbe aims to improve ties with the West, a striking move by a Russian ally, one that has drawn the attention of China.
Russia has long been a regional partner for Central Asian states in economy, energy, and security. In Tajikistan, Moscow’s economic, military, and political influence is still undebatable. Russia is the mountainous country’s major trade partner, while the Tajik economy remains heavily dependent on remittances coming from Tajik labor migrants living in Russia.
More importantly, Tajikistan is Russia’s ally in the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO), and hosts the Russian 201st Military Base with around 7,000 troops. But that did not prevent Dushanbe from attempting to flirt with the United States, at least when it comes to military matters.
Following joint Russian–Tajik anti–terrorism exercises in Tajikistan’s Khatlon region that began on 15 April 2024, later that month Virginia National Guard Soldiers conducted a mountain warfare exchange with Tajik military forces. There was no public reaction from the Kremlin.
Under the current geopolitical circumstances, and especially given the ongoing war in Ukraine, it is hard to imagine Russia holding military drills with any NATO country. Thus, it remains unclear why Moscow did not prevent its ally from developing cooperation with the U.S. military.
More importantly, on 10–13 June 2024, Tajikistan hosted the high–level Dushanbe Water Process organized jointly by the United Nations Development Program (UNDP) in cooperation with the European Union and the Tajik Ministry of Energy and Water Resources. The forum was a collaborative effort driven by the Climate Change and Resilience in Central Asia project funded by the European Union. It is therefore no surprise that Terhi Hakala, European Union Special Representative for Central Asia, was one of the major guests at the conference.
Despite Dushanbe’s close ties with Russia, no Russian representative was among major speakers at the forum in the Tajik capital. On the other hand, a moderator and a member of the organization committee was the State Department official Julien Katchinoff, while Diplomatic Courier was the only Western media covering the conference.
Still, one side event was organized by the Ministry of Natural Resources and Environment of the Russian Federation, while the Russian Embassy to Tajikistan actively participated in the Water and Glacier Festival—also part of the main forum where Russian was one of the official languages. These details clearly demonstrate that Tajikistan, despite its attempts to develop closer ties with the United States and the European Union, still sees itself as Moscow’s loyal ally and a very important partner in Central Asia.
Although the recent terrorist attack at the Crocus City Hall in Moscow, allegedly conducted by Tajik citizens, had an impact on diplomatic relations between Russia and Tajikistan, the Central Asian nation still remains firmly in the Kremlin’s geopolitical orbit. At this point, Dushanbe does not seem to be in a position to pressure Russia to close its military base in Tajikistan, which is what some Western pundits argue, as such a move could have a serious impact on Tajik national security.
Given tense and complicated relations between Tajikistan and the neighboring Taliban–ruled Afghanistan, Dushanbe can hardly allow itself to cut military ties with Moscow and the Russian–led CSTO. The former Soviet republic counts on Russian protection in the event of a potential Taliban incursion. At the same time, even if Dushanbe does not recognize the radical group as a legitimate authority in Afghanistan, it will likely seek to establish closer energy cooperation with the neighboring state.
“I reiterate my country's readiness to further strengthen regional cooperation in Central Asia and to solve the pressing water issues through a constructive dialogue,” Tajikistan’s President Emomali Rahmon said at the Dushanbe Water Process on 11 June 2024.
Given that Tajikistan, as well as other Central Asian states, fears that the Taliban–led construction of the Qosh Tepa canal will divert significant amount of water from the Amu Darya—a transboundary river that Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, and Turkmenistan heavily depend on—Rahmon’s statement suggests that he seeks to find a common ground with Afghanistan’s de facto rulers.
In perspective, Tajikistan hopes to develop its water sector, turn the country into a green economy, and significantly increase its electricity exports to Afghanistan, and also to neighboring Central Asian nations. The EU’s active presence at the conference in Dushanbe signals that Brussels supports such an approach.
But the EU’s influence in the country is rather limited. In the long–term, it is China, rather than the West, that will likely have the capacity to effectively crowd Russia out of Tajikistan. Unlike the EU, which remains focused on the implementation of the green agenda in Tajikistan, Beijing uses loans to gain political influence in the former Soviet republic.
Finally, the fact that China, rather than Russia or the West, is building the government complex in Dushanbe, clearly shows that Tajikistan might easily end up in the Chinese zone of influence.
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As Russian ally Tajikistan flirts with the West, China watches
Gissar, Tajikistan. Photo by Etienne Dayer on Unsplash
June 20, 2024
The EU and U.S. have been actively courting long–time Russian ally Tajikistan, with some apparent success. Yet in the longer term, China is more likely to crowd out Russia from Tajikistan than is the West, writes Nikola Mikovic.
R
ussia might be losing its influence in the post–Soviet space, but its presence in Tajikistan remains relatively strong. Unlike most other former Soviet republics in Central Asia, the landlocked nation of around 10 million people has still not fully developed a “multi–vector” foreign policy model. But there are signs indicating that Dushanbe aims to improve ties with the West, a striking move by a Russian ally, one that has drawn the attention of China.
Russia has long been a regional partner for Central Asian states in economy, energy, and security. In Tajikistan, Moscow’s economic, military, and political influence is still undebatable. Russia is the mountainous country’s major trade partner, while the Tajik economy remains heavily dependent on remittances coming from Tajik labor migrants living in Russia.
More importantly, Tajikistan is Russia’s ally in the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO), and hosts the Russian 201st Military Base with around 7,000 troops. But that did not prevent Dushanbe from attempting to flirt with the United States, at least when it comes to military matters.
Following joint Russian–Tajik anti–terrorism exercises in Tajikistan’s Khatlon region that began on 15 April 2024, later that month Virginia National Guard Soldiers conducted a mountain warfare exchange with Tajik military forces. There was no public reaction from the Kremlin.
Under the current geopolitical circumstances, and especially given the ongoing war in Ukraine, it is hard to imagine Russia holding military drills with any NATO country. Thus, it remains unclear why Moscow did not prevent its ally from developing cooperation with the U.S. military.
More importantly, on 10–13 June 2024, Tajikistan hosted the high–level Dushanbe Water Process organized jointly by the United Nations Development Program (UNDP) in cooperation with the European Union and the Tajik Ministry of Energy and Water Resources. The forum was a collaborative effort driven by the Climate Change and Resilience in Central Asia project funded by the European Union. It is therefore no surprise that Terhi Hakala, European Union Special Representative for Central Asia, was one of the major guests at the conference.
Despite Dushanbe’s close ties with Russia, no Russian representative was among major speakers at the forum in the Tajik capital. On the other hand, a moderator and a member of the organization committee was the State Department official Julien Katchinoff, while Diplomatic Courier was the only Western media covering the conference.
Still, one side event was organized by the Ministry of Natural Resources and Environment of the Russian Federation, while the Russian Embassy to Tajikistan actively participated in the Water and Glacier Festival—also part of the main forum where Russian was one of the official languages. These details clearly demonstrate that Tajikistan, despite its attempts to develop closer ties with the United States and the European Union, still sees itself as Moscow’s loyal ally and a very important partner in Central Asia.
Although the recent terrorist attack at the Crocus City Hall in Moscow, allegedly conducted by Tajik citizens, had an impact on diplomatic relations between Russia and Tajikistan, the Central Asian nation still remains firmly in the Kremlin’s geopolitical orbit. At this point, Dushanbe does not seem to be in a position to pressure Russia to close its military base in Tajikistan, which is what some Western pundits argue, as such a move could have a serious impact on Tajik national security.
Given tense and complicated relations between Tajikistan and the neighboring Taliban–ruled Afghanistan, Dushanbe can hardly allow itself to cut military ties with Moscow and the Russian–led CSTO. The former Soviet republic counts on Russian protection in the event of a potential Taliban incursion. At the same time, even if Dushanbe does not recognize the radical group as a legitimate authority in Afghanistan, it will likely seek to establish closer energy cooperation with the neighboring state.
“I reiterate my country's readiness to further strengthen regional cooperation in Central Asia and to solve the pressing water issues through a constructive dialogue,” Tajikistan’s President Emomali Rahmon said at the Dushanbe Water Process on 11 June 2024.
Given that Tajikistan, as well as other Central Asian states, fears that the Taliban–led construction of the Qosh Tepa canal will divert significant amount of water from the Amu Darya—a transboundary river that Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, and Turkmenistan heavily depend on—Rahmon’s statement suggests that he seeks to find a common ground with Afghanistan’s de facto rulers.
In perspective, Tajikistan hopes to develop its water sector, turn the country into a green economy, and significantly increase its electricity exports to Afghanistan, and also to neighboring Central Asian nations. The EU’s active presence at the conference in Dushanbe signals that Brussels supports such an approach.
But the EU’s influence in the country is rather limited. In the long–term, it is China, rather than the West, that will likely have the capacity to effectively crowd Russia out of Tajikistan. Unlike the EU, which remains focused on the implementation of the green agenda in Tajikistan, Beijing uses loans to gain political influence in the former Soviet republic.
Finally, the fact that China, rather than Russia or the West, is building the government complex in Dushanbe, clearly shows that Tajikistan might easily end up in the Chinese zone of influence.
